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MEMOIRS

OF

FIELD-MARSHAL

THE DUKE DE SALDANHA.



Joseph Brown sc.

Saldanha

JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE ST.

MEMOIRS

OF

FIELD-MARSHAL

THE DUKE DE SALDANHA

WITH

SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE.

BY THE CONDE DA CARNOTA,

AUTHOR OF THE "MARQUIS OF POMBAL."

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

23050

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1880.

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LONDON:
BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO., PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.

PREFACE.

In presenting this Biography to the public, the author is conscious that he owes many apologies to those who may become his readers. His apologies are, indeed, due, not for the subject, but for its authorship. He feels that the history of the Duke de Saldanha ought to interest not only the Marshal's countrymen, but also the English reader. It is impossible but that many of those who lived for years in social intercourse with Saldanha, will welcome some account of his life; while, it is hoped, they will be led by their recollection of that intercourse to accept this Memoir with indulgence. Others there may be who may feel interested to know more of the life of that General and Statesman, whom they have seen bearing so many of those decorations—testimonials to his high character—which recorded the progressive stages of his meritorious career, from the simple but treasured memorials of his gallantry at Busaco, to the last Grand Cross conferred upon him by His Holiness, Pope Pius the Ninth.

But a biography of Marshal Saldanha might well have tested the ability of a far abler pen than the author's; and he desires most respectfully to explain how it comes to pass that he has assumed a task, which he is conscious he could only imperfectly perform. First, then, that task devolved upon him as a duty. It was the often-expressed wish of Saldanha, while living, that the author should record, and should prepare for publication, the

leading features of his career. Many valuable documents were entrusted to the author's care at various epochs; and the Marshal anticipated, by the power he bequeathed to his widow respecting his remaining papers, that his brother-in-law would be the individual selected for their examination and disposal. Secondly; he confesses that not only the memories of his early friendship, but an honoured family connection of later years with the good Duke, have animated his desire, and prompted his ambition, to awaken recollections of Saldanha, as he already attempted to awaken those of Saldanha's grandfather—the great Pombal. And the author will, at least, have not written altogether in vain, if, by this Memoir, he may correct some erroneous accounts, which have been printed and circulated, injurious to the fair fame of one of the bravest, most honourable, and purest of men. Thirdly; if a personal acquaintance with his subject may be pleaded by any author as an excuse for his work, the apology is amply available upon this occasion. During a friendship which extended from the author's youth, in 1827, down to the last hours of the Duke de Saldanha in November, 1876, probably no one was so continuously and intimately acquainted with him, or was so often personally associated with the more important incidents of his life.

When Portuguese historians write this period of their country's history, the author hopes that the materials collected in this Biography may be of some service. He further hopes that he may yet be enabled to publish, in the original Portuguese, documents which, in this Biography, have been abridged, or merely referred to; and he trusts that this assurance will be satisfactory to any who may regret that the Marshal's papers were not confided to one of his own countrymen.

But, after all, it is to the incidents of the life of Saldanha,

and to the character of the man, as by those incidents exhibited, that the Author appeals for his own apology, and for the public approval. The example of such a life will, itself, he hopes, be deemed interesting and instructive. Saldanha was the soul of the political life of Portugal. As to the merits, indeed, of this or that political movement between parties, or of the wisdom of the different statesmen therein engaged, the Author would not pretend to estimate them; nor is it probable that any man now living is capable of appreciating them. The reader will find it difficult enough to thread his course through the labyrinth of those historic incidents, which the author has been forced to select as essential to his purpose. Their general bearing is, however, intelligible. While D. Pedro, (on his daughter's behalf), was contesting with D. Miguel their respective rights to the Throne, Portugal became the field on which was fought the battle between Absolutism and Liberal Government; with the surrounding powers of Europe—Spain, Austria, Prussia, even Russia, but especially France and England —as interested spectators. When the Constitutionalists prevailed, the confusion amongst themselves culminated, at times, to a state approaching anarchy. Thirty-five ministries in as many years! Five hundred and twenty ministerial changes within that period!* accompanied by, or following upon, fundamental changes in the Constitution itself; whilst assassinations, conspiracies, revolts, revolutions, sieges and battles— a very hurly-burly of successive political transformations— seem to circulate around one commanding figure, towards whom all persons looked to direct, if possible, the moving scene. Fortunately, such details lie beyond the scope of these volumes.

* The number of individual Ministers was but 142; many of these entered and re-entered the Ministry, or changed their Portfolios.

The duty which the author has undertaken, is to present a record of Saldanha's life. It is not an attempt to write a chronicle of the events which occurred in Portugal and elsewhere during his lifetime; but to tell *what part* he bore in the current events; and *how* he bore that part. The historic incidents required to be chronicled so far only as their details would enable a reader to appreciate the conduct and motives of the man. His acts would, indeed, appear in the narrative of the events themselves; but his motives, feelings, and principles, whether moral or political, would often require to be elucidated by evidence drawn from other sources, including a voluminous contemporary correspondence. For the reader could not be asked to judge the character of Saldanha, whether for praise or censure, upon the *ipse dixit* of his biographer; and he, therefore, often resorts, as briefly as was found practicable, to his correspondence, and that of others, as explaining his motives and illustrating his character.

The author has more than once, in these volumes, referred to the extraordinary mis-statements which have, at times, appeared in the Press, respecting Saldanha; and these it became the biographer's duty to correct. Even his own countrymen of the present day, if they reject the more glaring falsehoods, accept without consideration those of lesser importance. But in drawing attention to the errors of others, the author does not pretend to be free from error himself; and if, in dealing with the mass of materials before him, he has erred, he can only plead that he has striven to be truthful. He has fulfilled a duty to the extent of his ability; and endeavoured to supply a want which was already felt in 1859, when that distinguished author and poet, A. F. Castilho, wrote:—"It is a biography which Portugal demands." It does, indeed, seem fit that the

present generation should be reminded how much the Dynasty and the Portuguese Nation owe to the hero whose biography we offer to the reader.

But should that aim be deemed of insufficient general interest, we have a still higher one, in endeavouring to illustrate, by example, that a straightforward honesty of purpose is the best policy in the most elevated and turbulent positions of life, as in the most humble and quiet. This truth is shewn, at least in this instance, as well by the honours bestowed upon Saldanha during his life, as by the love and respect which accompanied him to his grave. At his death, after enumerating the numerous and important decorations which had been conferred upon him by his own and foreign Sovereigns, one writer aptly observed that: "the highest distinction which he possessed is the love which his country awarded him:" and, at the same time, the newspapers of all parties re-echoed the sentiment of a political opponent when he declared, that: "Saldanha leaves behind him many censurers; not a few envious; but not one enemy."

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MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

MARSHAL SALDANHA.

CHAPTER I.

1790—1814.

Descent—Birth—Education—Enters the army—Conduct of Napoleon—Junot enters Lisbon—Lusitanian Legion—Saldanha resigns—Political events—Wellesley arrives—Saldanha rejoins 1st Infantry—Gallant behaviour—Beresford—Anecdote—Busaco—Various battles—St. Sebastian—Correspondence—Appointed to 13th Infantry—Commands a Brigade—Medals for Busaco, etc.—Distinguished by Marshal Beresford—Anecdotes—Marries.

THE family of Saldanha is of Spanish origin. It traces its descent from the celebrated Bernardo del Carpio, son of the Count de Saldanha and of Donna Ximena, sister of the King of Castile, Don Alfonso the Chaste.

João Carlos de Saldanha Oliveira e Daun was the son of the Count de Rio Maior and of D. Maria Amalia de Carvalho e Daun, daughter of the celebrated Marquis de Pombal. On his mother's side, he was great grandson of General Count Daun, brother of the distinguished Marshal Daun, to whom the Empress Maria Theresa owed her crown, as she frankly acknowledged in a letter to the Marchioness de Pombal.* The Count de Rio Maior was great grandson of the Princess Con-

* The following, in the handwriting of the empress, is the postscript to the letter. "You and your husband have known the young queen, but not the old dowager. I therefore send you, with the young monarch, the old mamma (their portraits), who retains neither her vivacity nor activity, but only her tenderness for her family and ancient friends. The esteem which I have always had for your husband will only end with my sorrowful days, as well

stance Emile de Rohan Chabot, daughter of François de Rohan, Prince de Soubise and Duc de Fontenay, by his wife, the Princess Anne Chabot de Rohan. Thus, in addition to an illustrious Spanish and Portuguese descent, the best blood of Austria and France ran in Saldanha's veins.

João Carlos was born on the 17th of November, 1790. He was one of no less than twenty-two children, himself being the eighth son. The earliest account of him, that we possess, is in a letter from the Count de Rio Maior to his brother-in-law, the second Marquis de Pombal. It is as follows :—

"*17th November*, 1790.

"MY DEAR MARQUIS,

"Your sister and I inform you that this morning, at 11 o'clock, she was safely delivered of a fine boy; and, at this moment, mid-day, all is going on well. I am sure that you will receive the news with the greatest pleasure; and, with no less pleasure do I place myself and the newly born at your disposition."

On the 25th of the same month, the prince regent, afterwards D. João VI., and his consort, D. Carlota, stood sponsors to the future marshal.

João Carlos was at first destined for the navy. His mother superintended his education with the most anxious care. She was herself a woman of very superior talent; and had been the pride of her father, the great Marquis de Pombal. The boy's noble and affectionate disposition caused him to be her favourite son; and both his diligence and his remarkable determination to excel in whatever he undertook, gave his parents every reason to hope and expect, that, in after life, he would distinguish himself. He gained the first prize in mathematics, as well as those in all his other studies, which were entirely carried on at Lisbon, not at Coimbra, as has been erroneously

as that for your own virtues and merits, and for those of the Daun family, to whom I owe the preservation of the monarchy. Believe me, always most affectionately yours, MARIE THERESE." Vide "Marquis de Pombal," by the Conde da Carnota, 2nd edition, Longmans, 1871.

stated in various publications. Equally successful was João Carlos in acquiring the manly accomplishments of riding, fencing, and the broad-sword. He also obtained great proficiency in the English language; and he was, through life, always very partial to English literature. Chance, before he had finished his education, threw into his hands a work, then much more read than at present, the "History of Sir Charles Grandison." The Marshal Saldanha has often assured me how anxious he felt, as a boy, to form his character on such a model as Grandison; which was to aim at being as perfect, as possible, in whatever situation in life he might afterwards be placed. We may, in the course of this memoir, be able to judge how far the perusal of that work influenced his future conduct.

The marshal has often related the following anecdote of his early childhood. His tutor, on one occasion, punished him for an offence of which he was not guilty—the real culprit being one of his companions. The child bore the punishment without remonstrance; but it made an impression on his mind, which continued through life; causing him to reflect with how little justice men govern the world.

On the 28th of September, 1805, João Carlos entered the army as cadet in the 1st Infantry. On the 9th of June, in the following year, he was promoted to the rank of captain in the same regiment.

Great political events were now taking place in the Peninsula; followed by a war, glorious for the British arms, and in which the Portuguese troops took a very distinguished part. Portugal, as is well known, refusing to renounce her long continued alliance with England, and to obey the orders of Napoleon, that monarch proclaimed, in the *Moniteur* of November 11th, 1807, that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign; and he marched an army towards Portugal. It was Lord Strangford, the British ambassador at Lisbon, who announced this decree to the regent, D. João, who, in consequence of his mother's mental incapacity, then held the reins of government. D. João lost little time in determining the course he should pursue; for, in haste and confusion, he embarked for Brazil on the 29th of the same month, after appointing a regency to govern in the

queen's name, and leaving on record the unpatriotic order, that the French should be received as friends.* On the following day, Junot entered Lisbon without opposition.

Junot's first care was to disband a portion of the Portuguese army; retaining only about 8000 selected troops, whom, either by persuasion or force, he induced to take service under Napoleon.

João Carlos, who had then only just completed his 17th year, together with his brother officer, the Marquis de Castello Melhor, immediately resigned their commissions, being unwilling to serve under the French, whom they regarded as the enemies of their country. João Carlos was not less guided in this step by the patriotic, as well as prudent, counsels of his mother, who had inherited from her illustrious father an aversion to the French; or rather, perhaps, to the principles which the French strove to disseminate throughout Europe. Their resignation was accepted, although they were earnestly solicited by General the Marquis d'Alorna and General Gomes Freire to continue in the service. It was fortunate for them that they had received permission to resign; for, on the expulsion of the French, and on the reorganization of the Portuguese army, they were the only two officers who were considered entitled by their conduct to be reinstated in the same military rank which

* Eight ships of the line, three frigates, two brigs, three corvettes, and many armed merchant vessels, conveyed the regent and his family to Brazil, together with not less than 15,000 persons who accompanied them. It is said that they carried away from Portugal such immense sums in money, besides jewels and other valuables, that not more than 1000*l.* remained in the public treasury. With the regent embarked the queen mother, his eldest son, D. Pedro, and his son-in-law the Spanish Infante, D. Pedro Carlos. In another vessel was the regent's wife, D. Carlota, and their other children. The nobility who accompanied the Court were the Duke de Cadaval; the Marquises of Alegrete, Anjeja, Bellas, Lavradio, Pombal, Torres Novas, and Vagos, together with their families; the Counts of S. Miguel, Lumiares, Belmonte, Caparica, Cavalleiros, Pombeiro, and Redondo; the Viscount d'Anadia, Senhor d'Araujo, D. Fernando José de Portugal, D. João d'Almeida, D. Rodrigo de Sousa, and others. The fleet, accompanied by some British ships commanded by Sir Sydney Smith, arrived at Bahia on the 21st of January, 1808, and after some delay reached, on the 8th of March, the city of Rio de Janeiro. Lord Strangford, with the ambassadors of various other Powers, shortly followed the regent to Rio.

they had previously held. And yet, confounding the young patriotic soldier with an officer of the same name, born ten years earlier, it has been repeatedly stated in various publications, and it went the whole round of the newspapers in England and elsewhere on the occasion of his decease in 1876, that "Saldanha submitted to the invaders, like most other Portuguese," and that in 1810 "he fell into the hands of Wellington, who caused him to be sent to England."*

If it is a pleasure to the biographer to record the virtues and meritorious actions of a distinguished man, it is also his duty to contradict absurdities or calumnies, resulting from ignorance or enmity.

Some years ago, an English daily paper, with the laudable desire of vindicating the character of Saldanha, which, its editor was pleased to say, "had been vilified in the most scurrilous manner by a certain vacillating journal," thus came to the rescue of João Carlos de Saldanha, who, it will be recollected, first drew breath in the year 1790.

"Count Saldanha was formerly a member of the Council of the Prince Regent of Portugal, D. Pedro.† When his Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex visited Lisbon in 1802, the Prince Regent of Portugal appointed General Saldanha to show him every attention in the capacity of aide-de-camp.‡ On the Court being obliged to leave for the Brazils in 1807, he did not follow it, but remained in the Capital. On the entry of the

* The officer for whom Saldanha was thus mistaken was, we believe, a Saldanha born in 1778. Of the 8000 Portuguese troops which Junot sent to France, scarcely half of them, it is said, reached their destination, owing to desertion on the march through Portugal and Spain. Napoleon called them the Lusitanian Legion, and they served both at Wagram and Smolensko. They remained in the French service until Charles X. was restored. This force was commanded by the Marquis d'Alorna, and the chief of those who served under him were General Pamplona, afterwards Count de Subserra; Generals Gomes Freire and Souza; Marquises of Loulé, Ponte de Lima, and Valença; Count de Sabugal; Candido José Xavier, &c. &c. The first two of these officers continued in the French service under Massena, when that general invaded Portugal, and they were, in consequence, declared traitors to their country and condemned to death. They were afterwards amnestied by the Cortes of 1820, and subsequently by D. João VI.

† The regent at that time was D. João!

‡ At the age of 12!

French army into Portugal, under the command of Marshal Junot, Saldanha was one of the principal Portuguese who was sent to France by that general, and was entrusted by him with despatches for Napoleon. He accordingly set out in May, 1808,* from the head-quarters of the French army; but the Revolution, which just then broke out in Spain, induced him to return without accomplishing the object of his mission, or having passed the frontiers of Portugal. After remaining some time in Lisbon, he retired to Cintra. When the French army was obliged to retreat before the British troops, he demanded to be reinstated in the service, which was refused him.† He was subsequently arrested by order of the Portuguese Government, ostensibly as a measure of precaution, but really to prevent his prosecuting certain claims; and he was conveyed on board an English frigate. He was at length most honourably liberated, and his cause decided in his favour. Government afterwards sent him to St. Petersburg as ambassador; and also to the Court of France, where he gained many friends among the liberal party." ‡

From such materials is biography often compiled. *Et voilà comme l'on écrit l'histoire!*

We may here bring to the reader's notice, that not long before the entry of Junot into Lisbon, a secret treaty had been signed at Fontainebleau (October 29th, 1807) by Napoleon, Marshal Duroc, and D. Eugenio Izquierdo, by which treaty it was agreed that Portugal should be partitioned. It will, therefore, not create surprise, that Junot, after having deprived the Portuguese of their army, should proceed at once to take further steps to rob them of their independence. On the 13th of December, with guns firing from the castle, the inhabitants of Lisbon saw with astonishment the Portuguese flag, which had

* At the age of 17½!

† The very contrary was the fact in Saldanha's case.

‡ It is scarcely necessary to remark, that neither had João Carlos, at the age of 17½, a lawsuit with the Portuguese Government, nor was he sent prisoner on board an English frigate. His mission to St. Petersburg never took place; and even that to Paris was not until the year 1869. We do not follow the further absurdities contained in the "Defence," because they refer to events of a later period. *Ab uno disce omnes!*

hitherto floated on that fortress, give place to that of France. Some angry demonstrations were made by the people, but they were quickly repressed, and calm was restored. On the 13th of February (1808) Junot gave orders to substitute the Imperial eagle on all public buildings in the place of the arms of Portugal. News soon arrived at Lisbon of the famous decree of Milan, by which Portugal was ordered to pay a contribution of 100 million francs to the French Government. From that moment, discontent showed itself boldly in all parts of the country. On the 18th of June, Oporto, following the example of Braganza on the 12th, rose, and declared its country's independence, and hatred of the invader. A Junta was there formed, and the movement quickly extended itself in all directions. The few troops which remained in Portugal, together with those previously disbanded, were collected and reorganized; and, as soon as he arrived in Portugal, were placed under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, on the 1st of August, landed near the mouth of the river Mondego with a British force.

We learn with surprise, that whilst Junot was in possession of Lisbon, a deputation from that city, consisting of some of the principal noblemen of the country, sought and held an interview at Bayonne with the Emperor Napoleon, in the month of April, 1808. This interview resulted in an address from them to the Portuguese nation, their fellow countrymen, urging them to place their lot in the hands of the French ruler. "For," says the address, "we have ourselves seen that the moment has arrived, in which he has effected the happiness of his own country, and commenced that of ours." The Portuguese nation is further informed by these gentlemen that "his Majesty has no feeling of rancour, hatred, or vengeance against the prince who lately governed us, nor against his family. He occupies himself in nobler aims. He desires only to unite you with the other portions of Europe in his great continental system, of which we shall form the final link. He desires to emancipate you from those foreign influences to which you have been for so many years subject. The emperor cannot permit an English colony on the Continent. The emperor cannot, and will not, allow the return to Portugal of a prince who quitted it under

the protection of British ships." This address concluded by calling on the Portuguese to show their gratitude to the emperor, and was signed by the

MARQUIS DE MARIALVA.	BISHOP OF COIMBRA.
MARQUIS DE VALENÇA.	THE GRAND INQUISITOR.
MARQUIS DE PENALVA.	VISCOUNT DE BARBAÇENA.
NUNO CAETANO ALVARES PEREIRA DE MELLO.	LOURENÇO DE LIMA.
JOSÉ, MARQUIS D'ABRANTES.	JOSÉ, PRIOR MÓR D'AVIS.
COUNT DE SABUGAL.	JOAQUIM ALBERTO JORGE.
	ANTONIO THOMAZ DA SILVA LEITÃO.

This advice to their countrymen was followed by an address to the emperor, with a project for a "Constitution" to be granted to Portugal. The Portuguese are herein reminded that they are of French origin, as descendants of those who drove away the Moors in 1147!!! The emperor is furthermore requested to select, as their constitutional king, a prince of his own imperial family. This document, dated May 24th, 1808, was signed by all the nobility who were still resident in Lisbon, with the exception of the Marquis das Minas; who, prompted by a spirit similar to that which had animated the youthful João Carlos and the Marquis de Castello Melhor, refused his signature. Can we wonder that the people had become impatient after such disgraceful servility on the part of the nobility, and the insults offered to the country by its foreign occupiers?

João Carlos, who had never deserted his country, nor sought the protection of Junot, was for a time placed on the staff of General Bernardino Freire d'Andrade; but soon afterwards he rejoined his former regiment.

It is almost unnecessary to remind the reader that the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, gained by Sir Arthur Wellesley on the 17th and 21st of August (1808), were shortly followed on the 30th of the same month by the celebrated Convention of Cintra, by which Junot and the French troops were allowed to embark at Lisbon; and Portugal was for a time evacuated by the foreign enemy. Sir Arthur Wellesley and Sir Hew Dalrymple were recalled. Sir John Moore being appointed to command the

troops destined to assist the Spaniards against their invaders, marched from Lisbon in October; and having entered Spain, circumstances obliged him to make a precipitate retreat to Corunña, where, in January, 1809, as is well known, he succeeded in embarking his troops, but at the cost of his own life.

Great had been the enthusiasm of the people throughout Portugal, when the English came to their assistance. The soldiers of the army, which had been disbanded by Junot, had hastened to the ranks the moment they were summoned; and, as soon as incorporated, marched without uniforms and almost barefooted towards Lisbon. But their recent disorganization had produced a total disregard of discipline. It is narrated, that the 1st Regiment of Infantry, being on its road to the Capital, arrived one night at Thomar, and was marched to the convent of the monks of the Order of Christ, which is built upon an eminence commanding the town. The regiment was drawn up in line in front of the edifice; but, the moment the soldiers became aware that they were to be quartered in the convent, the entire body, with the exception of one company, descended in disorder to the town, and billeted themselves amongst the inhabitants. The company which remained firm to its duty was the 8th, commanded by the youthful João Carlos, whom his men had already learned to respect. Soon afterwards, and only on receiving instructions to that effect, did João Carlos descend with his soldiers to the houses selected for their reception. On another occasion, when their young captain held temporary employment on the staff, the 8th Company, then on service at Figueiro dos Vinhos, themselves became insubordinate, and fired upon their officers. Upon this, João Carlos again assumed the command of his company, and restored order and discipline. His soldiers had learned to estimate the kindness and conduct of their commander, to whom they were attached; and who had already given proofs of being what he always was—the soldier's friend.

Soult now advanced into Portugal, and, after some resistance, entered Oporto on the 29th of March (1809). Whilst there, a deputation came from Braga to offer him the crown of Portugal!

Oporto remained in the hands of the French until Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had returned to Portugal, obliged them to quit it on the 12th of May following; and the country was once again relieved from its foreign intruders, until Marshal Victor made his appearance in the Alemtejo. On this memorable occasion of the taking of Oporto, João Carlos was present with his regiment, the 1st Infantry.

Marshal Beresford had been appointed to the command of the Portuguese army early in 1809; and, on the 7th of April, he established his head-quarters at Thomar. Saldanha, who was at that time the youngest captain in the service—not yet 19 years of age—on returning from Oporto, acted for a short period as aide-de-camp to General Miranda, who was quartered in that city. It was about this time, that a serious riot took place in the dungeon of the public prison at Thomar; a short account of which we will lay before the reader, as it serves to illustrate the courage of Saldanha, and the presence of mind and decision which he displayed at so early an age.

It is necessary to explain, that the dungeons, in nearly all the rural prisons, are strongly built rooms, with stone pavements and vaulted roofs, which, having no doors, are entered from an opening in the floor above, through which, when necessary, a ladder is lowered for the prisoners to ascend or descend. The means of other communication with the inmates are by the strongly barred apertures which serve to admit air and light. The worst of criminals were generally congregated in dungeons of this kind, and were enabled to procure liquor, without restraint, through the apertures; whilst little surveillance was exercised over the acquisition of weapons which they so well knew how to use. It often followed, that serious disturbances took place among them, in which lives were lost, and which the jailers were utterly powerless to prevent; as the ladder, the only means of communication with the interior, would be in the power of the rioters the moment it was lowered. The sole remedy which had been found efficacious in such emergencies was to empty baskets of slaked lime upon the heads of the combatants. Just such a disturbance as we have described took place at Thomar. The military were called in, and the

trap door was opened; but each one hesitated to lower the ladder, and to be the first to descend amongst the rioters. The young aide-de-camp, who was present, at a glance became aware of the situation, and as instantly solved the difficulty. Sword in hand, he leaped through the aperture, and alighted on his feet in the midst of the astonished rioters. Flourishing his sword in the air, he quickly cleared a circle around him; the ladder was immediately lowered; the guard descended; the rioters were disarmed; and order was restored.

While at Thomar, the conduct of João Carlos had attracted the attention of General Blunt, whose quarters were at that city, and the English general took great interest in the young and promising officer. He lent him the necessary books, and assisted him in making himself, while at Thomar, thoroughly acquainted with both the theory and practice of the English system of field tactics, which was about to be introduced into Portugal. When Marshal Beresford was inspecting General Blunt's brigade at Varzea Grande, he enquired the name of the young officer whom he had remarked during the inspection, and desired that he should be presented to him. The marshal was so struck with the intelligence which João Carlos displayed, and by his knowledge of his profession, that, on the 9th of December, 1809, he promoted him to the rank of major, although, in his regiment, there were eight or nine captains, his seniors. Nor did the kindness of the marshal cease here; for he bestowed on the young major a personal friendship, which was continued in after life, on the warmest terms, up to the period of the marshal's death in 1854.

On the occasion of his promotion, the marshal had given João Carlos permission to go to Lisbon for a fortnight, in order to obtain his uniform and to see his family. At the end of a week he presented himself at head-quarters. "I thought you were in Lisbon?" said the marshal. "I have been there," replied the young major; "and having done all I had to do, I hasten to report myself." Such behaviour, and a constant attention to his duties, procured him, on a subsequent occasion, a very marked distinction. For, when the marshal sent positive orders to Lisbon, that all officers

on sick leave should, immediately, either join their regiments or go into hospital, Major João Carlos was especially exempted.

In 1810, the French armies again entered Portugal, under the command of Marshal Massena. The author does not pretend to describe the sieges and battles of the Peninsular War; nor to chronicle the glorious successes which attended the British and Portuguese arms against Napoleon's best marshals and generals. Such a course would be beyond the scope of these volumes. João Carlos was present at some of the principal battles and sieges which the history of this period records. At Busaco, when not yet twenty years of age, he commanded a battalion of grenadiers; and, for his gallant conduct, was not only honourably mentioned in the despatches, but received the gold medal bestowed on that occasion by the Prince Regent of England, afterwards George IV.* From the day of that glorious and hard fought battle, Saldanha's military career was one of constant success. He could proudly say that during the whole war he never once suffered a defeat; whether it was in holding a position or in taking one, in attacking or resisting an attack.

We offer the following anecdote as an instance of that serenity amidst dangers which Saldanha constantly possessed. His regiment, at Busaco, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Hill, and formed part of the brigade under Sir Denis Packe, the gallant conduct of which on this, and on so many other occasions, received great eulogiums from both Wellington and Beresford. The brigade was stationed at the foot of the hill on which the convent is situated; and, on the 27th, the attack of the enemy commenced before dawn in that direction. It

* Colonel Chaby, in his "History of the Peninsular War," thus refers to the young major: "During the battle, very gallant was the behaviour of a battalion formed, on the spur of the moment, by the grenadier companies of the 1st and 16th Foot, which repulsed the enemy opposite the headquarters of Wellington, and which was led on by Major João Carlos de Saldanha Oliveira e Daun, who, to the honour and glory of our country and of the army, is the present Field Marshal Duke de Saldanha." The Duke of Wellington, in his despatch to the Earl of Liverpool, giving an account of the battle of Busaco, writes that the 1st Regiment of Portuguese Infantry (Saldanha's) "showed great steadiness and gallantry."

was on the night of the 26th, that João Carlos and a brother officer, Captain Mackintosh, were at their posts awaiting the expected attack. Saldanha, wrapped in his cloak, laid himself on the ground, and told his orderly to call him if the enemy showed any sign of movement. "What!" said Mackintosh, "will you be able to get to sleep? I don't think I can." "I hope I shall," was the reply. The firing had commenced when the orderly called his officer, who, on awaking, cried out, "Holla, Mackintosh, get up." But poor Mackintosh was a lifeless corpse near the side of his comrade. During Saldanha's long military career, the narrow escapes which he had were innumerable. On one occasion, about this time, as he was advancing to an attack, a musket shot penetrated his thickly padded neck-cloth, such as in those days it was the strange fashion to wear, and he escaped with a slight contusion. At another, whilst his servant held a basin as he washed his hands, a bullet shattered it to pieces.

Various were the engagements to which Saldanha was a witness between this period and the 5th of February, 1812, when, on the recommendation of Marshal Beresford, the young major, being then little over 21 years of age, passed over 23 majors, many of them English, and was gazetted lieut.-colonel.

We are enabled to offer a few extracts from private letters written by João Carlos to his eldest brother during this stirring period. It was after the battle of Vittoria (June 21st, 1813), at which Saldanha's regiment, in Packe's brigade, greatly distinguished itself, that Wellington's army advanced on Tolosa, where the French made a stand at a league in front of that city. Here it was that João Carlos wrote to his brother on the 27th, two days after the attack:—"Such is the nature of the country, that it must be seen to be understood. All seemed to think that it would be impossible to dislodge the enemy; but the brave Sir Thomas Graham at once prepared for battle. My brigade and Bradford's attacked in front. At 6 o'clock in the afternoon the French began to give way and to retire on Tolosa. Tolosa is walled; and the French had shut the gates and barricaded the streets. But our second Wellington, who never sees difficulties, ordered the artillery to force the gates. We

entered Tolosa at night. Yesterday and to-day we repose. In fact, if this work were to continue another four days, I think I should die of hunger and want of sleep. My compliments to all; and tell my sisters not to forget to pray to God that I may yet have the pleasure of seeing them."

In front of Pamplona, João Carlos writes on the field of battle (July 20th, 1813): "It is noon, and I have just come from the trenches, where I must again be at 6 o'clock. The enemy's shells and shot are flying about us. Two hours ago we commenced firing from three batteries, mounting thirty-two pieces. I was in front when, on a given signal, they all began firing; and I can assure you that the earth shook as I never felt it shake before. You can imagine what our ears felt.

"P.S. If it please God, after the assault I will send you details; and with what satisfaction!"

At the first assault on St. Sebastian, the 1st Portuguese Infantry was one of those selected for the attack. João Carlos writes (July 25th): "We have lost more than a hundred men of my brigade. I and John, God be thanked, have escaped for this time."

On the eve of the second assault (August 31st), the brigade to which Saldanha belonged begged to be allowed to commence the attack. General Graham replied that it was the high opinion he had of the brigade which had induced him to hold it in reserve. And, indeed, the important assistance it rendered, when the success of the assault was doubtful, confirms the judgment of the general.

João Carlos wrote to his brother on the day following the assault: "I have the satisfaction of telling you, my dear brother, that the Marshal Marquis of Campo Maior (Marshal Beresford) meeting me yesterday, during the assault, complimented me, and said that he had selected me from amongst the lieutenant-colonels on account of the opinion he had of me, etc. etc. etc.: that he had given me the colonelcy of the 13th Infantry, and would give *immediate* orders that I should *at once* take the command. I pass over the heads of sixteen or seventeen lieutenant-colonels."

After the capture of St. Sebastian, the British and Portuguese armies directed their course towards Bayonne. During their march, on the 14th of September, João Carlos writes to his brother: "I did my duty. You may be satisfied on that point. I had the satisfaction, with only two sergeants and two soldiers, to bring in eighteen prisoners. There is not a braver man than my General Bradford. *Between ourselves,* four times has he complimented me and given me thanks. My regiment lost in killed and wounded one hundred and twenty-nine. Thanks be to the Almighty that I escaped this thunder storm, which was not a little one. My compliments to all; but, as I say something about myself, I beg you, by our friendship, only to show this letter to the Viscount da Bahia, whom I esteem as another brother. . . . I forgot to tell you, repeating my request that you will not show this letter except to the viscount, that General Hay, who did not know me, enquired who I was, and requested Lugo to introduce me, declaring that he had become my friend since he had witnessed my behaviour."

In a few days, João Carlos again writes to his brother:

"CAMPO DE SANTO ANTONIO, *September 24th,* 1813.

"Here I am, during these last three days, an inhabitant of the celebrated Pyrenees: who would have said so when I occupied the hills around Sobral? On the 21st, I took the command of this regiment (13th Infantry), and was received with the usual formalities.

"The feelings with which I separated myself from my old and good regiment, the 1st, cannot be described: but to my great satisfaction, and, I am sure, to yours, as I know your perfect friendship, I must tell you that I saw tears in the eyes of almost all the officers; nor did the soldiers show less feeling. Oh, my beloved brother, what an excellent regiment it is in every respect! May God permit that its new commanding officer may appreciate it, and rule it with the kindness and delicacy it deserves. During the whole war, there was not one single officer placed under arrest by order of the general! General Packe, so active and exacting, never had occasion for it: and, I

believe, it is the only regiment of the army in which no officer was brought to a court-martial."

After quitting the Pyrenees, the conduct of João Carlos at the battle of the Nive obtained an eulogium from Marshal Beresford; and the medal which he afterwards received from the Prince Regent of England, to commemorate that battle, was forwarded to him under especial circumstances, and with marked distinction.

In the spring of 1814, in consequence of the illness of General Hill, João Carlos, already commanding a brigade, took charge of that of Hill at Bayonne; and in these circumstances commanded a Division at the age of twenty-three! On this occasion he writes to his brother: "See what a *figurão* I shall become!"

For his brilliant services during the Peninsular campaigns, João Carlos received from the British Government a gold medal for Busaco, inscribed on it, "Major João Carlos Saldanha, 1st Portuguese Infantry;" with two clasps for St. Sebastian and Nive: besides crosses from the Spanish Government for St. Sebastian, Nive and Vittoria. On the last mentioned was inscribed, "Recompensa de la Batalha de Vitoria." From his own country, he received a decoration with the names Busaco, St. Sebastian, and Nive inscribed thereon, and his initials, J. C. S. O. D., in the centre.

Nor did his friend and general, Marshal Beresford, suffer João Carlos to be unrewarded in a more substantial manner; for, being the eighth son of so large a family, his fortune was very limited. Accordingly, some time after the conclusion of the war, at the special request of the marshal, the regent, D. João, conferred on him the Commandery of Sta Martha de Serdedelo, the emoluments of which produced the possessor 1,600,000 reis (about £450) a-year. This sinecure João Carlos enjoyed, until, by the Constitutional Charter, to establish which he afterwards devoted all the energies of his life, such Commanderies were abolished, and the reward of his own transcendent merit fell with them.

After the battle of Toulouse, João Carlos accompanied the Duke of Wellington to Paris; whence, having obtained leave,

he proceeded to London on his way home. He narrates that during the voyage from Falmouth to Lisbon he was suffering much from sea-sickness, when a large privateer was seen bearing towards them. He rose immediately to dress and arm himself; and his sickness at once left him. On a sudden, the privateer took another direction; which was afterwards accounted for by the appearance in the distance of two English ships of war.

Although we have passed so lightly over the events of this memorable war, and have scarcely alluded to the sieges and to the great battles which were fought during a period of nearly five years, yet, in a memoir of the life of Saldanha, it is due to his fame and reputation to recall the reader's thoughts to the principal scenes of that war, in so many of which young João Carlos held, albeit a subordinate, yet an honourable command. Saldanha was present with his regiment at the undermentioned battles, engagements, sieges and assaults, in the period from the 10th of May, 1809, to the 28th of April, 1814, besides those to which he was called either on temporary service, or whilst acting on the staff of those in command.

1809, May 10.—Albergaria.
,, ,, 11.—Grijo.
,, ,, 12.—Oporto.
1810, Sept. 19.—Sta. Combadão.
,, ,, 24.—Mollejoso.
,, ,, 26.—Busaco.
,, ,, 27.—Busaco.
,, Oct. 10.—Alemquer.
,, Nov. 22.—Ponte do Calhariz.
1811, Mar. 11.—Pombal.
,, ,, 12.—Redinha.
,, ,, 14.—Condeixa.
,, ,, 18.—Ponte da Murcella.
,, May 11.—Almeida.
,, Sept. 27.—Alfaiates.
1812, Jan. 7 to 19.—Ciudad Rodrigo.
,, Jan. 19.—Ciudad Rodrigo.
,, July 22.—Salamanca.
,, Sept. 17.—Estepar.
1812, Sept. 19.—Hornwork, Burgos Castle.
,, Oct. 19 to 21.—Burgos.
,, ,, 25.—Carrion.
,, Nov. 8 to 14.—Passagem do Tormes.
,, ,, 17.—Huerba e S. Muñoz.
1813, June 21.—Vittoria.
,, ,, 24.—Villa Franca e Lascaño.
,, ,, 25.—Tolosa.
,, July 9 to Sept. 13.—Pamplona, St. Sebastian, &c.
,, Oct. 7.—Passage of the Bidassoa.
,, Nov. 10.—Nivelle.
,, ,, 18.—Bidart.
,, Dec. 9.—Nive.
1814, Feb. 23.—Bayonne.
,, Feb. 27 to Apr. 28.—Bayonne.

If Saldanha so distinguished himself as to obtain promotion, on various occasions, over many of his seniors, and to merit the eulogiums which his superiors in command most freely bestowed

on him, how much more is the value of that distinction enhanced by the consideration, that the Portuguese army itself, during the whole of the Peninsular War, gave so many and constant proofs of its valour and discipline. For, to be the bravest, where all are brave, is double distinction.

We read in Marshal Beresford's despatch, on the 14th of April, 1812, after the taking of Badajoz, that "the conduct of the Portuguese troops does honour to the nation, which may well be proud of them, whether during the siege or at the assault, where their zeal and valour were equally shown." And again, "the Portuguese soldier is worthy of fighting at the side of the best troops in the world." After the battle of the Nivelle, which took place on the 10th of November, 1813, Marshal Beresford, in the "Order of the Day," wrote, that "Europe will see and honour the virtues of the Portuguese nation reflected in its army."

A Portuguese historian of this period declares that Marshal Beresford never failed to do justice to, and to record the merits of the Portuguese troops, although he censured and punished most severely any misconduct. And he allows that it was to the marshal's management that the army reached that degree of perfection which excited the admiration both of its friends and enemies. It is but just, that while Portugal looks with complacency on the valour of its sons during the Peninsular War, it should not forget the services of Marshal Beresford, nor complain of the rewards which a grateful nation conferred on him.

Wellington, after the battle of Busaco, spoke with enthusiasm of the conduct of the Portuguese troops. "The time," he writes, "has been well employed in disciplining them; for they form now the most solid foundation for the hopes we have of freeing the Peninsula." It is said, that General Saint Simon, who was taken prisoner at Busaco, remarked to the English officers; that it had been a very clever stratagem, that of dressing English soldiers in Portuguese uniforms, in order to deceive the French troops.

Another English general wrote: "The Portuguese troops are always eager to engage, and invariably behave with enthu-

siastic bravery:" and, "the Portuguese troops, two days without bread, beat us in the march, and fight the enemy to admiration."

After these eulogiums, the reader will not be surprised to learn that, more than once, the author has been assured by Marshal Beresford that the Portuguese became "the best light troops in the world."

It is generally known that, not long before the battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington had urgently requested the English Government to obtain a reinforcement of Portuguese troops for the allied armies. Transports were sent to the Tagus to fetch them. But the regency declared that they could not authorize the sending troops out of the country without the sanction of D. João, who was absent in Brazil. The transports awaited orders. Beresford was in Lisbon as commander-in-chief. Saldanha was colonel of the 13th Infantry. In such good discipline was this regiment, and so high was its reputation, that the marshal's quarter-master-general, D'Urban, wrote to Saldanha, saying, "I will not go to bed without telling you what I heard to-day at the marshal's table. Speaking of the regiment which you command, the marshal said, 'If only one regiment goes to Belgium, it shall certainly be the 13th.'"

Unfortunately for João Carlos, while the royal sanction from Brazil was awaited, the battle of Waterloo was fought, and the campaign was over.

The author begs to remind the reader that sixty-four years have now passed by since the events referred to were brought to a close. There are no contemporaries alive who could furnish the author with anecdotes of Saldanha's early youth; no brothers in arms who could bear testimony to his acts of decision and gallantry in the field during the six years of war in the Peninsula. It was otherwise when the author first visited Lisbon in 1835. He was then able to listen with delight to the recital of glorious deeds, which Saldanha's companions were proud of bringing to their general's recollection. It was not alone Saldanha's courage and daring which struck the author, but, even more, his humanity and generosity. Among so many English, as well as Portuguese officers, who served with João Carlos

during the war—many in the same regiment—there was but one voice as to the qualities he possessed, which procured for him the esteem and affection of the general-in-chief, of his companions, and of the private soldiers. All loved him.

We have mentioned with what care his fond and anxious mother herself superintended his education. The reader may smile on learning that it was by her wish that the young officer, when he first put on his uniform, should be accompanied, when on duty, by his tutor—a priest! But, as João Carlos reminded his regiment (the 1st Infantry), in after life, "his beard first sprouted when in their companionship." To the day of leaving his home, the boy-soldier had always occupied a bed in his mother's room. On his first visit to Lisbon, after an absence with his regiment, the same couch was still allotted to him; but the fond mother found it unoccupied when she came to bid her darling boy a good-night. The young officer had already learnt to be independent of the luxury of a bed;—he was asleep on the ground in a corner of the room.

Saldanha, throughout his whole life, presents a remarkable instance of possessing the power of sacrificing his inclinations to his duty. He has often mentioned, that, during the war, as a very young man, he had contracted, with his English fellow officers, the unpleasant habit of smoking. On an occasion when rations were short, he saw that some of the soldiers still eagerly exchanged their allowance of bread with their comrades for a portion of tobacco. "I reflected," said Saldanha, "how unhappy was the position of those, who, to satisfy an acquired want, which in its origin was a superfluity, were led to sacrifice the first necessity of life, in order to indulge themselves in a luxury. I have never smoked since that day."

Shortly after his return to Portugal, Saldanha was married to Miss Maria Theresa Horan, a young lady born at Dublin on the 26th of December, 1796, and daughter of Thomas Horan, Esq., and his wife Isabella Fitzgerald. The future Duchess de Saldanha was educated at Lisbon, where her father had for some time resided.

The marriage took place at the Church of S. Paulo at Lisbon, on the 27th of September, 1814.

CHAPTER II.

1815—1820.

Troubles in Brazil—Saldanha joins the "Royal Volunteers"—War in Montevideo—Desperate cavalry encounter—Gallant behaviour of a sergeant—Unexpected meeting in 1837—Supper at Montevideo—Honours conferred on Saldanha—Assumes the command of two Divisions—Anecdote of discipline—Method taken to silence intrigues.

WHILE Spain was suffering the evils of invasion, and, later, those of civil war, she was unable either to defend, preserve, or even to control her immense colonies in South America. Those of Rio de la Plata had revolted in 1811, and the Portuguese Government at Rio de Janeiro had, in consequence, advanced troops towards the Spanish territory on the left branch of the river Uruguay. Buenos Ayres had declared its independence of Spain, which was followed, on the 26th of May, 1812, by an agreement between the regent, D. João, and the provisional government of that republic, by which the Brazilian troops retired from that portion of the newly-formed republic which it had been deemed necessary to occupy. From 1812 to 1814, the Luso-Brazilian Government had felt the inconvenience of this agreement or armistice, as the insurgents infested the frontiers of Brazil, inciting the Indians and negroes to revolt; until, at last, it became indispensable to send to Portugal for additional forces, in order to oppose these repeated attacks, as well as to resist the propagation of revolutionary and republican ideas on the Brazilian frontier. Montevideo, another portion of Spanish territory, capitulated to the insurgents of Buenos Ayres on the 20th of June, 1814.

It was expected, when peace was concluded in Europe, that Spain would take measures to conquer her rebellious subjects

in South America. An expedition was indeed planned for that purpose, under the command of General Morillo, which was to have set out from Cadiz in May, 1815; and it was concerted that a Portuguese force of 5000 men should be sent to Brazil, in order to defend the frontiers of that country against the encroachments of the Spanish rebels and republicans.

In the meantime, Artigas, a Spanish adventurer and revolutionist, had established himself in the territory of Montevideo, as chief of the eastern republic of Rio de la Plata, and was continually making incursions on the neighbouring Brazilian frontier of Rio Grande. This Artigas had accumulated considerable forces, which he had very effectually disciplined by the assistance of many foreigners who had entered his service. Portugal had made repeated complaints to the Spanish Government of these depredations on her territories, but Spain had taken no measures to remedy the evils complained of, and the force under General Morillo had never left Cadiz. In these circumstances, after the conclusion of peace in 1815, a force of about 5000 men, under the name of the "Portuguese Royal Volunteers," was sent from Lisbon to Rio Grande, both to aid the Brazilians in the war which was being carried on against Artigas for the preservation of their territory, and to guard also the Brazilian frontiers from the effects of those revolutionary ideas which Spain herself was unable either to suppress or prevent. The Government at Rio de Janeiro, to effect its purpose, was compelled to occupy a portion of the revolted Spanish provinces of Rio de la Plata, which bordered on Brazil. This forced occupation gave rise to so angry a correspondence between the Governments of Spain and Portugal, that, on the 16th of March, 1817, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, England, France, Prussia, and Russia addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rio, directing his attention to the fact, that "the peace of Europe might be endangered by the quarrel between Spain and Portugal in America."

Whilst the discussions were taking place, and hostilities going forward, General Lecor, who commanded the "Royal Volunteers," advanced upon Montevideo, jointly with the Brazilian troops under Generals Curado and Marques. Barreiros, who,

in the absence of Artigas, held possession of that city, fled on their approach. On the arrival of Lecor within a distance of two leagues from the city, he was met by a deputation of its inhabitants, which presented him with its keys; and, on the following morning, at 11 o'clock, on the 20th of January (1817) the army entered Montevideo, where it was well received by the people. From this period, Lecor was appointed to the supreme command of the three Divisions.

Saldanha, who had accompanied the "Royal Volunteers" from Lisbon under General Lecor, had taken an active, although, as yet, subordinate part in this protracted war against Artigas and his powerful forces. We have, unfortunately, no accounts before us of this singular war until the taking of Montevideo. Saldanha always spoke of it as being one of the most interesting periods of his life; and, certainly, not the one least fraught with danger. The troops under Artigas, composed chiefly of well-disciplined Indians, in addition to their indomitable courage and activity, brought into action a mode of warfare peculiar to themselves. Their cavalry carried with them no less than six offensive weapons; viz. the carbine, the pistol, the sword, the knife, the lasso, and the *bolla*. At full gallop, they could throw a noose (the *laço*) around a flying enemy and unhorse him instantaneously. The ball (*bolla*) attached to a line they threw, for the same purpose, with equal dexterity. If, at the greatest speed, their horses fell, they themselves alighted on their feet ready for the contest with their various arms. Each soldier had with him at least three horses—and the very infantry itself performed its long marches on horseback. Such a mode of warfare, said Saldanha, no European is prepared to cope with; nor is he able to appreciate its dangers until after considerable experience.

After the occupation of Montevideo, the Portuguese and Brazilian troops which remained there suffered greatly, at times, from the want of provisions, and especially of firewood, in consequence of the strict blockade which Artigas was enabled to extend around the city. Frequent sorties, in force, were therefore made to procure these necessaries; during which the superiority of the enemy's cavalry had been continually ap-

parent. The younger officers were daring and courageous; but their chiefs had adopted a line of prudence, after having, on one occasion, lost nearly 120 men of a cavalry force which had been cut off, and of which few returned in safety but their commandant.

On the 1st of May, 1817, the cavalry had again suffered a considerable defeat; and Saldanha having reproached the officers with their ill-success, and the sorry figure they cut, they replied, "Put yourself at our head some day, and you shall see what we can do." Such, already, was the effect, at the age of twenty-six, of the reputation for courage and daring which Saldanha had obtained amongst the troops with whom he was serving.

On the 5th of the same month, the force under General Silveira, to whom Saldanha was next in command, was returning to the city in charge of a large quantity of corn and firewood which they had procured at some distance off. Saldanha perceived by the enemy's movements that an attack was meditated by them on the two squadrons which formed the rear-guard of the convoy. Hastening to the general, he requested permission to reinforce those two squadrons with two others. Scarcely was the order given, when Saldanha saw the swords of the two rear squadrons shining in the sun, and he remarked to the general, "See there, the affair looks serious; with your permission, I will go there myself at once with the remaining two squadrons." Arriving at the spot, he addressed a few encouraging words to the six squadrons; and perceiving that the enemy were rapidly advancing, Saldanha charged boldly the hitherto invincible cavalry, and threw them into confusion. The shock was terrible. Saldanha has often assured the author that he was never witness to a more obstinate contest. Five times the enemy re-formed after their squadrons had been charged by those of Saldanha; but, finally, they were completely routed; and the conquerors pursued, for more than a league, the flying enemy. During the final encounter an event occurred, more characteristic of the romance of chivalry than of the disciplined caution which regulates the movements of a commanding officer in modern

warfare. Saldanha, on a magnificent horse, was, at some distance in advance of his own force, galloping towards General Sabalaga, who commanded the enemy's cavalry. He reached the general, and his upraised sword was about to descend on his adversary's head, when Sabalaga, who had drawn a pistol from its holster, fired. Fortunately for Saldanha, the aim was unsteady; but the ball pierced the breast of his gallant horse, and it fell to the ground. In a minute, himself on foot, Saldanha was surrounded by the enemy on horseback. Five of his own troopers, who had fortunately come up, rushed forward to assist their leader. Before further assistance could arrive to put an end to so unequal a combat, four of the five gallant men were stretched on the ground, and the fifth had lost an arm. The rout was, however, complete; and at length, after the combat ended, Saldanha found himself covered with the blood and brains, both of his companions and of the enemy. The slaughter was great on both sides; but the prestige gained by the cavalry on this occasion was never lost during the whole time the war continued. The enthusiasm amongst the whole army for the name of Saldanha became unbounded.

The memory of this brilliant exploit, and of Saldanha's personal danger, was subsequently revived between two of the principal actors therein, on an unexpected occasion. For, during a period of civil war in Portugal, in 1837, when, as Saldanha was about to enter Castello de Vide, he was narrating some of the events of the five years' war in Montevideo, in which he had been so constantly engaged, he related the above anecdote to the Duke da Terceira and to Sr. Mousinho, as a remarkable instance of almost providential preservation. On the following morning, when they were at breakfast, Saldanha was informed that there was a man who greatly desired to see him. Being admitted, and gazing on the marshal, as if comparing in his mind the young man of 1817 with the mature general of 1837, he exclaimed, "Your Excellency does not recognize me; but you will remember the sergeant of the 1st Cavalry of 'Royal Volunteers' who lost an arm at your side, during the engagement near Montevideo, when your Excellency, on that occasion, took the command of the cavalry."

We may imagine Saldanha's pleasure at again meeting with, and thus unexpectedly, so devoted a follower.

Unfortunately, the author of these Memoirs has not found any published account of this war in Brazil; and the scenes and times of it are remote. But he has been acquainted with many witnesses to this and other acts of Saldanha's resolute courage during that time; and their enthusiasm for their leader, at so distant a period, was still as great as if his gallant deeds were but of yesterday.

The enthusiasm in the army, excited by the event which we have described, shortly afterwards found vent as unexpectedly, as it was, perhaps, inconvenient. On the 13th of May, eight days after this brilliant affair, it being the birthday of the king, D. João VI., who, on the death of his mother, in March of the previous year, had ascended the throne, the municipality of Montevideo gave a ball in honour of the day, to which all the officers of the garrison were invited. It was determined that, at supper time, only one toast should be proposed; that one, of course, being devoted to the king. On this occasion, all rose to drink to the health of their Sovereign; but scarcely were they again seated, when the whole company, by a sudden and spontaneous impulse, doubtless much to the surprise of Saldanha himself, exclaimed with loud voices, "To the health and prosperity of João Carlos de Saldanha." Repeated were the "vivas," and with, if possible, increased enthusiasm, when Saldanha, in a few words, modestly returned thanks, giving the whole glory of the 5th of May to his brave and generous companions.

It was at this period that the king conferred on Saldanha the military Order of Christ; and, on the 22nd of January of the following year (1818), he received his brevet rank of brigadier. His full rank dates from May 13th, 1820.

The army under the Captain-General Lecor consisted of three Divisions. The right was now commanded by Lieut.-General Avilez; the left by Lieut.-General Curado; and the central by Brigadier Saldanha. General Curado wishing to retire in consequence of his age, wrote to the commander-in-chief, Lecor, suggesting that it was unnecessary that his Majesty should

appoint a general from Rio Janeiro, there being so many officers in the three Divisions well qualified to replace him; and that, moreover, he thought it his duty to make especial mention of Brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha. These two Divisions, commanded by Curado and Saldanha, were at that time encamped at the Rincão das Galinhas, seventy leagues distant from Montevideo. In consequence of this marked recommendation, and of the great estimation in which Saldanha was held—notwithstanding there were eleven officers, in the first Division alone, of higher grade and longer service than his own, he was appointed, being now twenty-seven years of age, to the sole command of the two Divisions. From that time, the army he commanded became invincible. It adored him for his bravery; for his kindness and affability to all ranks; as well as for the strenuous efforts he made to secure punctual payment to the troops, and for the care he took for their well-being and comfort. Yet Saldanha was a strict disciplinarian. The training which he had received under Wellington and Beresford had contributed to make him such. Of Beresford, whom he so much respected, the author has often heard Saldanha remark, that the marshal was the man the most *justiceiro* of any that he had ever known; meaning by this expression, to denote one who executed justice strictly and severely without favoritism. That Saldanha had profited by the marshal's example, we may learn from the following anecdote.

During the Peninsular War, Saldanha was quartered for a time in Lisbon with his regiment, of which he was lieut.-colonel. It had become an exceedingly inconvenient practice of the soldiers to be repeatedly requesting ladies to ask their colonel to grant them leave of absence. Consequently, one day, after parade, Saldanha announced to them that any soldier who in future should solicit such leave, otherwise than by direct application to his colonel, would be punished with twelve lashes. For a time, after this warning, all went well. But one evening, at a party, a lady came up to Saldanha and declared that she had a favour to ask. He replied, with his usual courtesy, that it was already granted. "Well," she said, "it is only leave of absence, for three days, for my godson." "Cer-

tainly," exclaimed Saldanha, "I will not fail to attend to you request." He accordingly took down the name of the soldier and, on the following morning, in the presence of the regiment, he called forward the man, and inquired of him, if, contrary to orders, he had solicited Donna * * * to obtain leave of absence for him. The man acknowledged he had. "Well," said Saldanha, "I have given my word to the lady that your request shall be granted. I also will keep my word with respect to the discipline of the regiment. You will receive the twelve lashes, and the three days' leave of absence." It will be imagined that similar requests were, in future, not made.

On his first arrival in Brazil, Saldanha took a very effective way of silencing intrigues amongst the officers under his command. He was soon made aware that there were many mischief-makers in a certain regiment, and that he himself would inevitably be the subject of their intrigues. When an opportunity occurred, an officer told Saldanha that he was sorry to inform him that this and that officer had been saying many things to disparage their commander; and that he, the officer, had thought it his duty to put Saldanha on his guard, and warn him of those who were his detractors. Saldanha thanked him for his good intentions towards him; and the officer retired, doubtless greatly pleased with himself and his success. But on the first occasion when the officers were assembled together, Saldanha addressed them; and said, that he was very well aware that no officer in command, notwithstanding his best endeavours, could hope always to give satisfaction to those under his orders; that he was sorry to hear that several officers, in no measured terms, had expressed themselves dissatisfied with him; he hoped always to do his duty. But one piece of advice he must offer to all present,—which was, that whenever they had any observations to make, unfavourable to him, that they would not confide them to Captain * * *, because the said officer would make a point of immediately repeating them to their commander. From that moment, no officer ever attempted to prejudice Saldanha against his companions.

If we were able to accompany Saldanha throughout this war,

which lasted, without intermission, for a period of nearly six years, it would doubtless be, by all reports, a narration of daring acts of courage, of hair-breadth escapes, and of skill in command. Artigas was a brave and clever general, and was continually shifting the scene of action in these vast provinces. The duration of the war will not, therefore, astonish us. Notwithstanding that the object of the Brazilians had not been to obtain increase of territory, but simply to preserve their own; yet, at the conclusion of the war, in spite of the protest of Spain, Montevideo was incorporated in the Brazilian Empire. A history of this war has not been written; which is to be regretted, as it would have had a peculiar interest, from the strange mode of warfare carried on by the valiant Indians, whom Artigas had so carefully and successfully disciplined.

In all these long campaigns, Saldanha was accompanied by his youthful and affectionate wife, who cheerfully suffered with him those domestic privations inseparable from war. We may feel assured that her presence, amidst such constant scenes of hardship and rough struggles, tended not a little to preserve in Saldanha that mild and amiable courtesy which distinguished him through life.

CHAPTER III.

1821—1822.

Montevideo annexed to Brazil—Saldanha captain-general—His government—Bribe offered—Crime repressed—Justice—Popular movements—D. João returns to Portugal—Arbitrary decrees—Brazilians revolt—Conduct of Saldanha—Correspondence—Demands a passport—Is offered a kingdom—Reasons for refusal—Goes to Rio—Offers made—Patriotic reply—D. Pedro crowned emperor—Saldanha wears mourning at theatre—Message from the emperor—Reply—Goes to Lisbon—Reception there.

AT the termination of the war, which, as we have seen, resulted in the annexation of Montevideo to Brazil, the Count da Figueira was captain-general of the Province of Rio Grande. The king, D. João, desirous of replacing him, consulted with Admiral Quintella as to the officer whose nomination would be most advisable; and he requested him to ascertain the public opinion on that subject. In a few days, the admiral returned to the king, and said, "I have found the man. I have made inquiries of people of all kinds of opinions; but in the mouths of all there is but one name, and that is João Carlos de Saldanha." Saldanha was accordingly appointed captain-general, or viceroy, of the Province.

After commanding successfully in the field, he was now called upon to exercise his talents in a widely different scene of action —that of the government of a vast Province. He accepted the appointment in troublous times. As early as 1817, signs of dissatisfaction and of revolutionary intentions had been shown in various parts of Brazil. But the Province of Rio Grande had been tranquil, and remained so under Saldanha's wise and benignant administration. He sought intercourse with the chiefs of the Indians, who were no longer in arms, and they became personally attached to him. He administered justice so evenly to all classes that he was popular throughout the province; and none but the ill-intentioned and wicked sought to

disparage him. "And by what means," says Saldanha himself in a private letter, "did I gain the affections of the inhabitants of Rio Grande? By such as have ever obtained for me the esteem and friendship of those who have been under my government or command. Few results are so securely attainable as the love of one's subordinates, when proper means are used to inspire it. The entire secret consists in, first, justice in the distribution of rewards and punishments: mercy is a noble quality, but justice holds the first place in the social world; secondly, lenity to involuntary errors, but inexorable justice to wilful ones; thirdly, to make evident the pain you feel in inflicting punishment, and to prove that the punishment is inflicted from a feeling of public duty, without the slightest shadow of personal feeling; fourthly, to show yourself interested in the fortunes of those around you—rejoicing with the happy, and sympathising with the unfortunate; fifthly, to endeavour, as far as possible, by kindness and condescension, to lessen the arduous duties of service. In command of a brigade, at the age of twenty-four, and, four years later, commanding two of the three Divisions which composed the army at Rio da Prata, I played at *Malha* and other games with my aides-de-camp and officers. Many of them still live, and could testify if the general, on any occasion, ever had reason to repent the familiarity to which he admitted his officers, or if an instance ever occurred of their failing in their respect to him."

When Saldanha arrived at Porto Alegre, the Capital of the Province which he was about to govern, he called together, on the following day, all the principal inhabitants of the city, and requested their opinions and advice as to the requirements both of the Capital and the Province, and as to the reforms which they considered were the most necessary to be undertaken. He found the business of all the public offices enormously in arrear; but he set to work; and, following the example of his illustrious grandfather, the Marquis de Pombal, he commenced by providing that every case should be brought forward in its proper order; and, when all arrears were disposed of, he took care that from henceforth they should never again be allowed to accumulate.

Public men might freely give their advice to, and private individuals might feel proud at being consulted by the governor of their Province. Following out his views of reform, and undeterred by any considerations for the wealth and influence of those whose interests he would have to assail, Saldanha soon felt called upon to interfere with one of those parasites on the State, in the shape of a farmer of the public revenues, who regard their enormous gains as establishing almost a vested interest in their contracts, and who resent with bitterness any attempt, however conscientious, in a minister, either to reduce their profits or to make better terms for the public advantage.

Many years previously, the tithes on the cattle and the fifth on the skins which the Province annually yielded, had been farmed at Rio by public auction to one Antonio de Paiva and his sons; and the contract had been continued to them by successive decrees, without being again put up to public auction, as the law required. The number of cattle having greatly increased during these years, the loss to the public revenue was proportionately great. Saldanha, on inquiry, found also that great frauds and much injustice were committed in the collection of that revenue. His predecessor had attempted to remedy the evil, but in vain, notwithstanding he went to Rio on purpose to remonstrate with the Government.

Saldanha's inquiries becoming known, the son of Sr. Antonio Paiva presented himself at the Residency, and declared to his Excellency, that his father had heard with great pain, that the general had some idea of putting up the tithes and fifths to auction. He hinted to the general how ineffectual had been the attempts of his predecessor to induce the Government at Rio to order that step to be taken; that his father's contract was now sanctioned by so many decrees; and he presumed to insinuate, that the attempt to rescind those decrees would be an act of rashness, which might create many enemies, and lead to very serious consequences to the general. He then ventured to add, that his father and himself were honourable men; and that, if the general would allow the affair to remain as it was at present, they, in the most secret and confidential manner, would place the sum of 200 contos (about £56,000) at the

general's disposition. The reader may be surprised at this offer; but, if so, he little appreciates the extent and ramification of intrigue and corruption in those days. The very insolence of the proposal shows the estimate in which Paiva and his son had grown to hold the integrity of public men, while it proves that they felt they must bid high for a Saldanha. But they were destined to learn a lesson that should give to them instruction, and to the public an example.

Saldanha at once replied that he had indeed conceived the idea referred to; and had, in fact, within a few days, forwarded to the Secretary of State a proposal for his approbation; but, that now, after what he had heard at this interview, he could assure Sr. Paiva that the contract should be annulled, and that the farming of the tithes and fifths should be put up, within a few days, to public auction. This was accordingly done; and the increased produce of the taxes was so great, that no interested party at Rio had the courage or assurance to say a word against the measure.

But not only contracts made at the expense of the State revenues required to be reformed, the administration of public justice equally demanded it. At the time of Saldanha's arrival, the gallows were familiarly known as the *Donzella*, or *Maiden*, from the fact of there never having been an execution at Porto Alegre since they were put up. Yet, he found in the prisons, no less than eighty-four criminals charged with the crime of murder. Bringing them to trial, he selected, from those found guilty, four of the most atrocious cases, and had the murderers hanged. And in order that all classes might be alike impressed by the terror of this example, the four who suffered were selected from different races of men, comprising a white man, a mulatto, an Indian, and a negro. The white man was cousin of Lieut.-General João de Deos Minna Barreto, head of one of the most influential families of the Province. The result of this judicious firmness was, that, during the remainder of Saldanha's government in Rio Grande, not another prosecution on a charge of assassination became necessary.

If, by these prudent measures, Rio Grande was rendered happy and prosperous, the other Provinces of the Brazilian

empire, less fortunate in their government, were not so. Popular movements had commenced at Pernambuco. These were followed by disturbances at Bahia and Pará, which, on the 26th of February (1821), extended themselves to Rio itself. A Constitution was insisted on and granted; and the king and the prince royal took the oath to the new order of affairs. The king, from the balcony of his palace, is said to have called out, "Constitution for ever!"

The Count de Palmella, who, at that time, was Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rio, had advised the king to prevent the ill effects of revolution by placing himself at the head of it and guiding its course. Already, in January, in a letter to the king, Palmella had declared that, unless the fatal revolution of 1820 (to which we shall hereafter refer) were stemmed in Portugal, disasters must be expected in Brazil. He represented, very truly, that it was not only by the mal-administration of justice and of the finances that Portugal had been agitated and made unruly; but it had been further excited by the example of other countries which were bent on obtaining constitutional government. He therefore advised the king to consent to a suitable Constitution in Portugal, and to go there himself; or, at least, to send his eldest son, D. Pedro, in order to stay further anarchy in that country.

D. João, accordingly, in April, 1821, was prevailed upon to leave Rio for Lisbon, where he arrived on the 3rd of July, bringing with him his wife and younger son, D. Miguel; and leaving D. Pedro to govern, as regent, in Brazil. In this place we will only refer to Portugal so far as to observe that, shortly after the king's arrival, the Cortes thought proper to decree that Brazil should be divided into provincial governments, subordinate to the government at Lisbon; and they determined, probably with a foresight of his intentions, that D. Pedro should return to Europe. This and other decrees made at Lisbon, without consulting the colonists, were ordered to be carried into effect at the commencement of the year (1822).

Great was the excitement when these orders reached Brazil. Provisional Juntas were formed throughout the country in opposition to the Government at Lisbon. The authority of the

captains-general in the various Provinces was upset, except only in that of Rio Grande; and, to all appearance, the state of disobedience and anarchy promised to become general. On the 9th of January, the municipal authorities of Rio waited upon D. Pedro, who declared that he would never desert the country; and, from that day, measures were taken to ensure the independence of Brazil. For this act of rebellion, both against his father and his country, D. Pedro may, probably, have excused himself under the pretext that, had he not done so, all the Brazilian Provinces would have become one or many republics. The Portuguese troops at Rio, after offering some ineffectual opposition, were allowed to embark for Lisbon on the 12th of the following month. Those at Bahia and Montevideo continued in those Provinces to support the authority of the mother country. These circumstances coming to the knowledge of Saldanha, he wrote to the various local authorities, and to the most influential inhabitants of the Province, to the effect, that "the people of Brazil, from Pará to Sta Catharina, having established provisional Juntas," he invited the people of Rio Grande to state in writing their ideas on the subject, in order to advise with him in establishing a government, that would not be inconsistent with the orders they had received from the mother country; and he, at the same time, informed them that their answers would be all opened on a given day in the Municipal Hall, and there be publicly read.

When that day arrived, the replies were found to be unanimous in declaring, that they were all so satisfied with the government of Saldanha, that they only regretted it could not be eternal.

During the three following nights, the inhabitants, spontaneously and with enthusiasm, illuminated the Capital, Porto Alegre. On the third night, when the captain-general entered the theatre, all the ladies rose and sang verses in his honour, which were composed for the occasion, the chorus to which, as sung by the whole house, was as follows:

Ditosa gente !	Fortunate people !
Feliz terreno !	Happy land !
Que um tal Governo	That such a ruler
Poude alcançar.	Has obtained.

In this state of affairs, Saldanha at once called the electors together, in order to proceed to the choice of the three Presidents, whom, as he pointed out to them, the new law had determined should be elected; and which law he considered it his duty to his sovereign, D. João VI., and to his country to see carried out.

The electors met at 9 o'clock in the morning, and consulted until 2 P.M. A deputation of fifteen then waited upon the captain-general, and declared that the electors, to the number of 120, after serious consideration of the subject, had come to the unanimous conclusion not to proceed to the elections; but they desired that General Saldanha should alone continue to govern the Province as hitherto. To this, Saldanha replied, that their decision did him much honour; but that, nevertheless, it was not a question of opinion required of them, but of the execution of the law; and that he, as chief authority amongst them, required its fulfilment; and that any delay on his part would, at a distance of 2000 leagues from Lisbon, whence his orders emanated, be liable to misconstruction by his Government. The deputation retired, but returned at 8 o'clock, and added to their former declaration, "that the entire body of electors were satisfied that the people desired no other government than that of Saldanha; and that such were the instructions which they had received from their constituents." But Saldanha was firm in his purpose of executing the orders of the Government under which he was serving; and he declared to the deputation, that their refusal to obey would oblige him to retire, and would leave the government in a state of anarchy. On the following morning, at half-past 4 A.M., the whole body of electors proceeded to the palace of the captain-general, and there declared to him that, as there was no law which prohibited the three various appointments from being centred in one person, they had unanimously elected him as president of the Civil Government; of the department of Justice; and of Finance; and they asserted, as their opinion, that he was equally eligible to continue in command of the military forces. Accordingly, much to the satisfaction of the people, Saldanha found that he could offer no further opposition to this literal

carrying out of the law, although it was not, probably, quite as it was intended it should be.

But soon the desire for complete independence of the mother country showed itself throughout Brazil. Even the Province of Rio Grande joined in the almost universal and very natural wish, accompanied though it was by the desire that their favourite, Saldanha, should still be their governor, and be one of themselves. Now Saldanha was in heart and soul a Portuguese. Proud of his ancestral lineage, he loved the country of his birth with a fervour that was more than patriotic. He saw instantly the danger of accepting this otherwise flattering proposal, and resolved never to occupy a position, however lofty, which might embarrass his honour or his patriotism with a divided duty. As early, therefore, as May, 1822, he wrote to Rio, demanding his dismission, and insisted upon resigning all the appointments he held. A provisional Junta in favour of Brazilian independence was formed at Porto Alegre, to whom Saldanha equally addressed himself, declaring his unalterable resolution to resign all the employments he held in Brazil, and to return to his own country, allegiance to which he would never abandon.

On the 13th of July (1822), Saldanha addressed a letter to the vice-president and members of this Junta, of which he himself had been elected president, wherein he declared his resolution to retire from the provincial Capital, Porto Alegre, as soon as possible. He, however, still continued to hold his military appointments; as he had, in the first instance, received them from and under his sovereign, D. João; while he administered the duties of his civilian appointments, to which he had been elected under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. We do not pretend to explain here the limits of these various jurisdictions; our object being merely to enable the reader to understand the following correspondence, and to appreciate the motives of Saldanha. But it will create no surprise to learn, that, from the moment when the revolutionary plots began, even Saldanha became exposed to endless intrigues and hostilities; so that his position remained more elevated than agreeable. But he continued to discharge the multifarious duties of his several offices, until D. Pedro himself rendered

this position in Brazil no longer consistent with his loyalty to the Crown of Portugal. On January 9th (1822), we have seen that D. Pedro determined on assuming the sovereignty in Brazil, and that the Portuguese troops at Rio, finding their efforts ineffectual to support the authority of their absent sovereign, had embarked on the 12th of February for Lisbon. Further, on June 3rd (1822), by decree emanating from Rio de Janeiro, D. Pedro ordered an assembly to be convoked, with the avowed object of settling the bases on which Brazil should be established as an independent kingdom. If, up to this time, Saldanha had waited for an opportunity to throw down the offices which he held under the provincial government of Rio Grande; and for the orders of his sovereign to retire from the governorship of that Province, while he should either resign his military command in Brazil, or use it in maintaining the integrity of the empire, now, at least, he hesitated no longer. The reader will find in the following extract from his letter of the 3rd July, the explanation of his motives. After referring to his incessant labours and efforts, amidst intrigues and opposition, to maintain unity and peace within the Province of Rio Grande, and to the fact that those efforts had not been considered sufficiently meritorious to obtain the full confidence of the ministers at Rio de Janeiro, he appeals to the fact that he had preserved in the Province under his government, although "under the most critical and difficult circumstances, the most perfect state of peace and tranquillity, at a period when it was, perhaps, the only Province in Brazil where blood has not been shed through political opinions." He acknowledges "the demonstrations of affection and confidence which the inhabitants of that Province had so prodigally bestowed upon him;" and explains, at length, the reasons for his retirement, in the following terms:—

"HEAD QUARTERS AT PORTO ALEGRE, *July 3rd*, 1822.

"ILLMOS E EXMOS SENHORES,

"I addressed, on the 3rd of May, to his Royal Highness, through the Home Office, a representation, in which I requested him to grant me a dismissal from my various military

posts in this Province; and this request I repeated a second and third time, as I have already informed your Excellencies, awaiting the decision of his Royal Highness, and trusting I should be allowed to retire. News, however, arrived here a few days ago from Rio de Janeiro, with the decree of his Royal Highness, dated June 3rd, in which he orders, (without first consulting the wishes of the people or of the Cortes,* where nearly all the Provinces of this kingdom are legally represented, and after simply hearing the two representatives of Rio de Janeiro,) that a constituent and legislative assembly be convoked, for the purpose of at once deciding the bases on which to establish the independence of Brazil—publicly announced to-day in this city. This has convinced me that the political measures lately adopted at that Court tend towards the separation from the Portuguese monarchy of, at least, the southern portion of Brazil, and are an attack upon the sovereignty of the nation; which opinion of mine, far from being singular, is shared by a Brazilian born, a man of intelligence, a lover of his country, and one who reflects honour upon Bahia, his birthplace. Now, as I took an oath of fidelity to our sovereign, D. João VI. as King of the Portuguese; to the Cortes; and to the Constitution which the said Cortes prepared, I cannot, nor ought I, as a Portuguese, to give my support to an act which is entirely opposed to the principles adopted by the nation and by the king, and sworn to by all. For these reasons, I take advantage of the permission which his Royal Highness concedes in his proclamation published in the Rio Gazette, by which all who hold contrary opinions are allowed to leave the country; and I conceive myself fully authorized to renounce the posts I hold in this Province, and to return to my country. Considering, therefore, the powerful reasons I have stated, I trust that your Excellencies, justly appreciating them, will accept the resignation, which I now offer, of all my posts; and will grant me a passport, for the persons named in the accompanying list, for Lisbon, by way of Montevideo, where the military Division to which I am attached will embark (if it has not already done

* Assembled at Lisbon.

so) to return to Portugal. Allow me to assure your Excellencies, that no considerations whatever will make me give up this resolution, which is based upon the risk I run of seeing my honour, as well as the fidelity I swore to the king and to the nation, suspected, should I continue any longer in the posts I at present occupy.

"I have, etc. etc.

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA."

Notwithstanding this determined resolution on Saldanha's part, these gentlemen of the Junta left no resort untried, whether by way of evasion, assertion, plausible argument or bold refusal, to deter Saldanha from his purpose, and to retain him in their midst.

In the correspondence that ensued, the Junta vainly endeavoured to explain away the obligation of the oath which Saldanha was so firmly resolved not to violate; and, finally, finding that all further attempts to induce their president to become a Brazilian, and to give up his allegiance to Portugal, would be unavailing, the Junta at Porto Alegre granted him a passport.

The passport to Saldanha was as cautiously given, as it was tardily. It allowed him to proceed only to the seat of Government at Rio de Janeiro; whereas he had applied for permission to embark at Montevideo. Although the main object of the regent, D. Pedro, might have been the important, but hopeless, attempt to induce Saldanha to remain in Brazil, there was a less worthy motive in preventing him from proceeding to the port he had named. It was feared by D. Pedro, that Saldanha would unite himself to that portion of the "Royal Volunteers," which, under the command of D. Alvaro da Costa da Souza de Macedo, still remained at Montevideo, faithful to Portugal and to D. João VI. Their former commander, General Lecor, had himself, from the commencement, declared his adhesion to the new empire. D. Alvaro, like Saldanha, was a man of illustrious descent in Portugal, in whose family there is said to exist a dormant British peerage. Lecor was a soldier of fortune.

On the occasion we have related, as on many others with which the reader will be made acquainted hereafter, Saldanha

well deserved the confidence of his sovereign, while he took captive the hearts of the people by his incorruptible firmness of principle:

> "Among innumerable false, unmoved,
> Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified,
> His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal."

Before Saldanha left Porto Alegre, he was waited upon by a deputation from the chief people of the Provinces of Montevideo, of Santa Fé, of Corrientes, and of Rio Grande, who declared; that they were disposed to form an independent kingdom of their Provinces, if Saldanha would accept the Crown. On this subject, in a letter dated August 13th, 1869, Saldanha wrote: "Thanking them sincerely, I, without hesitation, refused the offer. *Un roi parvenu*, and in those regions, would have found himself in a precarious situation. I may sincerely declare before God, that neither in my public nor in my private life have I ever committed an intentional act of injustice; and I am persuaded that I should have been *un assez bon chef dans un Etat quelconque*. But, if events at any epoch of my life may have given rise to contrary opinions, I assure you, on my honour, that my highest ambition has ever been to be considered one of the bravest soldiers of the armies in which I have served; an honest man; and a sincere and devoted lover of my country."

During his long journey by land from Porto Alegre to Rio, Saldanha was greeted by the inhabitants of the country through which he travelled with the greatest attentions and enthusiasm. The authorities everywhere met him on his arrival; and, wherever he passed the night, the houses were illuminated. The people cried out; "*Viva o nosso Saldanha, que ha de ser brazileiro por força.*" * The regent himself, who could respect in Saldanha that consistent loyalty to D. João which he had himself violated towards his own father, met him at Stª Cruz, ten leagues from Rio de Janeiro.

On Saldanha's arrival at Rio, great and repeated efforts were made by the Government to induce him to become a Brazilian.

* "Viva our Saldanha, who *must* become a Brazilian."

He was offered the post of marshal-general of the army; the title of marquis; and a grant of Crown lands to any extent, and in whichever Province he might select. Such were the proposals made to Saldanha by the emperor, and urged upon him by the ministers, and by the most influential people of Rio. The minister, José Bonifacio d'Andrade, endeavoured to persuade him to remain, by arguing that, by the separation from Brazil, Portugal would become an impoverished and insignificant country. "The greater the reason," replied Saldanha, "that I should not desert it."

We have the following incident, relating to this period, in Saldanha's handwriting.

"On the first occasion that the emperor received me at S. Chrisostomo, he perceived that I wore the Portuguese national colours, blue and white. After I had left him, and had retired to the further extremity of the long gallery where we had conversed, his Majesty sent a Chamberlain to request that I would not make use of those colours. I replied, that the prince royal had declared the separation of the two kingdoms; but that I, who intended to remain a Portuguese, would never cease to wear the colours of the country to which I had the honour to belong. The Chamberlain returned again, advising me on the part of the emperor that I should not wear them in public, lest I should receive some insult from the people. I replied, that I was too old a soldier to be afraid of *moleques*.* Making an angry gesture, the Chamberlain retired. Half an hour later, the Minister of Marine told me that, for the future, his Majesty would receive me without a uniform."

The independence of Brazil having been declared, the regent, on the 12th of October (1822), had thought proper to assume the government of the country by the title of the Emperor D. Pedro. We have little to do with the motives which induced him to this act of hostility towards his father and his native country; nor need we enter into the negotiations which followed it. Suffice it to say, that it was not until the 13th of May, 1825, that the independence of Brazil was formally acknowledged by Portugal.

* A *moleque* is a young black slave.

The emperor was crowned on the 1st of December. Saldanha was still at Rio. There were great festivities on the occasion of the coronation. At night, the emperor went in state to the theatre. Saldanha appeared there, dressed in black, and occupied a seat in the box of his sister, the Countess da Ponte. The Minister of Marine going in, said, "General, the emperor wonders why you are in mourning." "Can I be otherwise," replied Saldanha, "on the day when the dissolution of the monarchy is effected!" The full import of this incident will be appreciated, when it is remembered, that the emperor went in state; the Court was in full dress; all officers, of necessity, in uniform; and all Orders and decorations were put on by those who were entitled to wear them. The conduct, therefore, of Saldanha indicated his silent protest, that he had not yielded up, but still maintained, his allegiance to his lawful sovereign; while he mourned over the dismemberment of the Portuguese empire.

Saldanha, two days afterwards, left Rio, in the bark *Tres Coraçoens*, and reached Lisbon, with his wife and infant son, afterwards Count d'Almoster,* on the 25th of January, 1823. With the principles which actuated his conduct through life, it will readily be imagined that he left behind him many friends and admirers. Nor need it create much astonishment—none to those who knew him well — that the captain-general of a Province, with almost unlimited power, reached his country, after eight years of service, with less than £6 in his possession.

A glorious reception might have been expected for one who had served his country so well, and his sovereign so faithfully. But it was otherwise. One Colonel Augusto Pinto was a fellow passenger on the voyage home, who, although he had, from the commencement of the revolution, taken part in the rebellion against his country, had, but a day before the ship sailed, been dismissed from the command of a regiment of grenadiers, which he had held under the new Government. "Equal," remarks Saldanha, "was our reception; and similar were the replies which we received to the letters we addressed to the Cortes on

* Born on the 26th of December, 1821, and baptized in the month of April following, at Porto Alegre.

our arrival." Future events may throw some light on what would otherwise appear incomprehensible.

Some years after this period, when Saldanha met D. Pedro in Paris, conversing together on the events which had taken place in Brazil since the departure of Saldanha in December, 1822, the ex-emperor said, "What the devil did you do with the Brazilians in the Province of Rio Grande? When I went there, I heard nothing from all sides but what was done in the time of Sr. Saldanha. Sr. Saldanha did this—Sr. Saldanha did that." D. Pedro added, that the very road on which he had travelled was called "Estrada Saldanha," a name which the authorities had given it in memory of their beloved and regretted governor.

Saldanha was one of the very few officers who held the gold medal for having served the entire period of the six years' war in Montevideo. Many of his companions have declared that period as the most interesting one of his life. But, alas, nearly sixty years have passed by, and the thousand anecdotes and recollections of his goodness, valour, judgment and wisdom are now lost for ever.

CHAPTER IV.

1823.

Occurrences in Portugal—Revolution of 1820—Cortes assembled—Regency—D. João arrives—He accepts the Constitution—Queen banished from Court—Opinions respecting the Constitution—Russia, Austria, and Prussia recall their ministers—Observations—Saldanha's desire for constitutional government—Ordered to return to Brazil—His refusal, correspondence, and peremptory order from the king—Is sent to prison—Kindness to a fellow-prisoner.

AFTER the departure of the royal family from Portugal for Brazil, in 1807, a regency had governed at Lisbon in the name of the queen, D. Maria I. At her death, in 1816, her son, D. João VI., became king, but continued to reside at Rio. During the regency, there was a great tendency already shown in Portugal towards so-called liberal ideas. In 1817, the Government became aware of a conspiracy which was plotted amongst some officers of the army, the object of which was to revolutionise the country. General G. F. d'Andrade was the prime mover of it. The plot being discovered, he and some others were tried and executed. Indeed, since the close of the Peninsular War, influenced probably by the example of Spain, affairs had been far from presenting a calm appearance in Portugal; and the English Government had been, for some time past, desirous that the royal family should return to Lisbon. Already, in 1816, Admiral Sir John Beresford had been sent with a squadron to Rio, for the purpose of bringing them to Europe. But the king, at the last moment, refused to depart.

Increased signs of political agitation were seen in Portugal at the commencement of 1820. Masonic lodges were in full activity; and there was a secret political society, at Oporto,

called the "Synedrio," composed of all the restless spirits of that city. In these circumstances, Marshal Beresford, still, at that time commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, left Lisbon for Brazil, early in April, in order to make the king acquainted with the actual state of affairs, as well as to insist on the necessary means for the payment of the troops, and to ask for additional powers with which to meet any extraordinary case of political emergency. During his absence, there was a successful rising, on the 24th of August, at Oporto; and the people were seconded by the troops in proclaiming the necessity of a constitutional government. A Junta was at once formed, presided over by Sr. A. da Silveira Pinto da Fonseca;* and a manifesto was published, stating the causes of complaint which, it declared, the nation had against the actual government. This Junta pretended to be actuated by no want of loyalty to the reigning family of Bragança; and their protestations of fidelity to the Crown, and respect for the religion of the country, led the people in general to acquiesce in the change of government which had taken place. The Marquis de Chaves, then Count de Amarante, thought proper, however, on news of this change, to march towards Oporto with the force at his disposal; but, on the road, he was, for the most part, deserted by his troops. The regency at Lisbon, seeing this, issued a proclamation on the 1st of September, convoking the Cortes in the name of the absent king, in order to avoid, as it was declared, "the imminent evils of anarchy, civil war, and, perhaps, the dissolution of the monarchy." This proclamation was drawn up by the Count de Palmella; and signed by the Cardinal Patriarch, the Marquis de Borba, Count de Peniche, Count de Faria, and by Sr. A. Gomes Ribeiro. At the same time, they sent a messenger to Rio, urging the immediate return of the king to Lisbon.

The measures taken by the regency to prevent the spread of the revolution were ineffectual. The calling together of the Cortes was too late: for, on the 15th of the same month, the example of Oporto was followed in the Capital. A Junta, calling itself the "Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo,"

* He afterwards became Viscount de Canellas, and joined the party of D. Miguel.

was formed; and, by its authority, the regency was formally dismissed.

On the 6th of October, the Junta called on all Portuguese to take an oath of obedience to the "established government; to the Cortes (not yet assembled); and to the Constitution yet to be made; maintaining always the Catholic religion and the Bragança dynasty." Orders were issued by the Junta that deputies for all the Provinces should be elected to form a representative Chamber. Palmella (and we believe the Count de Linhares) declined to take the oath, and he embarked for Rio de Janeiro. Lord Beresford returned from that city on the 12th of October in H.M.S. *Vengeance*, 74, Captain Maitland, but was not allowed to land in Portugal.

On the 24th of January (1821), a "Cortes" was assembled at Lisbon, consisting of one Chamber, under the presidency of the Archbishop of Bahia. In the absence of D. João, a regency was formed, consisting of the following five members: the Marquis de Castello Melhor; Count de Sampayo; Frey Francisco de S. Luiz; José da Silva Carvalho; and João da Cunha Sotto Maior. The provisional Junta resigned its powers. We have little to do with the proceedings of this Cortes, unless it be to remark, that their first budget showed a deficit of nearly three millions sterling.

Urged by the advice of Palmella on his reaching Rio, D. João, after some hesitation, (and a proposal that D. Pedro should proceed to Portugal in his stead, as regent,) determined on returning; and having left Rio on the 26th of April, 1821, as we have already stated, he arrived at Lisbon on the 3rd of July, accompanied by about 4000 persons, including his family, the Corps Diplomatique, the Ministers, the Court, deputies for the colonies, and a numerous suite.

On the following day, the king disembarked amidst great rejoicings, accompanied by his son, D. Miguel. After attending a Te Deum at the cathedral, he proceeded to the House of Deputies, where he took the oath to the new Constitution, "so far as it was already prepared." This Constitution was not completed to the satisfaction of its framers until after long deliberation. It was, in the end, but a copy of that which had been

proclaimed in Spain so long previously as 1812. Its principles were completely republican. There was no Senate or second Chamber; and the prerogatives of the king were hardly those of a republican president.

At length, on the 23rd of September, 1822, the completed Constitution was declared ready for trial; and D. João, on the 1st of October following, took the required oath to its observance. One hundred and forty deputies were present on the occasion, who signed their adherence to the Constitution. On the 4th, the Chamber was prorogued.

On the 1st of December the House met. The king was not present at the opening of the Session. An unexpected event occurred. The royal consort, D. Carlota, refused to take the oath to the Constitution. Persisting in her refusal, a royal decree, dated December 4th, after declaring that she had forfeited all her rights by such refusal, ordered her to retire from the Court and reside at the Quinta de Ramalhão, near Cintra. It was pretended, that the state of her health prevented her from actually being banished from the kingdom—the punishment assigned to every Portuguese, of whatever degree, who declined to take the required oath to the new *liberal* Constitution.

A Portuguese writer, Sr. L. A. Rebello da Silva, whose opinions cannot be suspected of anti-liberalism, having, at a later period, served as Minister of State with an ultra-liberal government, thus describes the Constitution which these revolutionary liberals had concocted.

"The Constitution of the 23rd of September, 1822, when it left the hands of its authors was already diseased with political consumption, of which in the following year it died suddenly." . . . . "The general opinions of Europe were against its principles." . . . . "A single Chamber, of popular origin, had to nominate a 'State Council,' composed of thirteen members, whose term of office was to be but for four years." . . . . "The Crown, deprived of the right of dissolving that Chamber or of proroguing or assembling it, was silent and powerless in the presence of the Assembly." . . . . "If the Chamber became factious, violent, inimical to order, the sovereign, with hands tied, must yield to its deliriums or its treacheries, and behold

its suicide with crossed arms! To unjust and fatal laws the sovereign could only oppose a temporary opposition! (the *veto suspensivo*). Six ministers, ineligible to a seat in the House, possessed no vote in the popular Senate." In framing this Constitution, be it said, twenty-six deputies voted for two Chambers.

Sr. Rebello da Silva acknowledges that the "Congress," instead of taking advantage of the occasion, and of the favourable intentions of D. João, in order to effect some real good for the benefit of the country, contented itself with the proclamation of theoretical principles, and entangled itself in questions of secondary and remote interest. "A Constitution thus paralysed," he writes, "and reduced to a collection of theoretical maxims,* neither fulfilled its promises, nor produced the benefits, which all had hoped would be the result of its establishment. On the contrary, the fallacy of the unnatural graft of new institutions on the decayed stem of absolute government aggravated the disease. The wording of the liberal code, unsupported by regulating laws, was devoid of meaning to the ears of the people.† Men in office, having no responsibility, smiled at a document which, for want of execution, had become a dead letter. Their excesses were shielded by impunity. For the most part, those who occupied the highest situations of the magistracy and of the finance department were still the same who had so much contributed towards the ruin of the regency of the Rocio; and the vices and the systematic and lucrative abuses of their administration, far from being restrained, had been encouraged by many, who purposely omitted no means, however base and disloyal, to discredit by corruption and immorality the first steps of the liberal government. The result was, that during the last months of its existence, there were

* Article 362 of the "Civil Code" declares that a man's *thoughts* are free: "O pensamento do homem é inviolavel."

† In Portugal, after a law has passed the Chambers, the Government is authorised to explain, amplify, or *regulate* such parts or articles of it as might otherwise admit of a doubtful interpretation. Such "regulations," simply signed by the Sovereign and Ministers, have the force of law, and naturally admit of many abuses, especially where the liberty of the subject is concerned. Charter, Article 75, § 12.

committed more scandals, more injustice, and more illegalities, if possible, than during the days of absolutism.

"The nation thus deceived in all its hopes, was not a nation composed of learned men and philosophers (who would be satisfied with theories). Great and immediate advantages had been promised; and, at the end of three years (from 1820), not one had been obtained! Abuses were to have been rooted out, and they spread in every direction. The people had been attracted, seduced and led by words; and, in the meshes of those who promised them so fairly, found themselves as poor, as oppressed, and as weak as they were before! Goodwill, if inactive, never gets beyond idle intentions; and no country was ever saved by such, however well-meant."

The establishment of this "Constitution of 1822," as we shall hereafter denominate it, was at once so strongly opposed by the three great powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, that they immediately recalled their ministers from the Court of D. João.

We may be permitted here, slightly, to anticipate the events of this history, by informing the reader, that when this Constitution of 1822 was abrogated in the following year, and was succeeded, in 1826, by one more consistent with steady and monarchical government, it became the great aim and object of Saldanha's life, as we shall hereafter see, to oppose the restoration of that of 1822; at the same time that he laboured to ensure for his country, at so many sacrifices, the benefits of sound constitutional government.

It may well be doubted if the calling together of the ancient Cortes of the kingdom, as by law and custom established, would not have been a more desirable step than any other. But the last meeting of such Cortes, consisting of members of the three Estates of the realm; the clergy, the nobility, and the people, had been so far back as 1697. Had they continued to assemble, and to assert their independence and rights, it is probable that the civil wars of this century would not have taken place.

If we may judge from the numerous instances, cited in Portuguese history, of the independence of the Cortes with regard to their sovereign, such Cortes were as unwilling as any

modern parliament to suffer the sovereign to encroach on their own liberties, or on those of the people.

We read in the Chronicle of Duarte Nunez Leão, that, in the 15th Cortes, which assembled about the year 1352, "The king went from Lisbon to Cintra to hunt, and remained nearly a month, at a time when matters of great importance, respecting the government of the kingdom, were treated in the Council. One of the members, in the name of the rest, spoke to him thus, on his reappearance in the Council :—'Sir, you ought to amend the life you lead, and remember that you were given to us as a king, in order to govern us; and, for this reason, we give you our tributes and maintain you in honour, whilst you follow the chase as an occupation, and the government of your kingdom as a pastime: whereas it is certain that God will not demand of you the number of boars and stags you have killed, but rather of the complaints which you have not heard, and the duties you have not performed. For, when *we* are treating of matters of the highest importance, you have absented yourself from the Council, in which you were so necessary, and have gone to the chase, leaving us here idle, for so many days, waiting for you. Reform, or if not, we will seek another king, who may govern us with justice, and not abandon the government of his subjects for the pursuit after wild beasts.'"

While this, apparently unsuccessful, attempt at constitutional government in Portugal was being tried, Saldanha arrived in Lisbon, on the 25th of January, 1823, as we have already stated. It would be difficult to ascertain, and, therefore, needless to inquire in what light his coming was viewed, either by the king or by the Constitutionalists. The former, probably, looked with some suspicion on a successful general, who returned to his country, after so long an absence, with a popularity which had preceded his arrival, and of which the king was well aware. The latter feared an adversary to their extreme principles, in a practical statesman, of the loyalty of whose sentiments there had never been a doubt. The desire of Saldanha, from his earliest youth, had been to see his country free, and in the enjoyment of those institutions which England possessed, and which he had carefully studied. But it was not to be supposed

that he would lend himself to support the republican principles, which, he would soon discover, guided the most active of the liberal party. They sought his aid and countenance, and hoped to induce him to become their chief. At the same time, the smallest tinge of liberal principles was sufficient to render him an object of suspicion at Court. There was no doubt of the hatred which the queen, his godmother, bore to the new ideas. She had rallied round her a party whose object was a complete reaction. As each of these parties professed to claim Saldanha as its own, and sought his support accordingly, they were always prepared, both now and hereafter, to heap abuse on him, proportionate to his unwillingness to proceed to the extreme lengths of either. But we shall find that his conduct was ever so undeviatingly open and straightforward, that, amidst all the intrigues and confusion of parties, he at all times stood firm, like the "faultless cube" (τετάγωνος ἀνεῦ ψογοῦ) which, in whatever way thrown, always remained upright.

Whatever were its motives, the government (liberal) was not long in coming to the decision, that the presence of General Saldanha was not desirable in Portugal. For, on the 7th of February, a "*Portaria*" appeared, which we present to our reader, together with the correspondence which, in consequence, immediately followed between the minister and the general. The reader will not fail to observe, that, on the date of this Portaria, Saldanha had been with his wife and child but twelve days in his country, after an absence of eight years of arduous and continual service.

PORTARIA.

"PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *February 7th*, 1823.

"The king has ordered that, through the War Office, it be communicated to the brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun, that his Majesty has been pleased to name him to a command in Brazil; for which purpose he will immediately proceed to embark on board the frigate *Perola*, where he will receive his credentials and instructions.

"(Signed) MANOEL GONÇALVES DE MIRANDA."

On receiving this indefinite commission, Saldanha was confounded. A "command!" and in "Brazil!" The very nature of his command was not specified; for it was not until a subsequent decree of the 11th February, that Saldanha received his actual commission, which thrust upon him the command of "all the military and naval forces which are to be, or are already, collected at Bahia, with the direction and command of the said forces wherever they may operate."

Perhaps no one living knew so well as Saldanha did, what were the requisites, under such circumstances, for such an expedition. He had but just returned from an experience of eight years in Brazil. During that period; in his varied capacities of general-in-command, governor of a vast Province, administrator of various different offices in detail within that Province, and, more than all, as a trusted citizen amidst citizens, he had acquired more than ordinary knowledge of the country, of its physical nature and resources, of the character of its people, and of the working of its institutions. Warned by that experience, he resolved he would not accept such a command, until reasonable provision had been made to meet its difficulties. If the scene of his intended operations had been a foreign country, or a colony, of which the mass of the population were loyal to the king whose commission he held, he might have regarded his duty from a different point of view. Invading a foreign country, he might have looked to levy supplies, or even money, upon the native population, to save a starving force; and, in a nominally loyal colony, he might have looked hopefully to the co-operation of the local government to furnish the same, whether upon payment in cash, or upon the credit of the parent State. But Brazil was then ruled by a son of D. João VI., who had usurped the sovereignty of his royal father; while the population had asserted the Independence of Brazil; and, instead of furnishing supplies, would probably have done their utmost to starve any army coming from Portugal. Moreover, Saldanha was aware of the strength of the force already in course of embarkation, as well as of the general nature and scale of intended operations. He foresaw, that if he at once accepted the proffered command, he would undertake a perilous expedi-

tion; practically without men, money, commissariat, or powers. He resolved, therefore, urgently to press the Government, and peremptorily (if needs be) to decline the command, unless the Government first provided him with the following requisites.

1. Pay for his men.

2. A commissariat, both in actual supplies, and with a complete staff to conduct the store department.

3. Full authority, in the name of the lawful sovereign, over the local Juntas of Finance, of whose impracticability he had had painful experience; and, in connection with that subject, a paymaster's department.

4. A carefully selected staff for the field; the staff, in all these branches, to consist of men nominated, or, at all events, approved, by himself.

5. Special powers to commission, cashier, or degrade officers; and to punish soldiers; including troops which he might raise in Brazil.

6. A clear establishment of his own supremacy over the provincial governments of Brazil.

The necessity of these conditions was only increased by the request—which he resolved to make—of a large addition to the force then in course of embarkation. If the correspondence which follows shall appear to the reader to be of a character unprecedented, so also were the circumstances. Saldanha acted under the firm conviction, that, without some such precautions as those which he required, his command could only end in disaster to the cause of the king, humiliation to his country, and ruin to his own reputation. He therefore addressed to the Minister of War the following letter.

"LISBON, *February 8th*, 1823.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"Having received last night a Portaria, undated,* in which your Excellency orders me to immediately embark on board the frigate *Perola;* as his Majesty had been pleased to do me the honour to select me for a command in Brazil; your Excellency adding, that my credentials and instructions would be

* The date had been carelessly omitted. It was afterwards supplied by order of the Minister of War.

forwarded to me on board;—my character as a citizen, my frankness as a soldier, and my duty as a general, to whom is committed a most difficult task and a most hazardous enterprise, lead me to lay before your Excellency some remarks which I consider necessary for the good of the service, and the honour of our country, and for my own justification.

"The Government, desirous of obtaining the certainty, as far as it can be assured, of a successful result in its efforts to pacify Brazil, and reduce the various factions to their due and just obedience to the royal authority—and considering the high degree of animosity which has there shown itself, the military force already established, and the operations already commenced, together with the fact that war has already been partially or entirely declared, must establish a just proportion between the means of attack and defence. Your Excellency, as an officer, cannot but recognize the truth of this; and, it is my opinion, that the means which are about to be placed at my disposal are decidedly insufficient: the battalions already embarked are reduced to half their numerical strength: and with less than 4000 men, in addition to those already in Brazil, I cannot persuade myself of the possibility of obtaining the desired result—of doing justice to the exertions of the nation, and of maintaining the reputation of the army.

"If your Excellency had not named me to the supreme command, I should have felt great pleasure in promptly and obediently serving, as I have done all my life; but, in the capacity of commander-in-chief, which makes me responsible to my country and to myself, I must know before I embark, what is to be the extent of my instructions, and what is required of me, in order that I may compare the enormous responsibility, I take upon myself, with the means placed at my disposal.

"In the 4000 men I have spoken of, I wish there should be included a squadron of cavalry, to be there mounted; and some light artillery.

"By the last news from Bahia, the Government is made aware of the requirements of General Madeira,* both in money

* The officer in command of the Portuguese "Royal Volunteers," stil remaining in Brazil.

and provisions. An increase of numbers must increase those wants. It is, therefore, necessary, that those items should be provided for in the following manner. I must take with me six months' pay for men and officers; and provisions for, at least, three months after my arrival. For your Excellency well knows that beyond the cities of the coast, which are well nigh exhausted, no supplies can be reckoned upon in Brazil at this moment.

"I should also desire that my instructions be most clear and explicit as to my authority over the Juntas of Finance,—the sources of so much dissension between the civil and military authorities in Brazil.

"The peculiar nature of my commission renders necessary a carefully selected Staff; not only for the direction of the operations on a field so vast and wide spread, but for the management of accounts which will serve as security for a just military and civil administration. For this service, I shall require men of my own particular selection; as, I am sure, your Excellency, who has been an officer, and an officer on the staff, will agree.

"Placed at such a distance from the seat of government, and subject to such various contingencies, the nature of the services I may have to order or require, render necessary extensive military powers—such as, in far less critical circumstances, were given to Lord Beresford and the Baron de Laguna. That is to say, the power to commission officers in the field, or cashier those who misconduct themselves; depriving them of their command; and sending them to Portugal, or punishing them upon the spot; with all the rigour of martial law, as circumstances may render advisable; and these powers are indispensable, not only over the troops I go to command, but for those I may raise in the country.

"I also consider it to be necessary that my supremacy over the provincial governments be clearly established; for the feeling of rivalry, and the observance of a petty etiquette, often prove great hindrances to military operations which require rapidity and prompt obedience.

"Allow me to remind your Excellency, that the situation of General Madeira may render it imperative that the troops

already on board should set out as soon as possible; and I can sail afterwards with the rest, if my ideas meet your Excellency's approval.

"Such are my opinions, and my conditions for accepting the command-in-chief; made, I repeat, because I consider them necessary for the public welfare. They are the result of eight years' experience in Brazil in various commands. Should, however, it be preferred that I should command a company, a regiment, or a brigade, I am quite ready to do so. For then, my only duty will be to obey; and fight when and where I am ordered. This I know how to do. But to take the command-in-chief, which implies responsibility, I can only do on the terms I have laid down.

"I have the honour, etc.

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA DE OLIVEIRA E DAUN.

"*To* H. E. MANOEL GONÇALVES DE MIRANDA."

Saldanha having had a conference with the minister, again addressed him as follows:—

"LISBON, *February 9th*, 1823.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"As the result of the conference I yesterday had with your Excellency, when I laid before you the absolute necessity that everything should be conceded which I had requested in my letter of the 7th, and which I had the honour of addressing to your Excellency in answer to the Portaria, which simply named me commander of the forces in—I cannot say what part of Brazil, as the Portaria does not state it; I again repeat most frankly and positively, that I will not accept the chief command to commence operations in Brazil, in the present state of that country, unless such means are placed at my disposal as my experience, my reason, and a simple glance at the map of Brazil, prove to me to be indispensable. If, by a most painful fatality, after nineteen years of continuous service under the very trying circumstances in which my country has been placed; and after the serious sacrifice I have recently made to enable me to reach Lisbon, after losing everything I possessed; it is necessary to declare that I am ready

to serve; that I do not refuse to serve; but even wish to do so, may I beg your Excellency to order me to go and serve under the command of General Madeira. In this case, I will immediately set out, putting aside all personal feelings as to being his senior officer, to prove that I never feared the risks of war—as the entire army can bear witness; but I do fear dishonour: and that is why, without the means I have declared requisite, I cannot believe in the possibility of making a campaign, which will be of utility to the country, and glorious to the army.

"To occupy Pernambuco and Bahia, as your Excellency spoke of, implies the occupying two cities (taking Olinda and Recife as one) one hundred leagues apart. Pernambuco is still more scantily provisioned than Bahia. Fresh meat to both these Provinces has to come from Piauhy, and cannot reach them whilst the rebels occupy the Rio de San Francisco road, which passes Jacobina, Santo Antonio das Queimadas, S. Anna, &c. On the Pernambuco line, whilst they hold the communications with Ceará and Rio Grande, the employment of a larger force is required in order to allow the sending off of flying columns until the country becomes quieter.

"In a word, allow me to assure your Excellency, that I much prefer exposing myself to anything fortune may have in store for me, on this disagreeable occasion, rather than take upon myself an enterprise, for which the means I consider necessary are not granted; upon which the hopes of the nation are fixed; which hopes, without larger forces, cannot be realised.

"I trust that your Excellency will present this official to his Majesty, together with mine of the 7th, to which your Excellency has only given a verbal answer, unsatisfactory to me, and insufficient to relieve me of responsibility upon a subject so particularly important to the service of the country, and to my own reputation.

"I have, &c.,

"J. C. DE SALDANHA."

Saldanha again addressed the Minister of War on the following day.

"LISBON, *February* 10*th*, 1823.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"The conference I have just had with your Excellency, and with his Excellency the Minister of Justice, has finally convinced me that neither can I, nor ought I to accept the command in Brazil in the manner your Excellencies verbally indicated; since I can neither obtain the ends desired by the Government, nor still less satisfy the hopes and wishes of the nation; as the forces and powers which I consider necessary are not to be granted. This I pointed out to your Excellency in my first letter, to which your Excellency has not as yet thought it convenient to reply in writing; but which letter will serve to vindicate my conduct. The manner in which your Excellency desires to send me cannot, in my opinion, be of any advantage to the country; and I do not desire to be the instrument of its dishonour, or of that of the army, in which I was born, and in which I hope to live and die with glory.

"The draft instructions which your Excellency showed me are insufficient, because they are not in accordance with that which I required; therefore, for the third time, I beg your Excellency will do me the honour of placing my letters before the king, so that his Majesty may name some other officer—it being impossible that I should accept such a commission, unless my requests are satisfied.

"The measures your Excellency indicated to me, although they may, for the moment, give credit to the Government, can be but of little advantage to the country. Pardon me this sincerity. It is my duty to your Excellency and to the public service.

"I have, &c.

"J. C. DE SALDANHA."

The sole reply to this letter was the following Portaria:—

"PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *February* 11*th*, 1823.

"His Majesty having commanded the brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun to embark, without delay, on board the frigate *Perola*, and to proceed to Bahia; and there take the command of the expeditionary troops: and not considering well-founded the observations contained in his three

officials to the Secretary of State for the War Department: and expecting also that the said brigadier will not forget that the first duty of a soldier is obedience to the positive orders of the Government:—his Majesty now commands, through the War Office, that the said brigadier immediately go on board the frigate *Perola*, where he will receive his credentials and instructions necessary for the execution of the commission his Majesty has thought fit to entrust to him; and, as soon as he arrives on board, he will immediately give notice to this Office, in order that the said credentials and instructions may be forwarded to him.

"(Signed) MANOEL GONÇALVES DE MIRANDA."

On the same day, a second Portaria followed the preceding one:

"PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *February* 11*th*, 1823.

"The king has commanded that, through the War Office, there should be forwarded to the brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun, for his information, and that he may carry it into effect, the enclosed copy of the decree by which his Majesty has thought fit to name him commander of all the military and naval forces which are to be, or are already, collected at Bahia, and to entrust him with the direction and command of all the said forces, wherever they may operate.

"(Signed) MANOEL GONÇALVES DE MIRANDA."

THE DECREE.*

"PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *February* 11*th*, 1823.

"Considering the merit and other qualities united in the person of the brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun: I have thought fit to nominate him commander of all the military and naval forces, which are to be, or are already, collected at Bahia; and to entrust him with the direction and command of the said forces, wherever they may operate, in conformity with the instructions which will be handed to him,

* A Portaria is signed by a Minister. A Decree by the Sovereign and one or more Ministers.

and be signed by Manoel Gonçalves de Miranda, my Councillor, Minister and Secretary of State for the War Department. The said Minister and Secretary of State; the General military Governor of Bahia; all the commanders of the ships of war, or of the regiments stationed on that continent; also, all the Juntas and other authorities concerned, will understand and comply with this decree.

"The royal signature.

"(Signed) MANOEL GONÇALVES DE MIRANDA.

"(Signed) MARTINHO JOSÉ DIAS AZEDO."

Portaria having followed Portaria, the decree was followed by another Portaria, all bearing the same date :—

"PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *February 11th*, 1823.

"The king has commanded, that, by instructions through the War Office, the brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun, entrusted with the direction and command of all the military and naval forces to be collected, or already collected, at Bahia, be informed, that orders have this day been transmitted to the military Treasury to hand over to him the salaries and extras now owing; and that the public Treasury will pay to him the sum of a conto of reis (at that period about £280) for the expenses of his outfit, including provisions for use on board.

"(Signed) M. G. DE MIRANDA."

To these four officials, Saldanha immediately replied :—

"LISBON, *February 11th*, 1823.

"ILLMO E EXMO SENHOR,

"Love of my country, zeal for our national honour, and for the reputation of our army, which forced me to address your Excellency as I did, in my letter of the 7th inst., place me superior to all the persecutions which may be in preparation for me, and oblige me frankly to answer your Excellency's Portaria, dated this day, and which is now before me. My conscience directs me. Public opinion is my tribunal. I abide its decision.

"When I pointed out the means I considered necessary for carrying out the commission which the Government desired to entrust me with, I had reflected on, and was thoroughly convinced of, the means necessary to preserve the credit of the nation, and realise the hopes and desires of all good Portuguese in both hemispheres. The Government has not chosen to attend to my requests; how, therefore, can I take upon myself an enterprise, which, I am certain, I cannot carry to a glorious end with the scanty means the Government place at my disposal?

"Four days have elapsed without the Government thinking it necessary either to satisfy me, or to combat my assertions; and, at last, it has again ordered me to undertake that to which I have objected. I thank my good fortune, that I am too well known as a soldier to be afraid of the stigma of cowardice, even if I should, as I do, continue to refuse such a commission. If the Government requires a victim, let it say so, and I will go, like Decius, to sacrifice myself for my country:—but not as general-in-chief, unless that which I ask is conceded. For the means offered are insufficient, and the result would compromise the honour and interests of the nation. May I, therefore, beg your Excellency to present to the king this my respectful observation: That I do not decline to serve, but I refuse to govern without forces, without means, and without powers; and if it is my fate that I should be punished for not taking upon myself that which I know I cannot do, the Government will find me ready and resigned to retire to any fortress it may determine; preferring that unmerited lot (for I have always served with honour, courage, and fidelity) to the taking upon myself the responsibility of unforeseen events, which, with such limited means, I cannot prevent. Similar reasons to mine, I am informed, were given by General Luiz Rego, when he declined to accept the same post.

"I am well aware that I have no weight in a balance in which on one side, is the ministry; and, on the other, my small credit; but I would rather suffer than be dishonoured, by being the instrument of the useless, because insufficient, efforts of the nation.

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA."

However the reader may regard Saldanha's conduct from a strictly military point of view, he will, we hope, sympathise with him in his refusal to accept a command, which was thus attempted to be forced upon him; morally persuaded as he was, that the means placed at his disposal were not sufficient for the end to be obtained. George the Third considered that a general officer was not merely privileged, but bound in duty to his sovereign, to decline a command which he could not execute; and accordingly, when his Britannic Majesty confirmed the sentence on General Whitlock, he added to it the following note:—"By this example, let it be a lesson to generals, not to accept duties or commands, which they do not consider themselves equal to execute." This privilege was denied to Saldanha; and the result was, as we shall see by the following Portaria, that the distinguished general, whose fortunes we are following, was condemned to a prison.

"PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *February* 15*th*, 1823.

"The brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun, having been appointed to the direction and command of all the naval and military forces which are to be, or are already, collected at Bahia; and, it being his duty, by virtue of the orders forwarded to him, to embark and set out for that purpose with the expedition which has just sailed,—which duty he has not fulfilled:—the king orders, through the War Office, that the brigadier temporarily occupying the post of military governor of the Court and of the province of Estremadura, do immediately cause the said brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun to be taken prisoner, for the purpose of being subjected to a court-martial, for the above-mentioned neglect of duty, which was the cause of the expedition setting out without the commander-in-chief whom his Majesty had appointed. The documents on which the accusation is founded, and the names of the President and other members of the Court, shall all be shortly forwarded.

"(Signed) MANOEL GONÇALVES DE MIRANDA."

The author has been unable to obtain any particulars of the

proceedings of this court-martial; except that Saldanha trusted to his own eloquence for his defence; and that, on arriving at its conclusion, one of the members, General Amaral, went so far as to declare that a sentence of death would not be too severe a punishment to be inflicted on an aristocrat!

Thus Saldanha, who had served his country already so long and so well, was placed a prisoner in the castle of St. George. On the first night, probably from carelessness on the part of the authorities, he shared the *enxovia*, or common prison, with strange companions—pirates who had been taken prisoners off the coast of Spain. The next day he was better accommodated; and soon found a fellow-prisoner in whose fortunes he felt an immediate interest. He had observed, in his prison of the previous day, one who, dressed in faded black, held aloof from the others. Saldanha made inquiries respecting him, and was informed by the jailor, that he knew no more of him than that the other prisoners addressed him as "General." Upon this, Saldanha requested that the stranger should dine with him on that day. Made happy by such an unexpected change of fortune, this prisoner stated that his name was Macdonell—that he was a brigadier in the Spanish army; and was about to leave Cadiz for America, when disturbances in that city obliged him to escape in a vessel that was to sail immediately for Gibraltar. That, during the short voyage, the ship had been taken as a pirate, and the crew and himself were all brought to Lisbon and confined in prison, where he had now been some time suffering the greatest privations. From that day forward, while Macdonell remained in prison, he became Saldanha's companion; dining with him, and enlivening the weary hours of confinement by playing at chess. On his obtaining his freedom, Saldanha generously furnished him with the money necessary to obtain decent clothes, and to pay for his passage to England.

We shall hear of General Macdonell again, at a later period, when, on two occasions, the fellow-prisoner whom Saldanha had thus hospitably entertained, met his former companion of the castle of St. George as an opponent in the field.

CHAPTER V.

1823—1826.

Occurrences at Villa Franca—Constitution proclaimed illegal—Saldanha quits his prison—Is appointed to a command—Returns to prison—Released by royal order—Advises the king to grant a Constitution—Expedition to Brazil unsuccessful—Negotiations with D. Pedro—Loulé murdered—Palmella's reflections—D. Miguel's behaviour—Foreign ambassadors interfere—Banishment of D. Miguel—Constitution promised—Royal correspondence—Spain—Letter from Canning—Saldanha commands at Oporto—Anecdote—Services—D. João dies—His daughter Regent.

At the period of Saldanha's arrival in Portugal, after so many years' absence, there were three principal parties in the State, with none of which was Saldanha, as yet, peculiarly identified. There was the ultra-liberal party which then governed the country under the authority of the Constitution of 1822, to which it was hardly probable that Saldanha would attach himself, if he saw in it those defects which were so candidly confessed to by Sr. Rebello da Silva, as we have seen in the preceding chapter; there was the reactionary party, of which the queen, D. Carlota, was the heart and soul, supported as she was, in Spain, by the influence of her brother, Ferdinand VII.; and, in Portugal, by the higher clergy and by many of the nobility; and there was the moderate constitutional party, of which the Count de Palmella, at that time, was, perhaps, considered as the head. To this last party, all Saldanha's sympathies inclined. For although he numbered many friends amongst all and each of them, yet he showed himself equally averse to the extreme principles of liberalism as to those of absolutism. The king himself, as we have seen, had ostensibly given his approval to the Constitution of 1822.

On the 23rd of February, 1823—a very few days after the imprisonment of Saldanha—the Count de Amarante issued a

proclamation at Villa Real de Tras-os-Montes, in which he declared that he rose "to deliver the country from the yoke of the Cortes, and the revolutionary pest, and to give the king his liberty." The king, as it appears, did not approve of this attempt in his favour; or, at least, was compelled to act as if he did not: for a royal decree, on the 4th of March, deprived the Count of his titles and honours, and warned the people against "the seductions of impostors who wished to plunge the people in the horrors of civil war." The Count was forced to take refuge in Spain with the troops he had collected.

It is needless to inquire as to the sincerity of the king in these affairs. At one time, he swore to observe the Constitution which had been so recently and solemnly proclaimed. At another, he listened to those who were plotting against it; whilst partisans, on either side, declared that, on each occasion, he was acting under compulsion. Although the attempt of the Count de Amarante had been condemned by the king, it was followed very shortly afterwards by another,—made, this time, by his own son, and with a similar object.

On the 27th of May, D. Miguel left the royal residence of Bemposta and proceeded to Villa Franca, where he proclaimed that his object was to deliver the king from those who held him in subjection. He was joined by many troops, and, amongst others, by 2000 commanded by General Sepulveda, who had been one of the leaders of the Oporto revolution in 1820. Nevertheless, for some reasons of his own, into which we need not inquire, D. Miguel ordered Sepulveda to be arrested.

In Lisbon, while this was passing at Villa Franca, the 18th Infantry regiment marched to the palace, and shouted: "Viva el Rei absoluto! Morra a Constituição!" The king made his appearance at one of the windows, accompanied by his two daughters, and, it is said, without hesitation exclaimed, "Since you wish it, since the country desires it, Viva el Rei absoluto!" Then, accompanied by his daughters, and escorted by the same regiment, he entered his carriage, and proceeded to Villa Franca. From this place, D. João, in a proclamation dated 31st May, declared that the actual Constitution—that of 1822—was illegal and incompatible with good government, but that he would

shortly bestow on his subjects a more suitable one. Meanwhile, on the 1st of June, D. Miguel was appointed commander-in-chief of the army. Taking alarm at these proceedings, sixty-one members of the Cortes, on the following day, signed a protest against any alteration of the Constitution.

It had become painfully evident that the king was a mere cipher in the country. The queen, D. Carlota, from whom he was entirely estranged, corresponded with her brother, Ferdinand VII., and, unknown to her husband, plotted a complete reaction in favour of absolutism. D. João returned to the Capital on the 5th of June, and a new ministry was formed under the presidency of the Count de Palmella, who, on his return with D. João from Brazil, had been ordered to retire to Borba. This appointment seemed a guarantee for a government founded on constitutional principles, albeit not directed to the support of the Constitution of 1822, the tendency of which, it was generally felt, was to overthrow king and nobility, and to bring the country to a state of anarchy.

If the first revolution in Portugal to which we have had occasion to refer—that of 1820—was made by the people, this counter-revolution had, undoubtedly, its origin in the Court.

On his entrance into the ministry, it became the duty of the Count de Palmella to write to the various Portuguese chargés d'affaires* resident at foreign courts, and to give them an account of the recent events. Palmella took, perhaps, rather a favourable view of them when he declares that this "great and happy change had been effected by the *unanimous and spontaneous movement of all classes*, restoring the king to the free exercise of those powers, without which there can neither be stability in the monarchy, nor dignity on the throne, nor tranquillity for the people." More correct, probably, was he in asserting that "the people had already become aware that the numerous promises which had been held out to them at the beginning of the revolution were contradicted by facts, and were diametrically opposed to the results obtained."

So high an authority as Palmella declares that the results proved that, during the three years' government by the revolu-

* The late Government had suppressed all higher diplomatic posts.

tionists of 1820, "a series of misfortunes, forerunners of still greater ones, had fallen on the Portuguese with the most fearful rapidity: the loss of Brazil; the public debt enormously increased; commerce decayed; the rights of property shamefully violated; the Portuguese territory covered with the oppressed and the banished;* religion scoffed at; the throne vilified in the person of the august consort of his Majesty; our intercourse with foreign governments interrupted; and, lastly, not to prolong an interminable list of evils, civil strife commenced in the kingdom, with imminent danger of foreign war, rashly brought about by the blind faction in power;—these misfortunes opened the eyes of the most incredulous, and produced a general state of excitement which could no longer be suppressed."

Palmella then tells of the "noble resolution" of the young Prince, D. Miguel, "model of nobility and loyalty," who had, in a few days, so successfully put down "an intolerant faction (calling itself *liberal*), ambitious and greedy, which pretended to substitute experience by abstract theories, to deceive by idle words, and, in reality, to exercise a most insupportable tyranny."

As soon as the events of the 27th of May were made known to Saldanha in his prison, he, without hesitation, took an opportunity of escaping from it; hastened to Villa Franca, and placed himself at the orders of his sovereign. On arriving there, accompanied by the 6th Caçadores and 20th Infantry, he was immediately placed in command of the 2nd Division of the army, consisting of a battalion of Caçadores, the 4th and 13th Infantry, the 7th and 10th Cavalry, a brigade of mounted artillery, and a squadron of municipal cavalry. Singular change of fortune, from a prison to a command!

D. Miguel, who had occupied Santarem, marched on Cartaxo; and, on the 3rd of June, his whole force, consisting of three Divisions, received orders to advance, with two days' rations, towards Lisbon. The first Division was ordered to pass the night at Sacavem; the second—that under the command of Saldanha—at Alverca; the third, at Alhandra: from which three points the entire force was to march, on the following morning, to occupy the Capital; which was effected without resistance.

* From the Capital, as Palmella himself had been.

This step of Saldanha's has been absurdly represented, by some writers, as if he were at one time a partisan of D. Miguel. But, in truth, Saldanha joined his sovereign, whom he considered in danger; and, on so doing, he was by that sovereign placed as a soldier under the orders of the commander-in-chief, D. Miguel, who was not then twenty-one years of age, and to whom Saldanha was a stranger.

On the certainty of quiet being preserved in the Capital, Saldanha addressed the following letter to the major-general of the forces, José Vasconcellos de Sá.

"LISBON, *June 6th*, 1823.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"I have the honour of announcing to your Excellency, that being a prisoner in the Castle of St. George, when the 6th Caçadores and 20th Infantry set out to have the honour and glory of joining H.R.H. the Infante, commander-in-chief; and feeling that neither the respect and affection I feel towards our sovereign the king, and to his august son, nor the sincere interest I take in the happiness of my country, would allow me to remain a tranquil spectator, when it was a question of saving it from an atrocious despotism, of preventing civil war, and of avoiding foreign invasion, I determined to accompany those regiments, to co-operate, as far as was in my power, for the attainment of such just and glorious objects. Now, however, that his Majesty, fortunately, is replaced upon his throne, with the same prerogatives with which his ancestors occupied it; now that the anarchical faction is broken up, whose endeavours were to submerge the nation in a similar vortex of horrors and atrocities, as that in which France was torn to pieces in the time of the Convention; and, consequently, the noble aim, which H.R.H. the Infante, commander-in-chief, had in view, is attained, I should fail in my duty if I did not address his Royal Highness, requesting him to be pleased to name the officer who is to substitute me in the command of the troops he was pleased to entrust to me, so that I may return to the prison I left. For this purpose, I beg your Excellency to do me the honour to place this my letter in the presence of his Royal Highness.

"(Signed) JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA."

Such a letter, under such circumstances, could receive but one answer. It was as follows:—

"LISBON, *June 7th*, 1823.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"In order that your Excellency may have early notice of the order of his Majesty, which I have this moment received, I send you the *Aviso*,* which has been sent to me from the War Office, that you may act upon it, and then return it to me.

"JOSÉ VASCONCELLOS DE SÁ.

'WAR OFFICE.

'PALACE OF BEMPOSTA, *June* 7, 1823.

'His Majesty having been informed that the brigadier João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun proposes returning to his prison in the Castle of St. George, which he quitted for the very praiseworthy purpose of establishing his Majesty upon the throne, with all the lustre and dignity which is due to royalty; his Majesty now orders your Excellency to inform him that he is much pleased with his conduct, both with respect to the step he took in quitting his prison for such purpose, and to his wish to return to the same, from which his Majesty is pleased to release him.

'(Signed) M. J. M. PAMPLONA CORTE REAL.

'TO S^R JOSÉ VASCONCELLOS DE SÁ.'"

During Don João's short stay at Villa Franca, Saldanha strongly advised the king, his godfather, to give his subjects a Constitution, such as that which was proposed at the Congress of Verona, viz., with two Chambers, and the royal veto. The king declared he would do so; and a proclamation to that effect was drawn up by Sr. Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro, on the 31st of May, and issued from Villa Franca on the 3rd of June following. Shortly afterwards, on his arrival in Lisbon, as the king was alighting from his carriage at the door of the cathedral, surrounded by a great crowd, the Marquis de Lavradio shouted out, "Viva el Rey absoluto!" On which Saldanha, who was

* Order of a Secretary of State in the name of the Sovereign, but without the signature of the latter.

standing by, instantly realised the imprudence, the danger, and even the folly of this manifestation, prompted alike by his own principles and sense of justice, by his loyalty to the people, and above all, to his sovereign, came at once to the rescue of the king, and exclaimed still louder, that "his Majesty had promised a constitutional Charter;" to which the king immediately replied, addressing himself to the people, that such was indeed his intention.

At this period, the Count de Palmella (shortly afterwards created a marquis), in a despatch to one of the diplomatic agents abroad, alluding to the "fortunate counter-revolution"* which had taken place, states that his Majesty had, by a royal decree dated June 7th, restored the queen to all her civil and political rights, which had been forfeited by her refusal to take the required oath to that Constitution, of 1822, which was now set aside.

On the 14th of the same month, Palmella writes "that his Majesty, as well as the whole country, being convinced by sad experience that the Constitution of the Cortes of 1822, founded on vain theories, can never fulfil the objects proclaimed by its authors,—the rather that being opposed to the customs, opinions, and wants of the Portuguese people, it tended to bring about the overthrow of society by not conciliating in any manner the rights and interests of the different classes of that society, his Majesty, accordingly, in proof of the sincerity of his promises, had determined to appoint a Junta in order to prepare a project for a constitutional Charter." The Count de Palmella, as president, and fourteen members, "distinguished by their talents, virtues, and learning," were appointed to compose this Junta.

On the 20th, a decree was issued forbidding all secret

* And yet the author has seen it stated, that Palmella had been influential in getting up the revolution at Oporto in 1820! Equally ridiculous is what we read in the 6th volume of the "Galerie historique et critique du XIXe Siècle," where the writer, with a strange confusion of dates and facts, narrates, that on this occasion (April—May, 1823) Saldanha, "with equal bravery and patriotism," had put down the "Miguelite party," and obliged D. João VI. "to recognize and guarantee the rights of the nation." The writer describes Saldanha, on the same occasion, as "proclaiming the charter of D. Pedro" (three years before it was given), and "sending in his resignation as chief of the staff to D. Pedro" (eleven years before that event happened!)

societies. The former punishment for belonging to such—which was death—was repealed; and a fine and five years' transportation to the coast of Africa substituted. It was ordered that every public functionary, both civil and military, should take oath that he was not a member of any such societies, including that of Freemasons, which society, the decree adds, "may have been innocent in its primitive origin."

The Junta selected for the formation of a new Constitution met on the 7th of July, when its president, the Marquis de Palmella, speaking of the Constitution lately overturned, very justly complained, that it had been got up by "the scandalous manœuvres practised at the elections by secret societies for the purpose of calling to the Congress the chiefs of the revolutionary faction and their followers, in order to form such a Constitution as they wished for." Palmella added, "that the king desires to promulgate a code, formed, not for the display of vain theories, but to practically guarantee our most essential rights; and to build, with successive improvements, public prosperity on solid foundations, whilst preserving a prudent analogy with the wisest institutions of other European monarchies,—not only because experience has proved their advantages, but because the good feeling and close connection in which we are with other States, show how desirable it is that the political institutions of all the powers should approximate, as much as possible, with each other, and contribute mutually to tighten more and more each day the bonds of union by which they are connected."

We left the king's son, D. Pedro, at Rio de Janeiro, in the government of those Brazilian colonies which his rebellion against his father and his country had made his own. Palmella informs us, in a despatch, dated September 6 (1823), "that the expedition has returned from Bahia—no good result having been obtained by it; on the contrary, many misfortunes have occurred, which are entirely owing to the errors of the late ministry. Nevertheless, his Majesty does not cease to employ every means of conciliation, and will do all in his power still to preserve Pará and Maranhão, which continue loyal."

This was a remarkable confirmation of the wisdom which

guided Saldanha in his refusal to comply with the orders of that ministry, which sent him to a prison for not accepting the proffered command.

To bring D. Pedro to terms, D. João determined on soliciting the mediation of the Emperor of Austria, whose daughter was married to D. Pedro; but no good resulted from this step.

Shortly afterwards, the Count de Rio Maior was sent as Chief Commissioner to Brazil, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between the king and his son; but he returned unsuccessful, and was obliged to embark in a merchant-ship—the *Treze de Maio;* as the government corvette, in which he had arrived at Rio de Janeiro, was detained there by the authorities, until the "Supreme Council" should decide whether she was to be considered as a fair prize.

Palmella, on this occasion, very indignantly writes: "The letter which his Majesty addressed in his own handwriting to his august son was returned without having been opened; and the communications which the royal Commissioners had with the minister, José Joaquim Carneiro de Campos, were of no effect. For that minister confined himself to requiring, as an indispensable preliminary, the recognition of Brazilian independence." . . . . "In the meantime, it cannot be ignored that that country is about to be the theatre of a revolution more dangerous still than that from which the Peninsula has been so happily freed; and that the prince is the slave of a faction, the more detestable in proportion to its pernicious effects."

The attempted Constitutions of 1820 and 1822 had certainly not inclined Palmella to view with favourable eyes such projects; for he again strongly expresses himself against them as "these monstrous Constitutions evidently fabricated only to facilitate the passage from a monarchical government to republicanism."* And alluding to his own position in the ministry, at that time so shortly following the Government of 1822, he very justly observes: "Not so easy nor so short is the labour of improvement and of healing wounds, as it is to overturn and destroy."

* In 1846 Palmella allied himself, in opposition to Saldanha, with the party which supported these Constitutions.

While dwelling on these circumstances, which will serve to render future events more intelligible to the reader, we have, for a while, lost sight of Saldanha, after he had performed his part, in rescuing his country from a faction which was leading it to anarchy and ruin. His own longings were satisfied by the king's promise to give his subjects a monarchical Constitution; and he had no reason, then, to doubt but that such promise would be carried into effect by the Junta which was appointed for that purpose, under the presidency of the Marquis de Palmella.

The king did not long rest satisfied with having, in courtly phraseology, and accompanied by the expression of the royal pleasure, sent a mere pardon to the offending general, who had escaped from the prison to which he had been sentenced by court-martial. In the month of June (1823), Saldanha was appointed to the command of 7000 or 8000 men in the Alemtejo, in order to protect the frontier from a possible invasion of the Spaniards; or, at least, from the incursions of vast numbers of irregular troops, which, in consequence of late events in Spain, had assembled on various parts of the frontier. But the presence, in the neighbouring kingdom, of the Duke d'Angoulême, who had entered Madrid on the 24th of May, suppressed the revolution, and restored that country to comparative quiet.

We need not enter into all the plots and counterplots which agitated Lisbon at this period. Saldanha, at a distance with his army, watched the course of events, which he foresaw were likely to end in confusion and disasters. For, on the 24th of July of this same year, the proscribed Amarante had returned from Spain and entered Lisbon with a considerable force. The king not only received him in the most friendly manner, but bestowed on him the title of Marquis de Chaves, and a pension of 6000 cruzados for three lives. The liberal party of all shades remained quiet, although it observed with dismay the reception given to Amarante, and the honours conferred upon him. Saldanha resigned his command on the 5th of October.

Early in the following year (1824) a tragic event occurred at the royal palace at Salvaterra. The king was residing there, and in attendance on him was the Marquis de Loulé, Master of

the Horse, to whom the king was much attached, and who was much in his master's confidence. The marquis, on the night of February 28th, was assassinated; and the next morning his body was found under a window of the palace, out of which it had apparently been thrown. The mystery of his death has never been brought to light. The marquis was supposed to hold liberal opinions; and this was probable enough, as he was one of those Portuguese officers who joined the French revolutionary army after Junot had entered Lisbon, and who continued in the service of Napoleon.

On this occasion, the Marquis de Palmella writes, on the 4th of March, to the Count de Porto Santo: "The affair of the Marquis de Loulé (who, between ourselves, was without doubt assassinated) has horrified everybody, and has caused most terrible suspicions: you may imagine what is said. . . . . To tell you the truth, things are going on badly. . . . . The Infante (D. Miguel) only occupies himself with trifles; God help us! . . . . We must act with vigour and activity to restrain the revolutionists; and, at the same time, resist the ferocious reaction of those who call themselves royalists."

The fears of Palmella were shortly confirmed. On the 30th of April, D. Miguel, still commander-in-chief, openly declared himself and his party averse to any constitutional government. As commander-in-chief, he was in full power over the military forces. Numerous arrests were made on the night of the 29th, amongst which was that of the Count de Villa Flor; * also that of Sr. José Xavier Mousinho da Silveira, a man of liberal principles, who had but recently quitted the Palmella ministry. But to the surprise of many, Palmella himself was, at the same time, seized and imprisoned in the Torre de Belem. A reign of persecution commenced. All access to the king was denied, and he was virtually a prisoner in his palace at Bemposta. On the 3rd of May, he was compelled to sign a paper which was printed and circulated, and which commenced as follows:—

"The Infante, D. Miguel, my much loved and esteemed son, commander-in-chief of my royal army, having strong reason to

* Afterwards Duke da Terceira.

believe that in several clubs there was being plotted a conspiracy against himself, against the queen, my much loved and esteemed wife, and against my royal person, which placed him (in such a crisis) in the necessity of taking arms without having previously obtained my royal sanction for such purpose," etc., etc.

If there were plots for the king's dethronement, it was surmised that they proceeded from his wife and son; and the king was in the greatest terror. In these circumstances, the French ambassador, M. Hyde de Neuville, together with the whole of the foreign ministers, went to the palace, and insisted upon being admitted to the royal presence. It is pretended, although probably with little foundation in truth, that when they entered the room where they found the poor monarch, he was on his knees; and that on seeing the French ambassador, he exclaimed, "How glad I am that it is you! I thought it was my sentence of death." The anecdote, however exaggerated, at least serves to show what were the opinions on the subject at that time current.

It is certain that each party accused the other of an intention to get rid of the king by assassination; and D. Miguel excused his own conduct towards his father, by the assurance that, he had only acted as he had done, with a view to prevent such a criminal purpose being effected. But the king was not satisfied with these assurances, and preferred other and more efficient steps to secure his safety. Counselled by the diplomatic body, he took refuge, on the 9th of May, on board H. B. M. ship of war, the *Windsor Castle;* and, on the same day, he issued the following manifesto, supposed to have been composed by Palmella, who had been released from prison, and had rejoined his sovereign.

"PORTUGUESE,—Your king does not abandon you. On the contrary, he only desires to relieve you from the terror and anxiety which oppress you; to re-establish public security; and to remove the veil which hides from you the truth: feeling convinced that, at his voice, this loyal nation will unite to sustain the throne; and that the conflict of exaggerated opinions and

passions, which have so lately produced the most fatal anarchy, and threatened the government with utter dissolution, will cease.

"My son, the Infante D. Miguel, who so recently covered himself with glory by the heroic action he undertook, he it is who, now, led away by sinister inspirations, and deceived by traitorous counsels, has allowed himself to commit acts, which, were they even just and necessary, ought only to emanate from my sovereign authority; and, by so doing, he has assailed the royal power, which is indivisible.

"The daybreak of April 30th found the troops of the Capital under arms; and my son was seen quitting my royal palace to place himself at their head. He ordered, without my knowledge, the arbitrary imprisonment of an immense number of individuals of all classes, some occupying the first appointments of the State, amongst whom were to be found my very ministers, and some of my chamberlains. The palace I inhabit was seen surrounded by armed people, or rather was transformed into a prison; and access to my royal person was prevented during the space of several hours. In a word, proceedings so violent were witnessed—and they so nearly touched upon the borders of open rebellion—that all the representatives of the sovereigns of Europe considered themselves bound to protest formally against the violation of my royal authority.

"So bold a resolution, threatening the most fatal consequences; so complete an abuse of the confidence I deposited in my son; can only be explained, or excused, by the supposition of a conspiracy; but which even then could not justify such unheard of proceedings.

"As, however, I desired, even at the cost of greater sacrifices, to preserve public tranquillity, and also perfect harmony amongst the members of my royal family; I was pleased, by my royal decree of the 3rd inst., to order judges to be named to legally try the accused persons; and I was also pleased to pardon my son for the excesses of jurisdiction committed; in the hope that the legal course of law being restored, the revolutionary measures would cease, and good order would be gradually re-established. That which my paternal mind so anxiously desired did not, however, take place. The imprisonments continued, and orders

were sent out in the name of the Infante, many of them being signed by obscure persons, who have no part in the government.

"Resolved to put an end to such a public scandal, and to the injury done to the royal authority, so contemptuously treated, to the manifest detriment of my loyal subjects; and not finding any means of making known my royal will, through being surrounded by the rebels, who had led my son astray, and who already, on the 30th of April, had conspired against my liberty; —I resolved (to avoid a conflict, the result of which could not, however, be doubtful, considering the well-known fidelity of the Portuguese nation) to go on board a British ship of the line, anchored in this port (whither I was followed by the representatives of the sovereigns of Europe), in order, frankly, to lay before my loyal subjects the infamy of my situation, and to call them, if necessary, to my defence.

"Having heard the advice of my ministers and of other intelligent and God-fearing persons, zealous in my service, I have resolved to reassume the authority of Generalissimo of my royal armies, and to dismiss the Infante D. Miguel from the post of commander-in-chief of the army, which I had conferred on him;—prohibiting all authorities, and all and every one of my subjects from obeying the orders of the said Infante, or those given in his name, under penalty of being considered rebels against the royal authority, which belongs by Divine Grace, to me only.

"Portuguese,—Such were the first measures I took; and immediately afterwards, I gave the necessary orders that the innocent persons involved in these arbitrary proscriptions should be set at liberty;—but to punish all those who can be proved guilty of participating in the plots of secret societies, against whom I wish proceedings to be taken with all the rigour the laws allow; so that virtue and loyalty may be vindicated, and crime punished.

"Soldiers,—I do not reproach you for what you have done. You obeyed the voice of the chief I had given you, as was your duty. This inexperienced chief was led involuntarily and by perfidious counsels—opposed to his natural disposition and

filial obedience—to commit a most criminal offence to his father and to his king. I withdraw from him the authority which perverse intriguers, of no public character, have led him to abuse; and I command you only to recognize my royal authority, by virtue of which, confining yourselves to the military duties imposed upon you, you will not use the arms I confided to your fidelity, except in my service, obeying always the chiefs it may be my royal pleasure to nominate.

"By this Proclamation I confirm, in the exercise of their authority, all those at this moment invested with it, until further orders; and I command all and every one to preserve the strictest obedience to that which, in my royal name, may be ordained to them by their superiors, who from this time shall command them.

"Subjects of all classes, preserve order, and look to your Sovereign for the restoration of public tranquillity, of justice, and of general security.

"On board the English ship of war, the *Windsor Castle*, anchored in the Tagus, May 9th, 1824.

"(Signed) EL REI."

The party of reaction found their plans frustrated. Commanded by his father to come to him on board the *Windsor Castle*, D. Miguel endeavoured to find excuses for his late conduct. But the king was not to be imposed upon. He determined that his son should, without delay, be sent out of the country, before he himself returned on shore. Accordingly, on the 13th of May, D. Miguel embarked for Brest; and, on the following day, the king landed, and was received with great demonstrations of respect and joy.

From the *Windsor Castle*, Palmella officially addressed all the chiefs of the diplomatic body, thanking them gratefully for the energetic measures they had taken to secure the king's safety; and whilst still on board, D. João signed "Royal Letters" conferring titles on some few, amongst whom was the English minister, Sir Edward Thornton, who was made Count de Cacilhas.

In a circular addressed to the Portuguese diplomatic agents

resident abroad, dated June 8th, Palmella, in giving an account of the recent events, imputes them to the youth and inexperience of D. Miguel, and to the "exasperation created by the excesses of the revolutionary party, and especially by the criminal projects of some ambitious individuals, who took advantage of the credulity of an inexperienced prince to persuade him that he would obtain the applause and gratitude of Europe." Palmella further informs them, that measures would be immediately taken to prepare the Constitution which had been promised at Villa Franca; and that his Majesty had determined to banish from the kingdom "the insane authors of the fatal revolution of August 24th, 1820,—origin of so many evils and misfortunes; the sacrilegious authors of the insurrection of February 26th, 1821, which took place in the very presence of the sovereign; and the most violent demagogues of the Cortes, and ruffians of the revolutionary faction." An amnesty was however granted to those who had taken a minor part in the revolution of 1820, and other periods.

By a decree of June 5th, the Cortes of the kingdom, consisting, as in former times, of deputies of the clergy, the nobility, and the people, were ordered to be assembled. Thus, for a time, the desires of the constitutional party in Portugal were held in abeyance.

Palmella, who was equally an object of dislike to the anarchists as to the absolutists, with neither of whose principles could he agree, thought it desirable, after the departure of D. Miguel from Portugal, to investigate thoroughly the circumstances and secret plots which had led to the late events. Having laid the result of his inquiries before the king, his Majesty decided to address the following letter to his royal consort,—which letter, and the consequent correspondence, we lay before our readers, as it will serve to show in what high quarters attempts were made to re-establish despotism, and to prevent the king's promise of a Constitution being fulfilled.

Communication addressed by D. João VI. to the queen, D. Carlota, dated Bemposta, 22nd of June, 1824:—

"The fatal machinations which disturbed this kingdom, and which produced the attempt of the 30th of April against my

sovereign authority; an attempt, the origin of which is known to every one, and which every one laments; places me in the painful necessity of making known to the queen, by this means, my royal will. I cannot for a single moment forget, that the maintenance of peace and the tranquillity of my kingdom, as well as the insurance of the happiness of my people, are the very sacred obligations which I contracted when I ascended the throne on which Providence has placed me; and these obligations, with Divine favour, I have endeavoured, at every sacrifice, to fulfil.

"The queen knows that her august brother, the catholic king, has already given her, in writing, the most salutary advice; frankly suggesting to her the expediency of absenting herself for a short time from Portugal; as a step the most decorous and prudent in actual circumstances; not only from motives of public interest, which are so notorious, but also for her own sake, in order that her royal name should not, in future, be stained by suspicions, nor compromised by being made use of to authorize fresh intrigues and conspiracies.

"All the other sovereigns allied to this Court approve of the advice given by his Catholic Majesty; and their opinion has been made known to me. Without doubt, this opinion will be unanimously adopted by all those sovereigns whose representatives have so lately witnessed the terrible crisis in which the monarchy was placed—a crisis which they so honourably assisted in bringing to an end.

"It being, consequently, indispensable that the queen should come to a speedy resolution, and that all doubts should be removed as to the carrying out of the plans which were proposed to her, and which, unfortunately, I consider are the only ones which it is desirable she should follow; I now formally make known to her my order, that she should prepare to quit Portugal with the least possible delay; and that she should reside for some time in Italy, where she will be conveyed, and where she will continue to be treated with all that respect and consideration which her rank demands.

"As king, I have to give an account of my actions to God alone; and I do not judge it desirable, nor suitable to my

dignity, nor even consistent with the respect due to the queen, that I should weigh all the powerful motives which have compelled me to make known this my sovereign determination; nor do I doubt but that the queen herself will know how to appreciate them, and will yield that prompt and entire obedience which she owes both to her sovereign and to her husband.

"If, however, contrary to what I expect, it should happen that the queen, rejecting the counsels of her august brother, should also hesitate in obeying my royal order, she is informed that, in such case, she will not be forcibly compelled to execute it, but she will incur the responsibility of such disobedience, which will draw down upon her the censure of the whole world, and will give occasion to the most sinister interpretations. I should then take such precautionary measures as may be necessary, in order that public tranquillity should not be again disturbed, nor the sovereign authority be outraged; and, especially, to prevent that my most faithful subjects, carried away by an excess of affection and loyalty so invariably manifested for my royal person, should again run the risk of becoming involuntary instruments of criminal machinations.

"This is all that it appears to me necessary to communicate to the queen for her understanding and prompt execution.

"(Signed) REY."

The notice which the queen took of this royal mandate will be seen by the following letter addressed to her by the Archbishop of Evora.

"BEMPOSTA PALACE, LISBON, *June 26th*, 1824.

"MADAME,

"I carried to the royal presence of the king, my lord, the verbal reply which your Majesty was pleased to give to the letter which the said august lord addressed to you, and of which I, in company with the Cardinal Patriarch, was the bearer. The king, my lord, orders me to declare to your Majesty, that, it was not his royal intention to compel your Majesty to undertake the journey, should the actual state of your health not allow of it; trusting, nevertheless, that, as soon

as it is re-established, your Majesty will not fail to comply with his royal order.

"With respect to your Majesty's demand, that the crimes which gave rise to the order should be proved by authentic documents, the said august lord decides, that it would neither be decent, nor consistent with the high position of your Majesty, to make formal and judicial accusations. And your Majesty may understand, by the distress which his Majesty suffers, by his grief, and by the letter which he addressed to you, how imperious was the necessity, and how strong were the reasons, which obliged him to adopt this extraordinary measure, which, with the motives for it, he will not fail to communicate to his Catholic Majesty and to all his august allies.

"This, by order of the king, my lord, I make known to your Majesty, whose life and health may Heaven deign to preserve for many years.

"I kiss respectfully the royal hand of your Majesty.

"(Signed) O ARCEBISPO D'EVORA."

In reply, the queen addressed the archbishop as follows:—

"PALACE AT QUELUZ, *June 29th*, 1824.

"ARCHBISHOP,

"The day before yesterday, I received your letter of the 26th of this month, by which I am informed, that it is not the intention of the king to oblige me to undertake the journey, which his Majesty had determined, should the actual state of my health not allow it; trusting, however, that as soon as it is re-established, I should not fail to comply with the order. But that with respect to my demand, that my crimes should be proved by authentic documents, the king decides that it would neither be decent nor consistent with my high position to make formal and judicial accusations.

"I reply, first, that I am very ill, as everyone is aware of; and that, at this moment, I am suffering from an attack of rheumatism, with great pains and fever, which has deprived me of the use of my leg; and I am still but little better, and, consequently, not in a condition to undertake a journey. Secondly, I insist upon

being tried judicially; as the laws direct, that no one can be punished without having been heard, and the crime having been proved; and, as I have not committed any, I am not afraid of any proofs appearing; for I have never said nor done anything against the king. I repeat, that would I were as pure before God as I am towards the king; and, for this reason, I wish to be tried judicially. For it would be indecorous, on my part, to withdraw my request; as it would be an acknowledgment of crimes which I have not committed. And still more indecorous would it be, on the part of the king, to proceed to such strong measures against me, without a formal process and sentence which would make known my crimes to the nation and to the whole world. The king has a council of state and many wise and honourable ministers. Let him name upright judges—I will appoint an attorney, and let the truth be made patent: for it is just that the guilty should be punished.

"I have no objection to subject myself to those measures which are not deemed decorous. It is crime which disgraces. I have committed none; consequently, I again demand to be tried judicially. It would not be the first time that a queen has been tried; consequently, the example would not be a novelty. A novelty—and a great novelty—would it be to degrade a queen without a knowledge of her crimes.

"I expect from the righteousness of the king, and from his kindness, that he will listen to reason and justice: for he has done as much to his very enemies; and he will not fail to do the same towards his wife, who is not undeserving of him.

"May God preserve you for many years in His holy service!

"(Signed) RAYNHA."

REPLY OF THE ARCHBISHOP.

"BEMPOSTA PALACE, *July 8th*, 1824.

"MADAME,

"As in duty bound, I carried to the royal presence of the king, my lord, the letter which your Majesty condescended to address to me; and the said august lord commands me to reply to your Majesty, in the most positive manner, that he

cannot accede to the request made, both verbally and in writing, that your Majesty should be tried judicially. For, if such a measure had been deemed necessary, his Majesty, sole judge of what is most desirable for the decorum of his royal crown and family, and for the welfare of the country, would not have simply confined himself to insisting that your Majesty should follow the advice of your august brother, the catholic king; which it is to be regretted that your Majesty, understanding the wisdom and necessity of such counsel, should not have spontaneously determined to embrace. Your Majesty, by a temporary absence from this kingdom, continuing to be considered and treated with due decorum and respect, could not consider yourself degraded, nor allege that you have suffered punishment without being heard, or without an offence having been proved. For no one can dispute the right of the king, your august husband, as sovereign and head of his family, to adopt such a measure when he judges it necessary for the maintenance of public tranquillity. Your Majesty, consequently, cannot but be aware how ill-timed it would be if the king, my lord, should consent to grant that which your Majesty *demands*; it being, on the contrary, fitting that your Majesty should give an example of obedience and respect for the sovereign orders, which emanate from the king alone, and which oblige equally all his subjects, amongst whom your Majesty occupies the most conspicuous place. Finally, the king, my lord, confirming in every respect that which he declared in his letter of the 22nd of June, as well as that which he commissioned me verbally to make known, has ordered me to repeat, that his royal will is, that your Majesty shall undertake the journey as soon as your health will permit—a period which the conscience of your Majesty will determine. His Majesty also expressly orders that there shall be no further contest on this subject; and your Majesty is to consider that this letter terminates so painful a correspondence.

"May God preserve your Majesty many years! I respectfully kiss the royal hand of your Majesty.

"(Signed) O ARCEBISPO D'EVORA."

Her Majesty did not leave Portugal on this occasion. But in

forwarding copies of these letters to his agents at foreign courts, Palmella (in a circular dated June 30th) gave an account of the measures of precaution which the king had been obliged to take "against the machinations and the criminal intrigues which, unfortunately, had been woven in the very bosom of his own family. From on board the *Windsor Castle*, his Majesty had already taken the resolution to write to his Catholic Majesty, in order that this sovereign should endeavour to induce his august sister to absent herself voluntarily for some time from Portugal; and thus to give a satisfactory contradiction to the suspicions which had been created against her, and to take from those who had made use of her name their most powerful means of continuing to agitate this country." . . . . "The connection of the queen with the conspirators of the 30th of April is almost publicly notorious; and it is fit that all those who were concerned in this act of such manifest treachery towards the royal authority—which might have led this country into civil war—should not, whatever their rank, be allowed to escape with impunity."

D. Miguel, after leaving Lisbon, had, on his arrival at Paris, remained there for some time in disobedience to the wishes and positive orders of D. João. At length, when he was induced to proceed to Vienna, Palmella, in a despatch to the Baron de Villa Secca, dated September 4th (1824), instructs that minister to privately make known to the Austrian Government, that when D. Miguel should arrive at Vienna, he must not be allowed to return to Portugal without D. João's permission; and to request the Austrian Government to set a watch over the Infante, so that he might not leave stealthily; also to prevent him from being in communication with "suspicious Portuguese;" and not to allow such to reach Vienna. The Baron is further ordered to request the government to use force, if necessary, to frustrate any attempt at flight.* "You," adds Palmella, "who witnessed the events of the 30th of April and of the following days, cannot but know that the ill-timed return of his Highness to Portugal would reduce the country to a state of anarchy; and produce, in contempt of his sovereign rights, nothing less than the destruction of the government of his Majesty."

* De o deter até por força, no caso de uma tentativa de fuga.

The unhappy king was surrounded by intriguers plotting each other's overthrow; and, it is pretended, that he was in constant fear of being assassinated. His health began to decline; and, on this subject, Palmella writes (September 7th), "His two sons, in fact, have contributed to shorten the days of his life; and the terror of the possibility of the Infante's return is what most afflicts him. You will be doing the greatest service if you can obtain from the Austrian Government the promise to oppose the Infante's departure from Vienna, even by force if necessary."

If the promise made by D. João at Villa Franca in May, 1823, to give a constitutional Charter to his subjects; and the formation of a Junta in the following June, for the purpose of carrying his intentions into effect, had raised the hopes of the liberals, great must have been their dismay, when, after a delay of fifteen months, they became acquainted with the results of that Junta's labours. We have seen that it was to be composed of fourteen members, presided over by the Marquis de Palmella; and now, on the 7th of September, 1824, that statesman, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, made known to his diplomatic agents abroad, the bases of the projected Constitution.

The marquis writes as follows:—

"By the enclosure you will see, at a glance, the basis of the project for the organization of the three Estates of this kingdom. You will see that it is proposed to calculate the elements of such organization in such manner, as to remove all fear of democracy; and that, instead of a tumultuous and disorderly assembly, it will be a prop and real support to the throne. That, far from being dangerous to the rights of legitimacy, it will serve to defend it against the attacks of the two extreme parties, which only tend to overthrow it.

"This same document I have already, in confidence, communicated to M. de Pflügel; and you may, if spoken to on the subject, point out the advantages of this our ancient fundamental law; and how much it is opposed to the demagogical principles proclaimed by the revolutionists thirty years ago.

"'ENCLOSURE.

"'The project for the organization of the three Estates of the kingdom is reduced to about the following bases:—

"'1. The clergy, the nobility, and the deputies from the towns and cities will unite (each class separately) in order to deliberate, with closed doors, on the subjects which the Government will present for their discussion. They will exercise no share of the legislative power, and will only enjoy the privilege of being consulted, or listened to, by the king.

"'2. The estate of the clergy is composed of bishops; of the priors of the three religious and military Orders; of the rector of the University; and of two or three dignitaries of monastic Orders; in all, about from twenty to twenty-five individuals. None of them can take his seat, until he shall have received a letter of summons from the king.

"'3. The estate of the nobility is composed of thirty members, selected from all classes of the nobility by nine electors who will be named by the king. The selection of these thirty must be confirmed or approved of by his Majesty.

"'4. The third estate is composed of a deputy for each Comarca (territorial division) selected from the deputies chosen by the cities and towns, who, for this purpose, will assemble in the chief town of their Comarca. In such manner, however, that these assemblies will never consist of more than from twelve to twenty individuals, who will select one of themselves to take his seat at the Cortes. The number of the deputies of the third estate will, consequently, be equal to that of the Comarcas of the kingdom and adjacent islands; that is to say, about forty. Besides these, there will be another seven, named by the king, who will represent the Asiatic and African colonies. No mention will be made of Brazil, except to say, that his Majesty, when a reconciliation has taken place, reserves to himself to determine respecting the representation of that kingdom.

"'5. The three Estates will be convoked when his Majesty thinks proper; and will be dissolved in the same manner.'"

Such a system of representative government, we need hardly say, was little likely to satisfy any fraction of the liberal party.

Ferdinand VII. continued not only to endeavour to thwart the introduction into Portugal of constitutional liberty, but he even opposed the calling together of the Cortes as proposed. "Pure absolutism," was his motto. The liberal party, therefore, saw, in the absolute rule of Ferdinand over Spain, a great obstacle to the fulfilment of their aspirations; and they naturally viewed with satisfaction the attempts which the Spanish liberals were preparing for the re-establishment of constitutional government in their own country. We may judge then with what reason Palmella complained, on the 7th September (1824), that Spain, through her ambassador at Lisbon, had shown decided hostility to the convocation of the Cortes by D. João; and that some of the representatives of other Courts at Lisbon had verbally expressed the same opinion; but, he was happy to say, Mr. Canning, in a letter to Sir Wm. A'Court, the English ambassador at Madrid, was of a different opinion. Mr. Canning wrote as follows:—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 12th*, 1824.

"SIR,

"My despatch of the 26th of July will have put you generally in possession of the course of the late discussion between the Governments of Portugal and Great Britain respecting the application of the former for an aid of auxiliary troops.

"But I think it right to send to you for your more particular information, copies of the notes which were exchanged between M. de Villa Real and me on that subject.

"I wish to call your attention to that part of my answer to M. de Villa Real which relates to the convocation of the Cortes in Portugal.

"It appears by recent information from Lisbon, that intimations of the displeasure of the Court at Madrid at this determination of H. M. F. Majesty, amounting almost to menaces, have been received by the Government of Portugal, and have created no small alarm in that Cabinet.

"You will make the Spanish ministry aware of the opinion, which his Majesty has thought fit to pronounce in favour of the King of Portugal's intended measures; and, you will let it be

understood, that any attempt by a foreign power, forcibly to control the free agency of the King of Portugal in the internal concerns of his own kingdom, would give to H. M. F. Majesty an unquestionable claim to the support and countenance of his ally.

"The substance only of my answer having been communicated to his Majesty's ministers at other Courts, you will be careful not to let the text of it get out of your hands.

"I am, &c.,

"GEORGE CANNING.

"RT. HON. SIR WM. A'COURT, BART."

It was during this period, that Saldanha, attending a reception held by the king at the Bemposta Palace, observed the presence of the same General Amaral who, in 1823, had expressed his opinion that Saldanha deserved to be shot for his disobedience of orders. Knowing that Amaral was soliciting a military command, Saldanha at once applied to the Minister of War in the general's favour. The minister, after obtaining the sanction of the king, authorized Saldanha himself to announce to the general that his petition should be attended to. Approaching Amaral with a smile on his countenance, and extending his hand, Saldanha declared how glad he felt in being instrumental to the promotion, which, he was happy to inform him, had that moment been granted, at his request, by the king. The general was struck mute with wonder; and, as Saldanha expressed it, "his astonishment was only equalled by his subsequent gratitude."

Saldanha, in the month of April (1825), was appointed military-governor at Oporto.

We may here relate a circumstance which occurred shortly after his arrival at that city, as it is a fitting illustration of the principles which at all times governed his conduct.

There being no public independent press to control the high functionaries of State, their power, which in an absolute monarchy was great, was often abused. For, by their connivance at many illegalities, or by shutting their eyes to them, they were, at times, able to render their appointments exceed-

ingly lucrative by the presents which they accepted, and even by the offices which they sold. According to this time-honoured custom, not long after Saldanha's arrival at Oporto, he was waited on by a well-to-do farmer of the neighbourhood, who, after the usual compliments, informed the governor that he had taken the liberty to offer to his Excellency some provisions for the use of his establishment; such as hams, wine, &c. The general requested him to do no such thing, as he made it a rule never to accept such presents. "Oh, but," said the farmer, "I have brought them, and they are on a number of mules in your Excellency's court-yard." On a positive refusal to accept them being given, the farmer begged to offer them to the general's wife. That also not being allowed, the poor man, in despair, said: "Then you will allow me to order them to be distributed amongst your Excellency's aides-de-camp;" and he added, "for I should be ashamed to be seen returning with them, as if I had offended your Excellency." Saldanha replied, "that he was very sure that no aide-de-camp of his would accept the presents; and that, as so many persons must be aware of the object with which the laden mules had been brought into the court-yard, he would give orders to a guard to accompany them to the outside of the gates of the city, in order that there should be no misconception as to the result of the affair."

Many were the services Saldanha rendered to the city of Oporto and its neighbourhoood during his government; and great was the popularity he acquired there. Previous to his arrival, constant robberies were committed in the streets, in private houses, and even in the very churches, by bands of organized miscreants. In less than a month, as many as 63 of these criminals were in prison, and the robberies ceased.

There is little to narrate of what occurred in Portugal at this time. Palmella, in January, 1825, had resigned the portfolios of Home and Foreign Affairs; and, in the following May, was sent as ambassador to London. He was succeeded at the Foreign Office by the Count de Porto Santo. Saldanha had repeatedly urged the king to grant the constitutional Charter, which had been promised at Villa Franca; for he felt convinced that nothing less would satisfy the increasing desire for it, which

was felt amongst all classes. He continued in his command at Oporto; and on the 6th of February, 1826, was promoted to the rank of Maréchal de Campo.

The death of D. João VI. took place on the 10th of March. The king had signed a decree on the 6th, appointing his daughter, the Infanta D. Isabel Maria, regent (during his illness, or in the event of his demise) in the absence of his eldest son, D. Pedro, the lawful heir to the throne of Portugal. The dispute between Brazil and Portugal had been terminated by a treaty dated the 29th of August of the previous year (1825); and the Independence of Brazil had been finally acknowledged by Portugal on the 5th of November following.

As soon as the news of his succession to the Crown reached D. Pedro, at Rio de Janeiro, he at once confirmed the appointment of his sister, as regent, in his absence.

CHAPTER VI.

1826—1827.

D. Pedro king—Grants Charter on conditions—Steps taken by Saldanha to proclaim the Charter—Is appointed Minister of War—Letters to the regent—Intrigues—Cortes assemble—D. Miguel takes oath of allegiance to the queen and Charter—Intrigues of Ferdinand VII.—British troops are sent to Portugal—Saldanha's correspondence with D. Pedro—He quits the ministry and retires to Cintra—Question of D. Miguel's regency—Saldanha arrives at Plymouth.

By the decree of 6th March, 1826, as stated in the last chapter, D. João had appointed his daughter to act as regent in his name, so long as his illness should continue; and, in case of his death, until the lawful heir and successor to the crown should issue his commands on that subject. In this regency, there were associated with the Infanta, D. Isabel Maria, the Cardinal Patriarch; the Duke de Cadaval; the Marquis de Vallada; the Count dos Arcos, and the six secretaries of state for the time being.

The civil war between the faithful subjects of the queen D. Maria II. and the partisans of her uncle D. Miguel, which so long desolated Portugal, will be in the remembrance of many. Portugal, at that time, may be described as the battle-field, where the political opinions which then divided Europe were to be contested. This strife was not only of local interest, but was one watched with anxiety by the absolutists and the constitutionalists of all countries. General Saldanha took so important a part in these events, which ended by the constitutional queen being established on the throne, that it will be necessary to relate briefly the circumstances that led D. Miguel and his followers to renounce the oath of allegiance which, we shall see, they had taken to their lawful sovereign.

D. Pedro had been formally recognized heir to the throne of Portugal by the "Carta Patente" of 13th May, 1825; in which, and by the treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro on the 29th of August of the same year, the independence of Brazil was acknowledged by D. João, who, nevertheless, retained for himself jointly with his son, the title of Emperor of Brazil. By these arrangements, D. Pedro had in no way renounced his future right to the crown of Portugal; and it was in consequence of this acknowledged right, that, on the decease of D. João, a deputation, headed by the Duke de Lafoens, immediately proceeded to Rio with an address to their Sovereign to congratulate him on being "happily called by right of succession to occupy the throne of his glorious ancestors." At the same time, anticipating the possibility of D. Pedro electing to reign in Brazil,* the deputation begged him, in that case, to send to Portugal as queen, "the eldest of his daughters, the Senhora D. Maria II."† It is scarcely necessary to inform our readers that the Salic law had *never* existed in Portugal.

On the 6th of April, D. Miguel wrote from Vienna to his sister, the regent, to condole with her on the death of their father, and to express his approbation of the regency, which the late king had appointed to govern the kingdom, until, as he expressed himself, "the intentions of the legitimate heir and successor to it, who is our much loved brother and lord, the Emperor of Brazil, should be made known." He continues with the request, "in case any one should rashly make an abuse of his name to serve as a cloak for projects subversive of order," that his sister would publicly declare, in his name, his disapprobation of such "pernicious designs." D. Miguel, on the same day, addressed a letter to his brother, the Emperor D. Pedro, in which he acknowledged his Imperial Majesty as his legitimate sovereign, and heir and successor to the Crown of our glorious ancestors;" and he enclosed in this letter a copy of the one which he wrote to the Infanta, the principal object of which, he asserted, had been "to prevent the effects of machinations arising from the abuse of my name."

* By the laws both of Brazil and of Portugal, a sovereign reigning in one country could no longer reign in the other. † Born April 4th, 1819.

D. Miguel was well aware of the nature of these machinations and of their origin. For, as soon as news of the death of D. João had reached Vienna, the Spanish minister at that Court called on the Baron de Villa Secca, and strongly advised the immediate departure of D. Miguel for Lisbon; in order, as he observed, by the Prince's presence and authority, to stifle any reactionary popular movement, in which it was possible the troops themselves might take part. The Baron replied to the Spanish minister by assuring him that the prince would not leave Vienna; that he would, without hesitation, yield obedience to the regency named by his late father, until he received further instructions from the king his brother; and that such determination had been approved of by Prince Metternich, and by all the foreign ambassadors resident at Vienna. Ere this information had reached Lisbon, the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid had written, on the 24th, to the Count de Porto Santo, informing him that the King of Spain was persuaded how desirable it was to oppose the coming of D. Pedro to Europe, "both on account of his liberal ideas and his warlike and intrepid disposition, each of which might be the means of causing disturbance in Spain." The Chargé d'Affaires comments on the king's vexation at his sister not being the regent; and makes known Ferdinand's secret intentions of sending emissaries to Lisbon to work for the immediate return of D. Miguel; and, if possible, to arrange a marriage between that prince and the Princess Christian of Naples. He further informs the foreign secretary of state that instructions had been sent to the Spanish minister at Vienna for the purpose of urging the immediate departure of D. Miguel for Lisbon; to which the prince had indignantly replied, that he himself had, in 1823, supported legitimate authority, and should continue to do so.

On the 12th of May, D. Miguel again addressed his brother with constant expressions of loyalty and obedience to his "legitimate sovereign;" and in a letter to the Infanta regent, dated June 14th, he approves the publication of his previous letter, declaring himself the "faithful subject" of his brother, "to whom it is the duty of us all to submit."

In the meanwhile, D. Pedro, by a decree dated at Rio on the

26th of April, had confirmed the authority of the regency to govern until the constitutional Charter, which he had prepared for Portugal, should be promulgated. Three days afterwards, on the 29th, the Charter was granted; and signed by D. Pedro as King of Portugal and Algarves; and Sir Charles Stuart,* who had been much consulted on the subject, undertook to convey it himself to Lisbon.

Having granted this Constitution or Charter, hereafter known as the Charter of 1826, D. Pedro proposed to abdicate the throne of Portugal in favour of the next heir, his daughter D. Maria da Gloria, which he did by a "Carta Regia," dated 2nd May (1826). This abdication, nevertheless, he made dependent on two conditions; the one, that the reception of the Charter in Portugal, and the oaths taken to observe it, should be officially made known to him before his daughter should leave Rio; the other, that a marriage between D. Miguel and the young queen should be contracted; and that the first steps towards this, namely, their betrothal, should have taken place.

While this was occurring at Rio, Portugal was in a state of uneasiness. The intentions of D. Pedro were as yet unknown. Saldanha was still governor at Oporto, and was watching passing events with great anxiety. He was in correspondence with Sir William A'Court, the British ambassador at Lisbon; and on the 15th of May he writes to that diplomatist:—

"I duly appreciate the favourable idea you entertain of my services; and I pledge my honour that in this part of the kingdom, and I believe I may venture to say also in Lisbon, no movement whatever will take place by either of the parties, until the decision of D. Pedro be known, except if his brother should make his appearance. You assure me, England has already declared to the present regency, that she will consider any arrangement as incomplete that will not receive the sanction of the nation, according to those forms which the ancient usages of the kingdom require; and that our Government has fully admitted the necessity of that sanction. England acts according to her duty (allow me the term) to her faithful and old ally,

* By "Royal Letters," dated 1st May, 1826, D. Pedro conferred the title of Marquis de Angra on this diplomatist, afterwards Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

the Portuguese nation: but, I am most terribly afraid, she will lose a great part of her merit, and her right to the gratitude of the Portuguese, if she will not insist—if she will not oblige the present regency to call the Cortes immediately."

The preceding passage, written in English, is followed, at considerable length, by proofs of the authority of the regency to assemble the Cortes,* and concludes as follows:—

"The profound wish I feel for the welfare of my country; the anxiety I am in respecting its future destiny; the fear of a civil war; and the persuasion I am in that you may so decidedly contribute to prevent the last and promote the first, are the pressing motives which have made me write so extensively: and what stronger reasons can I offer to plead my excuse?"

On the 2nd of July, the news reached Lisbon that D. Pedro had given a "constitutional Charter" to Portugal, and had, conditionally, abdicated in favour of his daughter, the nearest heir. It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm of the liberals. Saldanha exulted in a Constitution which would secure to Portugal a free people and a limited monarchy. He wrote, shortly afterwards, to the English ambassador as follows:—

"OPORTO, *July 9th*, 1826.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"You will easily appreciate the excess of my joy; but, if it could, it would be disturbed by the news I have received from Lisbon. They assure me that both the Spanish ambassador and the Russian minister have protested against his Majesty's decision; and that some doubts were entertained about the line of conduct Government would follow. It cannot go backwards. All the nation knows the liberality with which the king has given us a Constitution; and, if it is not made public immediately after the arrival of Sir Charles Stuart, a terrible explosion will take place. But all trust to your exertions, and firmly hope you will (if it becomes necessary) assist, with the powerful means you have at your disposal, the

* The first Cortes known in Portugal were those at Lamego in 1143. The last, previous to the period of which we write, were in 1697-8, at Lisbon.

efforts of those who will require from Government the execution of his Majesty's desires.

"The moderation of the inhabitants of this populous city is beyond expression. After the steam vessel arrived every one was aware of the enthusiasm that had been manifested at S. Carlos Theatre at Lisbon, and immediately got ready to do the same here. I knew it, and insinuated my wish of reserving these marks of joy until the day I would receive the official news. The theatre was completely full that night, and the greatest silence reigned all the time. Not one single person of those known as enemies of the representative government has received the slightest insult; but, in almost every countenance, you may read the strongest satisfaction. They do me justice. They know I am ready to give my life for their welfare. They trust I will direct them right; and with the greatest docility have followed my advice. I shall be consistent with my principles, and will answer their confidence. The one who has been acknowledged the legitimate sovereign has given us a Constitution. Our noble ally, Great Britain, approves it; (else Sir Charles Stuart would not be its bearer). The Brazils will maintain it. And therefore, I am determined, if the intrigues of Spain and Russia prevail, to put myself at the head of the troops of all the northern provinces, of whose obedience I am sure, and act according to the orders of my king. I hope I shall meet your approbation, and that you will have the goodness to write to me by the first post.

"I have, etc.,

"J. C. DE SALDANHA."

The Charter arrived at Lisbon on the 7th July, brought by Sir Charles Stuart, who immediately left for Caldas, where the Infanta was residing. The regency vacillated. The expected Proclamation failed to appear; the oaths were not taken; and Saldanha began to tremble lest the nation should even yet be disappointed of the promised boon. Fortunately, the Charter contained in itself a remedy for this delay. For, in its very final paragraph, all competent authorities are called upon "to swear to and to cause to be sworn to;—to execute and to cause

to be executed;"—all the provisions therein contained. Acting upon this authority, Saldanha wrote to the Infanta (now sole regent by Art. 92 of the Charter), declaring, that only out of consideration for her Serene Highness had he hitherto deferred obeying the mandate of his sovereign, by proclaiming the constitutional Charter the law of the land; but, if the oaths were not taken by the 31st of July, he, Saldanha, would publicly take them himself, and compel them to be taken, on that day, in all the northern provinces. At the same time, he wrote to the minister of war (Count de Barbaçena), informing him, that he had ordered a squadron of the 6th Cavalry, which was marching to Chaves, to stop at Villa Nova de Gaia, that it might form part of the force with which he should march on Lisbon, if the constitutional Charter was not sworn to by the 31st of July. This was indeed a strong measure. But the loyalty of Saldanha's motives was appreciated by the regent. Her Highness immediately replied to his letter, and gave orders that the oaths to the Charter should be taken simultaneously throughout the country on the 31st of July: that, that day and the two following, should be days of "grand gala" and rejoicings: whilst, on the last of these, at 5 o'clock, a solemn Te Deum should be sung in the cathedral. Similar rejoicings, to inaugurate the nation's freedom, were to take place in all the cities and towns in the kingdom; and all Portuguese subjects residing abroad, were called upon to take the oaths, without delay, at the offices of the various consuls.

"Without this, my firm resolution and determination," said Saldanha, in a letter which he addressed to his Majesty D. Pedro V., on the 11th January, 1860, "the constitutional Charter would have become a dead letter: the throne of her Majesty D. Maria II., so intimately connected with the fundamental law of that Charter, would not have been secured: D. Miguel would quickly have seized the sceptre: and the august mother of your Majesty would have remained Princess of Grand Pará."

In his account of the civil war in Portugal, Colonel Badcock, of the 7th Hussars, who, on the part of the British Government, was afterwards present at the siege of Oporto, writes of this period as follows: "The reins of government were in the hands

of D. Isabel Maria; and every one was prepared, according to appearances, to see the offered Constitution rejected, or allowed to sleep; when, suddenly, Saldanha, Governor of Oporto, proclaimed it the law of the land." . . . . "Everything was done to suppress the Constitution: when Saldanha's proceedings held him up as the hero of the day. As he was grandson to the celebrated Marquis of Pombal, who could suspect that *he* would aid in lowering the privileges of his class? Lose *caste!* Impossible! Some of the nobility of Oporto had full confidence in his firmness to their interests; that he was no constitutionalist; and therefore, they flattered him on all occasions. They volunteered schemes, plans, and ample information. '*He* doubted (said they) whether the queen (widow of João VI.) and D. Miguel had many friends in Oporto!' 'Innumerable,' was the reply; and they clubbed together their wise heads to form a correct muster-roll of their party. Each man was proud to have his name in a conspicuous place in the list: fortune was to attend all included in the honourable nomenclature; when, lo! confusion and dismay! twelve hours* after receiving the document, this very Saldanha proclaimed the Constitution, and became, as *they* said, 'the champion of Freemasonry.'"

As Freemasonry was regarded by the absolutists in an odious light, it was considered a great reproach to Saldanha that he should have ever been connected with that society, which had been introduced into Portugal by the late Duke of Sussex. But, at that time, we may presume Freemasonry to have been a friendly and charity-working society as in England. It became afterwards, in Portugal, a political one devoted to the worst purposes.

The popularity of Saldanha had now become immense amongst all classes. The liberals, except those who were jealous of his supremacy, looked up to him as their saviour. Their enthusiasm was without limits. Even amongst the very reactionists, there were those who considered his advent to power, as necessary, to stem, by his authority, the rushing tide of too advanced

* The colonel is evidently somewhat wrong in his dates.

liberalism. Consequently, the regent thought it desirable to call Saldanha to Lisbon, immediately after the promulgation of the Charter, which, as Sr. Soriano observes, "had been sworn to freely and spontaneously by the Government, the grandèes of the kingdom,* the judges, the army, the clergy, the nobility, and the people."

A new ministry was formed on the 1st of August, in which Saldanha, in his absence, was named to the War Department. Of his colleagues it is unnecessary to say much; beyond that, as Soriano describes them, "they were so indolent, and, perhaps, such secret enemies of liberty, that, were it not for Saldanha, the Charter might have fallen to the ground." On his nomination being made known to him at Oporto, Saldanha immediately embarked for Lisbon on the 3rd August, much to the regret of the inhabitants. At his departure, he issued a proclamation, calling upon them to preserve quiet in the city; and he declared, that such was his confidence in their love of order, and in their affection towards himself, that, without hesitation, he intrusted to their care his wife and children. He was led to this resolution as much by the unexpected suddenness of his departure, as by the thought of the unknown dangers which he might, in these troublous times, have to encounter.

The corporation of the city accompanied Saldanha on board ship, whilst thousands were present on the river's side. The windows of all the streets through which he passed were ornamented with damask silk hangings. In the evening, printed papers were distributed by order of the authorities, in which were made known to the people the encomiums which Saldanha had bestowed upon their loyalty, and his great regret at leaving such valued friends, such excellent citizens, and a city where he had governed during fifteen months; an epoch which he considered the most glorious of his life. From amongst the numerous congratulations, odes, and other verses which were written on this occasion, we select only the following, composed by that ardent patriot, and yet honest man, Manoel Passos, whose name will often recur in these pages.

* Dukes, Marquises, and Counts.

23050

AO GENERAL CONDE DE SALDANHA,

Nobre Campeão da Senhora Dona Maria II., Duqueza do Porto e Rainha Constitucional dos Portuguezes,

HONRA E GLORIA.

SONETO

Por ocasião d'haver o General acclamado na Cidade regeneradora a Carta Constitucional de 1826.

Da lisonja o thuribulo odioso
Não posso manejar, não sei, não quero;
Criou-me a liberdade assim austero
Qual de *Bruto* discipulo orgulhoso.

(Da Patria Pai) o vulto magestoso
Do grão THOMAZ nunca incensei (severo)
Quando foi Nume ou Rei: hoje o venero
Que he pó, e está na campa!—Homem famôso

Assenta-se nos túmulos verdade;
E sua boca o chamou da Patria esteio,
Pai, Fundador da Lusa Liberdade.

SALDANHA he tal:—mas no porvir não leio;
Julga-lo só pertence á postr'a idade,
E em vida até louvar *Catão* receio.*

ALMENO DAMOETA.

On his arrival in Lisbon, Saldanha addressed a very energetic circular to the army, dated August 5th, in which he warns them of the example of some turbulent officers, who, after unsuccessful attempts at revolt, had deserted with their men into Spain.

* (*Translation.*)

"To feed the censer of base flattery
I know not, and I cannot, nor would try;
For as a youth of Brutus' school would be,
Such has stern Liberty created me.
E'en to the great Thomáz, his country's sire,
Howe'er majestic, lit I not the fire
Of incense, when he stood a King or Being higher:
But to thy dust that now in the tomb is laid
O noble one! be willing reverence paid!
Truth on the tomb sits thron'd: thy country's stay
Her voice has named thee: thine it was the ray
Of Liberty to light o'er Lusitania's sway.
And such Saldanha! But *his* Future may
Man read? Posterity the guerdon gives;
I praise not e'en a Cato whilst he lives."

Such was the conduct of 80 men of the 2nd Cavalry; 211 of the 24th Infantry; and about as many of the 17th. The first, says Saldanha, never served in the field—the last, never distinguished itself. By a decree of the same date, the names of these regiments were to be struck from the Army List for ever. With respect to those officers who had not accompanied their regiments, inquiries were to be made as to their behaviour on the occasion, and their future position would be considered.

On the 8th of the month, the ministers, desirous of setting an example of economy, by permission of the regent, lowered their own official salaries from about £1800 to £1000.

On the 30th, Saldanha addressed the following letter to the regent, by which we may judge of the state in which he found the country and the army, on his taking office, and of the difficulties with which he had to contend.

"MOST SERENE HIGHNESS,

"By the decree dated the 1st of this month, your Highness was pleased to do me the honour of naming me Minister of War; and thereby confided to me, at a most critical moment, the important and delicate duties of that department. On the 5th, I began to exercise the functions of my office; and it is my duty to lay before your Serene Highness a succinct account of the state and situation in which the public forces of Portugal were handed over to me; of the measures I have taken, and the efforts I have made, to re-establish public tranquillity; and to bring to their duty the troops which had been seduced from the respect and obedience due to the king D. Pedro IV., to your Serene Highness, and to your government. In laying the following narrative before your Highness, I consider I am doing my duty by enabling you to see, at a glance, what measures it is most desirable to proceed with; to stay; or to vary according as your Highness may consider most useful for the king's service, and for the national interests, which his Imperial Majesty D. Pedro IV. so wisely entrusted to the government and care of your Serene Highness.

"Our internal security, threatened by the cabals of a powerful and disorganizing faction, which had had ample time to plot

and consolidate its plan of refusing obedience to the king; and to the Charter which his Majesty had so loyally and generously presented to us, was undoubtedly the subject requiring the more immediate and severe measures. Rebellion had raised its parricidal cry, on the frontiers of the Province of Traz-os-Montes, on the 26th of July; and, in the Alemtejo, on the 1st of this month. Two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, many officers and soldiers of other regiments, and some militia soldiers, seduced and led away, not only by the apparent chiefs, but by others who, in secret, are endeavouring to undermine our country, had joined the rebellion; and the rebels openly announced their expectations that their criminal example would be followed by other regiments and other districts, while they held forth the extent of the means at their disposal, and the greatness of their projects. Their prophecies were in part realised. The 3rd Regiment of Artillery revolted in Elvas on the 1st of August; and the 5th Regiment of Infantry was vacillating. The firmness of some other regiments crushed this new rebellion at its birth; but several chiefs and officers, rebels at heart, appeared only to be biding their time, or awaiting secret orders, to follow the same criminal path. It was under such auspices that I entered the War Office. In such circumstances, half measures serve but to compromise constituted authority without eradicating the evil; for this reason, your Highness, by your decree of the 5th of this month, ordered the rebel regiments to be disbanded and struck off the list of the army; and declared that the commissioned and non-commissioned officers would meet with no pardon or clemency. This decree cowed the rebels and paralysed the rebellion; this blow, unprecedented in Portugal, made them feel the force of the arm which gave it, and the means at the disposal of the government.

"The General Order, No. 85, made known to the army your Highness's sentiments and intentions; and the language of reason and of truth appeared to convince those who were, as yet, uncontaminated by the hypocrisy of seducers.

"The decrees, of different dates, which separated from their regiments those commandants and officers whom public opinion denounced as agents or promoters of rebellion, broke the threads

of the web which their intrigues had woven; and their places being taken by officers of known fidelity and attachment to D. Pedro IV. and to your Highness's government, re-established order and discipline, wherever the flame of insubordination and bad feeling had been fanned by those commandants and officers. The class of non-commissioned officers, badly educated, and having no path open for their advancement but that of revolutions, had contributed largely to raise a bad feeling among the soldiers; this class has been severely punished; a large number of its members having been, upon information from their superior officers, dismissed the service. Simultaneously with punishments, rewards have been distributed; and several officers, who, in addition to the services they rendered on the 26th of July and 1st of August, had several years of services unrewarded, have been promoted without injury to others.

"Such are the measures that have been employed to produce a better feeling in the army; to re-establish discipline; and to put an end to the general rising of the northern and southern provinces.

"Those who were faithful to the king and Charter felt reassured, when they saw that your Highness's Government followed openly the path of good faith, from the 1st of August onwards; and, thus reassured, they increased the moral strength of the nation.

"The Province of Traz-os-Montes; from its position, from the character of its inhabitants, and from the events of 1823, required and received serious consideration. Situated at a distance from the metropolis, on the confines of Spain, and its people but little enlightened, this Province has always been in a state of distrustfulness. The measures adopted by the late Cortes ruined its agriculture, and brought about the rising of February, 1823. The ministry which followed completed the exasperation of the Province. Its inhabitants were led to believe that the Charter the King had given them was but an invention of the *Freemasons;* a symbolic term which is sufficient to raise the people against every innovation or reform; for which purpose, the clergy, the magistrates, and the upper classes have made a point of applying it wherever it suits them. Some

regiments of infantry were sent to this Province, and some were stationed in observation on the left bank of the Douro. These and other measures of more general effect re-established peace and tranquillity: but the germ of sedition is not yet extinct; because the Spanish authorities of Leon and Galliza promote rebellion and desertion by every means in their power, short of compromising the Crown. In the prisons and fortresses of Oporto exist large numbers of prisoners implicated in the rising of this Province, whose trials have already commenced.

"The insurrectionary spirit of the population in the Alemtejo is less general; though it is stronger in the army of that Province; partly through the want of energy in the civil and military authorities of the Province, and partly from the closer connection the chiefs of the conspiracy were able to maintain with the contrivers of the rising in Lisbon. Fresh generals were sent there with two regiments of infantry; and, by these means, a check was placed upon desertion; although it is true that the people between the Guadiana and Estremoz, especially in Villa Viçosa, and those between Monsarás and Ouguella, are not well inclined, for the same reasons referred to in Traz-os-Montes; that is to say, that the governors of Badajoz and Monte-Rey, like the captain-general of the kingdom of Leon, have welcomed the rebels in a far different manner than the requirements of the law of nations allow. Magessi proclaimed in Almendral, on the 14th inst., that their Highnesses, D. Maria Thereza and the Infanta D. Maria Francisca d'Assis, supported his rebellion; and I am not aware that the Spanish Government has prohibited such an abuse of their name. From this Province, there is already in the prisons and fortresses of the Capital, a large number of soldiers; priests (the most antagonistic class of all); and civilians, accused of complicity in the revolts of July 31st, and August 1st. Among them are the chiefs of the sedition of the 3rd Regiment of Artillery: their trial has commenced; but I should have preferred a special tribunal, a military commission for such crimes; for it is only by instantaneous punishment that we are able to repress them; and it is by such means that rebels are tried in all other armies upon such important occasions. However, not wishing to wound your

Highness's kind heart; and feeling that such a measure, from being novel in this country, would be thought cruel, I have abstained from proposing it; although I will certainly do so if circumstances render it necessary.

"Such, your Highness, had been the work of my ministry down to the 21st inst., when I was not only informed, but convinced, that the cavalry of the Guarda Real da Policia, casting aside all feelings of duty, honour, and fidelity, were preparing to commit most nefarious crimes, commencing by a complete insurrection against the king, D. Pedro IV., and against the person and government of your Highness, as will be proved upon their trial. I could not hesitate; affairs were pressing, and not a moment could be spared. That very night, the Guarda Real was surprised; disarmed in its barracks, and conducted on board the ship of war, *D. Sebastião*. This strong measure met with general approval;—such was the discredit into which the force had fallen. The people have no confidence in the police. The citizens reject its services in the theatres, meetings, and places of amusement. It has, therefore, become an instrument of disorder, and not of security. Under these circumstances it must be disbanded. Those soldiers who are entitled to their release must be discharged; and the others be draughted into other regiments to serve out their time. This refers only to the infantry, as the whole cavalry is on its trial. The duties of this body are temporarily supplied by troops of the line; and as they are few (none of the regiments having their complement of men), the militia assists, receiving an allowance of bread and pay by the ancient tariff, as has been done on former occasions.

"To maintain public security, and to avoid the loss of the mounted police being felt, I have called to the Capital a squadron of the 10th Horse.

"In Minho, Beira Alta, Beira Baixa, Algarve, and the Oporto district, not only have there been no signs of disaffection; but, on the contrary, all the local authorities answer for the fidelity of the inhabitants; as to the district of Oporto, there will never be anything to fear; but Braga, the capital of the Minho, has not the best of feelings; as is the case with all the districts where

the clergy have any influence; as, for instance, Elvas, Villa Viçosa, etc., etc.

"Such, Madame, have been the proceedings of the War Office during the twenty-five days that I have had the honour to direct it. All my energies have been applied towards the placing superior officers of character and confidence in the various regiments; and to replace those, of whom I have had bad reports, by officers of known good conduct and attachment to the institutions given us by the king. Wishing to economise the public money, I have ordered few changes in the quarters of the troops, confining myself to those of absolute necessity.

"The unusual measures I have described, and the precautions required for public security, have absorbed all my time and thoughts; rendering impossible, for the present, those measures of reform and reorganization so necessary in all the branches of the military administration.

"The army is almost extinct; the number of officers excessive; while the soldiers are few—there are barely enough for the garrisons. A new conscription is imperative, if only for the purpose of giving their discharge to those who have completed their time. Good faith is the corner-stone of a just Government.

"It is just that I should take this opportunity of mentioning those generals who rendered the greatest services during this critical period. Among them are José Correa de Mello, Military Governor of the Province of Traz-os-Montes; Carlos Frederico de Caula, Governor of Elvas; Brigadier Francisco de Paula Azevedo, Governor of Fort la Lippe and commander of the troops in the Alemtejo.

"I consider it also my duty to inform your Highness, that of all the officers of the army none made more sacrifices, or more strenuous efforts, or more freely risked their lives for the good of the service and the execution of the royal orders, from the beginning of July down to the present time, than the chief of the 1st Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro; the captain of the 11th Regiment of Cavalry, Manoel Joaquim de Lima Berrêdo Praça; and the lieutenant of the 16th Regi-

ment of Infantry, D. Fernando Xavier d'Almeida. These two latter officers have for some time formed my staff.

"I have, etc.

"J. C. DE SALDANHA."

"30*th August*, 1826."

This letter was followed by another, dated 9th of October, which we present in full without comment, constituting as it does a valuable State paper, in which the reader will find a graphic account of the state of the Portuguese army, accompanied by remarks that may be studied by all readers at all times.

"9*th October*, 1826.

"SERENE HIGHNESS,

"In the beginning of September, I had the honour to lay before your Highness an account of the state, from a political point of view, in which I found the army, when your Highness was pleased to entrust me with the management of the War Office. I also acquainted your Highness with the spirit of the troops at that period. I indicated those regiments which had committed the foul crime of high treason, and which had deserted the country in open rebellion; and I showed which were the people that perfidy, ignorance, seduction, and rebellion had carried away to the extent of causing them, in a manner more or less explicit, to doubt the unquestionable rights of the king D. Pedro IV., and the legitimacy of the succession to the crown of this kingdom; and I briefly narrated the measures I had put in force to restrain the troops, and to lead the minds of the people to that obedience and loyalty which is their duty.

"Those measures of severity and well merited punishment paralysed the revolt of entire regiments; because, by the withdrawal of those officers known to be disloyal, weak or suspect, through their words or actions; and their replacement by others of firmer character, and known adhesion to the principles sanctioned by his Majesty in the constitutional Charter; as also by the imprisonment and trial of various individuals of the military and other classes; the rebellion appeared to be

suffocated and reduced to the simple enunciation of political blasphemies, senseless proclamations, and absurd publications. But, your Highness, the seduction, the virus, the corruption had sent their roots much deeper. The rebels had still more secret projects, stronger springs; and had agents so powerful in this country, and still more so in a neighbouring kingdom, that a few days after my narrative was laid before your Highness, the country was inundated by seditious papers; proclamations inciting to rebellion; false decrees unworthily attributed to a prince of the blood royal; and a thousand other inventions and traps tending to seduce the unwary and to frighten the peaceful: the Press lent its powerful arm to the wicked; rebellion boldly raised its head and lit its fires throughout the kingdom; desertion to Spain continued; and some of the regiments placed to watch the frontier contributed a shameful contingent to the traitorous deserters. This criminal fanaticism, although of comparatively small growth, acquired its largest development amongst the troops of Traz-os-Montes; who, through the proclamations of the traitors Monte Alegre, Magessi, Antonio da Silveira, and Leitão, were led to believe that the Charter given to us by his Majesty was not his own production, but that of the same democratic faction against which Portugal, and Traz-os-Montes in particular, had revolted in 1823.

"The general orders to the army, and all the correspondence of the War Office, have been employed and drawn up with a view to the removal of this dangerous error. The generals of the Provinces have the fullest powers for capturing and trying every soldier or officer who endeavours to propagate subversive opinions. Every means at my disposal, or at least all those which have occurred to me, have been put in practice to inspire the troops with sentiments of loyalty and obedience. Everything that sound reason could suggest has been done. The places of command have been filled up with men of character; and your Highness has, at my request, dismissed some officers; relieved others from various posts; and discharged some scores of non-commissioned officers, whom the rewards of previous revolutions had rendered desirous of another.

"In spite, however, of these efforts, I have to lay before your

Highness a fresh act of the vilest treason—the flight, desertion, and revolt of the ex-governor of Almeida, Manoel da Silveira, natural brother of the Viscount de Canellas—which is more atrocious and more infamous than any of the preceding desertions. This governor fled from Almeida on the 15th of September, abandoning, by night, a fortress which the king had entrusted to him; and joined the rebels, who had a few days previously entered Freixoneda. This criminal example, together with a host of papers which the rebels spread over the country during that period, (prepared in a neighbouring kingdom, and promulgated through the medium of the Lisbon press,) led the 11th Infantry to the same crime and the same treason. This regiment, 250 strong, left Almeida on the 16th of September, the day following that on which the governor deserted. The event is the more surprising, when it is considered, that this regiment was reckoned one of the most faithful of the army, and that some of the officers who accompanied it had been looked upon, up to that moment, as staunch liberals.

"This treason produced a great effect upon the people of Beira Alta and Beira Baixa. The majority remained wavering: whilst in the town of Villar Maior, things were carried to the extent of proclaiming the Infante D. Miguel, absolute King of Portugal. In spite, however, of this excess, order was quickly restored; there were no riots, no reprisals, nor was any damage done. The generals of the two Beiras took every possible precaution to prevent the spread of the contagion, and to maintain order.

"Several militia officers and individuals of every class have emigrated to Spain; not only since this last attempt, but even previously to it; and the civil and military authorities have not been able to restrain them, although proclamations have been made of the pains and penalties they are subject to: this being owing to the delusive hope held out by the anarchists, that his Highness the Infante D. Miguel is coming with a Franco-Austrian army to overthrow the Government and the institutions granted by his Majesty; which delusion has dazzled and led them astray. The Viscount da Varzea, a relative of the

renegade Governor of Almeida, has requested to be exonerated from the government of the Province of Beira Alta; alleging that the treason of his relative has placed him in a false position; at the same time protesting the impossibility of his being himself disloyal to the king; but he is aware that he cannot but be the object of injurious imputations; and, therefore, he requests permission to resign his post. Under these circumstances, Brigadier Francisco de Paula d'Azevedo, a most trustworthy officer, was ordered to the government of Beira Alta; and Brigadier Antonio Carlos Cary was named to the command of the forces in the Alemtejo.

"The revolt of Almeida produced (if your Highness will allow me to say so) a most serious impression in the War Office. The Capital showed signs of fear and ominous distrust. The anarchists prophesied new defections; and the subjects faithful to his Majesty, to your Highness, and to the Charter, began to tremble. The Capital required the support, the assistance, and the services, of a man whose firmness of character and attachment to the principles his Majesty has established should be a certain guarantee as to his conduct.

"In a country in which, from long habit, force is necessary to ensure respect for the laws, the public gaze is always turned upon the War Office. If the armed forces obey the Government, the laws in force are obeyed, and peace prevails. At this period, General Palmeirim, whom I can accuse of nought but weakness, did not give satisfaction either to the government, the army, or the people. It was necessary to find a substitute: —but where? This difficulty is of daily occurrence in the War Office. The army lists contain hundreds of officers, the majority of whom are totally unfit for any duty. The general voice was in favour of a man whose long and continued services were a sufficient recommendation, and whose honour and probity had at various times placed him in most difficult and delicate positions. This man was the Count de Sampayo (Manoel). Forced, therefore, by necessity, and by the supreme duty of ensuring the public safety, I laid before your Highness the necessity for another general; and the ministry proposed the aforesaid Count de Sampayo (Manoel), for General of the Court

and Capital. This nomination was, by itself, sufficient to tranquillise those spirits whom the desertions and intrigues of the rebels had filled with disquiet; and his subsequent election as deputy for Estremadura proved, that the public approved your Highness's choice.

"Your Highness is well aware that the strongest basis of all governments is equity and justice. In accordance with these principles, and without neglecting the necessary forms which must be observed by all legal and representative governments, some officers who had been dismissed without trial, in 1823, have been reinstated; and others will be successively proposed to your Highness, as soon as the committee which your Highness ordered to be named, by the decree of August 17th last, shall have declared them innocent.

"In a word, your Highness, public tranquillity reigns in Portugal, but the spark of insurrection is not entirely extinct; and the utmost vigilance is necessary to enforce discipline in an army, in which, six years ago, it was unknown.

"The Lisbon troops being insufficient for the service, your Highness commanded recruits to be drawn from the first and second lines; but only in those districts where it could be done without risk. The conscription in Portugal has always been disliked; it was, however, indispensable.

"It is much to be lamented that your Highness's appeal to the youths of Portugal, inviting them to enlist, has not produced the effect it ought to have done. The demoralization has reached such a point, that, even in the Capital, where so many boast of their attachment to the person of his Majesty, very few came forward to enroll themselves.

"Desertions of individuals have continued, though in small numbers, in spite of every effort; nor will they cease while the Spanish authorities upon the frontiers contribute to this state of affairs, as they do in a manner more or less declared. Such is the opinion of the generals who govern the various Provinces; and the Governor of Elvas gives it as his opinion, that this underhand warfare which Spain is waging with us is far more dangerous than open strife; and in this I concur.

"To prevent any attempt by the rebels to invade our terri-

tory, I have assembled the forces at my disposal in the Alemtejo, Beira, and Traz-os-Montes. Were it not for foreign assistance, the rebels would never again put their feet in the country they have deserted.

"Up to the present time, I believe that an example of severity would have produced excellent results; and, for this reason, I proposed the nomination of military commissions. The Government, however, in consideration of the state of external politics, has resolved to defer the measure.

"But, whilst rebellion and desertion have, to a certain extent, brought discredit upon the army, it is most pleasing to have to declare to your Highness that, in addition to those officers whom I had the honour to mention to your Highness in my former account, Major-Generals Viscount de Beire, the Count d'Alva, the Marquis d'Angeja, Major-General Stubbs; Colonels the Marquis de Valença, the Count de Lumiares, D. Thomaz de Mascarenhas, the Count da Ponte; and many other officers mentioned in the accompanying list, have rendered valuable services, and given proofs of the sincerest fidelity to his Majesty D. Pedro IV., to her Majesty D. Maria da Gloria, and to your Serene Highness, which will make them, at any time, worthy objects of the royal consideration.

"This narrative was finished and ready to be placed before your Serene Highness, when I was informed of a new attempt planned by the Marquis de Chaves. This base and furious madman, as for the last two years he has been supposed to be, or has pretended to be, that he might more easily deceive your Highness's Ministers and betray his Majesty, endeavoured, on the fifth of this month, to raise a rebellion in Villa Real; but a detachment of the 9th Caçadores, stationed there, immediately put it down, and forced the marquis to seek safety in flight. I am, as yet, only aware of the fact through the despatches of the general commanding at Oporto; but, I trust, the consequences will have fallen only upon the vile promoters of the rebellion.

"I have, &c.,

"J. C. DE SALDANHA.

"*List of the Officers who have rendered the greatest services, and shown the most faithful sentiments of obedience and loyalty to his Majesty, D. Pedro IV., and to the Charter granted by him.*

Major-Generals	Marquez de Angeja.		
	Visconde de Beire.		
	Thomaz Guilherme Stubbs.		
Dº. Brevet	José Maria de Moura.		
Brigadiers . .	Sebastião José de Mira.		
	Conde d'Alva.		
	Antonio Carlos Cary.		
Colonels . . .	Marquez de Valença	commanding	4th Infantry.
	Conde de Lumiares	,,	1st ,,
	Jeronimo Pereira de Vasconcellos	,,	16th ,,
	Henrique da Silva da Fonseca	,,	18th ,,
	Francisco José Pereira	,,	6th ,,
	João Joaquim Pereira do Lago	,,	12th ,,
	José Benedicto de Mello	,,	10th ,,
	João Corrêa Guedes Pinto	,,	8th ,,
	Antonio José Soares Borges	,,	15th ,,
	José Lucio Travassos Valdez	,,	3rd ,,
	Bernardo Antonio Zagallo	,,	9th ,,
Lieut.-Colonels .	Luiz Manoel de Lemos	,,	8th Caçadores.
	Conde da Ponte	,,	7th Cavalry.
	D. Thomaz Mascarenhas	,,	4th ,,
	José de Barros e Abreu	,,	12th ,,
	José Baptista da Silva Lopes	,,	4th Artillery.
	José Julio de Carvalho	,,	10th Caçadores.
	Joaquim Antonio d'Almeida	,,	9th ,,
	D. José Miguel de Noronha	,,	21st Infantry.
	Pedro de Souza Canavarro	,,	6th Cavalry.
Majors . . .	Romão José Soares		2nd Caçadores.
	Francisco Manoel Ribeiro d'Azevedo		4th Artillery.
Captain . . .	Manoel de Souza Rebello		3rd Cavalry.
Lieutenant . .	Macario de Castro, Aide-de-Camp to the Brigadier José Corrêa de Mello.		

N.B.—In addition to these, I had the honour of mentioning in my first account; Major-General Carlos Frederico de Caula; Brigadiers Francisco de Paula d'Azeredo and José Corrêa de Mello; Lieutenant-Colonel Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro; Captain Manoel Joaquim de Lima Berredo Praça; and Lieutenant D. Fernando Xavier d'Almeida."

Shortly after the date of this letter, fresh disturbances occurred in the Algarves, which commenced by the revolt of

the 14th Infantry and a battalion of the 4th Caçadores. To quell this insurrection, the Minister of War determined on going himself to the scene of disturbance; leaving Quintella, the Minister of Marine, to act at the War Office in his absence. A paper of that period informs us that "the illustrious General Saldanha appeared at seven in the morning of the 14th (October) in the Terreiro do Paço,* where the Division was formed. He addressed the troops with great energy; and their enthusiasm, and that of the people, can only be imagined by those who know the patriotic fire which General Saldanha can inspire."

The troops, which had been got ready in the space of thirty-six hours, to the number of 4000, consisting of two brigades of infantry; a force of cavalry and one of mounted artillery; crossed the Tagus in boats during the day; and the next morning the general followed with his Staff. The regent, on the occasion of his departure, presented him with three superb chargers.

Saldanha pursued the insurgents, who, awed by the terror of his name, and by his unexpected presence, fled wherever he approached. From his head-quarters at Tavira, he was able, on the 25th, to declare that the insurrection was suppressed. It is remarkable, in so far as we have been able to ascertain, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at this period D. Francisco d'Almeida, carefully avoided, in his despatches to his diplomatic agents abroad, all mention of Saldanha's name, and the services he was rendering to his country. About this time there began to arise a jealous feeling of his increasing popularity and influence; pretended suspicions were entertained of his tendency to support ultra-liberal opinions,—the consequences of which will be more clearly apparent as we proceed. His colleagues in this ministry were of different shades of politics. For instance, there was Sr. Trigoso, the Home Minister, the tendency of whose wishes we may judge of by the following. On the occasion of the insubordination of the garrison of Almeida, on the 10th of September, Saldanha presented to the Ministers in Council an energetic and severe "Order of the Day;" when, as Sr. Liberato informs us, Trigoso objected to the words *patria* and *liberdade*,

* Commonly called "Black Horse Square" by the English traveller.

which were made use of. Could he have imagined that such words in the mouth of the loyal Saldanha implied republicanism and anarchy? The other ministers were, more or less, in continual opposition to the measures of their more active and more far-seeing colleague, who was convinced that much danger for the future might be avoided by energy and timely precautions. To use the words of Colonel Badcock, "The State was full of ulcers, and Saldanha was a heavy-handed surgeon;" and, "when Minister of War, he had an opportunity of clinching the nail of his popularity, and of winning the army to his interests by doing acts of justice."

Somewhat later in our history, but in reference to this period, that distinguished statesman, Sr. Rodrigo de Fonseca Magalhães, sitting in the Chamber of Deputies on the 10th of November, 1834, but in opposition to Saldanha, observed: "D. Miguel arrived. The army was in excellent condition, for which too great praise cannot be given to General Saldanha, who had purified it by purging it of individuals who were unworthy to belong to so noble a profession, and who were dangerous to the safety of the State."

On the 30th of October, the Chambers were assembled; and, the Infanta Regent, addressing the peers and deputies present, congratulated them on this their first meeting, in virtue of the new constitutional Charter; and announced that, within a few hours, she had received information from Vienna that her brother, D. Miguel, had, on the 4th, taken the oath to the Charter. At the same time, her Highness made known that measures were in train to procure the necessary dispensation from Rome, for effecting the betrothal between D. Miguel and "my august niece and lady, the queen D. Maria II."

The Marquis de Palmella, then ambassador in London, was informed by Mr. Canning; that the news of D. Miguel having taken the oath to the Charter only reached Lisbon in time to be mentioned, in the regent's speech, at the opening of the Cortes; and Canning thus concluded his note: "Viva, viva! Thus the *benevolent* intentions of Prince Metternich towards Portugal are happily frustrated. If the messenger had arrived twenty-four hours later, who could declare the consequences

which might have resulted from the belief in which the members of the Chambers were—that D. Miguel was hostile to the Constitution."

On this occasion, the oaths of allegiance to the QUEEN and CHARTER were taken by the Chamber of Peers; there being present; the Cardinal Patriarch; 1 Duke (Cadaval); 24 marquises; 41 counts; 3 viscounts; 4 archbishops; and 13 bishops. Of the deputies present, there were 111, besides the president, vice-president, and secretaries. Saldanha took his seat for the Province of the Minho.

We shall see hereafter with what ease these oaths were disregarded by D. Miguel himself, and by so large a number of those who took them.

On the 29th of November, D. Miguel, on his own part; and the Baron de Villa Secca on the part of the queen D. Maria II.; in the presence of the Austrian emperor; the Archdukes Ferdinand and Francis; Prince Metternich and others, signed the contract for the marriage, which was to take place on the queen's attaining the legal age, or by a special dispensation from his Holiness for that purpose. The Marquis de Palmella, in a despatch dated London in the previous September (9th), states how anxious the emperor had been to get this marriage adjusted, in order that D. Miguel should assume the regency during the young queen's minority. D. Miguel, as Palmella informs us, had delayed, as long as possible, taking the oath to the Charter; first on one pretence, then on another; and, finally, on that of consulting the emperor, who was absent from Vienna. It was doubtless more prudent to throw off the mask, if such were already the intention of D. Miguel, only when he should be in a better position to support the character he proposed to assume. That the prince had temptations offered to him, before he left Vienna, is indeed confirmed in a despatch from Palmella to his government, dated December 15. He writes: "I saw a despatch from Prince Metternich, in which it is stated; that the Sr. Infante had brought him a letter and papers, which had been sent to his Highness, for the purpose of convincing him of his right to the throne, and of the nullity of the oaths which they had obliged him to take."

Saldanha, on his return from the Algarves, where he had successfully suppressed the attempted rebellion, was attacked by a very serious illness. It is generally supposed that he was poisoned when dining at the Bishop's palace at Beja. The Bishop was absent. Strange symptoms declared themselves on the following morning; but neither Saldanha nor his friends suspected, at that time, the cause of his illness. An illness at such a period was unfortunate for the country. Saldanha was unable to attend to the duties of his office; and they were undertaken, from the 6th of December, by the Marquis de Valença, who, in his turn, was succeeded, on the 9th of the following month, by Sr. Candido José Xavier.

The intrigues and the hostile intentions of King Ferdinand towards Portugal continued. He gave open countenance to the rebels who had taken refuge in his country, and who were continually crossing the frontiers. They assembled in such force, that, when Colonel Valdez marched against them, he and his troops, writes Sr. Liberato, were vanquished and taken prisoners. The name of D. Miguel was constantly invoked in support of these rebellious attempts. The Spanish Government declined either to acknowledge the rights of the queen, D. Maria, or the authority of the Infanta Regent. In this state of affairs, fearful of the still more open hostility of Spain, which might even be countenanced by those powers who were inimical to the Charter, the Portuguese ambassador was instructed to claim that assistance from England, which was stipulated by treaty between the two countries. Accordingly, George IV. sent a message to the two Houses of Parliament, calling on them to secure from foreign hostility "the most ancient ally of Great Britain." Palmella, on this occasion, wrote triumphantly to Lisbon: "I cannot express how astonished and stupified were the ambassadors of Austria and France (the Russian a little less). It was a *véritable 'coup de théâtre.'* Half-an-hour before the message was sent down to parliament, no one had an idea of it, except the ministry, and, I believe I may add, myself."

Five thousand British troops were, in consequence, sent to Lisbon under General Clinton.

It was during Saldanha's illness, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs complained bitterly of what the ministry had to contend with; to whom Palmella wrote in answer, March 10th, 1827, "No one knows better than I do the spirit of low intrigue, of perpetual envy, and of stupid suspicion, which unfortunately, at present, characterizes a portion of our nation."

Saldanha had now partly recovered from his severe and dangerous illness. The state of the regent's health had become such, that she was totally unable to give her attention to public affairs; and Saldanha, therefore, thought it advisable to address the following letter to his colleagues.

CIRCULAR ADDRESSED TO THE MINISTERS OF STATE.

"ILL^MOS E EX^MOS SEN^RES,

"As a Portuguese, and as a minister, my first duty is to uphold and defend the rights of our lawful king, D. Pedro IV.; to carry into perfect execution the constitutional Charter he has given us; and to support and serve the government of her Serene Highness the Infanta, who, in his name, rules over us. In the critical circumstances in which the public cause is placed, I should be betraying those sacred duties, if I did not pronounce, frankly and loyally, my opinion as to the means which appear to me most fitted to prevent the evils which threaten us. Since armed rebellion has been driven beyond our frontiers, the greatest necessity of this kingdom has been the want of prompt and energetic measures, on the part of her Highness's Government, to produce a unity of feelings in all the Portuguese; to furnish proofs of the good faith and strength of the Government; to fortify the faithful in their sentiments of fidelity; to decide the timid and wavering; and to intimidate the bad-intentioned. This necessity becomes every moment more urgent; and each day lost diminishes considerably the moral strength of the Government. The disaffected consider inaction to be timidity; and the result, is renewed attempts at revolution; the faithful become disconsolate, imagining themselves without protection or support; the selfish become each moment more confirmed in their indifference, trusting to find safety therein,

should affairs go wrong. This opinion is confirmed by the daily occurrences of the Capital, and by the accounts received from the provinces. Her Highness's illness, which has as profoundly afflicted the faithful subjects as it has rejoiced the unfaithful, has prevented as yet the employment of those measures; but, as they become each day of more urgent necessity, it is the minister's duty to seek some expedient to remedy this evil.

"But what is this expedient to be? In my opinion, the only legal and suitable expedient is, that her Highness should delegate her powers, as regent, to her Serene Highness the Princess D. Maria Benedicta, during her illness.

"This expedient is perfectly legal; because her Highness holds the regency, not by a merely personal delegation of the royal authority, but by her own right established in the Charter; and as, in the wording of the Charter, there is no restriction placed upon the exercise of that right, it follows that the general principle is applicable to this case,—that any one may do through another that which he has the right to do himself. The Serene Princess D. Maria Benedicta appears specially marked out for this delegation by the virtues which adorn her character; by the love and respect the Portuguese have at all times shewn her; and by the fact of her being the nearest relation in the order of succession, and the one who, by the Charter, would succeed the Serene Infanta D. Isabel Maria in the regency.

"This measure, in addition to its political recommendations, is, moreover, indispensable. Although the ministers of state, in a representative government, are the only persons responsible for all the acts of the executive power, still they have no authority of themselves. Instruments of the executive power, they derive from it their force, their rank, and their power. The ministers do everything, and answer for everything, that is done; although nothing is done in their names. Responsible for all that is bad, they are forced to attribute the good to the supreme head of the nation. But when that head is incapacitated; when the entire nation is aware that a serious illness prevents the Infanta Regent giving her orders to her ministers; and when those ministers are passing orders, with which every one is

aware that the regent is unacquainted; what strength can they be supposed to have? By what right can they expect to be obeyed? If, instead of being instruments of the executive power, they, of their own accord, constitute themselves its delegates, are they not in reality usurpers? The public has already began to consider these questions, and each one answers them in his own fashion; but the only result of such discussions can but be, discredit to the acts of the Government, and the annihilation of the moral strength of its ministers. To these inconveniences. another equally serious one must be added; which is, the entire cessation of all acts which require the royal signature; which puts a stop to the carrying out of many measures of general interest; and impedes the progress of private business; thus giving rise to discontent on the part of those who are interested therein; while the former evil is injurious to the royal service; and, would be found still more so, if any unexpected event were suddenly to arise demanding an immediate remedy.

"This, as your Excellencies are aware, has always been my opinion in the councils of ministers which have been held upon this subject; which opinion I am impelled to transmit to your Excellencies in writing; so that, at a future day, the motives upon which it is based may not be ignored.

"God preserve your Excellencies!

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA D'OLIVEIRÀ E DAUN.

"To Illmo e Exmo Sr D. FRANCISCO D'ALMEIDA.
,, Illmo e Exmo Sr ANTONIO MANOEL DE NORONHA.
,, Illmo e Exmo Sr BARÃO DO SOBRAL (HERMANO).
,, Illmo e Exmo Sr LUIZ MANOEL DE MOURA CABRAL.
,, Illmo e Exmo Sr BISPO DE VIZEU.

"*War Office, 10th March*, 1827."

It is asserted by Sr. Liberato, that the chief object of this suggestion was to anticipate, in case of the Infanta's sudden death, the necessity, which might otherwise arise, for a successor being named by the Chambers; whose choice, if it fell upon D. Miguel, might prove fatal to the constitutional cause. The regent, fortunately, recovered; and Saldanha's adversaries did not fail to represent to her his proposal in an odious light.

Little repose was allowed to the Minister of War, on his again being able to attend to the duties of his office. For, on the last day of April of this year (1827), the garrison of Elvas, on the frontier of Spain, revolted; and, uniting itself with the populace, declared in favour of D. Miguel, as "absolute king," with cries of "Death to the Constitution!" General Caula succeeded, after considerable bloodshed, in quelling this insurrection; and the Count de Villa Flor, having marched to the spot with part of the Lisbon garrison; on his arrival at Elvas, ordered some of the leaders of the revolt to be tried by a court martial and shot. On some others, less guilty, minor punishments were inflicted.

Sr. Liberato writes of this period, that constant intrigues were plotted against Saldanha at Court, and even in the ministry itself. The absolutists asserted that he was nothing less than a republican at heart. Complaints were made against him, both for his having placed on the retired list those officers on whose loyalty to their sovereign and the Charter he felt he could not depend; and for his having restored to their posts Claudino, Pego, Barros, Barreto Feio, Freire, Cabreira, Margiochi, and others who were staunch and undoubted constitutionalists. That he had acted with prudence and justice was afterwards proved by the avowal of the Miguelite, Viscount de Canellas; who affirmed, "that the conduct of Saldanha, at that time, had been fatal to their cause, because he had dismissed from the army many superior officers on whom they reckoned to carry out their projects."

The many excellent measures which Saldanha had carried out, or furthered, during his administration, at this period, obliged Sr. Liberato to acknowledge, although an opponent, that Saldanha's appearance in the ministry was "like a ray of light which rends asunder in a moment the darkness on the horizon;" and that; "if the minister made some mistakes, in the hurry which necessity required, they do not obscure his good intentions, nor diminish the great services which he rendered by his loyalty and patriotism to the constitutional liberty of his country." And he adds, that, at that time, "only a prodigy could save the country, and that prodigy appeared."

On the complete recovery of Saldanha from his illness, he

addressed the following letter to his sovereign, D. Pedro IV., at Rio de Janeiro. The letter constitutes another valuable state paper and historic narrative.

"LISBON, *May 4th*, 1827.

"SIRE,

"The long and dangerous illness, which has deprived me of the honour of serving your Majesty for the space of six months, prevented my continuing to inform your Majesty of the march of the affairs of my particular department, as I had already done, during the months of August and October, in the papers which her Highness, the Infanta Regent, will have laid before your Majesty. Having, however, resumed the War Portfolio on the 1st of this month, I not only fulfil my duty as a minister, but also carry out the wishes of my heart, as an old and faithful servant of your Majesty; and satisfy my conscience in placing before your Majesty a succinct, but sincere and correct exposition, of the situation of Portugal; a situation most delicate, if your Majesty's well-known forethought and wisdom; your love for, and the interest you take in the welfare of your subjects; do not induce you to continue to them your generous protection and constant solicitude. Your Majesty has been made aware of the spirit of rebellion which, fomented by the genius of ambition working upon the ignorance of the people, and assisted by the promptings of our neighbours, has arisen in Portugal. This rebellious spirit gained strength by the wavering timidity of the Government in some of its acts, and has already produced terrible evils. Your Majesty's legitimate authority has been ignored, and the kingdom invaded. But the fidelity of the majority of the troops, led by the officers I had given them, combined with that of some of the nobility, and of a large number of the officers who, as belonging to the Division of the King's Royal Volunteers, had already had the honour of knowing your Majesty; together with the adhesion of the city of Oporto and the greater part of Lisbon; has preserved intact, down to the present day, and under her Highness the Infanta's auspices, the institutions you were pleased to grant us. Her Highness's painful illness (although the smallest and least

fatal of the ills your Majesty has to learn); the advice and intrigues of the ultra-religionists; and the influence of many of the resident diplomatists, who can with difficulty tolerate the constitutional Charter your Majesty conferred upon us—these keep the country in a state of restlessness, which disheartens many even of those who are, both in sentiments and principles, your Majesty's faithful subjects. The oscillation and fear became most violent and overflowing during the latter days of the month of April last. I, although ill at Caldas da Rainha, perceiving the approach of the storm; and knowing that my friends who, I may say, are all those who love your Majesty, looked to me (if I may be excused the self-praise) and required my greatest sacrifices; faithful to your Majesty, and obedient to my duty, having resolved long before to give my life for my king and the Charter, I did not hesitate,—I set out immediately for Lisbon, where I arrived at the precise moment that the revolt of the 3rd Artillery and the 8th Infantry broke out at Elvas. I sought her Highness, but the severity of her illness prevented my seeing her. A few hours were sufficient to enable me to point out a considerable number of individuals, to whom the painful and afflicting condition of her Highness was far from appearing a calamity. Faithful to your Majesty, and resolved to support with my life your Majesty's hereditary sovereignty; having acquired the certainty that the Corps Diplomatique and some of her Highness' advisers, under the pretext of fearing my influence as a liberal, would do all they could to diminish my popularity; and that they felt the greatest pleasure in my continuing unconnected with public affairs; I at once took possession of the War Portfolio, with a view to the restraining sedition and internal and external intrigues; at the same time that I created a fresh bulwark for the defence of your Majesty's legitimate power, and of the constitutional Charter. The good opinion of the army, and of the people in general, has given me a moral strength, which, I am happy to say, has been of great use to me; and the affairs of the State now bear a different aspect. The revolt was paralysed in Elvas; and the Count de Villa Flor is marching towards that city. The Count de Lumiares goes to the Minho; the Marquis de

Valença to Beira; and the Marquis de Anjeja will remain in Tras-os-Montes. With these, and some other noblemen of character, I will make head against the rebellion, which is endeavouring to insinuate, that the Charter your Majesty granted us is identical with that of 1820. With the honest and well-intentioned liberals, (for all liberals do not come under those denominations), I will oppose the factions which are against us. In the midst of this struggle, however, though I do not fear the result, I cannot but feel convinced that her Highness's unfortunate illness aggravates considerably the evils we are suffering from; and, that upon your Majesty, and solely upon your Majesty, depends the future tranquillity and security of Portugal, and the consolidation of its institutions. A day, a moment only, that your Majesty could be in this country and in Lisbon, and place the crown upon the queen D. Maria's head, would create a bond of union for all the Portuguese, and enforce respect from our external enemies, who, in a thousand ways, are endeavouring to work our destruction. Come, Sire, to Portugal; give the final touch to the glorious work you have commenced, and raise another land-mark of your glory. I take the liberty of impressing one point upon your Majesty, trusting to your well-known generosity and candour. It is of the greatest necessity to declare at once, whether the Infante D. Miguel, upon attaining his twenty-fifth year, does, or does not, assume the regency; and this question only your Majesty can decide. For the various chances which the future may bring with it, my honour and my conscience impel me to inform your Majesty, that Lieut.-Col. Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro, and the Captains Manoel Joaquim de Lima Berredo Praça, and D. Fernando de Almeida have been, and are, most strenuous defenders of your Majesty's rights. My candour and fidelity require and force me to declare to your Majesty, that some of my colleagues in the councils of her Highness, accustomed during the last six months to easier and less compromising proceedings, feel a difficulty in accompanying me in those political measures for security, the neglect of which, as, unhappily, experience has proved to us, produce the ruin of the State. For this reason, a time may come when both my credit

and my honour may force me to separate from them; or intrigues, internal or external, may bring about my dismissal. In either of these cases, I can assure your Majesty that no sacrifice shall be wanting on my part to preserve intact your Majesty's rights. Thousands of faithful Portuguese will side with me; and nothing but foreign powder, or some secret trick of diplomacy, shall destroy the glorious edifice your Majesty has founded upon the constitutional Charter; nor anything, at any time, weaken the profound sentiments of my faithful and constant obedience.

"God preserve your Majesty! &c.,

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA D'OLIVEIRA E DAUN."

The announcement of Saldanha's recovery from illness was received with joy in all parts of Portugal. Congratulations were forwarded to him from almost all the municipal Chambers of the kingdom. Sr. Soriano informs us of the complete inactivity of the ministry during Saldanha's absence from it. He complains that all business had been neglected in every department; and that the country was in a most dangerous position. No sooner had Saldanha become fully aware of the actual state of affairs, than he determined on bringing the conduct of his colleagues to the notice of the regent. This he did in their presence, (making one honourable exception in favour of the Minister of Marine); and they at once tendered their resignations, which were accepted.

The following are the names of the ministers who formed the new administration on the 7th of June:

War—GENERAL SALDANHA.
Home—VISCOUNT DE SANTAREM.
Justice—BISHOP OF ALGARVES.
Finance—SR. MANOEL A. DE CARVALHO (Baron de Chancelleiros).
Marine—SR. NORONHA.
Foreign—COUNT DE LOUZÃ, D. DIOGO.* (In absence of Palmella).

The Count de Louzã and the Viscount de Santarem were most decidedly disinclined to constitutional government. Both

* The Count nominally held office during two days, when Saldanha took the Portfolio (*ad interim*).

these ministers, at a later period, held office under the usurping government of D. Miguel, although they both, at this time, had sworn allegiance to the queen and Charter. Whether Palmella was unwilling to be associated with these men, whose sincerity he may already have suspected; or whether, as some have pretended, he was averse to enter an administration with Saldanha; or whether, again, he was satisfied with his pleasant post of ambassador in London, it is difficult to determine. Suffice it to say, that he hesitated to accept the offered portfolio.

Saldanha's possession of the Foreign Office was so sudden, that a letter came into his hands, which was intended for his predecessor. It was from the British ambassador, insisting upon the dismissal of a certain public functionary. Saldanha, amazed at such presumption on the part of a foreign diplomatist, immediately wrote to the ambassador, commenting very strongly on his conduct. Unfortunately, we have no copy of the correspondence, and must content ourselves with relating the occurrence in the words of Sr. Liberato.

"I will take this opportunity to recount a very interesting anecdote, which illustrates the character of this diplomatist (Sir W. A'Court), and the political tendency of his country. As Saldanha's entrance into the cabinet (Foreign Affairs) was so sudden and unexpected, he took that department, as it were, by surprise. He found there a despatch of Sir W. A'Court, in which that diplomatist insisted upon a certain *employé*, whose name I have forgotten, being dismissed. Saldanha, astonished at such interference, answered it immediately in English, informing Sir William that such a singular demand had surprised him exceedingly, feeling sure that a similar request, made by a foreign diplomatist to an English Minister of State, would be answered by the sender receiving his passports. If, therefore, his Excellency persisted in his demand, or continued to make similar ones, he, Saldanha, should advise the regent to forward him his passports. Sir W. A'Court neither insisted, nor did he even answer this letter; but, meeting Saldanha a few days afterwards, he paid him a great many compliments; and told him, laughingly, that he ought not to have taken his despatch so much to heart, as it was not directed to him, but

to his predecessor, D. Francisco de Almeida. Saldanha replied; that he felt sure he would not have ventured to address such a request to him; and the matter dropped.

"Some time afterwards, when Saldanha was an emigrant in London, he dined one day with Palmella; and among those present was one of the members of the Administration.* Saldanha spoke to him in French; but the minister answered him, that he hoped he would converse in English, which language he knew that Saldanha both wrote and spoke perfectly. He then informed him; that he had read the answer sent to Sir W. A'Court; that he respected him for it; and was most happy to make his acquaintance. This proves, that, if the English are haughty, and sometimes even insolent, they know how to respect those who resist them with dignity and reason."

We have seen how Portugal was distracted by intestine divisions; by a continually revolting soldiery; and by the intrigues, and even menaces of Spain. Arduous was the task of Saldanha to preserve order. Fortunately, the arrival of Clinton's division, and the engagements contracted by England, relieved him from the prospect of foreign invasion and war with Spain. We ought not to feel surprised, if, ere long, we find Saldanha in self-defence, or rather in defence of his country, retaliating on Ferdinand, by suggesting measures to deprive that king of his powers of aggression, even at the cost of his throne.

D. Pedro, aware to some extent of what was going forward, had recalled his brother, D. Miguel, to Rio; and had sent a ship of war to Europe to fetch him. But D. Miguel, having solicited the advice of the Austrian emperor, for which D. Pedro had desired him in all emergencies to apply, that monarch had recommended delay, until an answer to the letter which he had written to his son-in-law, D. Pedro, should reach Vienna. Prince Schwarzenberg, in May, arrived from Rio with despatches for the Austrian Court; and the Portuguese minister at Vienna was struck with the marked silence observed by Prince Metternich as to their contents. The wary prince

* Lord Dudley, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

simply assured him, "that there was nothing new from Rio." But the minister, Villa Secca, very justly suspected—as events afterwards proved—that there was a scheme going forward between the Governments of Austria, England, and France, to deprive the Infanta of the regency, and to transfer it to D. Miguel. It was on this account, that the emperor had written to D. Pedro to obtain his permission for D. Miguel to remain in Europe.

The reasons which led to the late change of administration at Lisbon, we learn more at full in a letter addressed by Saldanha to D. Pedro; as well as the motives which induced him to send off an aide-de-camp to that sovereign, immediately it became known at Lisbon, that D. Miguel had determined on not proceeding to Rio. The state of things disclosed by this letter will satisfy the reader, that the almost imperious promptitude of the course taken by Saldanha was necessary to the safety of the throne, and of the constitutional cause.

"LISBON, *June 15th*, 1827.

"SIRE,

"By the brig *Constancia*, and through the officer Fernando José de Santa Rita, I had the honour, and thereby fulfilled a sacred duty, of placing in your Imperial Majesty's august presence, a short, but true and faithful account of the afflicting condition of Portugal, during those days of fear and disquietude, which were originated by the long and dangerous illness of her Highness the Infanta regent, together with other and serious causes. But Heaven has listened to the prayers of your Majesty's faithful Portuguese subjects. Her Highness has partly regained her strength; and now, with astonishment, perceives the rapid strides with which the country advanced on the road to ruin, during the period of her Highness's illness. She has seen with her own eyes the proceedings of the ministers both of Home and Foreign Affairs. She had observed the public anxiety—the overhanging danger—your Majesty's rights threatened—and even the very existence of the State compromised. The oath of fidelity sworn to your Majesty required prompt measures; time was pressing; and her Highness, firm to her principles of

upholding and supporting your Majesty's orders, did not hesitate to furnish a remedy to public disasters by changing a ministry, which, from various causes and difference of opinions, had arrived at such a state of dissension, and inspired so little confidence in the minds of people of all political colours; and more especially in those who have made the greatest sacrifices to preserve intact legitimate principles, and the complete observance of the constitutional Charter, which your Majesty was pleased to grant us. A part of the ministry was therefore changed, Sire; and, as her Highness did me the honour to continue me in her service as Minister of War, I begged of her Highness, permission to send my aide-de-camp, Captain Manoel Joaquim de Lima Berredo Praça, to inform your Majesty of all that has happened in Portugal since last August; which he is the more competent to do, considering that he has witnessed, and taken a most active part in everything. His trustworthy account will place your Majesty in a condition to determine those measures, which your Majesty's known wisdom will suggest for the benefit of your subjects in the Old World. The fact of my remaining in the ministry when my colleagues retired, requires that I should explain to your Majesty how that event was brought about; so that your Majesty may do me the sole honour I desire; which is, to believe that I conducted myself, upon the occasion, with the frankness and disinterestedness, which, I trust, will always characterise my public life.

"When I took the War Portfolio on the 1st of May, my first care was—as it ought to be—to look to and remedy the miserable condition into which the army had fallen—a state of hunger and wretchedness which had led to the revolt in Elvas on the 29th of April—and to give force to our negotiations with Spain, that the rebels might be withdrawn from the frontier where they were, and are still, promoting rebellion in this kingdom; as your Majesty will be pleased to see from the autograph despatches I forward from General Caula and the Marquis d'Anjeja, with whose handwriting your Majesty is acquainted. The first of these transactions required the most cordial co-operation on the part of the Minister of Finance: I did not obtain it; nor, although receiving every assistance from her High-

ness, the Infanta regent, could I induce that minister, at so critical and decisive a moment, to alter the usual formalities for the more prompt assistance of the soldiers; who, in the midst of continual temptations, and after fighting bravely in defence of your Majesty's rights and the independence of the monarchy, were expiring of hunger, without pay or rations, in the deserted and wasted villages of the frontier. Of the second, I can say; although I do not assert that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has neglected to demand of the Spanish Government the observance of the treaties; that he has not attended to the continual representations from the generals on the frontier, which have been almost daily forwarded to him from my department: still, it is undoubted, that a large number of rebels exist in a line extending from Olivença to Caminha, whence they attack Portugal in every possible way. No later than last week, a guerilla passed from Gallicia to Portugal, in the neighbourhood of Melgaço, robbing and murdering; and then returned into Spain. In this state of affairs, the combination of fear, bad passions, private interests, and general wickedness was producing symptoms of a dangerous fermentation; and recriminations were being made against the ministers in general by the private enemies of each. Such a situation could not suit me; I know very little of intrigues, and Nature has not given me an aptitude for them. I therefore declared frankly to her Highness, that the ministry had lost the confidence of the nation; and that it could no longer serve with advantage, either to the State, or to the constitutional system; and I therefore begged her Highness to call a Council, presided over by herself, at which I would give the novel example of a minister declaring to his sovereign's delegate, that neither he himself nor his colleagues could any longer serve the State as efficiently as was requisite. This conference took place on the 7th; and my colleagues did not refuse to recognize in her Highness's presence the truth of my declaration; and they agreed as to the utility of resigning. Her Highness was thus convinced of the necessity for selecting a fresh ministry; and, by a continuation of her favour, she continued me in the War Department; naming from her own entire conviction, and of her own accord, four new ministers:—for

Foreign Affairs, the Marquis de Palmella; Home Affairs, the Viscount de Santarem; Justice, the Bishop of Algarves; Finance, at first, the Count de Louzã, D. Diogo, and then the Marquis d'Olhão. Both of these last-named noblemen, however, having refused to accept the portfolio, alleging the infirm state of their health, her Highness was pleased to decree that the Minister of Marine should take charge of the Finance Department until her Highness should think fit to name some one else; and, as the Marquis de Palmella is absent, her Highness was pleased to command me to accept temporarily the portfolio of Foreign Affairs; which I did. Union in the ministry was necessary; for the enemies of the representative system are untiring; and they received strength from the want of harmony among the ministers. The blindness of their abettors is such, that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Pflügel, thought proper, in a conversation with me on the 9th, some hours after the arrival of a post from Vienna with letters of the 13th of May, to say plainly; that, as I had always made such great sacrifices for my country, he did not hesitate in telling me, that the moment was arrived when I could make the greatest of all, by advising her Highness, the Infanta regent, to declare that she was not in a state to govern; and that she ought to call his Highness, the Infante D. Miguel, as the only person who could gather all the Portuguese around his throne; and that I, individually, would gain much by so doing, as the Infante was much attached to me; moreover, the Infante's party are spreading the doctrine, that her Highness, the Infanta regent, ought not to govern after D. Miguel attains his 25th year; that he ought not to go to Brazil; and that, if he does go, the princess D. Maria Theresa* will publish a manifesto, declaring that *she* also has a right to the crown; while, to save the credit of the Spanish Government, she will declare that she, and she only, has promoted the rebellion in Portugal; and that she will come in person at the head of a fresh invading force. In Madrid, both manuscript and printed documents in this sense have been distributed; and Viscount de Canellas appears to be the princess's favourite: while she does not receive favourably

* D. Maria Theresa was eldest child of D. João VI. of Portugal, and widow of the Infante of Spain, D. Pedro Carlos.

the other rebel chiefs. The coming of the Count de Subserra to Portugal has an air of mystery about it; and it is worthy of note that, after their Highnesses declaring open war against him, in Madrid, in 1824 and 1825, he was now, the moment he arrived at that Court, visited by Joaquim Severino; which proves that their Highnesses have changed their opinions with respect to him. Nor would the Count de Subserra have ventured so suddenly into Portugal, if he had not some one to speak for him to the Infanta, who hated him most sincerely. The Count is still as intimate as ever with Joaquim Severino Gomez, the princess D. Maria Theresa's secretary; and it is to be feared they are in combination. That the constitutional Charter is distasteful to Austria, Prussia, and France, and is a source of fear to Spain, is undoubted. England is the only country which desires the Constitution; because it will separate Portugal from the influence of the Continental Powers, which, with the exception of Spain, would certainly only go to war *in extremis*. But these great Powers, who are in divergence on this one point, are, however, united upon another, which is not to allow Brazil to be united to Portugal. And this, Sire, is the position in which we are: feeling, each moment, more and more the necessity for energetic measures on the part of your Majesty, and for a prompt solution of the question. In October next, his Highness the Infante D. Miguel will complete his 25th year; and the apostolic party, which is spread over the face of Europe, will undoubtedly strain every nerve to bring about the Infante's presence in Portugal; and, if they succeed, I do not hesitate to affirm to your Majesty that your rights will be placed in great danger; and the Crown which your Majesty, so magnanimously and wisely, placed upon the head of your august daughter, D. Maria II., will be shaken; however great may be the sacrifices her Highness, the Infanta Regent, and all the loyal Portuguese, including myself, are firmly resolved to make. Sire! So firm is my conviction on this point, that I will venture to assert to your Majesty; that even if his Highness, the Infante D. Miguel, was to arrive here with the firm resolution to support the institutions your Majesty in your wisdom granted us, still their existence would be but of a few days' duration; for no one would believe in such intentions; and, there-

fore, the majority would hasten to declare themselves against the institutions, in the hope of gaining a share in the rewards, which the experience of the last few years in Portugal has proved to be the recompense of rebellion. If affairs in Brazil would admit of your Majesty coming to Portugal, it would be the means of deciding once for all the future of this country. Your Majesty's presence here, however short your stay in Europe, would at once settle all doubts; but if this is impossible—though so ardently desired by her Highness and your Majesty's faithful servants,—then it becomes most absolutely and urgently necessary that, by some means or other, her Highness, the Infanta D. Isabel Maria, should retain the regency: the way most to be preferred being, both in consideration of the other European Powers as well as Portugal, that her Highness should continue as at present: but that a declaration should emanate from your Majesty to the effect, that, in accordance with article 97 of the constitutional Charter, her Highness, the Infanta, ought only to resign the government, when the queen, D. Maria II., attains her majority. There is also another expedient; which is, for your Majesty to name your august sister your Viceroy in Portugal; though the decree naming her to that elevated post may be withheld until thought convenient.

"Her Highness, by the sacrifices she has bravely made to carry out your Majesty's orders, merits (if I may be allowed to say so) your Majesty's entire confidence. I ought also to inform your Majesty; that, in spite of external intrigues and internal rebellion, a large majority of the army will remain faithful; and, unless in the case of a war or foreign invasion, accompanied by his Highness, the Infante, your Majesty's rights will be defended and sustained. It is a fact, Sire, although a painful one—her Highness's illness, coupled with the want of harmony amongst the ministers, gave great encouragement to the idea of rebellion during my unfortunate illness; but believe me, Sire, no effort shall be wanting on my part to sustain your Majesty's, and the queen D. Maria II.'s rights, and to preserve the independence of the monarchy. Still, Spain is increasing her forces, and thus encourages and protects rebellion in Portugal; and, until his most Catholic Majesty shall be advised to modify the Spanish institu-

tions, that country must always be a source of distrust to us. At the same time, it is true that when once war is declared against that Power, a part of its army will revolt against the yoke of the Junta Apostolica. In Portugal, some hundreds of Spanish emigrants are already to be found; and much greater would be their number if her Highness's government had chosen. That your Imperial Majesty may be thoroughly persuaded and convinced that the Spanish Cabinet has been the principal originator of the rebellion, I have thought it would be advisable, after consulting her Highness, to send to your Majesty copies of some of the documents taken from the rebels in the Province of Minho, after the defeat they suffered at Barca and the Ponte do Prado. These documents prove the views, the means, the agents of the rebel chiefs, and the ends they desire to attain. The note addressed to his most Catholic Majesty by Viscount de Monte Alegre proves openly the master spring of the rebellion. The letters of General Longa, of the Marquis de Chaves, and others, prove the protection received through certain princesses who reside at Madrid. The despatches of ex-Major Teixeira to Viscount de Monte Alegre place this fact beyond doubt. In a word, your Majesty will perceive that Viscount Monte Alegre has seized every opportunity of endeavouring to shield himself with the august name of her Majesty the empress queen. Many other papers, demonstrating the truth of these remarks, exist in the cabinet of the department over which I preside. God preserve your Majesty, etc.

"J. C. DE SALDANHA OLIVEIRA E DAUN."

The above letter was followed by another of the 1st July; they should be read and considered together as constituting one State paper.

"LISBON, *July 1st*, 1827.

"SIRE,

"On the 15th of last month, I had the honour of informing your Imperial Majesty (through my aide-de-camp, Manoel Joaquim de Lima Berredo Praça, who left this Court for Rio de Janeiro in the *Canoa*,) of the happy improvement in her Highness the Infanta regent's health; and of the political

position of the country at that date. I also showed your Majesty the state of fermentation, among the various political parties, caused by the intrigues and incitement of various Courts, but chiefly of that of Madrid; and I did not hide the fact, that several diplomatists were endeavouring to impede, as much as they could, the consolidation of the representative system in Portugal; and sought to throw doubt upon the legitimate and recognized right of your Majesty to the Crown of this kingdom. I did not, also, hesitate to declare to your Majesty candidly and loyally, that, if his Highness, the Infante D. Miguel, was advised to put off his voyage, which your Majesty had wisely determined he should make, to Rio de Janeiro, that fact would be an additional foundation for the projects of those opposed to the sovereignty of your Majesty and the queen D. Maria II.; and the Infante's refusal would be considered by the rebel party as a declaration by Austria against your Majesty's rights; and would raise fresh obstacles to the putting in force the Charter your Majesty so liberally gave us. This anticipated fear of mine has just been realized, as her Highness, the Infanta regent, had also foreseen; and the copies of documents, which her Highness forwards to your Majesty, will enlighten you as to the way in which her Highness was informed of the Infante's resolution, immediately after the arrival of M. Neumann at Vienna. Your Majesty will, doubtless, remark, that Baron de Villa Secca, in charge of the Portuguese Legation at Vienna, has not said a word to her Highness about this important resolution;* whilst the Chargé d'Affaires at Paris was, in proper time, thoroughly aware of it, and made it known to the English ambassador at that Court. It is also singular, as your Majesty will observe, that the Marquis de Palmella, (in his despatches of June 16th and 20th, which her Highness also forwards to your Majesty) having seen the communication made by the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, who forwarded his despatches to her Highness through the marquis, unsealed, does not say a word upon so important a subject, as he ought to have done, and as was necessary.

"From this silence on the part of Baron de Villa Secca, her

* The determination of D. Miguel not to proceed to Rio de Janeiro.

Highness infers; that Prince Metternich did not wish to make Portugal acquainted with the Infante's resolution, whatever may have been the motive; and that the Marquis de Palmella also avoided touching upon so important a subject until he was better informed. In the mean time it is undoubted, that his Highness, the Infante, has not embarked; that the ship of war, *D. João VI.* is about to set sail on its return to Brazil; and that the rebel party is gaining strength through these events: and though they are only known for certain to those who enjoy her Highness the Infanta regent's confidence; yet the conjectures and arguments as to their probability derived from the silence of the Government upon so transcendently important a subject, upon which the eyes of the nation are fixed, are sufficient to give rise to most serious fears amongst the faithful subjects of your Majesty; and to give force to the intrigues, calumnies, and projects of the secret and declared enemies of her Highness's Government, of your Majesty's sovereignty, and of the constitutional Charter. I can boldly assert, that the moment it is divulged that the Infante refuses to obey your Majesty, the bearing of the fomenters of rebellion will become at once haughty, insolent, and turbulent. But they shall be kept under; and her Highness's regency be supported. For this purpose, I am taking every precaution at my disposal. I do not fear the Infante whilst he is absent; but I have everything to fear from his presence; for many of the soldiers and officers, who would not hesitate to encounter the leaders of the rebellion, would hesitate to draw their swords against the Infante in person. In such an extreme case, the presence of the Infante may lead astray some even of those who have, until now, bravely opposed the rebellion.

"The people are longing for a king; their habits and education lead them to desire one; and the Infante's adherents are untiring in their efforts to prove him to be the legitimate sovereign. This it is, Sire, that I fear. And, for all these reasons, it is, that undauntedly and without regret; faithful and resolved to give my life for your Majesty's service, and for the defence of your legitimate rights and those of your august daughter, the queen D. Maria II.; I consider it my duty, once more, to declare to your

Majesty, that the Infante's presence, (joined to the intrigues and even aggression of Spain, connived at and encouraged by France and Austria,) may, I fear, result in overthrowing your Majesty's rights in this kingdom; if your Imperial Majesty does not deign to come here to consummate and perfect the great work commenced by the law of April 29th, 1826.* Your Majesty's presence is the only bulwark that your Majesty's faithful subjects can, with security, raise against the attempts of rebels at home and aggression from abroad. This conviction, Sire, is not peculiar to myself; it is common to all men of independence and good sense in Portugal.

"My duty to my Sovereign, and my private obligations to your Majesty, oblige me—force me—to say everything my conscience points out, that may contribute to support the glory of your name, the credit of your intentions, and the prosperity of my country. It appears to me, Sire, that some of the European Courts wish to humiliate your Majesty; and, finding themselves unable to do so in the Brazilian empire, they would not be averse to throw discredit upon your name in Europe; trusting by that means, indirectly, to do you harm in the New World. This oozes out in some circles, where it is asserted that your Majesty's power in Brazil is dependent upon the Crown; or, at least, upon the influence of Portugal; and that the moment your Majesty loses this kingdom, by any other means than a spontaneous and voluntary abdication in favour of queen D. Maria II., your power in Brazil will also decline. The prosperity of that empire is creating a jealousy in Europe. The Brazilian empire is a young but thriving plant, whose extending branches already begin to cast a shadow upon some of the commercial countries of Europe. The result is, that the interests and glory of Brazil are intimately connected with the reign of D. Maria II. in Portugal: for your Majesty's august daughter being upon the throne of this country, Brazil can draw every assistance it requires from Portugal; and this it is, which the enemies of your Majesty are endeavouring to thwart. On the other hand, your Majesty's coming to Europe will not compromise either the security nor the tranquillity of Brazil, which has witnessed the

* The day on which the constitutional Charter was signed.

rapidity with which your Majesty visits any part of your empire. But, allowing that Brazil still contains some few, desirous of the anarchy which must result from the slightest internal troubles; they, also, cannot but recognize the resources your Majesty can draw from Portugal, to put down any faction which might take that opportunity to raise itself.

"In a word, Sire, Portugal is lost, annihilated, ruined, if your Majesty abandons us; and Brazil cannot but participate in the evils of which Portugal may become the victim. Your Majesty's presence in Europe will be as the appearance of a new planet, which the nations will view with jealousy, but with respect. Think, Sire, of the miserable condition of unhappy Spain! France is far from tranquil or contented. Neither France nor Spain is ruled by a warlike prince. Who can tell what fortune, Heaven may not have reserved for your Majesty, in the Peninsula, if your enemies oblige you to make use of means which, though violent, are not unknown. Brazil, the depositary of your Majesty's august children, Brazilian princes by birth, will respect in them the image of their father; and will have no cause for alarm at your Majesty's coming temporarily to Europe, to place a Crown upon the head of queen D. Maria II. The glory of the Brazilian empire is also connected with your Majesty's generous abdication of the crown of Portugal, and the reign of your august daughter. Such, Sire, are the reflections I desire to place before your Majesty; limiting myself to them, considering that her Highness, the Infanta regent, also writes to your Majesty. I trust your Majesty will excuse; in consideration of my zeal, intentions, and wishes to maintain your rights and orders; any inconsiderate or unfounded opinion which may have escaped me.

"God preserve your Majesty, etc.

"J. C. DE SALDANHA OLIVEIRA E DAUN."

In answer to these letters, D. Pedro replied in the most gracious terms. He regretted that he had not received them before he had signed the nomination of his brother as regent. He further observed, that every evil had its remedy. He insisted that Saldanha should continue in the ministry; and

declared that he would immediately write to his brother to express that desire. To prove still further his appreciation of Saldanha's services, and devotion to his sovereign and to his country, he was pleased to confer on him the title of Count.

Before the decree of 3rd July, 1827, which contained the nomination of D. Miguel, arrived at Lisbon (August 16th), Saldanha, still minister, and, apparently, in the regent's confidence, had advised her Highness to resist the assumption of the regency by that prince, should it be attempted; urging, that she was in legal possession of those rights conferred on her by the Charter itself. The Infanta replied, that she would be powerless to oppose the nomination of D. Miguel, however illegal it might be. "If your Highness," answered Saldanha, "will second me with the sanction of your name and authority, I will answer with my reputation and my life, that you shall retain the regency, with a constitutional government, until the queen shall attain her majority." The Infanta declined the offer; and, perhaps, from that moment thought that Saldanha was too powerful, if not too dangerous a subject, for the vicinity of a Court.

From this last anecdote, and from the two preceding letters, the reader will have acquired some further insight into the character of the minister who advised his sovereign; and of the sovereign himself who had not the wisdom to act in the spirit of that advice. These letters describe, at least in part, the condition of Portugal, and even of its army, which during Saldanha's long illness had fallen into a state of indiscipline and neglect; they illustrate the action, and enable the reader to understand the motives of the political parties into which society was divided; they exhibit the intrigues of foreign governments, and the audacity of foreign influence, seeking to control the political destinies of Portugal; to regulate the succession to her throne; and to restrain the liberty of her people. They show also the grounds of Saldanha's own resistance to what was, and we shall see was rightly, regarded as the cause of D. Miguel; and they speak plainly the simple remedy which Saldanha advised, as certain to be effective, in the redemption of his country; and that was the presence of

D. Pedro in Europe to assert the rights of his daughter the queen. They constitute the outburst of an oppressed, and even afflicted, but still undaunted spirit; yet of one who does not allow himself to indulge in acrimonious reproach upon D. Miguel himself. In D. Miguel, Saldanha contemplated a young prince; petted by such foreign Courts as Austria and Spain; urged in some degree—perhaps controlled—by an imperious, or, to put the right word in the right place, an absolutist mother: a queen-mother who preferred banishment from the Court and even from the country, to acknowledging the, to her, odious Constitution. Austria, which had ever repudiated liberal institutions; and Spain, which had but recently crushed the constitutional system she had possessed; and whose statesmen fostered and encouraged rebellion against the existing Government of Portugal;—Spain, whose monarch was prepared, but for the fear of England, to levy war against the country of queen D. Maria II. True! that young prince had outwardly performed the two conditions which were required by D. Pedro. He had solemnly sworn to maintain the Charter of 1826; and had betrothed himself to the young queen with all due solemnities. But Saldanha knew, that if once D. Miguel appeared in Portugal, even though that young prince might come with the firm resolution to support the Constitution, his presence would be the signal for a revolution, in which the prince, so placed, must either ascend to a crown, or descend to a grave. For the nation was divided between two leading parties, the Constitutionalists and the Absolutists. The latter had raised the standard of rebellion in various parts of Portugal; and this with the avowed purpose of abolishing the Charter; but, intending first, as a means thereto, to place D. Miguel upon the throne. As to the influence of foreign Courts, Austria may have foreborne from any direct interference; and Prince Metternich may even have counselled D. Miguel to be true to his oath; knowing that, in times of revolution, oaths of allegiance are oaths of circumstance; from the obligation whereof, men too frequently find, in their own consciences, a dispensing power. But when that crafty diplomatist, M. Pflügel, ventured to entreat Saldanha to make "the greatest of all his sacrifices,"

by sanctioning the call of D. Miguel to the regency, he, as Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon, could not but have known the state of parties in Portugal; and, probably, well knew that Baron Neumann had already gone to Rio to extort the consent of D. Pedro to that fatal step. Meanwhile, Saldanha must have smiled at the Boadicca of Spain, D. Maria Theresa,* threatening to come in person, at the head of an invading force; she thinking, probably, that the Spanish Government, whose credit she expressed her desire to save, already required a sacrifice like hers to redeem its honour.

The remedy which Saldanha recommended as a certain cure for his stricken country was simple—the presence of D. Pedro himself. He does indeed apostrophize, rather than suggest for immediate adoption, a more extreme course. Spain hovered like an evil genius over the fortunes of Portugal; and was now intriguing to direct the course of succession to the throne which D. Pedro had not yet fully abdicated. There is something truly, albeit unintentionally, dramatic in Saldanha's hint:—"Think, Sire, on the miserable condition of unhappy Spain! Who can tell what fortune, Heaven may not have reserved for your Majesty, in the Peninsula, if your enemies oblige you to make use of means which, though violent, are not unknown?" All, however, that Saldanha asked of his Sovereign at present was, "Come, if but for a brief interval, to the land of your birth, and place upon the brow of your child that crown which you inherited from your ancestors." But D. Pedro was, at least in this case, dull of apprehension; infirm of purpose; ready with a compliment; but chary of his confidence towards the man in whom he should have reposed the very secrets of his soul. What ruin and bloodshed might not have been spared to Portugal, if D. Pedro had acted upon the prudent counsel he received! Instead of this, he was, at this very time, listening to the advice, and led by the intrigues of foreign princes and diplomatists, under whose counsel he was meditating, if he had not already signed, the very act which was to plunge Portugal into a fierce civil war. Under other circumstances, it would have been only

* This princess had continued to reside at Madrid after the death of her husband, the Spanish Infante. She was mother of D. Sebastian.

natural that the king should yield to the promptings of affection for his brother; and should confide in the solemn oath by which that brother had pledged his own affection, truth, and loyalty, as well to the king, as to his daughter, the queen to whom D. Miguel was betrothed. But D. Miguel acted in defiance to these obligations; as D. Pedro had been already forewarned that he would. The reader will find, early in the next chapter, that the two letters to which his attention has been here earnestly invited, were indeed prophetic. On the other hand, some of the wisest heads in diplomacy failed to read the signs of the times. They even encouraged, or advised, the return of D. Miguel into Portugal as accredited regent. Not merely the King of Spain and his ministers; but the Emperor of Austria and the wily Metternich; M. de Villèle; Mr. Canning himself; and even the courtly Palmella, fresh from the diplomatic experience of St. James's, and well versed in the Foreign Office of Lisbon—all lent their sanction to this scheme. Among the men who took a leading part in directing the Government of Portugal, there was one only who was foresighted enough to conjure D. Pedro, by all that patriotism could dictate and eloquence could urge, to avoid it. That one was Saldanha. We shall see from the following letter how his patriotism was understood by the Court of Lisbon, and how far his wisdom was appreciated.

"CINTRA, *August 2nd*, 1827.

"SIRE,

"My fidelity to the principles your Imperial Majesty has sanctioned; my respect and loyalty to your Majesty's person; my duty; my sole ambition; which is the desire to preserve without stain, your Majesty's good opinion, imperatively oblige me to place before your Majesty a correct account—at least according to my way of viewing things—of the events which have taken place from the 19th of July last to the present date; in order to enable your Majesty, after mature deliberation, to appreciate the misfortunes and calamities which threaten this unhappy country; and, at the same time, to apply the remedies which Portugal expects from your Majesty, and which it merits for the love it bears you. When her Highness, the Infanta regent,

thought fit, on the 8th of June, to dismiss part of her ministers, I was retained in office by her Highness's own unbiassed will and power, without any manifestation, on my part, of a desire to continue to serve as Minister of State. Her Highness was then kind enough to convey to me her approbation in the most flattering terms; and named me also to the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs, during the absence of the Marquis de Palmella, who, like all the other ministers, had been selected by her Highness herself. When the marquis received his nomination, far from thanking her Highness for the honour done to him; he simply remarked, in a postscript to his despatch of June 20th, that, to his great surprise, he had just been informed through the Marine Department of the change in his position; and, enclosing the unsealed despatch of the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, (in which notice was given of the resolution taken by the Court of Vienna to counsel his Highness the Infante D. Miguel not to go to Rio de Janeiro,) the marquis, both in that and all subsequent despatches, abstained from again referring to this important subject.* By the packet which left Falmouth on the 13th of July, the English ambassador, Sir William A'Court, received information from the British Government, that Austria had addressed a memorandum to the great Powers, which declared his Imperial and Royal Majesty's reasons for advising his Highness D. Miguel not to embark; and the intention his Majesty had formed of consenting that his Highness, upon his attaining his 25th year, should go and assume the regency of Portugal; declaring at the same time that, if the other Powers did not agree to this, his Majesty, when the time arrived, would request the Infante to take up his residence in Spain, or wherever he should think fit. Lord Dudley added, that Russia, France, and Prussia, had adhered to the Austrian memorandum, and that his Government had not yet come to a decision upon the subject, as its attention was at that moment absorbed by the affairs of Greece; but that, when once those were settled, it would treat exclusively of the affairs of Portugal. By the same packet, and under date of the 11th of June, the Marquis de Palmella informed me, that having to delay some weeks in

* The marquis addressed himself directly to the regent.

London, he had thought it necessary to address himself directly to her Highness the Infanta regent, upon certain subjects; and the communication referred to, I had the honour of placing in her Highness's hands, at the instant of her departure for Caldas da Rainha. The situation in which her Highness's Government found itself placed by this declaration on the part of Austria was most delicate; and the most prudent, but energetic measures became indispensable for the maintenance of the institutions which your Majesty, as wisely as generously, granted us; and which are so inseparably united to your Majesty's sovereignty in these kingdoms. I gave my opinion with all candour; and one of the consequences of the principles I declared, was the necessity for placing in the public posts, men of whose unwavering character and adherence to the representative system there could be no doubt: the conclusion being that, among other things, the nomination of a 'Regedor da Justiça,' and a new 'Intendente Geral da Policia' was indispensable. At a council, presided over by her Highness on the morning she left for Caldas, all the ministers unanimously selected Pedro de Mello Breyner for 'Regedor,' and Manoel Duarte Leitão for 'Intendente;' and, this selection meeting her Royal Highness's approval, she was pleased to order the Minister of Justice to have the decrees drawn out, and sent to her without delay. This he did; but, a few days afterwards, he received a despatch from the Home Minister, who had accompanied her Highness, in which it was stated, that her Highness, on further consideration, had resolved not to sign the decrees. The ministers, whilst meeting in council for the transaction of general business at the house of the Minister of Justice, were made acquainted with this despatch; and as I, another packet having arrived at Lisbon, was to start that same night for Caldas; the ministers authorized me to kiss her Highness's hand in their name, and to beg her, as the greatest favour she could do them, to sign those decrees.

"The English ambassador hearing that I was going to Caldas, informed me that Mr. Canning had charged him to send his respects to her Highness; and to beg her to accept the conditions proposed by the Marquis de Palmella; and requested me to

inquire of her Highness what answer he was to send to Canning.

"It was thus evident that the marquis was supported by the British minister; and I could not, therefore, doubt the truth of that which his friends had given out; namely, that the marquis refused any post but that of Prime Minister; expressly stipulating my exclusion from the ministry. When I had the honour of arriving in her Highness's presence (it grieves me to confess it), I noticed in her countenance an appearance of reserve which, thanks to her great goodness, I had not been accustomed to. This did not, however, prevent me doing my duty as her Highness's minister; as your Majesty's faithful subject; and as a citizen who loves his country.

"I commenced by informing her Highness, that the English ambassador had informed me of the message Mr. Canning had sent him respecting the Marquis de Palmella's conditions; that he had requested me to beg her Highness to let him know what he was to answer; and that, consequently, I awaited her orders. Her Highness's reserve, not to say distrust, became then completely apparent; as also did her Highness's embarrassment, when I informed her, that nobody in Lisbon was ignorant, that the Count d'Alva had been the bearer of letters from the Marquis de Palmella to her Highness; in which, it was said, measures were proposed to her Highness, differing widely from the policy she had followed up to that time. I showed her Highness, that your Majesty's enemies repeated these conjectures with evident satisfaction; and that I should be placed in a most unfortunate position if I, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was not able to give the English ambassador the answer he had so urgently asked for. To all this her Highness, who had overwhelmed me eight days before with demonstrations of confidence in me, replied, in a manner which almost implied a dismissal, that she would send her answer to the marquis direct. This reply alone implied a great deal; yet I continued begging her Highness, in the names of the other ministers, my colleagues, as the greatest favour she could do us, to signify her approval of the measures her Highness had already consented to in council. I explained things to her Highness in the must sub-

missive and respectful manner; I called upon her, by everything I imagined might influence her mind, to consent; I showed her Highness the slight she would be putting upon the ministry, of whom it was already reported in the palace, that her Highness would not follow their advice; and that, in this manner, they would become discredited. To all these observations, her Highness coldly answered; that she had already resolved to the contrary.

"Looking into the innermost recesses of my heart, I find there nought but loyalty to your Majesty and to her Highness; and tried affection for my country; while the services I have rendered to the Crown have been more than could be reasonably expected of me. I did not therefore expect to have been treated with such slight regard. Still, had I not been convinced that the policy of her Highness had been changed since the declaration of the Court of Vienna; and that later events had proved beyond a doubt, that my advice, though supported by all the ministers, would be of no utility to the public cause, or to your Majesty's service; I would have made the painful sacrifice of remaining in the ministry. But, Sire, private counsels had gained preponderance over the decisions of the Cabinet; and, therefore, my continuance in office could only compromise my untarnished honour and fidelity. Firm in this opinion, the next morning, I respectfully and submissively requested of her Highness my dismissal; which was, at once, and without the slightest hesitation, promised. I returned to Lisbon; and, on the 24th, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I received the decree by which her Highness, in reply to my representations, granted me my exoneration, allowing me to retire with the honours of Minister of State. From the ministry, Sire, I have brought nothing but my honour and my independence. Those who served with me bear away no spoils of the State: no one will venture to say the contrary.

"The moment I received my dismissal, which took everybody by surprise (for the greatest secrecy had been kept as to what had passed between her Highness and her minister), I set out for Cintra; but, unfortunately, the people of Lisbon, startled at my dismissal, committed a thousand follies; which my greatest

friends had considerable difficulty in restraining, until order was restored by an armed force. At Oporto, a similar agitation broke out; and I hear that, from different parts of the kingdom, representations have been addressed to her Highness, requesting my return to the ministry: and I can readily believe it; for when, on the 1st of May,* I reassumed the functions of Minister of War, all the military bodies, and nearly all the municipal Chambers of the kingdom, gave proofs of their satisfaction. Under these circumstances, fearing that my enemies (and allow me to say, your Majesty's also) would draw from the favour I have found with the army and the nation a pretext for speaking ill of me, I begged her Highness's permission to present myself before your Majesty; and, by this means, to avoid any imputation on my conduct; recollecting also, that it would be the easiest way of restoring tranquillity; as those who desire my continuance in the ministry would imagine that I intended to advocate my own cause in your Majesty's presence. Unfortunately, my request was not granted: the answer to my direct communication to her Highness being a despatch from the Minister of the Home Department; in which I was permitted, with an indirect recommendation to avail myself of such permission, to go to England or France; and I have this very day received another despatch from the Minister of War, in which, in her Highness's name, I am commanded to change my residence to Oeiras, between this and the night of the 4th inst.; and to there reside until I leave the country.

"I have obeyed in silence, in order not to arouse the feelings of your Majesty's faithful servants; of the real constitutionalists who idolise the Charter; and of my true friends. As soon as my poor means will permit, I shall set out for Paris with my dear wife and three children,—the eldest of whom is five years of age, and the youngest 48 days;—there to await your Majesty's orders.

"In my former representations, I had the honour to declare to your Majesty, that nothing but your coming to Portugal could preserve to your Majesty and to your august daughter, the crown of this realm: and later events prove that I was correct. The English ambassador, Sire, and those who support his policy,

* After his long illness.

had the address to persuade people, that your Majesty's abdication had been complete the moment that D. Miguel took the oath to the Charter, and the espousals were concluded. This is why your Majesty's orders were not carried out; and the reason why, as my principles were at variance with theirs, the Infanta regent kept carefully from me that she had received such orders; and this, in spite of my repeated inquiries, and in the face of the documents which I had received from Lieut.-General Luiz do Rego Barreto. Excuse, Sire, my frankness, in consideration of my ardent desire that your Majesty should be acquainted with my sentiments, and with the wretched state of this country, which looks alone to your Majesty for its rescue.

"God preserve your Majesty, etc.,

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA."

The foregoing letter was written at Cintra, whither Saldanha had retired. The reader will, probably, be of opinion that, in the year 1827, no more oppressive or more insolent mandate could have been promulgated in any European State, than the command issued, in the name of the Infanta regent, that Saldanha should, within little more than forty-eight hours, change his residence from his then abode at Cintra to Oeiras, and there reside until he left the country. Fortunately, perhaps, for the authority, if not for the personal safety, of the regent herself, and of Saldanha's political enemies, he bore himself, under this injustice and insult, with the dignity, calmness, and loyalty which the reader will hereafter see described by his own pen.

Many times, in after history, has Saldanha been reproached for this very obedience to constituted authority: many declaring, that had he at once proclaimed himself regent in the name of the queen, and in support of the Charter, he would have held his own against all opposition; secured the throne of the queen; and saved the country from disastrous civil wars! But who, at that time, save Saldanha, had foreseen what would be the conduct of D. Miguel and his future partisans?

The Viscount de Santarem and Sr. Carvalho alone retained their posts in the ministry. The Count da Ponte succeeded to those which Saldanha had held—War and Foreign Affairs. As

soon as his resignation became known at Lisbon, the official Gazette of July 24th, thus informs its readers of what had taken place:—

"Towards two o'clock in the afternoon, the news began to spread that the Minister of War, João Carlos de Saldanha, had been dismissed, on account of his having insisted on the dismissal of 'Intendant-General' of Police, J. J. R. de Bastos, and of the President of the 'Relação' (a Court of Appeal) of Lisbon; both of whom were universally suspected of endeavouring to promote the success of the Infante D. Miguel's party.* Towards evening, in every direction, were to be seen groups of people giving *vivas* to Sr. D. Pedro IV.; to the constitutional Charter; and to General Saldanha. It was half past two in the night before the crowds dispersed."

The same Gazette, on the following day (25th), thus continues:—

"In the afternoon, when the Minister of Marine left the office, a crowd of more than 6000 persons, chiefly well-dressed, surrounded his carriage amidst cries of 'Long live our General Saldanha!' and, from the crowd, voices were heard uttering exclamations of indignation against persons, supposed to be implicated in causing the dismissal of General Saldanha. The people insisted upon their right to petition; and declared that her Highness had been imposed upon. The minister promised that he would express their desires to her Highness; and that, from her great virtues, they might feel sure of justice being done. After his departure, the people continued their *vivas* to the king, the Charter, and General Saldanha. At night-fall, the Brigadier Biquer made his appearance in the Rua Augusta and the Rua d'Ouro, imploring the people to make no disturbance. To him they repeated what they had already said to the

* Volumes might be written respecting the plots and intrigues which were described as going forward at this period, some of them real, some imaginary. The reader will not fail to discover a sad state of disorganization among the ministers and officers in the service of the State, encouraged by intrigues at Court, and by the connivance of the Infanta herself. One fact is certain, that, by far the greater number of Saldanha's adversaries at this period, although apparently serving their lawful sovereign and the Charter, became afterwards the strongest supporters of the usurpation of D. Miguel.

Minister of Marine. The crowds still increased; and, with repeated *vivas* to D. Pedro, the Charter, and General Saldanha, they proceeded through various streets with lighted torches, stopping in front of many well-known houses to utter their patriotic cries.* Everywhere the troops responded to these *vivas* with the greatest enthusiasm. Whilst this was passing in the streets, similar enthusiasm was shown at the Theatre of S. Carlos. Between the acts, and when the opera was over, the constitutional hymn was repeatedly called for, amidst a thousand *vivas* for the king, the Charter, and General Saldanha."

On the following day, the official Gazette continues to inform us that the dissatisfied people assembled in the Terreiro do Paço, calling for the reinstatement of their beloved Saldanha. A numerous deputation proceeded to the house of the "Juiz do Povo," † calling on him to represent to her Highness, in the name of the people, that she had been imposed upon; and that they wanted back their Minister of War, the General Saldanha. This magistrate was, at first, fearful of showing himself; but, seeing the peaceable behaviour of the people, he appeared at a window, and promised that he would proceed to Caldas that very night, and make known to the regent their wishes. The night passed amidst the greatest enthusiasm, but without disturbances.

We might presume, either that the new ministers were absent during these days with the regent at Caldas, or were unaware of the unwelcome truths which were being uttered by the official Gazette. For, as soon as they were brought to their notice, the chief editor of that paper was dismissed, by Portaria of July 28th, dated from Caldas—for having too faithfully described what had taken place in the capital. On that same day, the official Gazette, with its newly-appointed editor, announced; "That whereas certain officers and soldiers had taken part in the late demonstrations, such conduct, if repeated, would be punished with the greatest severity." An order also emanated from Sr. Bastos, the obnoxious chief of the police,

* This demonstration was afterwards known as the "Archotada." The word *Archote* signifying a torch.

† A municipal magistrate so called.

strictly forbidding the people from assembling in groups of more than eight or ten persons.

The Count da Ponte, Saldanha's successor at the War Office, issued, on the 28th, a circular to all the generals commanding in the Provinces, declaring that a handful (*punhado*) of Portuguese, having disobeyed the government; the law; and the constitutional Charter; they, the generals, were called upon to employ their utmost activity and vigilance in suppressing any "ramifications (however insignificant) of this party."

The "ramifications" were not so "insignificant" as the Count da Ponte pretended. The agitation was great throughout the whole kingdom. Some of the chief authorities in the Provinces were even brought to trial for their behaviour on the occasion; while many were censured for their want of zeal in not suppressing the many demonstrations of respect which were shown for Saldanha. Lieut.-General Stubbs, an old Peninsular soldier, who commanded at Oporto, was tried by court-martial for having forwarded to the regent, from that city, a petition for the recall of Saldanha. The Bishop of Elvas was censured for the demonstrations he had made in favour of Saldanha and the Charter; and, in the following February, was compelled to retire to Gibraltar, where he ended his days. Editors of newspapers were imprisoned for having remonstrated against the dismissal of Saldanha. We write *dismissal;* but have seen that the minister tendered his own resignation.

The Count da Ponte, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the following circular to the Portuguese diplomatic agents abroad; which document (dated from Caldas before he could have verified the exactitude of his assertions) is so remarkable an instance, not merely of the suppression of truth, but also of extraordinary misrepresentations, that we present it to our readers in full.

CIRCULAR.

"Her Serene Highness, the Infanta Regent, having been pleased to dismiss João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun from the post of Minister and Secretary of State for the War Department: immediately that the news spread through Lisbon,

various individuals, most of them belonging to the lower orders, and to the class which is always ready to foment disorder, began to collect in a riotous manner; and, on the evening of the 24th, traversed the streets of the Capital, inciting its peaceful inhabitants, and shouting *vivas* to the dismissed ex-minister. They went to the house of the Intendant-General of Police, insulting and threatening that magistrate; and would have invaded his dwelling, had not a military force intervened. On the nights of the 25th and 26th, these scandalous scenes were repeated, and her Highness's royal authority was treated with contempt; the bands of rioters going to the extent of directing their steps to the residence of the Minister of Finance, where that functionary was conferring with his colleagues of the Marine and Justice; and, on arriving there, three men, of no consideration, but of known bad conduct, demanded admittance; representing themselves to be deputed by the people; and insisted upon Senhor Saldanha being reinstated. They also went to the residence of the Juiz do Povo, and endeavoured to induce him to come to this town,* to lay before her Highness the wishes of these demagogues, who represented themselves to be the organs of public opinion.

"On entering the ministry, yesterday, I considered it to be my duty, before treating of any other matter, to take prompt and energetic measures for repressing these anarchical proceedings; and I was able, I am happy to say, to restore order, that very day, by the vigorous intervention of the military power, which forced the factious bands to disperse.

"The editor of the *Gazeta de Lisboa* having dared to insert in yesterday's and to-day's *Gazetas*, the articles you will see in those papers; written in support of the party which promoted the said disorders; the which articles are not only an attack upon her Highness's authority and a contravention of the 74th article of the constitutional Charter; but are also a tissue of falsehoods: her Highness has, therefore, been pleased, in the king's name, to dismiss from the editorship of the *Gazeta* the individual who held that post; as you will see by the inclosed supplement to the *Gazeta* of to-day.

* Caldas.

"I forward this explanation of the events of the last few days; not only to make you acquainted with what has happened, but to enable you to contradict any exaggerated or false accounts which may get spread abroad.

"God preserve you!

"CONDE DA PONTE.

"CALDAS DA RAINHA, *July* 28, 1827."

We have already seen by Saldanha's letter to D. Pedro, dated August 2nd, that he had retired from the Court; and that, on the 16th of the month, news reached Lisbon of the nomination of D. Miguel to the regency. If, at the time of the promulgation of the Charter, in July 1826, D. Miguel had been already 25 years of age, he would, by the 92nd art. of that Charter, have legally assumed the regency.* The law declared that the nearest relative, being of age, should act as regent during the Sovereign's minority. The nearest relative, "according to the order of succession," thus qualified for the regency, was the Infanta Isabel Maria. A question, however, had been raised; whether D. Miguel, on attaining the age of 25, would be legally entitled to assume the regency in the place of the Infanta, who had obtained it through his minority; or whether his sister, the actual regent, having once held it, should continue to do so. The Charter was not very explicit on this subject; but it was considered, and Palmella expressed the same opinion, that it was never intended that there should be a regency for a regent; as would have been the case, had the Infanta held her office only during the minority of the non-qualified prince.

The day D. Miguel's appointment was signed, D. Pedro wrote to George IV., informing that monarch of his determination. The letter was as follows:—

"RIO DE JANEIRO, *July* 3*rd*, 1827.

"SENHOR MY BROTHER AND COUSIN,

"The necessity for establishing order in Portugal; and of consolidating the constitutional system which has been there sworn to; compels me, as legitimate sovereign, to send an order, of this day's date, to the Infante D. Miguel, my brother and son-

* This prince was born on the 26th of October, 1802.

in-law, to proceed to govern that kingdom in my name, and as my lieutenant. Trusting in the unalterable friendship which exists between us, I beseech your Majesty, on your part, to assist me; not only that the said regency may be established as soon as possible; but, also, that the constitutional Charter which I have given, and which has been sworn to, shall become the fundamental law of the kingdom.

"PEDRO."

Much the same communication was made to the Emperor of Austria; but with a prudent reticence with respect to any assistance towards establishing a constitutional government in Portugal. The order sent to D. Miguel, and referred to in the preceding letter to George IV., was as follows:—

"For many and very powerful reasons worthy of my royal deliberation; and considering that the safety and security of the State are, and should always be, the supreme law for a Sovereign, who desires only the happiness of his subjects; and taking into my royal consideration the intelligence, activity, and firmness of character of the Infante D. Miguel, my much loved and esteemed brother:—I hereby appoint him my Lieutenant: granting him all the powers, which, as King of Portugal and Algarves, belong to me, and are set forth in the constitutional Charter: in order that he may govern and rule those kingdoms in conformity with the said Charter. The said Infante D. Miguel, my much loved and esteemed brother, will take cognizance of and execute this Decree.

"PEDRO.

"PALACE AT RIO DE JANEIRO, *July 3rd*, 1827."

Saldanha was compelled to remain at Oeiras until he could arrange means of future subsistence for himself, his wife, and children. He did not quit Portugal until the 21st of October; when he embarked for Plymouth, unaccompanied by his family, whom he found it necessary, for many reasons, to leave in Portugal.

A short account of the origin of the author's early acquaintance, and long continued friendship, with the subject of this

Memoir, may, perhaps, be here permitted. It was shortly after Saldanha's arrival at London, in the cheerless month of November, 1827, that a Portuguese friend, at whose house he was staying, proposed that he should accompany him to an evening party in Sussex Place, Regent's Park, where then resided three very accomplished ladies, sisters, whose father, after he had bestowed on them the advantages of a careful education, had suddenly become reduced to comparative poverty. Relying on the kind assistance of those friends with whom they had hitherto been intimate, these ladies, the Misses Gouldsmith, had determined on taking pupils, as boarders, at their own residence. From their previous position in society, they were enabled to offer educational advantages not often to be met with; and consequently, to obtain as their pupils, a class of young ladies whose parents could afford to pay a liberal remuneration.*

The Misses Gouldsmith often gave little evening parties, which were attended by their friends of former days, and some few diplomatists who sought their society. Their former pupils were often invited; and among these the two sisters of the author, who had recently completed their education. Upon one of these occasions, the Count de Saldanha was introduced to the author's sisters by the Portuguese friend already spoken of, who was on very intimate terms with their parents. The Count, having danced with the young ladies, and having, as he was pleased to observe, admired the amiable simplicity of their manners, begged his friend, on the following day, to present him at the house of their father. The domestic habits of Saldanha soon led him to appreciate the quiet evenings which he there occasionally enjoyed; and, during which, in marked contrast to his lately agitated life, he learned to join in a game at whist, which formed the family's usual evening amusement.

It was at this time, when the author was at home for his Christmas holidays, that he first became acquainted with

* Amongst others who were educated by the Misses Gouldsmith were the Ladies Lambart, sisters of the present Earl of Cavan, with whom the author was, for some years, at school at Salisbury.

Saldanha, whose loss, after nearly 50 years of constant friendship, he now, with so much reason, deplores. The author, then a boy not yet 15, looks back with pleasure to the intense admiration and enthusiasm he felt for his new friend; and recollects with what eagerness he listened to every little anecdote which Saldanha narrated of his past life; and, especially, of his campaigns in the Peninsula and South America.

CHAPTER VII.

1827—1828.

D. Miguel appointed regent—He arrives in London—Receives Saldanha coldly—Letters from Saldanha to D. Pedro—D. Miguel's conduct at Lisbon—English ambassador remonstrates—Clinton's Division recalled—Opinions of Duke of Wellington and others—Letter from Saldanha to D. Pedro narrating events—D. Miguel is declared king—Charter abolished—Saldanha's plans in favour of the queen—Constitutional movements in Portugal—Account of expedition to Oporto.

No sooner had Saldanha arrived in England, than the most ridiculous reports were circulated at Lisbon, respecting his intentions. The correspondent of one London paper wrote, on the 17th of November: "It is affirmed that in case Saldanha, whose departure for London I mentioned to you, should succeed by force of intrigues to secure the favour of Prince D. Miguel, some distinguished individuals had collected documents which establish the projects of this personage in the clearest manner, in order to submit the same to the prince on his arrival."

We may smile at the idea of Saldanha "by force of intrigues" acquiring the favour of D. Miguel; and it certainly required no "documents" to satisfy that prince of Saldanha's unalterable attachment to constitutional liberty, and of his allegiance to his lawful sovereign.

While the events narrated towards the close of the previous chapter were going forward in Portugal, the Marquis de Palmella had been strongly urging the British Government to unite with that of Austria for the purpose of inducing D. Pedro to declare his unqualified abdication of the Crown of Portugal, in favour of his daughter, the next heir, D. Maria.* When the question of the regency was determined, Palmella, who had been so instrumental in bringing it about, hoped for good

* The abdication was officially made known on the 3rd of March, 1828.

results from this appointment. For, in a letter which he wrote in August, he observed, "that it will shortly depend on his Highness, the Infante D. Miguel, to follow the generous inspirations of his heart; to acquire for himself an immortal name; and secure the happiness of the Portuguese nation."

After the resignation of the Saldanha ministry, Palmella was in correspondence with the Infanta regent respecting the formation of another administration; and we learn from the published letters of that diplomatist how unwilling he was to become a member of it. He writes (August 26th) that he has received orders to proceed immediately to Lisbon, where he will have "to present himself at the breach, for such," he says, "do I consider the situation to which I am unfortunately called. Lord Dudley and all my colleagues, as well as Prince Esterhazy, press me to go immediately to Lisbon, now that I have received (the day before yesterday) the reply from the Infanta regent; in which her Highness approves my observations respecting the re-organisation of the ministry, and desires me to depart without any delay. Lord Dudley even went so far as to declare me responsible for the consequences which might ensue from the administration being incomplete during the critical interval between this time, and the time when the Infante D. Miguel would assume the regency."

Notwithstanding this advice, the departure of Palmella was delayed; and circumstances shortly occurred which rendered it unnecessary. The ministry, of which the Count da Ponte and the Viscount Santarem formed a part, fell, and was succeeded by one at the head of which was Sr. Candido José Xavier.

When the news of the appointment of D. Miguel reached Vienna; and it was officially communicated to the Austrian Court; Prince Metternich, on the 18th of October, invited the English ambassador and the Portuguese plenipotentiary to a conference; at which it was agreed, how desirable it had become, that D. Miguel should accept the regency, and set out for Lisbon as soon as possible. In a despatch to Prince Esterhazy, on the same day as the Conference took place, Prince Metternich assured him; that D. Miguel, on his arrival at Lisbon, "firmly intends to support the Charter." The British ambassador

urged the immediate departure of the regent, as, he said, he was fully informed that the Portuguese refugees in Spain intended to make a revolution in Portugal before the arrival of D. Miguel. In consequence of these representations, that prince wrote to his uncle, the most Catholic king, on the 21st of October, begging him to take measures to prevent such a misfortune. It may be difficult to determine, unless we may judge by the sequel, whether or not the prince acted on the same principle as did that cautious person who, delivering an offender to an exasperated crowd, exclaimed, "Don't throw him into the pond."

The Conference referred to was signed by Prince de Metternich, Comte de Lebzeltern, Chevalier Neumann, Comte de Bombelles, Barão de Villa Secca, and Conde de Villa Real.

At the same period, Palmella had written from London to Villa Secca, "that the state of affairs is such in Portugal, that it is most urgent that his Highness should hasten his departure." Palmella had viewed favourably the appointment of D. Miguel. Absent from Portugal, he had not had the same opportunities as Saldanha for acquiring a knowledge of the projects and hopes of the absolutist party. Thus, although well acquainted with the misfortunes which lowered over his unhappy country, he thought he perceived one bright spot on the horizon. Accordingly, he had written with some feeling, as early as September 18th, to the Baron de Villa Secca as follows:—"My prayers were never more sincere and ardent than those I now make that the memory of this regency may be considered in future times as one of the most glorious epochs of Portuguese history. For, in truth, the evils which for so many years have afflicted our unfortunate country can only cease by the intervention of a royal hand, and by the alliance of royalty with moderation and firmness. . . . For if the opportunity is not taken advantage of, as I hope it will be, then, for many and many years, changes and disorders are in store for us."

It is unfortunate that the hopes and wishes of Palmella were to meet with disappointment. But let us be just; and consider whether the entire blame should fall upon the unfortunate prince; or whether it should not be shared by his faithless, if

not perjured advisers. If D. Miguel had committed errors in his youth, before he was banished from his country, it may be observed that, nowhere in those letters we have presented to the reader, has Saldanha sought to rake them up to the disadvantage of the young prince. Saldanha was decidedly opposed to the regency of D. Miguel, not only because he thought himself justified in considering the nomination illegal, but because he knew that the regent would immediately be made the dupe and tool of an obnoxious party, whose conduct would plunge the country into civil strife. The author does not pretend to throw "historic doubts" on the judgment of a preceding generation; but his impartiality, and his desire to avoid the suspicion of intentional deception, induce him to quote the opinions of those who were well acquainted with the young prince. *Discite justitiam moniti.*

As early as the death of D. João VI. (1826), after D. Miguel had resided for a considerable time at Vienna, Prince Metternich, in a circular to the Austrian envoys at various Courts, informing them of that event and its probable consequences, thus writes in favourable terms of the prince:—"Un jeune prince qui, par des qualités précieuses de cœur et d'esprit, s'est acquis les plus grands droits à l'amitié de notre auguste maître." Again, in reference to the advice which at that time the Spanish minister had offered respecting the immediate departure of D. Miguel for Lisbon, and to which the prince would not lend an ear, Metternich observes: "Je regarde comme un devoir de rendre à ce jeune prince la justice que ses pensées sont aussi correctes que sages et élevées."

Such, apparently, were the intentions of D. Miguel when he wrote the following letter to his sovereign and brother, D. Pedro, before he quitted Vienna.

"VIENNA, *October 19th*, 1827.

"SIRE,

"I have received the decree, dated July 3rd of this present year, which your Imperial and Royal Majesty has deigned to address to me; and in which your Majesty has been pleased to appoint me your Lieutenant and Regent of the kingdoms of Portugal and Algarves and their dependencies.

In compliance with the sovereign determinations of your Majesty, I immediately began to take the necessary steps in order to proceed to Lisbon, and carry out the paternal and wise views of your Majesty by governing the said kingdoms according to the tenor of the constitutional Charter, which your Majesty has granted to the Portuguese nation.

"All my endeavours will tend to the maintenance of the institutions by which the Portuguese monarchy is governed; and to contribute, as far as it is in my power, to the preservation of public tranquillity in the said kingdoms, by opposing all attempts of factions to disturb it: such factions, from whatever origin they may spring, will never meet with my support.

"May Heaven prolong the precious life of your Majesty; as is fervently desired by your Imperial and Royal Majesty's brother, with much love and esteem.

"MIGUEL."

On the 7th of December, the day following the departure of D. Miguel from Vienna, the Baron de Villa Secca wrote, in the following terms, to Sr. Candido José Xavier, at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs at Lisbon:—

"The leave-taking between H. S. H. the Infante and H. I. M. the Emperor was, on the part of both, painful in the extreme; this monarch, equally with her Majesty the Empress, having regarded and treated his Highness as if he were their own son. Their Majesties, as well as the Archdukes and Duchesses, testified their sincere grief and regret at the separation; and I can assure your Excellency that the same feeling prevails in the entire Court, as well as amongst the people, by whom his Highness is much loved; he having, during his residence here of three years' duration, conducted himself with so much propriety, dignity, affability, politeness, and kindness, that he became the admiration of the Court; and obtained the respect, love, and esteem of all. I, more than any one, by the confidence with which his Highness was pleased to honour me, was placed in a position to observe closely his high and noble character."

D. Miguel, having left Vienna, arrived in London on the 30th

of December. Before his departure, he addressed a letter to George IV., announcing his nomination as regent, and declaring his determination to maintain the constitutional Charter. He was entertained during three days by the king at Windsor; and afterwards visited the Duke of Wellington at Strathfieldsaye. Whilst in London, the prince is said to have had a narrow escape, when breakfasting in the Thames Tunnel, on the occasion when six lives were lost by a sudden irruption of the river.

In January of this year (1828), the Wellington ministry was formed; a ministry which, it was feared by the liberals, would be favourable to the plans which were nourished by the absolutist party. Already, before D. Miguel left London, a faction, acting in his name, or making use of it, had circulated at Lisbon revolutionary papers terminating with: "Viva the holy religion of our fathers! Viva the king, D. Miguel absolute monarch! Viva the august throne of Bragança! Viva the re-established monarchy!"

Meanwhile, Saldanha, on the arrival of D. Miguel, had taken an early opportunity of waiting on the regent, anxious as he was to learn from his own mouth the intentions of that prince. The interview was far from satisfactory; as we learn from the following letter, which Saldanha, without delay, addressed to D. Pedro.

"LONDON, *January 5th*, 1828.

"SIRE,

"On the 2nd of August last, I had the honour of informing your Royal and Imperial Majesty, as to the motives which induced me to request from her Serene Highness, the Infanta regent, my dismissal from the ministry. I stated the manner in which her Highness received me; the proceedings of the Government towards me; and I declared my intention of going to Paris, and there awaiting your Majesty's orders. Feelings of delicacy, however, prevented my embarking from Lisbon before the 21st of October; because one of the officials, appointed to inquire into the events which followed my retirement from the ministry, had declared to various individuals; that it would require a very slight amount of ability, on his part, to draw from the judicial inquiry sufficient matter to place

me upon my trial. Under such circumstances, I could not honourably leave the country; for, by doing so, I should have furnished my enemies with an opportunity for representing me as fleeing an inquiry. This having, however, concluded without my being implicated in any way, in spite of the endeavours of the Chief of the Police and others, I considered I ought no longer to stay in Lisbon; as my presence, which was highly obnoxious to the Government, could only serve to increase the persecutions of the true Portuguese and faithful subjects of your Majesty.

"Upon my arrival in London, I acquired the certainty that his Highness, the Infante D. Miguel, would visit that Capital on his way to Lisbon; and, imagining that it would be easier to obtain an audience of his Highness in London than in Paris, I determined to await here his Highness's arrival, which took place on December 30th.

"His Highness, however, and this (as I am informed) with great difficulty, only permitted me the honour of kissing his hand in public, together with other Portuguese; and, through the Marquis de Palmella, he informed me that he would not again allow me the honour of entering his presence. From the information I have received through the said marquis, and from some of the members of his Highness's suite, there are, it appears, five reasons for this proceeding of his Highness:—First, the conviction of his Highness, that, were it not for the efforts I made and the energy I displayed at Oporto, the constitutional Charter, your Majesty so wisely and generously drew up, would not have been sworn to in Portugal. Secondly, the persuasion he is under, that the energy and decision I have shewn, on all occasions, are the chief causes that the said Charter still exists. Thirdly, the certainty his Highness has acquired, that, in all councils and diplomatic conferences, I always maintained that the regency of the Infanta, D. Isabel Maria, ought to continue until her Majesty, D. Maria II. had attained her majority; or until your Imperial and Royal Majesty should expressly ordain the contrary. Fourthly, my having sent Captain Manoel Joaquim Berredo Praça to your Majesty's august presence. Fifthly, my not having publicly declared, that I was not the

author of a ridiculous and despicable Republican Proclamation, which Padre José Agostinho de Macedo inserted in one of his publications; a most ridiculous paper, the authorship of which I was never aware had been attributed to me.

"Such are the causes (the first four of which I shall ever consider my greatest glory) for which I have incurred his Highness's displeasure. This can but give me most heartfelt sorrow, when I consider that his displeasure arises from causes, which, evidently, prove what are the feelings and intentions of his Highness the Infante. For, by this, I have acquired the certainty, that his Highness was advised, both in Vienna and in Paris, on no account to give execution to the decrees of your Majesty, whose authority (it is pretended) had ceased by the delegation of your powers to your brother; and I cannot but tremble, when I consider the evils which are threatening unhappy Portugal, and the danger to which your Majesty's rights to the Crown are exposed.

"Yes, Sire, my loyalty to the person of your Majesty; my fidelity to the principles you have established; and my interest and love for the welfare of my unfortunate country; all oblige me to continue to address your Royal and Imperial Majesty with the candour I have always shewn; and I repeat, that your Majesty's rights to the Crown of Portugal run the greatest risk from the return of his Highness. I need not endeavour to prove to your Royal and Imperial Majesty that his Highness, holding the reins of power, can at any moment he chooses, declare himself King of Portugal; the only consideration which could withhold him having disappeared; that is, the uncertainty as to the manner in which the Cabinets of Europe would appreciate the proceeding. The Emperor of Austria, instead of declaring to his Highness, that if he did not respect your Majesty's rights, it would be a *casus belli*, contented himself with the warning that he would withdraw his friendship. The King of France did not even go to that extent. The English Government, although (as I am thoroughly convinced since I have been in contact with its most influential members) it desires the continuation of liberal institutions in Portugal, still if it is made to appear the national wish, will not take active

measures to force the adoption of that which is presented as against the will of the nation.

"Even before I had acquired the certainty that his Highness had been advised in Vienna not to carry out your Majesty's orders,* I could not doubt that such would be the result; for the Marquis de Palmella in conversation, on more than one occasion, had positively declared to me, that he had advised the Infante not to carry them out; that we could not be supporting two masters; and that the idea of the Infante going to govern Portugal had emanated from him: for that it was at his request, that Canning had addressed the Court of Vienna for that purpose. In vain I reminded the marquis that between disobedience and rebellion the distance was very small; and that his Highness would, by such a step, dishearten your Majesty's faithful subjects, and give an unequivocal proof of the small respect he had for your Majesty.

"Sire, the marquis, as well as the majority of his class, has lived in the persuasion, since the death of D. João VI., that the Infante would ascend the throne of Portugal: and this has become to them a certainty, since they have observed that the war in the south, and the state of the Brazilian Empire prohibit your Royal and Imperial Majesty from coming to Portugal; therefore, putting aside their fidelity, their honour, and the welfare of the country; and considering only their private interests; they have endeavoured, by every possible means, to stand well with the Infante, and secure his affection; and your Majèsty may be certain that they are, one and all, ready to do anything they may fancy will be agreeable to his Highness.

"In such circumstances, I cannot refrain from laying before your Majesty all I feel; and if I exceed due limits, the benignity of your Majesty's character will pardon me; acknowledging the purity of my intentions. In Portugal, Sire, all long for your Majesty, excepting the high authorities in general; the upper clergy; the aristocracy; and, as a matter of course, their dependents. Spain has fallen to the last stage of misery and despair; and I am in a position to be able to assure your Majesty, that the entire nation looks to your Majesty for its

* The orders were those of D. Pedro, desiring his brother to go to Rio.

redemption. France has just given such an extraordinary proof of firmness and adherence to the constitutional system, that the ultra-royalists are cowed, and their plans are disorganized. Let the events be what they may, Spain will certainly abstain from intervention; and if, though such a thing is impossible, it should attempt to repeat what it did in 1823, England would oppose it with all its forces; as I have heard the members of this Government affirm, who execrate the memory of Lord Wellington for not having opposed the invasion of that country by the French army. Italy, and all the other countries which are influenced by the Vienna cabinet, with the exception of the hereditary States, hate the despotism with which they are treated. Finally, all fear the outbreak of war upon the continent; because everyone knows that the people of Europe appreciate their rights, and will take every opportunity to gain their liberty. On the other hand, Sire, a residence of nearly eight years among the Brazilians has convinced me, most positively, that republican principles are engraven upon their hearts; and it is generally acknowledged, that only your Majesty could, by the virtues which ornament your character, have preserved so many, and such distant provinces, under a monarchical system; and nobody doubts that, through those same virtues, the Brazilian empire will last during the precious life of your Imperial Majesty. But, Sire, your Majesty cannot be indifferent to the voice of nature; and considering the dangers which threaten your posterity, I venture to hope that the day will arrive when your Majesty will once more take a high resolution, and present yourself in Europe. Ah! Sire, think of the words Napoleon Buonaparte so often repeated,—that the legitimate monarch, who should cordially espouse the cause of the people, would infallibly give laws to Europe.

"Your Majesty is the legitimate Sovereign who has convinced the people of Europe of your desire to reign over free men; and every thing tends to persuade me that your Majesty is the monarch Napoleon spoke of. Can it, therefore, be possible, Sire, that your Majesty, instead of reigning over fourteen millions of men like the Portuguese and Spanish, with whose assistance, moreover, you may still, perhaps, sustain your

authority in America, can prefer to govern (only) three millions of men of every colour, who foster in their breasts the blackest ingratitude. In a word, Sire, I again repeat that which I have so often declared to your Majesty, Portugal is lost—is ruined—if your Majesty does not personally bring it the remedy it requires; and Brazil will infallibly feel the evils of which Portugal is the victim.

"As one of the reasons which have placed me under his Highness's displeasure, is the persuasion, that I was the cause of the constitutional Charter being sworn to in Portugal: his Highness could not be ignorant of the fact, that, if my efforts had not been supported in the presence of the Infanta D. Isabel Maria by Councillor Abrantes, many difficulties would have arisen. For this reason, the said Councillor could not but equally fall under his Highness's displeasure; the more so, that he has at all times, and with the greatest efficacy, honour, and candour, proved himself to be a faithful and decided subject of your Majesty. His Highness, therefore, without troubling himself as to the effect such a resolution would produce as a proof of his intentions; and following, perhaps, the counsels of the Count de Villa Real and the Marquis de Palmella, would not allow Councillor Abrantes to have the honour to kiss his hand; thus causing a great sensation among the Portuguese who reside here.

"Sire, allow me with the greatest respect and gratitude, to have the honour of kissing the august hand of your Majesty for the manner in which, while granting me the title of Conde de Saldanha, your Majesty was pleased to give me so public a testimony of your Majesty's appreciation of my services. I trust your Majesty will pardon me, if, in the effusion of my gratitude, I asseverate that I only wish for opportunities of serving your Majesty in any part of the world, and in any situation; and that my only object is to merit your Majesty's approbation; for which end no sacrifice of mine will be too great. My zeal for the glory of your Majesty and for the prosperity of your august posterity; the interest I feel for my country, which is worthy a better fate; the agitation with the results I foresee from the return of his Highness, the Infante, to

Portugal; and, above all, your Majesty's benevolence of character, inspire me with the hope that your Majesty will pardon any opinion that may have escaped me, which may not meet your Majesty's approbation.

"God preserve your Majesty's august person, as is the wish of all good Portuguese.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

During D. Miguel's stay in London, Saldanha saw no more of him, save at the theatre; when the author of these pages—then at home from school for his Christmas holidays—had the honour of being seated in a box with the general, immediately opposite that in which was D. Miguel with his suite, amongst whom was Saldanha's brother, the present Count de Azinhaga.

D. Miguel left Plymouth on the 9th of February, and reached Lisbon on the 22nd; when the regent, in the presence of the Chambers, formally handed over her powers to him. It is somewhat singular, that, in her speech on the occasion, although she refers to D. Miguel's nomination as emanating from the king, D. Pedro, she neglects the mention either of the future queen, D. Maria, or of the constitutional Charter. Sr. Liberato declares that those around the Infanta had prevailed upon her to omit many passages of the speech which had been prepared for her.

Saldanha had now, more than ever, become convinced of what the conduct of the absolutist party would be, as soon as D. Miguel should arrive in Portugal. He was well aware of the support which that party would receive from King Ferdinand; and he therefore listened willingly to the proposals of the Spanish generals and other liberals, emigrants in London, to aid them in securing for Spain a constitutional Government, by placing the king, D. Pedro himself, on the Spanish throne. On this subject, he addressed the following letter to his Sovereign:—

"LONDON, *February 18th*, 1828.

"SIRE,

"His Highness, the Serene Infante D. Miguel, set out from Plymouth on the 9th of this month; and, in spite of the solicitations of all my friends, and of persons of the highest

'position in this country, I have determined to return to Lisbon by the steam-packet *Duke of York*, which will leave a few days hence. For no consideration can deter me from doing that which I consider to be my duty. In addition to the desire to fulfil my duty as a deputy, another inducement to me to hasten my departure is the conviction that my efforts may contribute to quicken the realization of the sole wish of all good Portuguese and Spaniards. Sire, the realization of these wishes is so far advanced, that, as soon as the necessary funds are forthcoming, they will be carried into execution without in any way compromising your august name. I have been so fortunate as to set aside the difficulties which had arisen between various Spanish generals, and other persons of distinction of the same nationality, residents in this country; and I again assure your Majesty, that if facilities are given me for obtaining in Lisbon the money which is indispensable, in two or three months a movement will take place in all the provinces of Spain, for the purpose of placing the august person of your Majesty upon the constitutional throne of that country. The glory of your Royal and Imperial Majesty and your happiness are the only objects to which my efforts are directed. May they be successful, and merit the approbation of your Royal Imperial Majesty, whose august person may God preserve as all good Portuguese require.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

The reader must not suppose that this suggestion by Saldanha of placing D. Pedro on the throne of Spain was the wild chimera of an adventurer; or that there would have been any injustice in such an attempt, if made. Spain, as we have seen, was resorting to every expedient, short of actual war and invasion, to thwart the attempts of the Portuguese at constitutional government. Unfortunately, at that time, Saldanha, amongst the chiefs of the liberal party, found little sympathy with his exertions to counteract the intrigues of Spain and of other absolute monarchies, who desired, through the regency of D. Miguel, to effect their favourite object. But the reader will, ere long, find Palmella and others writing, when it had become too late, quite as strongly as Saldanha had ever expressed

himself on this subject. In Spain, constitutionalism had been strangled; and many Spaniards, including some distinguished generals, whose opinions were liberal, had become exiles in England. They were ready and eager to change the dynasty at Madrid. They esteemed, admired, and knew personally Saldanha; and the latter would have been no criminal if, with his Sovereign's sanction, he had retaliated upon Spain the game which Spain was playing upon Portugal. Now D. Pedro was, by birth, nearly allied to the reigning family of Spain; for he was eldest son of D. João VI., by Carlota de Bourbon, daughter of Charles IV. D. João himself was grandson of Philip V. of Spain. It was, therefore, possible that, after a successful revolution in that country, effected by Spaniards under the command of Saldanha (himself of Spanish lineage) and other Spanish generals, D. Pedro might be accepted as the occupant of that throne. Nothing came of Saldanha's suggestion; but it was due to his reputation to explain this much.*

Shortly after the arrival of D. Miguel at Lisbon, the Viscount de Santarem, Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed, on March 22nd, a despatch to the Baron de Villa Secca, at Vienna; in which, after recapitulating the events of the last few years, he complains of the power which democracy had obtained in Portugal; and reminds the Baron that various European Governments had, in 1824, objected, through the fear of the encroachments of that democracy, to the calling together, by D. João, even of the very ancient Monarchical Cortes of the kingdom. He further states, that the most pressing and immediate object of the new regent was to resist and oppose all revolutionary principles. As this despatch was written with a view of explaining the conduct of the regent's government, the viscount

* A Portuguese writer indeed asserts that D. Pedro had a *right* to the Crown of Spain, since the right of his mother had been recognized by the Spanish Cortes in 1788, and by those assembled at Cadiz in 1812. We find Mr. Canning himself, on one occasion, threatening the Spanish Government to let loose General Mina upon them, unless their behaviour was changed. The Ponte-Santarem Ministry, which followed that of Saldanha (1827) promised the Spanish Government that Saldanha should never again be minister in Portugal! To discredit him with the regent, his opponents declared that he wished to establish a Republic, himself as President, with the title of João VII.!

endeavours to offer as an excuse for the very sudden and unexpected dissolution of the Chambers, so soon after the regent's arrival in Portugal, the circumstance that, in the Chamber of Deputies, there were no less than thirty-six members of that very Senate which, in 1823, had made its famous protest against any alteration in the Constitution of 1822; and who were, consequently, as the viscount pretended, not sincere in their support of the so widely different Charter of 1826; and only waited their opportunity to subvert it.* The Chambers being dissolved, the viscount states that instructions were given to call together the General Cortes in their stead.† It is singular that the regent's government should have made use of the very Charter itself, in article 75, paragraph 12, to support their arbitrary decree; that paragraph being the incomprehensible one we have noticed in a previous Chapter (page 49). We further learn from this despatch, that, already, the English ambassador, Sir F. Lamb; and the Austrian minister, Count de Bombelles, had remonstrated with the Government in simultaneous Notes, dated March 11, in which they state: "That, upon the invitation of a culpable party in this kingdom, the Portuguese refugees have formed the project of returning in a body, with the view of forcing his Royal Highness, the regent, to adopt a course, not less opposed to his solemn engagements than to his intentions." In his own Note, the Count de Bombelles reminds the viscount that already, in the previous October, similar guilty designs had been formed; which had been proved by the third Protocol of the Conference at Vienna; and of which his Highness, on that occasion, had expressed his complete disapprobation. To these Notes (which had been addressed to his predecessor in office, the Count de Villa Real) the viscount replied: "que não consta ao Governo nem officialmente nem por informaçoes particulares da existencia de semelhante intenção;" ‡ and

* By such reasoning, the viscount himself having sworn to observe the Charter of 1826, must have been insincere when he was serving with a Government which abolished it.

† We can imagine, by reference to page 88, how little satisfactory to the liberals would be the General Cortes, as a substitute for their Charter.

‡ "That the Government had no information, either private or official, of the existence of any such intention."

he offered, in proof of his assertion, the unsatisfactory statement contained in a Spanish official Note; in which, denying all connivance at such projects, complaint is made of the robberies and murders committed by the Portuguese troops who have sought refuge in Spain.

In this state of affairs, D. Miguel having become regent, and consequently all fear of aggression on the part of the Government of Ferdinand having ceased, the British Division, under General Clinton, was ordered to be recalled. The Count de Villa Real* had requested that its departure should be delayed; but Sir F. Lamb had frankly told him that what had already taken place since the arrival of the regent was such as "*à faire désirer que les troupes anglaises n'en soient point témoins.*" On this occasion, in a despatch dated March 12th, Sir Frederick wrote to Lord Dudley, "I know, with certainty, that the real motive, which leads the Infante to delay the departure of our troops, is, that his safety may be guaranteed until he has realized his plans."

Rumours of what was going forward soon reached London. The Portuguese funds began to fall. Palmella, still ambassador, writes that the Duke of Wellington and others "fear serious consequences from the recent proceedings."

D. Miguel reached Portugal on the 22nd of February, 1828. Early in April of that year, the Marquis de Palmella, having received from Viscount de Santarem, the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Lisbon, a despatch commanding him to impress upon the British Government the sincerity of his Highness the Infante D. Miguel's intentions, addressed a Note to that effect to the English Foreign Office (on the 8th of April), accompanied by some extracts from the despatch he had received.

Lord Dudley, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied at great length in a Note, dated April 22nd, which

* After the arrival of D. Miguel, Villa Real had held the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs, for a short time, previous to the appointment of Santarem. He emigrated, and remained faithful to the queen and to the liberal cause. The other members of the regent's first ministry were:—President, The Duke de Cadaval; Home and Marine, J. A. de Oliveira Leite de Barros; Finance, Count de Louzã, D. Diogo; Justice, Furtado de Castro do Rio de Mendonça.

proved that the plausible protestations of his Highness and his advisers had failed to delude that statesman. While recognising, in the Portuguese minister's assertions, a manifest desire to cultivate the friendship and acquire the confidence of his Britannic Majesty, Lord Dudley declares; that he cannot conceal the fact that the events which have signalised the regency of his Highness have produced a feeling of disquietude in the mind of his Britannic Majesty, and frustrated his hopes and expectations. After reminding Palmella of the oath the Infante had taken to the Constitution; his written and verbal promises made both at Vienna and London; and the conditions upon which he received the regency, according to the decree of nomination; all of which facts had influenced his Britannic Majesty so strongly in his Highness's favour, and led to the friendly and honourable treatment he had received while in England; and induced his Britannic Majesty to use all his influence at Rio de Janeiro to persuade D. Pedro to abdicate, as soon as possible, in favour of his daughter; the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs laments that all that has passed, since his Highness set foot on Portuguese territory, has led his sovereign to believe that the prince entertains the firm intention of setting aside the Charter.

One of the most evident proofs of his wish to do so, according to Lord Dudley, was to be found in the dissolution of the Chambers, and subsequent nomination of a committee to prepare regulations for the new elections; a measure which implied a wish to delay the calling of the fresh Chambers for an indefinite period, thereby trampling on the leading principle of constitutional liberty. It could not be argued that such a step was necessary, since two alternatives presented themselves; namely, to have caused the Chambers, before they dissolved, to pass regulations for the next elections; or to have dissolved them, and immediately elected fresh ones by the Ordinances of 1826.

But it was not only by this measure that his Highness had shown his anti-constitutional tendencies. His entire acts had been in contradiction to his promises, and antagonistic to existing institutions. He had called to power men who were known to

be opposed to liberal ideas; and having dismissed from the army those officers who had so lately and so valiantly defended the Constitution against the insurgents, had replaced them by men of contrary opinions. The result of such measures could only be, that D. Pedro would delay his abdication; and send orders from Rio de Janeiro for the immediate establishment of the Constitution he had given to Portugal; and if, as present appearances seemed to indicate, his Highness refused to comply, a civil war must be the necessary consequence.

Such a prospect could scarcely be agreeable to his Britannic Majesty; who, bound by treaties which had existed for many years to assist Portugal in case of necessity, and in return to receive assistance from her, could not look with indifference upon proceedings which must necessarily bring that country to a condition, in which it would become an easy prey to any other power, or would be rendered powerless as an ally.

In conclusion, Lord Dudley declares that the impression caused by such acts cannot be removed by a simple despatch from a minister, announcing that his sovereign's intentions are not such as might be inferred from his proceedings; and informs the marquis that his Britannic Majesty is anxiously watching the march of events, which threaten to put an end to the peace and tranquillity of a country in which he takes so lively an interest.

After reading these observations of Lord Dudley, founded on information supplied by the British ambassador at Lisbon, we learn, without surprise, that, on the 25th of April, a crowd assembled before the house of one Manoel Cypriano, an officer of the Municipal Chamber, and, with cries of "Viva D. Miguel, absolute king!" insisted upon his accompanying them to the Town Hall. The members of the Senate being in the secret, and fully prepared for this demonstration, immediately acquiesced in its purpose and joined in the acclamation. Thence they proceeded to the Ajuda Palace, where, it being the queen-mother's birthday, the regent and the Court were assembled. Here the wishes of the *people*, as they were pleased to call themselves, were made known to the regent; who replied, that their desires could only be legally communicated to him by the

various Municipal Chambers throughout the country. The hint was taken without delay. Instructions were forwarded from the Home Office to the presidents of all the Municipal Chambers, declaring the desirability that his Royal Highness should be "supplicated" as follows.

"1st. That he should declare himself lawful king; it being the general desire of the nation, and in the interest of the people, that he should do so:—not only because he was king by the fundamental laws of the monarchy; but also because it was the general wish of the people.

"2nd. That the new institutions should be abolished, as being contrary to the privileges of the nation;—destructive of the primordial contract;—and offspring of the democratic faction, which, in 1820, usurped the sovereign power."

In consequence of these and other representations which were made to him, the regent, by a "Carta Regia," dated May 3rd, ordered, that the "ancient Cortes of the kingdom" should be convoked in thirty days, in the place of the Chambers or Parliament, which, as we have seen, he had previously dissolved. The "Carta Regia," officially made known on the 6th, declares that this step was taken in consequence of the urgent representations of the clergy, the nobility, the magistracy, and all the Municipal Chambers of the kingdom.

The result of the elections which followed may easily be imagined, when we learn that instructions had been sent by the "Intendant-General" of Police * to the presidents of the Municipal Chambers, ordering that the "votes of those electors who, by their known sentiments and political opinions, had declared themselves enemies of the true principles of legitimacy and followers of the new institutions, should be considered factious, and not be allowed to be enrolled."

The action of Saldanha, during this time, we shall learn from his correspondence with D. Pedro, in the following letter, dated May 10th, 1828:

* This "Intendant" was the same obnoxious individual whom the regent Isabel retained in office, after having, on the representations of her ministers, agreed to dismiss him. This conduct on her part led to the resignation of Saldanha, who was well aware of the "Intendant's" principles.

"LONDON, *May*, 1828.

"SIRE,

"On February 18th, I had the honour to acquaint your Royal and Imperial Majesty with the intention I had formed of starting to Lisbon in the steamer *Duke of York*. This intention I carried into effect; but the delays we suffered, in consequence of the breakage of some of the principal parts of the machinery,—were such, that we only entered the Tagus on the night of the 20th of March. Having cast anchor near the Tower of Belem, to await the clearance visit, the first boat which approached us at daybreak, was the English admiral's, bringing a message from that officer, begging me to go without delay on board his vessel. This I immediately did; and I was there informed of the proceedings of his Highness's Government, and of the number of persons who had been forced to abandon the country; the Admiral, at the same time, urging me strongly not to disembark, until I was thoroughly aware of the state of affairs. I remained, therefore, on board the flag ship; and the knowledge which I there acquired of what was going on, opened my eyes as to the most prudent course to be pursued. As the ambassador, the admiral, and the English general* had, upon their own responsibility, held back the British troops; and as, in their opinion, the conduct of his Highness's Government had been such as would oblige the Cabinet of St. James to take very serious measures; I was, by those authorities urged not to form any plans, until answers should arrive from England to the communications last forwarded upon that subject. The proceedings of the Government of Lisbon, the moment it was informed of my arrival in the Tagus, most plainly proved its intentions towards me. Guards were placed at all the points of disembarkation; and, during the night, my house; and those of the English ambassador, and of the general; were surrounded: all passers-by were stopped and examined: and some of them, suspected of being my friends, were taken prisoners. At that period, nothing would have been easier for me than to have destroyed the usurping faction; for, in spite of all their

* Clinton, who commanded the British Division.

precautions, every one of the regiments of the Capital which had not, at that time, lost their worthy officers, placed themselves at my disposal; and four-fifths of the inhabitants of Lisbon would, most assuredly, have made common cause. But, Sire, his Royal Highness was the representative of your Royal and Imperial Majesty's august person; the conduct of his government, although to a certain extent doubtful, had not sufficiently clearly shown that its efforts were directed to the usurpation of the throne, to authorize a reaction; it was therefore impossible to act. It was not alone the regiments of the 1st and 2nd lines of the garrison of Lisbon, which placed themselves at my disposal. From the remotest parts of the kingdom; from Bragança, as well as from Elvas, Oporto, etc., officers presented themselves to me, in the names of the different garrisons, offering their services in any way I might think necessary for the conservation of the sovereignty of your Majesty, and of the constitutional Charter; and all of them received from me the assurance; that, when the opportune moment arrived, I would appear in their midst. Admiral Lord Amelius Beauclerk, who repeatedly heard these different officers, expressed his surprise at the spirit of loyalty manifested by the army; and I beg your Majesty's permission to remark, that this is the result of the transfers I ordered in the army; which were the cause of my being so calumniated in Europe; and, perhaps, also in the presence of your Majesty.

"In the meantime, orders arrived from England for the embarkation of the troops; and, as his Highness's Government, in consequence of the notes daily addressed to it by the Corps Diplomatique, proceeded with more circumspection (though without losing sight of its original object); and constantly assured the Sovereigns of Europe that your Majesty's rights would be respected, I was forced to leave the Tagus; where my presence, far from being useful, might be prejudicial; as giving an excuse to the Government for its proceedings against the true friends of your Majesty, who were still at their posts; and might induce them to endeavour to persuade all Europe, that I was there for the purpose of promoting a revolution, whose tendency was to be that which they had erroneously attributed

to the events of last July. This resolution coincided with the advice given me by the English ambassador and the admiral; so, although with a sad heart, resulting from the conviction that I had the power to remove the causes which threatened my country with misfortune; and which, if allowed to continue, would bring about its total ruin; and from seeing myself forced to abandon all, because I was unable to present sufficient reasons to justify my conduct; I returned to this country; trusting to be able to combine some useful means of employing my utmost efforts for the support of your Majesty's rights, the moment the usurpation should become manifest to the world. By the decree dated the 25th ult., it has now declared itself openly; and, therefore, the Marquis de Rezende and Viscount de Itabayana have combined with me to send orders to the Brazilian frigate, now at Genoa, to come to Falmouth: and, upon her arrival, I will set out in her for that point of Portugal, from whence I can, with most facility, give an impulse to the Portuguese spirit of loyalty; and gather around me the faithful subjects of your Majesty, for the purpose of enforcing your august rights in all their plenitude. Should we, before the arrival of the frigate at Falmouth, receive news of any reactionary movements against the usurper's government, we have resolved to charter a vessel to convey me to the spot, whence I can most conveniently join those who will have had the good fortune to precede me in the field, in opposing the iniquitous faction which has turned against your Majesty.

"I flatter myself that I have no need to make protestations of fidelity to your Majesty; and I also trust that your Majesty, doing justice to the purity of my intentions, will do me the honour to rest satisfied that I will do everything in my power to merit more and more your Majesty's appreciation of me. I, of course, cannot at this moment state exactly the means I shall make use of to obtain the desired end; but your Majesty may rest assured, that, being well acquainted with the system which governs the Cabinets of Europe, I will endeavour not to arouse the slightest jealousy; and I shall also endeavour, as far as possible, to confine myself to the plans I may finally decide upon with the Marquis de Rezende and Viscount de Itabayana.

But, Sire, however successful the result may be, I consider the future of Portugal to be most insecure, while your Majesty does not think fit to present yourself, even if only for a short period, to the Portuguese; and consider also, Sire, what dangers threaten the institutions which are inseparably connected with your Majesty's sovereignty in that kingdom, whilst Spain does not possess a similar form of government. Ah, Sire! I implore your Majesty not to neglect taking into consideration all I have had the honour of stating to your Majesty about that country. Circumstances are, from day to day, becoming more propitious for the execution of that vast project: the number of your Majesty's admirers in that country is daily increasing.

"The French, ere long, will have entirely abandoned that country; and the Russians have, probably, already commenced war in the East.

"Your Majesty will be informed by the Marquis de Rezende and Viscount de Itabayana, with more exactitude than I am able to do, of everything political that has passed between the diplomatists; I will therefore make no remark even upon the plan, which had been formed here, of urging your Majesty to realize without delay your abdication, naming as guardians to her Majesty D. Maria II. your august father-in-law and H.B.M. George IV.; and, as I am aware that the worthy and faithful Councillor Abrantes has had the honour to inform your Majesty as to the private events of Portugal, I will not longer trespass upon your Royal and Imperial Majesty's precious moments, trusting that God will preserve your august person, as all the Portuguese desire.

"Your Majesty's most faithful and most obedient servant,

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

On learning what had taken place at Lisbon on the 3rd of May, Palmella, on the 23rd, made known to Lord Dudley, that he could no longer deceive himself as to the nature of the events which were passing in Portugal; and, consequently, could not approve of them without transgressing the oath he had taken to the king, D. Pedro IV. and to the constitutional Charter. Palmella, at the same time, most honourably declared

to the Secretary of State, that his diplomatic functions at the Court of St. James, must, from that day, cease.

On the day following Palmella's resignation, the Marquis de Rezende and the Viscount de Itabayana addressed a protest to the Portuguese nation, in the name of D. Pedro, and of his august daughter, Queen D. Maria, whom they represented; in which they strongly protested against the unjust and shameful usurpation of their sovereign's rights.

A reign of persecution now commenced throughout Portugal; and all those who were suspected of liberal opinions, if they were not so fortunate as to escape from the country, were imprisoned.

The Cortes were assembled in Lisbon on the 23rd of June; and its members, after proclaiming D. Miguel absolute king, and declaring the Charter (which they had so recently sworn to observe) abolished, announced, on the 7th of July, that their mission was accomplished; and they signed, on the 11th, their adhesion to the usurper.

The example of Palmella was quickly followed by the Portuguese diplomatic agents at every other Court, except that of Berlin, where the Count de Oriola was Minister. This diplomatist even thought proper to return the protest of the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries in an envelope addressed to them, without deigning a line of explanation.

The Baron de Villa Secca was amazed at the behaviour of D. Miguel: and well he might be, after the very strong encomiums he had so lately bestowed on that prince. In making known his resignation to Metternich, he declared that the principles of legitimacy which he had always supported, rendered it impossible that he could serve a usurping government. At the same time, the Baron wrote to D. Miguel himself; and, after giving in his resignation, he added that one of the motives for his so doing was the certainty, that, after what had taken place in Portugal, no communication would be accepted from him by the Court of Vienna.

It may, perhaps, ever be doubted, whether, when D. Miguel left Vienna, he was sincere in his engagements to acknowledge the sovereignty of the queen, D. Maria, and to support the

constitutional Charter: but, when, after his arrival at Lisbon, he decided to do neither, he thought fit to endeavour to make known to the Emperor of Austria the reasons which had determined his altered conduct. In a letter to that monarch, dated July 26th (1828), after many asseverations of his love of order and dislike to anarchy, he excused himself by asserting how general throughout the country had been the desire that he should assume the kingly power. Still further to vindicate his behaviour, he forwarded "incontestable proofs" to the emperor, that he, after all, was the lawful heir to the throne of Portugal! This letter, accompanied by one for Prince Metternich, together with open copies of their contents, reached the hands of Villa Secca, after he had sent in his resignation; who, nevertheless, took an immediate opportunity of presenting them to the Chancellor. The prince, at once, declined to receive them, either for himself or on the part of the emperor, declaring that his Imperial Majesty would hold no communication with the Court of Lisbon, after what had so recently taken place in Portugal. In returning these letters to the Viscount de Santarem, on the 22nd of September, the noble conduct of the Baron becomes the more marked, when he feelingly concludes his correspondence with the observation; that, "after more than 30 years' services, which I believe to have been efficient and loyal, I am reduced, for want of other means of subsistence, to live entirely at the cost of my wife."*

After perusing the preceding pages, it is to be hoped that the reader, however conservative may be his opinions, will not connect the cause of legitimacy with that of D. Miguel. The author has dwelt on the subject at some length, in order that it should not for one moment be supposed that the conservative-liberal, chartist, or Saldanha party in Portugal ever sought to enforce its principles at the expense of legitimacy. As a youth, the author recollects how often he has heard contested, amongst English partisans, the respective rights of the two claimants—Maria and Miguel. He is fully satisfied that the supporters

* The Baroness was, by birth, an Austrian lady, at whose house in Vienna some few may still recollect, in her widowhood, the charming reunions of the best society of that Capital.

of the latter, if they were sincere, had their reason entirely influenced by their party wishes. Dining one day at Bedgbury with that honest and good old Tory, Viscount Beresford, years after the queen, D. Maria, was seated on her throne, he was astonished to hear the old marshal curtly observe to the assembled company, "After all, D. Miguel was the right heir." The marshal was an authority with whom the author would not venture to reason, when so many volumes had been written on the subject, advocating the claims of either side. Yet, disclaiming all argument to prove his opinion, he could not but reply; that the rights of the queen had been acknowledged by D. Miguel himself; by the whole of the high clergy of Portugal; by her nobility; her army; her magistracy; the peers of the realm; and the deputies of the people;—in a word, by the whole nation, as well as by almost all European sovereigns! The company present was silent; and the marshal replied only by a look, which seemed to acknowledge, "That *is* something more than I am able to answer."

We have seen by Saldanha's letter to D. Pedro, written in London (May 10th), that, after his return from the Tagus, it was agreed between him and the emperor's agents, the Marquis de Rezende and the Viscount de Itabayana, that the Brazilian frigate, the *Isabel*, then at Genoa, should be ordered to Falmouth, whence he would embark for any spot in Portugal, which he should consider most desirable for raising the standard of the queen, and of gathering around him such troops, and such of her other subjects as were favourable to her cause. He had further declared, that, should any circumstances arise before the arrival of the frigate, which might render so great a delay dangerous, he would immediately charter a sailing-vessel, and hasten to join those who were already in arms.

It had at first been proposed, that Saldanha, with a passport in a feigned name, should himself travel through France to Genoa, and there embark in the frigate for the coast of Portugal. But this plan was changed in consequence, *partly*, of the uncertainty of what might occur in that country, during the time required for so long a journey and the subsequent voyage. We say *partly;* for there were other motives which induced the

marquis and viscount to alter this secret plan, as originally proposed, and by which Saldanha would have gone with such only of his own friends as he should select to accompany him. Intrigues were already rife amongst the liberal party. Saldanha, as the chief, was made to become the first victim. Either he was really suspected of Republican principles, as was pretended; or, what is more likely (as so many after events proved), it was feared that the popularity he might acquire by success would cast all rivals in the shade, and render him, as some expressed themselves, the "virtual King of Portugal." Other counsels prevailed, and the frigate was ordered round to Falmouth.

In the meantime, Oporto, on the 17th of May, had declared for the queen; and, on the 22nd, a Junta, consisting of twelve persons, was established in that city. The news soon reached London that these events had occurred; and that the troops stationed in Traz-os-Montes and Minho had joined the garrison at Oporto, whilst those of Beira were marching towards Coimbra. It was therefore resolved not to wait for the arrival of the Brazilian frigate from Genoa; and Viscount de Itabayana ordered a sailing-vessel, a small schooner, to be immediately chartered at Plymouth to convey, to Oporto, Saldanha and his companions; amongst whom was Lieut.-General Stubbs, who, although of higher military rank than his brother-officer, declared his perfect willingness to serve under his orders. Other demonstrations, in favour of the queen, had been made in various parts of Portugal; and Bernardo de Sá Nogueira* wrote to Palmella from Portugal, informing him that the principal body of the constitutional troops was at Coimbra and its neighbourhood, and expressed his hope that "Villa Flor and João Carlos" would soon join them.

Under these circumstances, so favourable to the cause of the queen, Saldanha called on Palmella; who, on that occasion, begged him to do nothing, except in combination with himself and others; who, he observed, were equally anxious to take advantage of the better state of affairs which now presented itself. On the following day, a meeting was called at the house of the Viscount de Itabayana; at which it was decided that

* Afterwards Viscount and Marquis de Sá.

the two representatives of D. Pedro should acknowledge the authority of the Oporto Junta; and it was subsequently discussed whether it was desirable that Palmella himself should accompany the expedition, or should remain in London, where his services might be of the greatest importance. Unfortunately, the next day, it was determined that Palmella should go with the expedition to Oporto. Intrigues had been at work, during this time, with the Viscount Itabayana; and he had been made to believe that "Saldanha, at the head of the *canalha*, was more to be feared than D. Miguel at the head of the Silveiras."* We say, unfortunately;—for, were there no other reason, this determination of the Marquis was the cause of considerable and unnecessary delay in the setting out of the expedition;—partly on account of such preparations as he had to make previous to his embarkation; and, probably, in a still greater measure, from the delay occasioned by the rejection of the vessel, which had been got ready for Saldanha's use, in order to substitute in its stead a steamer. When they finally embarked, there was a further loss of time caused by an accident to the engines on the third day of their voyage, which obliged them to put into port, and prevented their being able to land at Mattosinhos, near Oporto, until the 26th of June. The Marquis de Palmella himself, in a letter to D. Pedro, ascribes one of the main causes of the failure of this expedition to the delay in reaching Oporto.†

"If," wrote Saldanha, "my departure with General Stubbs had taken place on the day fixed; that is, on the very day on which the Viscount de Itabayana (without attending to what had been concerted with me) listened to the wishes of the Marquis de Palmella and his three supporters, we should have reached Oporto at least a fortnight earlier; and I venture, without being governed by vanity, to declare, that the result would have been entirely different from what it was. Because, instead of allowing the 5000 men who were at Coimbra, under

* The ultra-liberals were described as *canalha*. The Silveiras (family name of the Marquis de Chaves) were considered the most active of the absolutist party.

† Despachos e Correspondencias do Duque de Palmella. Lisboa, 1860. Vol. iv., p. 67.

the orders of Brigadier-General Saraiva, to remain stationary there so many days, we should at once have marched on Lisbon with the despatch necessary for such an operation. The Government of the Infante had no troops between Coimbra and the Capital, except an infantry brigade at Leiria, composed of three corps; two of which, at the time they left Lisbon, had shown signs of adherence to the cause of their rightful sovereign. There was, therefore, nothing to prevent our reaching the gates of the city; where, even if the small garrison was disposed to resist, which was improbable, the inhabitants would have assisted us to enter without a shot being fired."* That Saldanha's opinion was well founded, we may assume from the fact, that when, five years later, a small body of Constitutional troops, under the command of the Duke da Terceira, approached Lisbon on the opposite side of the Tagus; the Duke de Cadaval, with a force many times superior in number, hastily fled from the city, which the queen's troops peaceably entered, being received with the greatest enthusiasm.

The delay thus occasioned enabled the Miguelite party to take energetic measures for the defence of the Capital: and the Constitutional troops, when Saldanha and his companions reached Oporto, had deserted the neighbourhood of Coimbra, and were retiring northwards.

It is here necessary to observe, that it had been agreed by Saldanha and his companions, before they left London, that on their arrival at Oporto, implicit obedience should be given to whatever the members of the Junta should determine.

On their landing at Mattosinhos, about four miles from Oporto, an incident occurred very illustrative of the personal respect and regard in which Saldanha was held in that neighbourhood.

* This extract, and those which will ollow on the same subject, are made from a private letter, dated Paris, September 6th, 1829, and addressed to Colonel de Brack, who was on the point of setting out for Rio de Janeiro. A more detailed account of the events of this period was published afterwards at Paris, to which Saldanha's signature was attached, and for which he had given the necessary information. But the entire narrative was not actually written by him. Discrepancies may, therefore, occasionally be detected in matters, generally unimportant, between the pamphlet published at Paris and Saldanha's own letters to Colonel de Brack.

The Countess de Villa Flor, having nobly accompanied her husband in this expedition, disembarked with the others; but the distance being too great for her to walk, the Count da Taipa hastened to a farmhouse which he saw at a short distance, and inquired if the owner could procure him a bullock-cart to go to Oporto. The man positively refused to lend his oxen at any price;—not only because they were at that moment engaged on his farm, but because he feared, if they reached the city, the authorities would not allow them to return. The count offered to buy them, but the man refused to sell. In vain he told him that there were ladies who were unable to walk—naming the Countess de Villa Flor; and that there were also her husband and the Marquis de Palmella. The man of the soil remained inexorable. But when the name of SALDANHA was mentioned, he exclaimed, "What! João Carlos, is *he* here? Let me see him. I know him very well." On recognising Saldanha, a little way off, talking to Palmella, he at once declared; that not only his oxen, but everything else they required, were at the service of João Carlos; and that he himself would conduct them to the city. Palmella, turning to Saldanha, observed: "I see you left a good name behind you at Oporto after you were Governor there." To which he simply replied: "I acquired the reputation of never doing an injustice."

The following were the principal generals and other officers who arrived in the *Belfast* on the 26th of June. Marquis de Palmella; Count de Sampayo; Count de Villa Flor; Count da Taipa; Count de Calhariz; Baron de Renduffe; Generals Saldanha and Stubbs; D. Filippe de Sousa Holstein; Sr. F. de Paula de Azeredo; Colonels Rodrigo de Pinto Pizarro and Candido José Xavier.

It was under such circumstances that the party arrived at Oporto; and that the Marquis de Palmella, after consulting with Villa Flor and Saldanha, and receiving their approval of his nomination, accepted the appointment of general-in-chief, which was unanimously conferred upon him by the Junta. On the evening of the 28th, these generals and others left Oporto, and advanced towards the Constitutional troops who were known to be approaching. The information they received, ere they

had scarcely proceeded a league, was far from satisfactory. Taipa, with that restlessness for which he was remarkable, had preceded his party at some distance; and had returned with the information that the Division had been attacked by superior numbers; and that the Miguelite cavalry had crossed the Vouga at Angeja, and now occupied the road on which Palmella and his party were marching. On this, Palmella proposed their return to Oporto; but was induced, by the solicitations of Saldanha, to continue their advance for a while. Saldanha gives a graphic account of this reconnoitring party of officers meeting Lieutenant Cesar, of the 4th Cavalry; and, afterwards, a sergeant, of the 10th Infantry, conducting wounded men;—of the sensation which this sight, and the accounts they received, aroused in his companions; and how it came about that, ultimately, he with three other officers, after riding through the night, at last met the retreating Division. Palmella and Villa Flor had, after meeting the wounded and their escort, at once determined to retire; and soon, all the party, says Saldanha, "formed the determined resolution to turn their horses' heads, and return to Oporto." He continues, "Seeing then, that I should never succeed in convincing them, and in making them change their resolution, I told them that I was determined to do my utmost to rejoin the Division; and I entreated those gentlemen, who were disposed to follow my example, to accompany me. Out of more than thirty officers, of every rank, of which our party was composed, only my aide-de-camp, Captain Praça; Colonel Pizarro, who was under the orders of the Marquis de Palmella; and Captain Albino, under the orders of the Junta, offered to accompany me. General Stubbs was at Oporto, commandant of the place."

At break of day, on the 29th, they met the retreating Division near Oliveira de Azemeis; where Saldanha, having already addressed the following letter to Palmella, ordered them to rest.*

"OLIVEIRA DE AZEMEIS, 5 A.M.

"The army will shortly arrive here, and I am seeing whether it is possible to arrange for them something to eat. I hope it

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 32.

will not be necessary that we should retire beyond Grijó. We are without powder, and some should be immediately sent to us. A depot ought to be made of some at Carvalhos. The enemy is very superior to us in numbers—especially in cavalry; and we must strengthen our army, without delay, as much as possible. The state of affairs is exceedingly delicate; but I do not consider the cause lost, if efforts are made at Oporto, such as circumstances require. For God's sake lay hold of every resource, and do it quickly.

"Your true friend,

"SALDANHA."

Villa Flor had now joined Saldanha, who had taken up his own quarters at Santo Ovidio Novo. From that place, Villa Flor writes to Palmella,* (July 1st) showing that Saldanha still admitted no thought of embarking for England, but was resolved and prepared to hold his position against the enemy. "Up to the present moment," he continues,—"it is half past 9 A.M., there is nothing new in the camp. It is reported that, yesterday afternoon at 5 o'clock, a force of 50 horse and 500 foot reached Oliveira de Azemeis; but they have not yet made their appearance in our front. Our camp is well guarded; and I have visited, with João Carlos, all our advanced posts. Good bye for the present, for I hope to see you here.

"M. S. S. M."

Early on the morning of July 2nd, Villa Flor again writes to Palmella, that there was nothing new, except that João Carlos had sent him word, by a priest, that the Miguelites had reached Oliveira de Azemeis with the 1st, 4th and 7th Cavalry; a considerable force of Artillery; and the 7th, 8th, 16th and 20th Infantry; as well as the 8th Caçadores.

Saldanha had, on the 30th, reviewed the Division at Grijó, and found that the whole force, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, consisted but of 3,200 men. Judging that it would be difficult to hold that position against such superior numbers, he determined to lead the Division to Villa Nova, a short distance from Oporto, but still on the southern side of the Douro.

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 32.

The news thus conveyed, both by Villa Flor and Saldanha, was not likely to reassure Palmella; although the resolution of Saldanha remained unshaken. It must be, indeed, admitted that Palmella, and those officers who shared his views, did not stand alone in their apprehensions of the results which might follow upon this expedition. In the eyes of the Junta, the state of affairs did not assume a promising aspect. As early too as the 30th of June, Captain G. W. Mildmay, commanding, in the Douro, H. B. M. brig *Cordelia*, had written to Palmella,* saying; that he felt very much the sad circumstances, which might render probable the request for an asylum, for the marquis and his companions, on board his Majesty's ships; and that he would detain the brigs until the morrow or following day; beyond which time he could not venture to do so.

At a conference which took place after this at Villa Nova, Palmella evinced the same earnestness to withdraw the expedition, while Saldanha was equally earnest to remain. Writing of their conferences at Villa Nova, Saldanha says:

"The Marquis de Palmella, who on the previous evening had come to see us for a few minutes at Grijó, returned a second time with the Count de Villa Flor; and, after having done me the honour to approve of all the dispositions I had taken, he invited me to his head-quarters, where I met Stubbs, Villa Flor, and the Colonels Pizarro and Candido José Xavier. The marquis, after having made a melancholy exposition of the situation of affairs, declared to us that he was himself decided to embark, that very evening, to return to England; and that he proposed to us to follow him. Colonel Pizarro and myself opposed this measure; and, with such vehemence, that we decided him to suspend his embarkation; and I obtained his permission to make, the next day, a reconnaissance.† I expected to find the enemy (who, during the whole of the two marches which I had directed, had not molested us) in the position of Grijó; and I felt the necessity of myself seeing his force, which they told us was so formidable. I went as far as Grijó; and, in the three leagues and a half, I saw only some patrols of cavalry.

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 35.

† This was executed with a force of 800 men.

The columns of the enemy had not passed Oliveira de Azemeis. On returning to camp, I was summoned to head-quarters, where, already were assembled, Generals Stubbs and Villa Flor, and Colonel C. J. Xavier. The marquis repeated to us what he had said the previous evening relative to his embarkation. He added, that all was lost; and that, as the disaster was without remedy, all those who had accompanied him to Oporto must follow him to England. At the moment when I had just declared, that I was not decided to accompany him, arrived the Judge Caldeira; who invited us, in the name of the Junta, to pass to the palace of the Government, where they were assembled; which we did immediately. All the members were assembled at that *'funeste séance.'*"

Let us accompany Saldanha.

On their arrival at the Council of the Junta (2 P.M.), Sr. Sarmento, in a long discourse, dwelt on the hopelessness of their cause; entering, at great length, on the various reasons which had determined his opinions:—That, independent of the enemy's forces, immediately in the neighbourhood of Oporto, General Povoas was advancing with 11,000 men: and other generals with some 9,000 more:—That, even if the forces of the Junta should repel the first attack of the enemy, the Miguelites must, eventually, enter the city, which would be exposed to all the horrors of a sack. He therefore proposed the dissolution of the Junta; and the retirement of the army into Spain; and concluded by asking the opinions of the various generals and persons present.

Saldanha rose, and said:—That it was now only five days since they had landed: that he had little more information than what the Government had afforded him: but that, even supposing such information to be perfectly correct, he thought there were other resources than a retreat into Spain: that he had that very day obtained information, which he had presented to the Junta, as to the provisions which existed in the magazines of the city; and he was assured that there were sufficient in Oporto to support the troops and population during more than seven months: that, with the loyal troops which were in the neighbourhood, he would undertake to make of Oporto a second

Saragoza, until they could obtain assistance, or receive the further orders of D. Pedro.* In reply, the members of the Junta declared that they could not take upon themselves the responsibility of exposing the second city of the kingdom to such disasters.† The Marquis de Palmella expressed his decided intention of re-embarking in the steamer that very night; and announced, that those of the Junta who wished to accompany him would find accommodation on board. Sr. J. A. de Magalhães then proposed, that the dissolution of the Junta should be at once made known to the people. Upon this, another member, Sr. Sarmento, declared that such a step would inevitably lead to their assassination by the enraged people, on their finding themselves thus deserted; and this decided those gentlemen not to make public their resolution, but to exact a pledge of inviolable secrecy upon all that had passed. Sr. Caldeira observed, that the army, seeing itself abandoned by the generals who had come from England, might disperse and never reach Spain. Then, coming up to Saldanha, he embraced him, and, with tears in his eyes, entreated him to make one more sacrifice by accompanying the troops out of the country. This, Saldanha, generously, and without hesitation, undertook to do; and Colonel Gama Lobo and Sr. Magalhães consented to assist the general in carrying out this unthankful duty. The other members of the Junta, if we except Sr. Caldeira, determined on withdrawing themselves by sea.

Saldanha then left the room, for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements for his departure; and it was not until

* As the abdication in favour of his daughter, and the appointment of D. Miguel as regent, were conditional, the authority of D. Pedro, when those conditions were broken, was acknowledged by the liberals until a new regency was appointed.

† The Junta wrote their account of this transaction to D. Pedro shortly after they reached England, but their letter was not published until the following year. Hereupon, the brave Pimentel, afterwards Baron de Mesquita, wrote at once to Saldanha, from Paris, on the 9th of November, 1829: "Having read," etc., "I have the honour to offer to your Excellency my testimony, and I can bring others if your Excellency wishes it, to prove, that in that Conference (the last of the Junta), your Excellency offered to defend the city to the last extremity; and that that proposal was rejected by the members of the said Junta. This was not only confirmed to me in the office of the said Junta, in which I was employed, but was immediately known throughout the city."

some time afterwards that he proceeded to the house of the Baron de Renduffe, where he was to meet Palmella and others at an early dinner. They had not yet made their appearance; but, on their arrival, he learned that they had remained in continued conference with the Junta.

As soon as dinner was over, Saldanha, after having been reminded by Palmella of his engagement to secrecy, left the house, and went at once to the Division encamped outside the city. Having called together the brigadiers Saraiva and Pizarro, with other commandants of corps, he explained the circumstances which had led to his consent to accompany the troops into Spain. They, one and all, refused to obey the orders of the Junta; Lieutenant-colonel Schwalbach declaring, that he would dissolve the corps, which he commanded, into guerilla parties;—carry on war, in this manner, against the usurper;—and die in Portugal, rather than lay down his arms in Spain. This feeling was unanimous. Saldanha, not being able to change their determination, requested them to give him their refusal in writing; which they, without hesitation, did; and he returned to the city. Arriving there, he sought the marquis and the members of the Junta, and learned, to his surprise, that they had retired on board the *Belfast*. Thither he at once proceeded, in order to make known to them the ill-success of his mission; and found them all on board, with the exception of the two members of the Junta, who had volunteered to accompany the Division into Spain. He then placed in the hands of Palmella the written declaration of the officers' refusal to go to Spain; and related to him all that had passed. Palmella seems to have had some fear, lest Saldanha, yielding to the impulses of a devoted and unselfish nature, might even yet return on shore, and rejoin the now deserted troops: for he at once reminded him, that "he could not now rejoin them, without breaking his own promise; seeing that the officers refused to obey the orders of the Junta." Then, finding that Colonel Lobo and Sr. Magalhães were not on board, Saldanha wrote to inform them of what had occurred, and awaited their answer. But exhausted nature must find repose: and, after having passed five days and nights of almost unbroken sleeplessness; worn with anxiety, fatigue and disappoint-

ment; seeing his plans thwarted, his counsels rejected, his hopes chilled, Saldanha gave himself up to a sense of loneliness, if not of despair, which found its natural relief in tears. After the first outburst of grief had subsided, he threw himself down in his berth and slept. His own account is given in the following words:

"Dans une affreuse agitation, et même (je n'ai pas honte de l'avouer) en pleurant à chaudes larmes comme un enfant, je me suis jetté dans une cabine, où aussitôt que mon agitation diminua, je me suis endormi, parcequ'il y avait déjà cinq nuits que je ne dormais pas."

We may, in some measure, judge of his surprise, but we cannot realize the conflict of his emotions, when, at daybreak on the following morning, going on deck, he found that the steamer had dropped down the river during the night, and was already on her return to England. Nor could all the assurances of Palmella, that he had acted in his interest as a friend, console Saldanha; much less reconcile him to the unwarrantable liberty which had been thus taken with him. Still less was he satisfied when he learned, that General Saraiva, with two other officers, had come on board during the night, and had acquainted Palmella that the commandants of the Division, had, after further consideration, expressed their readiness to conform to the orders of the Junta.

At the risk of wearying the reader, Saldanha's account of what then passed must be given in his own terms.

"What was my astonishment next day, after leaving port, to see General Saraiva, Colonel Torres, and Major Xavier on board the steamer. After expressing my astonishment, and having asked them by what casualty they were there together, they answered me, that the commandants of corps had changed their minds after my departure from the camp;—and had reduced into writing and signed another declaration, giving assurances that they were ready to execute the orders which it should be deemed advisable to give them;—and that the said commandant had charged them to present this declaration to the Marquis de Palmella, who, notwithstanding he had received it, had given them no answer, which had obliged them to re-

main on board. I went immediately to inquire of the marquis, if what the officers had just told me was true; asking him, at the same time, the reason which had prevented him from informing me of their coming. The marquis, with an appearance of candour, acknowledged that he had received this communication; but that, wishing to act towards me as a friend, he had taken the resolve not to awake me; because he was certain that, from this affair, I could acquire nothing but hard work and fruitless dangers. It is more easy to conceive than to describe the despair, which this pretended friendship caused in me."

The *Belfast*, having left Oporto on the 3rd of July at sunrise, had the ill-luck to meet with an accident which obliged it to put in at Corunna for repairs, and was delayed there for some days before it could proceed to England.

Palmella, shortly after his return to London, addressed a letter to D. Pedro, dated August 4th, wherein he gives an account of the late expedition and of its failure. He remarks that his Majesty would also receive other accounts besides his own; and he anticipates that these accounts would, at times, be in contradiction to each other, "from the endeavour of each to throw off from himself and let fall on others, the responsibility, or, perhaps, the fault, of the unfortunate termination of so noble and generous an undertaking." Palmella then again regrets the delay which took place between the rising at Oporto on the 17th of May, and the arrival of the expedition at that city only on the 26th of June; thus, as he admits, giving the enemy time to take active and energetic measures; and incurring, he adds, "the misfortune which prevented the immediate appearance of general officers of sufficient influence and capacity to form and strengthen a plan of operations, by which the first moments, so precious in such undertakings, might have been turned to advantage." *

What might not have been the result, if Saldanha had been enabled to leave England when he had wished; and if the movement itself at Oporto, on the 17th, had not been prematurely

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 63. At p. 73 we find the members of the Junta also lamenting that "unfortunate circumstances had considerably delayed the day of sailing."

made? For, his friends in Portugal had combined with him that no declarations in favour of the Charter should take place, until the moment of his arrival should be made known to them.

Palmella, in his letter above quoted, further reminds D. Pedro; that his Majesty's brother, having originally been nominated by himself, and selected as king consort, had both power and *prestige* in his favour amongst the people, as well as the warm and powerful co-operation of the greater part of the authorities, and of the clergy, whose influence, both by example and preaching, was immense.

He then adds, "all now agree, that if the troops at Coimbra had, in the early days of June, marched on Lisbon, success would have been certain." Instead of that, after a month of inactivity, the troops of D. Miguel on the 24th of June attacked them on the Mondego, and compelled them, under the command of General Saraiva, to retire, after successive halts and successive attacks, to the banks of the Douro.

"In these circumstances," continues Palmella, "we saw, on our arrival, three bodies of troops, under the commands of the Viscounts do Peso da Regua and S. João de Pesqueira; and of D. Alvaro da Costa, rapidly approaching Oporto; together with a large force, coming from Lisbon, led by General Povoas. The mouth of the Douro was blockaded by two frigates of the enemy, and two smaller war vessels. We saw the city in a defenceless state; and that it would be sacrificed should the enemy, on arriving, find it still occupied by troops. Consequently, on the 2nd of July, it was unanimously voted, both by the Junta and by the generals, 'that the command of all the troops should be confided to one general alone, in order to direct the operations about to be undertaken;' which were, the evacuation of the city, and the leading the troops over the Spanish frontier."

It is remarkable that the *name* of this "one general" was not mentioned; nor does the name of Saldanha appear in the whole despatch. And yet, would it not have been an act of justice to declare to D. Pedro, that there was one man amongst them; and that man, the general to whom they ended by desiring to confide

all power and responsibility; who had written to Palmella, from Grijó; "I repeat that I do not yet give up our cause as lost?" * And again; "the state of affairs is extremely delicate, but I do not consider the cause lost, if there (at Oporto), especially, the efforts are made which circumstances require. For God's sake, take advantage of every resource in our power."

After the *Belfast*, with its mingled freight of military and civilian officers, reached England, the expedition to Oporto, its origin, conduct and failure, naturally became the theme of general conversation and of public comment. Saldanha soon learned, that a desire had been manifested to attribute the unfortunate result of the efforts of the Constitutional forces to himself;—to him, the only man who had never despaired of those forces; who alone had led them into, at least, safe quarters; and whose only grief it was that he was not allowed to realize his own confident ambition of leading those troops to conquest. He at once called on Palmella, and asked for that written declaration which he had handed to the marquis, whereby the officers had refused to obey the orders of the Junta. Palmella, after feeling for some minutes in his portfolio, declared that he had lost it. But the officers who signed the Declaration being in England, Saldanha, ultimately, obtained from one of them the very words of that document, with the names of the officers who signed it. He also wrote to Palmella the letter, and received the answer which next follow:

"LONDON, 31*st of July*, 1828.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SEN^R,

"Some rumours rather disparaging to me having been set afloat, I find myself under the necessity of begging that you will be pleased to tell me, upon your word of honour:—1st, if, at the last meeting of the members of the Government of Oporto and the general officers, it was decided that battle should be given; and that, if the result was disastrous, we should retire into Spain; or, if the decision was, that that very night the troops should march to Gallicia; 2nd, if, down to the

* Correspondencias, p. 31.

moment of that meeting, I was the commandant of the army; or, if it was in consequence of the considerations there and then presented, that I agreed to take the command solely for the purpose of effecting the retreat which had been decided upon.

"Your friend, &c.,

"JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA."

"LONDON, *2nd of August*, 1828.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SEN^R,

"In compliance with the desire expressed in your letter of July 31st, I reply to the two questions it contains:—1st, At the last meeting of the members of the Government of Oporto, held on the 2nd of July, it was unanimously decided that the troops occupying Santo Ovidio Novo, to the south of the Douro, should, on the following night, withdraw to the opposite bank of the river; and this measure was decided upon in concordance with the generals then present; that is to say, General Stubbs, Count de Villa Flor, you, and myself.

"This initiatory movement was to be followed by the immediate evacuation of the city of Oporto, and the continuation of the retreat to the frontiers of Spain; that, at least, the officers and troops which remained faithful, might be saved.

"The Junta, therefore, knowing that, for these military operations to be effected, it would be more convenient to give the command to one general only; and that you enjoyed the good opinion of all, named you to the chief command; and, moreover, determined to dissolve itself and delegate its powers to you, and to two members of the Government who offered to join you in that dangerous and honourable service.

"The document of which I enclose a copy proves the exactitude of the above narration; and shows that the Junta did really dissolve itself on the morning of the 2nd of July.

"2ndly. Until the said 2nd of July, you did not have the command-in-chief of the Army of Operations; that command having been given to me by a 'Portaria' dated June the 26th; and was by me accepted, as you are aware, in acquiescence with your and the Count de Villa Flor's request, solely with

the intention of not wounding the sensibility of two generals, whose services were so meritorious, and to secure the co-operation of both.

"I hope these explanations will contain all that you think necessary, and

"I have the honour to be,

"Your friend and obedient servant,

"MARQUEZ DE PALMELLA."

DECREE.

"'The Provisional Junta charged with supporting the legitimate authority of the king, D. Pedro IV., taking into consideration the imperative circumstances which may oblige the army, which faithfully defends the rights of their august sovereign, to withdraw from the city of Oporto, and make successive and hasty marches in different directions, according as circumstances may require; and it not being possible that the Junta, composed, as it is, of many members, can accompany the army in such vicissitudes; neither is it convenient for the good of so sacred a cause, that a legally constituted authority should cease to represent the person of his Majesty, the king D. Pedro IV.; nor be incapacitated from, at any moment, taking the measures which may be necessary: thinks fit to deposit the full authority, that it has up to the present time exercised, in the hands of a permanent committee, composed of a President, General João Carlos de Saldanha de Oliveira e Daun, who will command the army; and two members, Francisco da Gama Lobo Botelho and Joaquim Antonio de Magalhães; who will make use of the said powers, the Junta being dissolved. This Portaria is addressed to all authorities that they may understand it and act accordingly.

"'(Signed) ANTONIO HYPOLITO DA COSTA, *President.*
DUARTE GUILHERME FERRERI, *Vice-President.*
D. FILIPPE DE SOUSA HOLSTEIN.
CONDE DE SAMPAYO.
CANDIDO JOSÉ XAVIER.
FRANCISCO DA GAMA LOBO BOTELHO.
ALEXANDRE THOMAS DE MORAES SARMENTO.

"'OPORTO, *July 2nd*, 1828.'"

On reading this reply from Palmella, Saldanha might well look aghast. It, indeed, exonerates him from the responsibility of the command up to July 2nd; at the same time (although, perhaps, it is hardly worth notice) the writer, in accepting those responsibilities, indirectly, perhaps unintentionally, appropriates to himself the credit of the operations which Saldanha alone conceived,—including the night reconnaissance to Oliveira de Azemeis, and the recovery of the stray Division, with all those careful provisions for their security and comfort already mentioned. But the Portaria is in its terms more general. It assumes to pass to the officers therein named all the powers of the Junta. On and from the 2nd of July, it bestows on Saldanha a command, and confers powers which he never received, much less accepted. It will be observed, that Palmella writes of "the document, of which I enclose a copy," as of an instrument, which he deemed it necessary to bring to Saldanha's notice, as evidence to support his previous statement. He does not write as of a document with which Saldanha was already well acquainted; much less as of a commission of which he, Saldanha, was presumed already to possess the original, handed to him before they left the shores of Portugal. The truth is, that until the receipt of Palmella's letter in London, Saldanha had never seen nor heard of the Portaria of the Junta of Oporto, of the 2nd of July. Palmella held the original, from which he forwarded the copy now for the first time.* It is presumable that General Saraiva, under whose immediate command the Constitutional Division had recently been,† was ignorant, and that Colonel Torres and Major Xavier were alike ignorant, of this "Portaria." Their presence on board the *Belfast* has been already accounted for. They came bringing with them the new Declaration to place themselves under orders. Whose orders? If under those of Saldanha, their course, like their duty, would have been at once to seek Saldanha

* As Saldanha never knew of such a document until it was forwarded to him by Palmella in London, we may presume that it was written and signed by the Junta after he had left them, and had gone with verbal instructions to the commandants of the Division. On his return, as we have seen, the Junta were on board.

† General Pizarro succeeded him on the Division arriving near Oporto.

himself in his cabin. But the fact is, that the second Declaration, which the officers of the Constitutional forces had signed, did not speak of "Saldanha" alone, but of "Palmella, Villa Flor, and Saldanha;" and, by that Declaration, the commandants "protested that they had decided to obey the orders of those Generals." Of them, Palmella was senior, and in acknowledged command. Saldanha was junior, even to Villa Flor. This second Declaration, like the Portaria of the Junta, was, in due course, handed to Palmella, who concealed them both from Saldanha.

It may be thought that we have dwelt too long upon the particulars of Saldanha's return to England after this unfortunate expedition; and the reader might well be referred to the whole course of his after-life, wherefrom to estimate the probabilities, if indeed there were any real conflict of testimony, respecting his conduct on this occasion. But there is, in truth, when once the whole written evidence is placed before the reader, no such conflict. If the question be asked generally, was Saldanha the man to turn his back upon danger, or to desert his soldiers, let the whole Portuguese nation, and the evidence of his own after career, return the answer. But more! The very stones around Oporto, could they speak, might rise up to answer that question. For it was in defence of this very city, and around its outworks, that Saldanha was destined, ere long, to conduct his operations with such talent, vigour, and ingenuity, as have been seldom equalled, and never surpassed in military history; lending to the disciplined system of modern warfare the individual heroism of the ancients; and rescuing the besieged city from a powerful enemy, under conditions which, until he took the command, were by all regarded as not less hopeless, than those from which the Junta, in 1828, fled in despair.

CHAPTER VIII.

1828—1832.

Saldanha at Terceira—Is fired on—Protest—Letter to D. Pedro—Arrival at Paris—Political emigrants—Lafayette's generous offer—July Revolution—Lafayette—Reign of terror in Portugal—Strange conduct of D. Pedro—Saldanha's protest—D. Pedro's abdication—He resides at Paris—Liberal behaviour of French Government—Saldanha escapes being shot with Torrijos—D. Pedro sends for him—Threat of Ferdinand VII.—Indignation of Saldanha's friends—Funeral of Lamarque—D. Pedro lands in Portugal—Duel—Saldanha's generosity—Newspaper attacks.

On the failure of the expedition to Oporto, there appeared but little prospect of success for the cause of the queen, D. Maria. Her father, disregarding the urgent requests both of Saldanha and Palmella, hesitated to absent himself from Brazil. Palmella, describing the situation of affairs to D. Pedro, in a letter dated August 9th, 1828,* laments the selection, by the Wellington Government, of Lord Strangford as ambassador to Rio. He considered such an appointment as alike unfavourable to the queen, and to the establishment of constitutional government in Portugal. With respect to the influence of Austria, he asserts that the Austrian minister at Rio, as well as Prince Metternich, never cease directly or indirectly to work for the destruction of the constitutional Charter. It was possible, he adds, that Austria might not be unwilling to see the queen, D. Maria, on the throne; but that, she would be sacrificed by that Government, rather than the liberal party should succeed in their object. Palmella reminds D. Pedro that Spain is a declared and open enemy;—has never even acknowledged the rights of his Majesty to the Crown of Portugal;—fears a constitutional Government in her neighbourhood;— and "*more than anything*, the possibility of your Majesty visiting Europe." "France, for special reasons," says Palmella, "may not be

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 90.

unfavourable to the cause of the queen. Russia may give it a certain amount of moral support, if only for the purpose of vexing the Wellington ministry, with which she is at this moment not on good terms. Prussia must be adverse to the queen's cause, because she does not wish to see the influence of constitutional government strengthened in Europe." After these observations, Palmella complained bitterly of the infamous conduct of the Spanish Government towards the Portuguese troops, (which had lately taken refuge in Spain) in giving notice to the general in command, that if in a month from the 16th of July they had not quitted Spanish territory, they would be compelled by force to do so:—the object of this ungenerous and inhospitable proceeding being to oblige the troops to surrender at discretion to the Government of D. Miguel. Palmella solicited both the English and French Governments to urge on that of Spain, the necessity for some further delay, whilst he endeavoured to freight some vessels for the transport of those unfortunates to a more hospitable country. Prince Polignac, in reply, humanely offered to request his Government to send French vessels for that purpose to the Spanish coast.

The islands of Madeira and Terceira had, in July, declared their allegiance to the queen; but, in the following month, the news reached London that Madeira had been taken by the Miguelites after a slight resistance; "which loss," writes Palmella, "has caused considerable surprise and indignation." Colonel Valdez escaped and took refuge on board an English ship of war.* The island of Terceira still remained faithful to the queen.

The young queen, D. Maria II., accompanied by the Marquis de Barbacena, was now sent by her father to Europe. She arrived at Falmouth from Brazil, on the 24th of September, 1828, where she was received with all the honours due to a Sovereign. Immediately on landing, she gave notice of her arrival to George IV., who, in his reply to her letter, did not hesitate to address her as Queen of Portugal.

The Portuguese emigrants, after having been driven from

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 175.

Spain, had, for the most part, established themselves at Plymouth. The Wellington Government, at no period favourable to the liberal cause, after a time expressed great objection to having so large a number of foreigners settled in that town. A proposal was, consequently, made to Palmella, that they should be dispersed amongst various towns and villages in the neighbourhood. In reply, Palmella declared that measures would be quickly taken to transport them to Terceira; that being the only spot in the queen's dominions which, at that time, acknowledged her sovereignty. Accordingly, it was arranged that a portion of them should be conducted to that island under the direction of General Saldanha, who, on arriving there, was to assume the command of the force already assembled, and of whatever should, thereafter, be able to join it.

As early as the 15th of October, the Marquis de Barbacena, prompted probably by Palmella, had addressed a Note to the Duke of Wellington, in which he solicited the Government to allow a British ship of war to escort H.M.F. Majesty's subjects to her dominions in the island of Terceira. The astute Palmella would have seen, in this request, a secure means of ascertaining the future intentions of the British Government, of which he might already have had his suspicions. If so, we shall shortly see verified the truth of those suspicions. Barbacena's letter is before us; but, unfortunately, we are not able to give Wellington's reply, if indeed any was vouchsafed beyond a simple acknowledgment.

Amidst the events and adventures which we have attempted to describe, the amiable Countess de Saldanha and her children have been lost sight of. She had succeeded in escaping from Lisbon with her two boys, Augustus and John Charles, and rejoined her husband in London. The youngest child, Louis, whom, in 1827, we left but a few weeks old, died shortly afterwards. From the day of her arrival in England, a warm friendship sprang up between the author's family and that of the countess. Of the latter, one only member, the present Duke de Saldanha, remains to recollect the kindly feelings which existed. To the day when, in 1849, the author lost his mother, neither the general, nor the countess, nor the boys,

ever addressed that beloved parent, either personally or by letter, but as "My dear mamma." He begs forgiveness for thus drawing the reader's attention to these details of early friendship with this excellent and esteemed family, so gratefully sensible to the slight services rendered to them during a painful emigration.

On the 6th of January, 1829, Saldanha left Plymouth for the purpose of accompanying the refugees to Terceira. The few following lines to his beloved wife were written at the very moment of his embarkation.

"*6th of January.*

"MY DEAREST ANGEL,

"We are going to sail with the help of God. A thousand kisses to my dear little boys. Oh, my friend, how I regret you. God bless you!

"Yours truly, and fond husband,

"SALDANHA."

On the 16th, the general arrived off Port Praia, in the island of Terceira, with four vessels containing the first portion of the emigrants who so anxiously desired to land in territory obedient to their queen, and to assist in its future defence.

To their surprise and dismay, they found that Captain Walpole, commanding H.B.M. ship *Ranger* on that station, refused to permit them to land on the island, or on any of the Western Islands or Azores; and threatened, in case of their persisting in the attempt, that he would use force to prevent their landing.

The following protest was drawn up by the Portuguese officers. But, after a fruitless correspondence with Captain Walpole, they had no alternative but to withdraw the expedition from the shores of Terceira.

PROTEST.

"On the 16th day of the month of January, 1829, on board the English brig *Susannah*, under the batteries of the town of Praia, in the island of Terceira. The said brig entered into the road of the said town in the company of the *Minerva*

sloop and *Lyra* brig of the same nation, and also of the *Dolphin* Russian sloop, all unarmed transports, which had sailed from Plymouth on the 6th of the said month, having on board the Conde de Saldanha, General Pizarro, different officers, soldiers, mariners, and Portuguese citizens. These, without arms, ammunition, or any hostile demonstration, were about to land on the island of Terceira, still faithful and obedient, like them, to their lawful sovereign the queen D. Maria II. of Portugal, when the said brig and the *Lyra*, being a-head of the sloops, were suddenly attacked by two English frigates, which a short time before had hoisted their colours to the leeward of the said port and transports. One of these frigates, the *Ranger*, under the command of Captain W. Walpole, as soon as she came within gun-shot, opened her fire on the *Lyra* and *Susannah*,—while the said brigs were already within and under the batteries of the town of Praia—a fire which instantly produced two leaks in the *Susannah;* shattered her long-boat; killed a soldier, who was assisting to get the boat out; and seriously wounded one of the citizens. In consequence of this alarming aggression, committed on the shores of the dominions of her Most Faithful Majesty D. Maria II., the *Susannah* and the other transports desisted from coming to anchor; and Captain Walpole sent an officer on board the *Susannah* with a letter, in which he demanded from the Portuguese for what object they had come to this island and the Azores. The Conde de Saldanha, whose duty as commander it was to answer this letter, declared that he had orders from his legitimate sovereign the queen D. Maria II., to conduct to the island of Terceira, (governed in her august name, and occupied by her troops,) a part of the Portuguese who had voluntarily gone to England,—orders with which he would comply at all risks. To this declaration, Captain Walpole replied, that he had likewise positive orders from his Government not to consent to their disembarking on any of the islands of the Azores; and that he would employ against us the forces under his command, if we should endeavour to land on any of them—insisting that we should depart. The Conde de Saldanha replied that, notwithstanding these determinations, he was, as he ought to be, resolved to comply with the orders

which he had received; and that he would only desist from landing at the port, (into which he had entered without encountering any impediment on the high sea,) when Captain Walpole should declare him a prisoner of war, or should take possession of the neutral and unarmed transports of which he had the charge; and he appealed to the right of nations, existing treaties, and the relations of peace and amity subsisting between her Most Faithful Majesty and his Britannic Majesty. The English officer, who was the bearer of a second intimation from the commodore, thought proper not to wait for a reply in writing; but communicating to his commander some reflections on the conduct of the Conde de Saldanha, he (the commodore) ordered Captain Bradford on board the *Susannah*, with a third intimation; which was, in substance, that if the *Susannah*, and the other vessels accompanying her, did not leave the port of Praia before three o'clock in the afternoon, he would employ force in securing obedience to his orders. The Conde de Saldanha maintained, in another note, his first declaration; and added that, hearing the verbal intimations of Captain Bradford, and the hostile expressions of the despatches sent by the commodore, he could only consider the Portuguese in the transports as prisoners of war; and that he would follow the British force wherever it might conduct him—declaring, at the same time, that the provisions and water of the transports did not permit a long voyage. In the meantime, the Conde de Saldanha wrote to Commodore Walpole, defending the rights of his Sovereign, whose royal orders he was executing, and expressed his regret that the commodore had not thought proper to reply to him in writing, under circumstances so arduous, so new, so extraordinary, and so unprecedented in the history of civilised nations. Meanwhile, the *Ranger* approached the *Susannah*, and the commodore intimated, not only to the Conde de Saldanha, but to the captain of the *Susannah*, that they must immediately comply. Notwithstanding this, and the lamentable and sanguinary aggression which the *Susannah* had suffered a few hours before, while about to cast anchor, the Conde de Saldanha ordered Captain Praça to go on board the *Ranger* with another despatch, stating various reasons for his conduct, and

adding, that the precipitancy of the threatening intimations deprived him of the possibility of presenting to the commodore the protest, which he was drawing up, against the unheard-of aggression, which the Portuguese had suffered in their own ports and waters. To this message, Commodore Walpole replied in writing, that it was only to save time that he had refrained from writing before; that to the intimations which he had given, and the reflections on the Conde de Saldanha, he had only to add, that the Conde de Saldanha might sail to France or to England, or to any other place he chose, provided he immediately left the islands of the Azores. In this, as well as in his other messages, the commodore omitted to state whether or not he considered the Conde de Saldanha a prisoner of war. This omission obliged the Conde de Saldanha to ask for further explanations; but at the moment in which he was writing, the shot of the *Ranger*, a frigate of his Britannic Majesty, passed again between the masts of the *Susannah*, in the waters of a port of which her Most Faithful Majesty D. Maria II.—perhaps the oldest ally of the King of Great Britain—is queen. The Conde de Saldanha then ordered the boat to be lowered; descended into it; and put off for the *Ranger*, which lay-to to receive him. He delivered the despatch which he had just written; but only obtained (beside the civil attentions of Commodore Walpole, who appeared to regret the painful service he was obliged to execute, and the blood which he had shed on board the *Susannah*) a reply in writing, renewing the intimations and threats previously given, and reiterating his firm resolution to employ the force under his command to drive us from the port of Praia. With this reply, the Conde de Saldanha returned on board the *Susannah*, and saw that the frigates had already taken up a position, which enabled them to sink the transports on the first fire. The Conde de Saldanha then, (observing that longer delay in the port of Praia could only have the effect of sacrificing the lives of the unarmed Portuguese whom the queen had confided to him, and to expose to greater insults the nation to which he belonged), declared himself a prisoner of war in the midst of the frigates of his Britannic Majesty; and ordered the transports to proceed in whatever direction the frigates should

point out. Escorted by the frigates, the transports stood to the north-east. We thus sailed till two o'clock in the morning, having left Praia at four in the afternoon, and, at that hour, the *Susannah*, in consequence of a storm, having separated from the other transport, was brought-to by a shot from the frigate, which exposed her to some danger. A short time after, the frigates fired on the *Minerva* for the same reason. It was thus necessary for us to observe, with all care, the manœuvres of the frigates, to avoid a fire from their guns. The undersigned cannot conclude this protest without again repeating; that our transports were not on the high seas when they were attacked; but that two of them were under the walls of the port of Praia, and other two in the waters of the same port; that the English frigates did not prevent us from approaching, but drove us from a Portuguese port, and a Portuguese coast, protected by the forts of the same port and coast, where there are fortifications as strong as Gibraltar; and, though badly garrisoned and badly provided with guns, are still Portuguese forts; that we were veering out our cables; that our anchors were ready, and about to be cast; when the fire of the *Ranger* killed a soldier while preparing to launch the boat; that we were finally driven from the Portuguese soil, and conducted by the arms, and in the name of an allied Power, through the high seas, as prisoners of war.

"Our brothers were on shore stretching out their hands to receive us; and the trumpets of the detachment which occupied the town of Praia were welcoming our arrival. We had so nearly approached Praia, that the Portuguese on board the *Susannah* requested the Conde de Saldanha and General Pizarro to land in the boat (our launch having been shattered by the fire of the *Ranger*), not believing that they could be English ships of war which, under such circumstances, committed an act of hostility. They, however, refused. Considering these facts, and other circumstances as painful and aggravating, which the shortness of time does not permit us to detail; it appears evident that the right of nations has been deliberately trampled under foot, in manifest prejudice of the acknowledged and inviolable sovereignty of her Most Faithful

Majesty D. Maria II.: and that those of her faithful subjects who, confiding in the public law of Europe; in the treaties existing between the legitimate sovereigns of Portugal and Great Britain; and even in the common law of the English nation, to which they came to deposit the remains of their fortune, not simply to a neutral, but to a friendly kingdom—have had their rights trampled under foot. And this, in contempt of moral and public faith, in virtue of which we were permitted to sail at our own risk, and at our own cost, (in neutral and unarmed transports, without arms, and without munitions of war,) for any port of the Portuguese monarchy which obeyed our legitimate queen, D. Maria II., and was governed in her name—circumstances which were completely realised in Terceira, the capital of the Azores.

"The undersigned,—taking Heaven to witness in the waters of the Atlantic, and under the guns of British frigates, which have made them prisoners,—protest, with all possible solemnity, against the hostile proceeding adopted against them at the port of Praia, in the island of Terceira, by Commodore Walpole, commanding the frigates of his Britannic Majesty, the *Ranger* and the *Nimrod;* and they repeat and declare that the said force, and the said commodore, made them prisoners in the port of Praia; and conducted and escorted them, firing upon the transports at the least change of course.

"In confirmation of this act of protest, made at ten o'clock on this 16th day of January, 1829, which I, Joaquim Nogueira Gaudra, Secretary to the Governor of Oporto, have written.

"(Signed) CONDE DE SALDANHA.
PIZARRO, *Brigadier-General.*
BARON DE SABROZO.
RODRIGO PINTO PIZARRO, *Colonel;*

and twenty officers of rank, including some Commissaries and the Chaplain."

Great indignation was everywhere expressed when this extraordinary conduct on the part of the British Government became known in Europe. There were not waiting some, amongst the Portuguese of the liberal party, who suspected that these proceedings had been taken in concert with the advisers of the young queen, D. Maria. They pretended that the Wellington

Cabinet had been privately informed that the wish of those advisers was, that the destination of the emigrants should be Rio de Janeiro, and not Terceira.* We know that instructions had been sent to Plymouth, that the four vessels should be victualled for ninety days: but whether from want of means, or other cause, these instructions had not been carried out; and some angry feeling was, in consequence, expressed on that subject when the vessels arrived at Brest. In an account of this expedition, given by a Portuguese, it is observed that, at a later period, no opposition was made by Captain Fitz-Clarence to the landing of the Count de Villa Flor at the same island; and the writer significantly enquires if the objection was solely to an expedition commanded by General Saldanha. Future events may, perhaps, throw some further light on this subject. We will, in this place, observe that, in the following month of March, after a debate in the House of Lords, originated by Lord Clanricarde, a protest against this act of the British Government was made, and signed by twelve peers of that House.

PROTEST.

"*March* 23*rd*, 1830.

"Because the forcible detention or interruption of the subjects of a belligerent state upon the high seas, or within the legitimate jurisdiction of either of the belligerents, by a neutral, constitutes a direct breach of neutrality, and is an obvious violation of the law of nations. And such an act of aggression, illegal and unjust at all times, against a people with whom the interfering Power is not actually at war, assumed in this instance a yet more odious and ungenerous aspect, inasmuch as it was exercised against the unarmed subjects of a defenceless and friendly sovereign, whose elevation and right to the Crown of Portugal had been earnestly recommended and openly recognized by his Majesty, and whose actual residence in Great Britain, bespeaking confidence in the friendship and protection

* It is somewhat singular that the Marquis de Barbacena, as he himself informs us in the letter already referred to, before writing to the Duke of Wellington respecting the departure of the emigrants for Terceira, should have sought his Grace at Strathfieldsaye, and, not seeing him, then only determined on writing.

of the king, entitled both her and her subjects to especial favour and countenance, even if considerations of policy precluded his Majesty's Government from enforcing her just pretensions by arms.

"HENRY RICHARD FOX VASSALL, LORD HOLLAND.
ULICK JOHN DE BURGH, LORD SOMERHILL, (MARQUIS OF CLANRICARDE).
GEORGE HOWARD, EARL OF CARLISLE.
GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER, VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.
WILLIAM FREDERIC, DUKE OF GLOUCESTER.
WILLIAM PLEYDELL BOUVERIE, EARL OF RADNOR.
PETER LEOPOLD LOUIS FRANCIS COWPER, EARL COWPER.
WILLIAM LAMB, VISCOUNT MELBOURNE.
CHARLES ROSE ELLIS, LORD SEAFORD.
PETER KING, LORD KING.
GEORGE CALTHORPE, LORD CALTHORPE.
HENRY GEORGE HERBERT, EARL OF CARNARVON."

We must now return to Saldanha and his companions, whom we left out at sea, in rough weather, driven from the shores of Terceira by the orders of Captain Walpole. They determined on steering their course for Brest, where they arrived on the 29th of January. From this port, Saldanha took the first opportunity of making known to D. Pedro what had taken place, and wrote to him as follows:

"BREST, *February 2nd*, 1829.

"SIRE,

"At this very moment, and at the residence of the governor of this fortress, I am informed that a Government corvette is about to sail for Rio de Janeiro; therefore, although in great haste, I profit by the opportunity, and beg leave to inform your Imperial Majesty that I sailed from Plymouth, on the 6th of January, with 600 Portuguese subjects of her Majesty the Queen of Portugal. We reached the port of Villa da Praia on the 16th; and when two of the transports which carried us were about to cast anchor, we were attacked by two English frigates, which, by fire of cannon, compelled us to leave the port, and escorted us during eight days as prisoners; after which period, they left us, leaving me reduced to the necessity of bearing for this port through scarcity of provisions; which is the reason I did not steer towards your Majesty's Court, after this monstrous aggression of the British Government against the subjects of

your Majesty's august daughter. I arrived here three days ago; and am awaiting her Majesty the queen's orders, and the determination of the French Government. The Portuguese under my direction carried neither arms nor munitions.

"God preserve your Royal and Imperial Majesty's august person for many years, as all good Portuguese desire.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

All honour is due to the French Government, on this and on all other occasions when political emigrants, of whatever party, have sought refuge in France. Saldanha's companions in misfortune had nearly consumed their provisions, and were, for the most part, without either money or the means of obtaining it.* Their leader lost no time in making known their sad case to the Préfet of the Department, and to the Minister of the Marine, M. Hyde de Neuville, who immediately ordered the most pressing wants of these unfortunates to be relieved. Without delay, Saldanha sent his aide-de-camp, Captain Praça, to London, for the purpose of bringing their position to the notice of the young queen's advisers, with the request that provision should be made for their support. He received an answer that the queen had no funds at her disposal for that purpose; and complaint was made that Saldanha and his companions had not sailed for Brazil, instead of going to Brest. Be that as it may, we learn that on the 2nd of January of this year, the queen had appointed the Marquis de Palmella to perform the duties of "Minister and Secretary of State" until her "father and guardian" † should "determine as to the government of my kingdoms and dominions. And," continues the royal letter, "at the same time, I authorize you to subsidise those of my said subjects who may require assistance, from their having emigrated from Portugal, and who, from justifiable motives, cannot proceed to Brazil." The means at the disposal of the queen's government were considerable amounts, due

* The official list states them at 650 in all, including some women. In this number were probably comprised 160 emigrants, who left Plymouth five days later with the same destination, but who, not reaching it, also landed at Brest.

† Pai, Tutor e Curador.

from Brazil to Portugal by a Convention made between these two countries on the 29th of August, 1825. It is but just to state, that the distribution of these monies was delegated by Palmella to a Commission appointed for that purpose. The conduct of that Commission, together with the uses to which the monies were applied, was much criticised and complained of at a later period.

In France, the greatest sympathy was felt for these unfortunate political refugees; and Generals Lafayette, Sebastiani, and Lamarque, as well as the Dukes de Broglie and de Guiche, exerted themselves in their behalf. Saldanha, as soon as possible, proceeded to Paris, where he succeeded in obtaining assistance for his countrymen from the Government of Charles X. His exertions gave great offence to the queen's agents both in Paris and London, who, jealous of his success, made every effort to compel the emigrants to quit France and proceed to Brazil. But, in spite of all opposition, Saldanha obtained permission from the French Government that they should land, and be allowed to reside in *dépôts* at Laval, Mayenne, and Dôle. A daily subsidy was promised of one franc each to soldiers, and three to officers of all grades, besides assistance to enable them to arrive at their several destinations.

Such a successful result was extremely unpalatable to Saldanha's opponents, as we learn from a letter written by Palmella to the Count de Sabugal, and dated March 23.*

"The 600 men who went with General Saldanha are now distributed in various *dépôts;* and the French Government has undertaken to provide for them. I have sent to acquaint J. C. de Saldanha that, as soon as the troops were dispersed, his commission would cease, and that he must no longer consider himself as commander-in-chief;—each *dépôt* communicating, in future, directly, with her Majesty's Legation at Paris. And I am informed that, notwithstanding the pernicious influence which Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro exerts over him, and whose excesses seem to tend towards overwhelming us in complete anarchy, General Saldanha has declared his obedience to the orders sent him in the name of her Majesty."

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 420.

But the sympathy of the French nation was not limited to granting them assistance from official sources; the Countess de Flahault got up a ball for their benefit, which produced no less than 29,000 francs, independent of the expenses attending it. The amount thus raised was placed by the Duke de Guiche in Saldanha's hands for distribution among his fellow-countrymen, a preference which gave still further offence to his opponents.

The orders referred to in the letter we have quoted, and other proceedings on the part of the queen's advisers in London, led to some correspondence between Saldanha and Palmella, which ended in a coolness between them. The French Minister, M. Hyde de Neuville, on being made acquainted with the interference, attempted by Palmella, declared that he recognized no one but General Saldanha as at the head of the emigrants; and the Préfets, where the several *dépôts* were established, received orders to the same effect.

In the month of January, 1830, the French Government, having determined on reducing the allowance of the Portuguese officers to two francs a day each, Saldanha went from Orleans (where he then resided) to Paris, in order to see whether he could do anything in their favour. Lafayette expressed the most lively indignation on the subject; and said that he would make an appeal to the French nation for the support of these political victims of tyranny, who had sought shelter and protection in France. He declared that he would place his name at the head of a subscription with twenty francs a month; and that he felt sure there would be a thousand Frenchmen who would do as much. But Saldanha convinced him that such a step would very much prejudice the Government against the emigrants; and that, at all events, it was desirable first to see what he could obtain by his own endeavours.

We learn from a letter to his wife, written from Paris on the 19th January, how contracted at this period were his own circumstances. He inquires, with anxiety, for how many more days the money he had left with her would suffice for herself, her two children, the nurse, and the faithful servant, José Vicente, who had accompanied him in all his dangers and

hardships. He tells her that he had been obliged to borrow money of his brother Domingos; which fact is confirmed by an entry in that brother's diary (in the author's possession), stating that, on the 13th of January, "I lent my brother, João, 105 francs." What a reverse of fortune for one who had held the highest offices in the State:—a viceroy in Brazil:—and who might have been a king!!!

Before Saldanha returned to Orleans, the minister promised that he would give his request immediate consideration; and the allowance was continued, as heretofore, until June, when he received notice from the Polignac ministry that, in the following month, it must entirely cease. Thereupon Saldanha, who had brought his family to Paris, spoke to the Duke de Guiche; and through the intervention of the Duke d'Angoulême, only a few days before the revolution of July, again succeeded in obtaining a promise for the continuation of the allowance.

We have many proofs that, during the whole of this time, there were those who, envious of Saldanha's reputation and jealous of his influence, endeavoured to prejudice the French Government against him, by representing that he was at the head of a party whose object was the spread of Republican principles. Saldanha's followers, in their turn, exalted him to the skies; and often threw on him the responsibility of opinions and projects which he himself would have indignantly disavowed. The liberal party was much divided even during the emigration, when union would have added so much to their strength. But, alas! neither then, nor afterwards, as we shall see, was union ever obtained. Some wag, during the siege of Oporto, in 1833, already made a division of the liberals into no less than fourteen different parties!

The Revolution of July, in which Lafayette took so conspicuous a part, now broke out in Paris; and while it served to raise the hopes of the Constitutional party, it still further increased the influence of Saldanha at Paris. During those days, he was almost constantly at the side of Lafayette. At the Hotel de Ville; in council; or wherever that general might be, orders were given that Saldanha, by day or by night, should be admitted to him without announcement. Saldanha was the

only man, not being a Frenchman, who was present at the secret and important meetings which led, at the instigation of Lafayette, to the occupation of the throne by Louis Philippe. The honoured Lafayette was, at this period, heard to declare, that although he had but one son, he regarded Saldanha as if he were another; and that it would be difficult for him to say which he loved most.

Through such influence, he was not only able to obtain from M. Guizot the promise that the allowance should be continued to those of his countrymen who had arrived with him at Brest, but that all other Portuguese political emigrants then residing in France, or who should come from Belgium or elsewhere, should be equally subsidized.

While Saldanha was thus rendering such services to his suffering countrymen, the queen's agent at Paris, D. Francisco d'Almeida,* ordered a notice to be posted at the door of his office or Legation, calling on all Portuguese subjects, who required assistance from the French Government, to give in their names at the said Legation, &c. Some few did so; but the French Government itself repudiated the interference of the Legation; and those emigrants whose names were presented to the minister by the diplomatic agent, had it notified to them in reply that they were to address themselves only to General Saldanha.

About this time, other constitutional Portuguese, under the direction of Colonel J. V. Barreto Feio, arrived at Brest from Brazil, and applied for assistance to the queen's agent. After waiting at Brest, during fifty days, for an answer, and receiving none, the colonel wrote to Saldanha, who immediately spoke in their favour to M. Casimir Perier, then minister; and we learn that they were admitted to the various *dépôts* on the same terms as the other emigrants. It is remarkable that, after so many endeavours had been made in London and Paris to oblige the Saldanha party of emigrants to go *to* Brazil, others under Barreto Feio should be sent *from* that country! The author is well aware with how much difficulty the English reader will give credit to the amount of petty intrigues which were going

* Afterwards Count de Lavradio.

forward at this period amongst the emigrants; he therefore, as some confirmation of the truth, refers him to the words of Palmella himself, written at an earlier period.*

Returning for a while to Portugal, the ministers of D. Miguel had established in that unhappy country a reign of terror. A living chronicler of that period,† although avowing himself a supporter of the Miguel party, confesses that he recites with horror the events of those days. Well he may! For this gentleman has now lived forty-four years under a constitutional government, and, despite of revolutions, and of attempted rebellions in favour of D. Miguel, he would in vain seek for a solitary example of any one being put to death for his political opinions or conduct. This author informs us, that, on the 9th of April, 1829, ten liberals were hanged at Oporto; and their heads, being cut off, were exposed in that city, and at Feira, Aveiro, and Coimbra. Thirteen others of the same party were sent to the coast of Africa, of whom four were publicly flogged before their departure. Amongst those put to death, we are informed, were colonels, captains, judges, and other functionaries. The list is continued of those who suffered at various periods, either by hanging, the galleys, deportation to the coast of Africa, or public flogging through the streets of Oporto. The author then enumerates the sentences pronounced (in their absence) on the 21st of August (1829), against those who had taken part in the *Belfast* expedition, in the previous year. The sentence declares that the criminals are to be deprived of all their "titles, privileges, honours, and dignities which they enjoyed in this kingdom." The following noblemen and officers (when taken) were to be conducted, bound with cords, through the public streets of Oporto, to the New Square (Praça Nova); and there, proclamation having been made of their crimes, they were to be strangled on a lofty scaffold, so that their punishment might be witnessed by the people. Their heads were to be cut off after death; and their bodies, together with the scaffold on which they had suffered, were to be consumed by fire, and the ashes thrown into the sea, in order that all memory of them should be lost.

* See p. 120 of this volume. † Sr. Pinho Leal.

Marquez de Palmella, Conde de Sampayo (Manoel), Conde da Taipa, Conde de Villa Flor, D. Filippe de Sousa Holstein, João Carlos de Saldanha Oliveira e Daun, Thomás Guilherme Stubbs, Francisco de Paula de Azeredo, Candido José Xavier, Manoel da Camara, and Barão de Renduffe.

The following gentlemen and officers were to be treated in a similar manner, except only that they were to be hanged instead of strangled :

Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro, Manoel José Mendes, Thomás Pinto Saavedra, José Victorino Barreto Feio, Manoel Joaquim Berredo Praça, João da Costa Xavier, Francisco de Sampayo, and Francisco Zacarias Ferreira de Araujo.

The reader will, perhaps, remember that it was at Mattozinhos where all these loyal Portuguese, thus ordered to be put to death and decapitated, landed on the 26th of June, 1828. The Government, therefore, ordered that their heads (when it got them) should be placed on poles on either side of the road leading from Oporto to that spot, with their faces turned in that direction, and there left until they were consumed by time.

Members of the Oporto Junta and others, to the number of twenty-five, who had taken part in the rising in that city on the 16th of May, 1828, were sentenced to death; but, as they had not committed the offence of landing at Mattozinhos, their heads were allowed to remain on their shoulders.

The two boys, A. D. de Sousa Holstein, and A. M. de Sousa Coutinho,—the former a son of Palmella—were, on account of their tender years, sentenced only to perpetual banishment in India, for having accompanied the expedition in the *Belfast.*

After Saldanha had been so unjustly and barbarously prevented from landing at Terceira in the beginning of 1829, he was not allowed to take any active part in what was going forward. It was probably surmised, that he might attempt privately to land at that island; for we find it stated in a letter written by Palmella, on the 19th of March of that same year, and addressed to the general in command at Terceira, that, "as João Carlos de Saldanha had not been able to land in January, when he was to have assumed the command of the

forces there,—of course under the authority of the provisional government and its worthy president,—her Majesty had now thought proper to annul the appointment, even if the said J. C. de Saldanha should arrive there." Under more favourable auspices, the Count de Villa Flor made a similar attempt in the month of June: and, whether Captain Fitz-Clarence was less vigilant than his predecessor, or more respect was paid to the nationality of the United States vessel in which the count had embarked, he was able to effect a landing. On the 11th of August, a Miguelite force disembarked at Villa da Praia with a view of obtaining possession of the island; but they were effectually repulsed: 500 deserted to the Constitutionalists; and not many of the others escaped on board the ships which had brought them from Lisbon.

The party of the queen having thus strengthened itself at Terceira, fresh hopes were entertained by the Constitutionalists. On March 3rd in the following year (1830), Palmella himself, in company with Sr. José Antonio Guerreiro, left Plymouth for the island; and arrived there, in spite of the blockade kept up by the Miguelite Government. A regency, named by D. Pedro, was forthwith, on the 15th of March, established at Terceira; the members of which were Palmella, Villa Flor, and Guerreiro; and, by them, Luiz da Silva Mousinho de Albuquerque was appointed Minister of State for all Departments.

Shortly after this, it began to be suspected in Europe that D. Pedro, by the advice of foreign diplomatists at Rio, or other cause, had cooled on the subject of his daughter's rights. This supposition is somewhat supported by the fact, that he gave orders for her return to Brazil, where, indeed, she arrived in the following November. Unaware of the fall of the Polignac ministry, D. Pedro had sent the Marquis de Santo Amaro to Europe; and this nobleman arrived there shortly after the July revolution had taken place in France. It then became known that the emperor, worn out by the continual persuasions of European Cabinets, had consented that the affairs of Portugal should be settled by the agreement of foreign Powers, even if the continuance of D. Miguel on the throne were to be the consequence. The marquis had been charged with these nego-

ciations. As soon after his arrival as this became known, a most energetic protest was drawn up by Saldanha and nine other deputies of the Cortes of 1826-7-8, then resident at Paris; and signed by them and by almost all the Portuguese emigrants who were in France, England, and Belgium. The mission of Santo Amaro, therefore, came to nought.

During Palmella's regency at Terceira, Sr. Lima was charged with the diplomatic duties at the Court of St. James. This small diplomatist—a natural adept at petty intrigue—was yet a diligent correspondent; and we know not whether to wonder most at the presumption with which he affects to counsel his superior; the wickedness of his calumnies of Saldanha; or the disrespectful audacity with which he alludes to the emperor.

On the 24th of October, 1830, he writes to Palmella as follows: * "Would it not be desirable to send from here some English staff-officer as an aide-de-camp to Count de Villa Flor? I should also think, that some of our own brave generals and officers, such as Cabreïra and others, might be sent. As to General Saldanha, I do not know whether his presence might excite discord; clashings of authority; and fatal embarrassments. * * * * *" The asterisks are in the published letter. We may surmise the character of that which the editor thought proper to suppress. The despatches of Chevalier Lima (afterwards Count da Carreira) to the regency, his widow thought proper to publish after his death; and by their contents we are somewhat enlightened as to what was going on behind the scenes.

In a despatch dated November 4th, Sr. Lima informs us, that at an interview with Lord Aberdeen, when the question arose as to D. Miguel being acknowledged by England, that minister said, "What can we do? We have waited as long as possible; but the emperor, D. Pedro, whose business alone it is to restore the throne to his daughter, not only does nothing, but officially declares he does not intend to do anything." Lord Aberdeen, confirming by these observations what had been rumoured as to the intentions of the mission of Santo Amaro, continued to say

* Correspondencias, vol. iv., p. 673.

that, according to the latest news from Rio de Janeiro, the emperor simply required the accomplishment of the marriage between D. Miguel and D. Maria. "His former proposals on this subject," added his lordship, "were amusing; for he desired that the Powers should guarantee the good conduct of D. Miguel towards his wife; as if the Powers would occupy themselves respecting the happy or unhappy life of husband and wife." . . . "In the meanwhile," continues the chevalier in his despatch to Palmella, "the emperor is so versatile, so easily changes his opinions and conduct, that his determinations merit very little consideration."

Having given this private slap to the emperor, he, two days afterwards, writes, that Saldanha had arrived in London on the 3rd; and had, on the 5th, addressed an "*officio extravagante*" to D. Thomaz Mascarenhas; which, says Lima, "unhappily proves that João Carlos de Saldanha easily allows himself to be guided by intriguers who have done us so much mischief." In a despatch dated December 15th, the chevalier informs the regency of words which were spoken by Lord Palmerston to D. Francisco d'Almeida; which words we are more inclined to believe were addressed *to*, rather than spoken *by*, Lord Palmerston. Lima writes as follows: "I must inform your Excellency that Lord Palmerston, speaking with D. F. d'Almeida, expressed himself very little to the advantage of General Saldanha; showing a desire that he should be put aside in order not to embarrass our affairs with his intrigues. It would, however, be very difficult to prevent General Saldanha from embarking, unless by a positive order from the regency, which it would be very desirable should be sent. For, besides the discredit into which the said general has fallen with all serious (*sisuda*) people, his turbulent (*buliçoso*) character may cause no little injury to the expedition, destroying the good harmony which is so essential to the success of undertakings of such a nature."

The chevalier thus shews himself to be at least no tyro at intrigue; and we shall see that he was not unsuccessful. D. F. d'Almeida, at Paris, contributed his share to calumniate the too confiding and noble-minded Saldanha; and the agent at St. Petersburgh, Sr. José Mauricio Corrêa, in a despatch to the

Chevalier Lima in London, dated November 26, infected, probably, by Russian influence, writes as follows: "Allow me to observe to your Excellency, how imprudent is the measure just taken by the regency (at Terceira) to adopt as the national cockade the colours of 1820, (white and blue) which identifies us with the revolutionists of that period, and with the party of João Carlos and Sr. Abrantes." And thus, this diplomatic trio, instead of attending to the business, if business there was, of their Legations, or their agencies, employed their time in officious interference with the duties of their superiors, and in intriguing against the reputation of one, with whom, ere long, they would be only too proud to find themselves associated. But how little did they understand the motives, or appreciate the conduct of him whom they thus calumniated! Saldanha had never identified himself with the revolutionists of 1820, or with the Constitution of 1822. Nay! he had even, as we have seen, risked the twofold danger of being either killed in action at Villa Franca; or, perhaps, shot for escaping from the prison (to which he had been condemned) when endeavouring to rescue his sovereign and his loyal fellow-subjects from the tyranny of that same political, but rebel, party with whom Sr. Corrêa feared to be connected by the bond of a white and blue cockade!

In a despatch dated January 20th, 1831, the chevalier transfers his anger to Saldanha's kind friend Lafayette. He writes: "General Lafayette is, at present, one of the greatest embarrassments to the French Government, by his imprudence, his folly, and his fixed ideas of republicanism." It is certain that Lafayette in his old age, and at the period when he was on such intimate terms with Saldanha, was no republican. He might have exclaimed with the philosopher: "Go, my friend, and try such a government in your own family." Did not the chevalier know, that it was the proposal of Lafayette to call Louis Philippe to the throne, when the opinions of the chiefs of the Revolution of July, 1830, mostly turned towards a republic, with Lafayette as their president. Yet the chevalier quotes with satisfaction the *bon mot* current at that time in Paris; that "Lafayette having made himself the *hero* of the two worlds—the old and the new—it was a pity that he did not go and

obtain the same title in the next." His estimate of Lafayette and his judgment of Saldanha were both about equally just.

"It would be tedious, as well as painful, to narrate the atrocities which were committed throughout Portugal, during this period, by the usurping government. For some offence, a Frenchman, M. Bonhomme, was flogged through the streets of Lisbon. Seven men, on one occasion, were strangled, and their bodies were burnt and thrown into the sea. On the 10th of September (1831), we learn that eighteen soldiers of the 4th Infantry were executed; and on the 24th, twenty-one of the same regiment met with a like fate. In a later despatch, the chevalier writes, that Lord Palmerston had told him, that in eleven days above a thousand people had been thrown into prison at Lisbon alone.

Let us turn for a moment to a more grateful theme, as it affords further proof of the honourable esteem felt for Saldanha, as chief of the emigrants. Having, at an earlier period, had some intercourse with the family of M. Malo, a shipowner at Dunkerque, Saldanha had obtained their sympathy and confidence in an extraordinary degree. To the reader who has not known him, what we assert might appear the author's partial panegyric; but there are few Portuguese, or others, who, at any time, have come in contact with Saldanha, but will acknowledge the extreme fascination of his manner. Anecdotes are numberless of those who, having entered his presence with already formed prejudices, have left it, both satisfied with him and pleased with themselves. The exceptions, if any, were those, who, taking advantage of his kind and courteous manner, thought they might, with safety, endeavour to overreach him. Alas! as future events may show, it required little art to deceive the unsuspecting nature of Saldanha.

Aware of the friendly feelings of M. Malo towards the Portuguese emigrants, and to the Cause for which they were suffering, one of them, Sr. de Castro, privately addressed himself to that gentleman (in May, 1831), declaring that he himself, "like Dion," with from twenty-five to thirty of his countrymen, had "resolved to make an attempt" to rescue Portugal from the tyranny which ruled it, if M. Malo would procure them the

means of landing in that country. This officer further declared that, as their success must, in a great measure, depend on the profound secrecy with which their plans were undertaken, he confided them to M. Malo alone. To this proposal, M. Malo replied as follows :—

"Of all men, the Count de Saldanha is the one most devoted to your country, and the most worthy, by his high character, of obtaining the confidence of the emigrants. I therefore beg permission to lay your proposal before him. If it obtains his consent and support, you may be certain that I will do everything in my power to assist you. I heard from this distinguished person a few days ago, thanking me in the name of the emigrants. I have not yet replied; and I shall now await your answer, in order to know if I may communicate your proposal to him, for the success of which, both his prudence and influence are indispensable."

Sr. Castro replied that he had spoken to General Saldanha, who not only approved of his project, but most ardently prayed for its success. His plans were, however, not carried out, owing, probably, in some measure, to what we are about to relate.

Having abdicated the throne of Brazil, D. Pedro, together with his wife and daughter, arrived in London on the 26th of June, 1831.* He shortly afterwards sent for Palmella; who left Terceira as soon as Villa Flor returned from the island of S. Miguel, which had now fallen into the hands of the Constitutionalists. Palmella arrived in London on the 19th of September.

After Lord Grey's ministry came into office, Lima renewed his efforts to obtain a formal recognition of D. Maria by the British Government. Lord Palmerston frankly told him that this would be impossible under the circumstances of D. Miguel's possession of the kingdom; but he assured him that, "We are disposed not to see what does not happen before our eyes. What the ministry of the Duke of Wellington would have pre-

* D. Pedro's first wife, daughter of the Emperor of Austria, had died; and he was now married to a daughter of Prince Eugene, Duke de Leuchtenberg.

vented, we will not prevent. But *il faut en venir là*, what the emperor *can* do, and what he *will* do."

The chevalier does not appear to have been very sanguine on the latter point; at least, so far as concerned financial matters. For he declares that the emperor is decidedly unwilling to risk any of his own fortune for the cause of his daughter.

With respect to D. Maria being a guest at the king's palace, on her arrival in England, Lord Palmerston told Lima that there would be great objections to such a proposal, on account of the difference of religious creed; as the celebration of Mass, for instance, would cause great scandal to the less enlightened classes of the nation, and might injure his Majesty in public opinion.

The arrival of D. Pedro in Europe with the young queen gave fresh life to the cause of the Constitutionalists; whilst the accession of Earl Grey's ministry, with Lord Palmerston in the Foreign Office, encouraged their hopes. The Portuguese emigrants took courage, and gave renewed evidence of their loyalty. On the 15th of August, the queen, being still in London, was presented by them with a copy of the constitutional Charter, and with a sceptre of gold. On the day following, D. Pedro accompanied her to Paris, where the queen, with her royal parent and the ex-empress, took up their residence in the Rue de Courcelles.

Saldanha also, early in 1831, left Orleans for Paris, where he occupied a small house, which was once, No. 5, Rue des Vignes, in the Champs Elysées. But he had now been long in exile, and his expenditure—less on his own account than on that of others—had exhausted his utmost means, until he was reduced to the necessity of raising a small sum on a pair of diamond earrings belonging to his wife. By some means this circumstance became known, and was reported on the following day to the chief of the police. Possibly, through this channel, the general's necessities were brought under the notice of one whose sympathies were moved; and, two days afterwards, Saldanha was requested to call on one of the ministers. Sanguine that he was about to hear something favourable to his poor emigrants, he hastened to obey the call, but was then surprised at the minister speaking

to him of his own personal position, and asking him if it was really true, that he had been obliged, since his arrival in Paris, to dispose of some jewels. Saldanha avowed that he had done so, for that he had no other sufficient means of meeting his expenses. The minister expressed his surprise, and presently alluded to the sums of money which had passed through Saldanha's hands for distribution amongst the emigrants. The allusion itself showed, that the minister had not then learned to appreciate the unselfish and impartial nature of the man with whose distress he already sympathised. He was, therefore, all the more surprised, when he learned that General Saldanha had apportioned to himself the same amount only as he had awarded to all other officers of whatever rank; which was three francs a day for himself, two for his wife, and one franc for each of his two children,* and no more. This even-handed justice was met by the French Government with a generous liberality. A few days afterwards, it was notified to Saldanha that, if he would call at the office of the Minister of the Interior, the sum of 1000 francs would be placed at his disposition, for his sole and separate use, every month, during his stay at Paris.

It was shortly after this, that Saldanha was placed by his friend, Armand Carrel, on the staff of the *National*, which engagement, we are informed, was the means of adding a further sum of 500 francs a month to his income.

Meanwhile, the emigrants remaining at Plymouth, to the number of some hundreds, had become reduced to very distressed circumstances; many of them depending entirely on the little assistance their fellow sufferers could afford them. Saldanha now managed to send £30 to Plymouth, in order to assist some few of them to arrive at St. Malo; when, he said, he would be able to obtain, from the French Government, the same help

* At this period, Saldanha's family consisted of three children; the two boys already mentioned, and a daughter, Eugenia, born at Orleans in 1831. But, when the Countess left London in 1828, she kindly invited one of the author's sisters to accompany her on a visit to Brussels, and afterwards to Paris, where she remained until the general and his family went to Orleans. In return for this attention, the younger boy was taken charge of by the author's mother,—the "English mamma," as the child was pleased to call her."

as it had bestowed on the emigrants already in France; but that he could not ask assistance for them, if they were not actually in France. This £30 was forwarded to Sr. Couto through Sr. Liberato; and, in reply to the latter, acknowledging its receipt, Sr. Couto writes:—

"This fresh service done to our compatriots by the Count de Saldanha will bring down upon him fresh calumnies from these vile hirelings; nevertheless, true Portuguese will do him justice: and I hope that the day will come when his country will also do him justice. You know that mine is not the voice of flattery; for I never asked anything of General Saldanha, when he was all-powerful. I was, am, and shall always be his friend. I always told him the truth, and gave him timely warning when I knew of the intrigues going on against him.

"JOAQUIM CARLOS FERNANDES DE COUTO."

"84, UNION STREET, STONEHOUSE, PLYMOUTH,
September 8th, 1831."

It was about this period, that one of those wonderful interpositions of a protecting Providence, of which the life of Saldanha presents so many striking examples, took place.

France, at this time, contained within its hospitable frontiers, large numbers of Spanish emigrants, who, like their brethren of the smaller portion of the Peninsula, had fled from tyranny, and were burning to return to their native land, and confer upon their fellow-countrymen, at the risk of their own lives, the blessings of liberty. Under the guidance of the brave, but unfortunate, Torrijos, some of these gentlemen had resolved to make a descent upon the Spanish coast, and, raising the constitutional standard, strike a blow for their country's welfare. Saldanha, tired of inaction, and believing that the success of the liberal party in Spain would be of material advantage to the same cause in the sister country, resolved to join them, as did Captain Boyd and others. To enable him to leave France, a passport was necessary; and this he endeavoured to obtain through the English ambassador at Paris; but that functionary, aware of Saldanha's political and military importance, declined to give him one until he had consulted his government at home. The

reply was in the negative, and Saldanha was forced to relinquish his plan. Had he not done so, his biography would have closed at this point, and Portugal would have seen her bravest, noblest, defender suffer an ignominious death in the cause of a foreign country. For, the confederates, forty-nine in all, having effected a landing on the coast, near Malaga, on the 11th of December, 1831, were betrayed, it is said, by one of their number, and shot upon the sands, after a short delay, by the dastardly Moreño, without even the form of a trial. The English consul was unable to obtain even twenty-four hours' respite for our unfortunate countryman, Captain Boyd, who filled the first grave in the English cemetery of Malaga; at which city a monument, in the Plaza de Riego, records their sad fate. Lord Palmerston, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, may thus be said to have preserved the life of General Saldanha, in refusing him a passport.

Steps were now being taken, since the arrival of D. Pedro at Paris, to prepare another expedition to land on the coast of Portugal. Lord Palmerston showed himself a sincere well-wisher to the liberal cause; and, in the following few lines addressed to Palmella, on the 26th of November (1831), urges him not to let the proper moment slip by:—

"Je vous conseille fortement de faire partir vos vaisseaux sans le moindre délai, afin d'éviter de nouvelles difficultés que les agents de D. Miguel pourraient vous susciter."

It thus had become most important to determine; not indeed who should take the command of the projected expedition, for the commander-in-chief would be either D. Pedro himself, or such officer as the existing regency at Terceira should approve; but, generally, what officers should be employed, whether as second in command, or in command of the respective corps of which the force might be composed. D. Pedro, having long since abdicated, could no longer constitute himself regent; but it was well known, that a scheme was on foot, which may or not have been reasonable, to get him appointed to that authority. By some persons this scheme was objected to and severely criticised. Amongst them was Colonel Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro, whom the Miguelite chronicler already referred to (albeit himself a Miguelite) describes as one of the "bravest officers of the Portuguese

army, and one of the most honourable, loyal, and energetic men of the liberal party." Pizarro had written a pamphlet and published it in Paris, entitled "Norma das Regencias de Portugal," in which he warmly attacked the right of D. Pedro to be regent, as well as the expediency of making the appointment. This called down upon Pizarro the wrath of D. Pedro, who, by a pretended "decree," dated the 6th of January, 1832, and countersigned by Candido José Xavier, ordered, that Colonel Pizarro should not be employed in the projected expedition, but that he should be imprisoned, tried, and sentenced, in whatever part of the queen's dominions he should appear.* Thereupon, in the same month, an attempt was made, both in London and at Plymouth, to get up signatures, amongst the emigrants, to a request that D. Pedro should assume the regency. But this attempt met with so little success, that, at Paris, the example was not even followed.

D. Pedro had thus rid himself, and deprived the queen of the support, of one of the most loyal and bravest officers in the Portuguese army. The reader will naturally enquire, what of the services of a still more distinguished officer and loyal subject of the queen—General Saldanha? And this brings us to an important period in his biography, in which we shall see the effect of the united intrigues and calumnies of his opponents. On the 11th of the same month, January, 1832, Saldanha received a letter from Sr. Candido José Xavier, announcing that D. Pedro wished to see him, on the 13th, at the Rue de Courcelles.

On that day, Saldanha went to the appointment, and was received with the greatest affability by the emperor, who said that he had desired to see him, in order to request that he would make a great personal sacrifice in favour of the cause of the queen, his daughter, D. Maria. Saldanha expressed himself willing to make every sacrifice in his power, and that his life was always at her service. "But," answered the emperor, "it is a greater sacrifice than, perhaps, you are prepared for." Sal-

* The so much dreaded Pizarro, whom Palmella seemed to consider as Saldanha's evil genius (see p. 215), was, in 1834, elected deputy, and became, in 1839, after the death of D. Pedro, Prime Minister, and Minister of War.

danha then listened with mute astonishment, when D. Pedro proceeded to acquaint him, that, on the previous day, the Spanish ambassador, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the ambassadors of Austria and England, had waited on him, and had declared, on the part of Ferdinand VII., that if General Saldanha should form part of the projected expedition, he, Ferdinand, would place an army of 40,000 men at the disposal of D. Miguel. But, D. Pedro added, the Spanish ambassador, in the presence of the French minister, and of the two other ambassadors, had pledged himself that King Ferdinand, if Saldanha remained at Paris, would remain neutral during the coming strife.

We do not pretend to complain of this prudent conduct of Ferdinand. Probably he was but too well aware of the combinations entered into, at a former period, between his own subjects and Saldanha for the restoration of constitutional government in Spain, and his own exclusion from that country. But what a testimony to the influence and power of one man; and that one a subject of so small a State as Portugal!

Thus far were the intrigues against Saldanha successful. He was unable to offer any opposition to D. Pedro's determination; but he insisted that he should be allowed to make known to his friends and the public, the reasons which compelled him to remain at Paris. He at once proceeded to call on M. Casimir Perier, and enquired of him if he was aware of what had been determined respecting himself, as to his not being allowed to accompany the expedition. The minister replied, that General Sebastiani, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, on the previous day, on his coming from the Rue de Courcelles, informed him of what had taken place.

On the same day, General Saldanha sent the following to a Paris paper for insertion:—

"PARIS, *le* 13 *Janvier*, 1832.

"LE GÉNÉRAL SALDANHA À SES AMIS.

"S.M.I. D. Pedro m'ayant fait appeler aujourd'hui à une audience particulière, m'a fait savoir que la *diplomatie* m'empêche de prendre part à l'expédition projetée pour rétablir dans mon pays la Charte et le Trône de la Reine, D. Maria II.;

et que, d'après cette opposition, S.M.I. ne pourra m'employer dans ladite expédition. Ayant compté jusqu'à ce moment, et dans la plus grande anxiété sur cette occasion de servir, le coup que je viens de recevoir est le plus funeste qui aurait pu m'atteindre ; mais je saurai le supporter, si mes amis veulent bien croire à la continuation de mes sentimens et de ma bonne volonté.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

A loud cry of indignation arose from amongst the friends of Saldanha, and, for the moment, they appeared resolved to allow their affection for their countryman to overcome their duty to their country. They declared that they would join in no expedition of which he was not to form part. In consequence of this declaration, the general, on the 18th, circulated amongst them the following letter :—

"Not being permitted to take part in the expedition which his Imperial Majesty promises to command against the oppressor of Portugal in favour of the Charter and of D. Maria II. : but feeling assured of the zeal which animates my friends; and accustomed to the kindness with which such worthy fellow-citizens have always honoured me, I venture to beg, that all those who have the means of reaching the Azores will not lose this important opportunity for sustaining the liberty of our country; and that all will allow me to add my prayers to second the desires and efforts of faithful Portuguese.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

In a letter which, on this occasion, was made public, the young queen was thus apostrophized :—

"If your Majesty already held the sceptre, you would call to your side the loyal Conde de Saldanha, as the heroic Marguerite of Anjou called the Lord Percy" . . . . . "But your Majesty is a child, otherwise you would use the language of Elizabeth, who said to her warriors at the camp of Tilbury : 'I know that I have the arm of a woman, but I have the heart of a king, and if my country must fall, I am prepared to be buried under its ruins.'" The authors conclude their letter, declaring

that when the queen is restored to her country, "the honour of Portugal requires that the excellent warrior, condemned by foreigners to ostracism, should be elected deputy in every province in the kingdom—thus to show that Lusitanian blood still runs in our veins. Then will be heard that sonorous voice, and then will be seen how he crushes his calumniators and the infamous enemies of the queen and of liberty. Then will be heard that noble soul, so cruelly offended, complain to his country, and we shall hear how his country will reply."

This letter was not written by an unknown hand, but by men whose names in Portugal are cherished as those of two of her noblest, most virtuous, most talented, and most disinterested citizens—the brothers MANOEL and JOSÉ DA SILVA PASSOS.* These were the men to appreciate the character of JOÃO CARLOS DE SALDANHA.

Saldanha remained at Paris. It was during the course of this year that France lost one of her most distinguished citizens—the General Lamarque. His funeral took place at Paris on the 5th of June, and many eloquent orations were made on that occasion. We are enabled to present to the reader the few words then spoken by Saldanha at the grave of his departed friend, which were expressed with that clear and sonorous voice, and with that unhesitating delivery which always distinguished him in the tribune, or wherever he spoke.

"Messieurs, permettez qu'un étranger,—pénétré des sublimes vertus, des grands talens et des rares qualités du général distingué, du législateur illustre et populaire, du patriote par excellence que la France pleure aujourd'hui, sensible et reconnaissant de la protection généreuse que les Portugais expatriés ont toujours rencontrée dans ce grand homme,—vienne en ce jour de deuil mêler la voix de sa douleur aux larmes de tant de cœurs attendris, qu'une perte commune assemble ici pour dire le dernier adieu, l'adieu de l'éternité au général Lamarque. Intrépide guerrier, législateur éclairé, la mort du général Lamarque est une perte européenne : les peuples libres perdent en lui un noble concitoyen, et les peuples opprimés un défenseur

* Their political opinions, although monarchical, were ultra-liberal. Both lived to become Ministers of State.

généreux. Oui, Messieurs, le noble cœur du général Lamarque ne battait pas seulement pour la liberté, pour indépendance et pour la gloire de son pays ; son patriotisme n'était point égoïste ; tout étranger qui combattait pour les droits de l'homme et pour la liberté de sa patrie, était le concitoyen du général Lamarque, était son ami, était son frère. Aussi, tous les proscrits qui, du Tage et de la Vistule, du Pô et du Manzanarès, sont venus chercher dans cette France hospitalière un asile et la liberté, ont trouvé, comme celui que ne rougit pas de pleurer ici avec vous, dans la philantropie du général Lamarque, l'accueil le plus compâtissant et la protection la plus généreuse. La France, si fertile en guerriers fameux, si féconde en orateurs distingués, si renommée par son patriotisme éclairé, apprécie et rendra justice, sans doute, aux services éclatans, aux campagnes glorieuses, aux travaux législatifs du noble citoyen dont elle déplore aujourd'hui la mort ; et moi, étranger et proscrit, je paierai mon humble tribut à un si grand nom, en gardant pour toujours le souvenir de ses vertus patriotiques, et en versant sur sa tombe des larmes sincères d'une reconnaissance éternelle. Fier d'avoir mérité son amitié et sa confiance, je mettrai toute ma gloire à le prendre pour modèle ; heureux si, fort des ses conseils et de son exemple, je puis marcher dignement sur les traces de ce grand homme ; vouer, comme lui, ma vie au service de la liberté, et mourir fidèle à l'honneur et à la patrie.

We return, for a while, to D. Pedro. He had left Paris on the 25th of January (1832) for Belle-Isle ; at which port, on the 2nd of February, he was received on board the *Rainha de Portugal* by Admiral Sartorius. This distinguished officer was engaged to command all the naval force which the Constitutionalists were able to assemble for the projected expedition. After leaving Belle-Isle, the small fleet reached S. Miguel on the 22nd ; and Angra, in the island of Terceira, on the 3rd of March. At Angra, the regency went on board the *D. Maria II.*, and resigned their powers to D. Pedro, "until such time as a lawful Government should be established in Portugal, and the Cortes should declare if he should continue regent."

Sr. Soriano informs us that, when D. Pedro reached Angra

and it became known that Saldanha was excluded from the expedition, great dissatisfaction was felt amongst the Constitutionalists. He quotes from the author of the "Revista Historica"—an eye-witness of what was going forward—who declares; that without discussing in detail the persons who accompanied his Majesty, it would have been better if some had been left behind. He describes such; as courtiers (*aulicos*) without popularity, intriguers without character, and pretended statesmen; who made their appearance at the island. From that moment, the writer asserts, the state of affairs became visibly changed; and the good fellowship which had hitherto united the liberal party was put an end to by the unbounded ambition and presumption of the *aulicos*, who themselves had rendered no services to liberty.

Every arrangement having been finally completed for a hostile descent on Portugal, the following was the amount of the naval force prepared to put to sea :—

Frigate	*Rainha de Portugal*	46	guns.
,,	*D. Maria II.*	42	,,
Brig	*Conde de Villa Flor*	16	,,
,,	*Liberal*	9	,,
Schooner	*Eugenia*	10	,,
,,	*Terceira*	7	,,
,,	*Coquette*	7	,,
	In all	137	,,

To these were added 40 transports of various tonnage.

This squadron, under the command of Admiral Sartorius, left Ponta Delgada on the 27th of June, and arrived on the 7th of the following month, off that part of the coast of Portugal between Villa do Conde and Oporto, called the beach of Mindello, where we will leave it until our next chapter.

When, however, news of the landing having taken place reached Paris, on the 22nd of July, Saldanha applied to the French Government, in the hope of obtaining its assistance to enable the remaining emigrants to return to Portugal, and take part in the strife now, apparently, about to commence in earnest. The Baron de Rigny replied, that such assistance would savour too much of intervention in a quarrel in which the Government had determined to observe the strictest neutrality; but that, if

the cause of the queen prospered, and she were seated on the throne, he would not fail to recommend that means should be granted by his Government to enable the emigrants to return to their country.

The Count Alexander Laborde having about this time published a pamphlet on the subject of Portugal, Saldanha wrote to him, and declared that many of the assertions contained in it were completely false. This led to his receiving a letter, on the 15th of July, from D. Francisco de Almeida, the queen's agent at Paris, in which explanations were demanded; as it was he himself who had given the information to the author. Saldanha answered him by saying, that he had applied the epithet complained of solely to the person from whom the false assertions had originated; and that no one better than D. Francisco de Almeida himself could know how false they were. Upon this, D. Francisco demanded satisfaction, which Saldanha declared himself quite ready to give in the manner required. Selecting his brother Domingos and Colonel Barreto Feio as his seconds, he sent the latter to acquaint Almeida, that, being tolerably expert in the use both of the rapier and broadsword, he should feel ashamed of claiming the choice of weapons with so helpless an adversary, and, therefore, he ceded his right to that choice.

On the following day, the combatants met at the Bois de Vincennes. Shots having been exchanged, D. Francisco's second, Sr. José Maria de Mello, insisted that, after the very gallant conduct of the general towards his adversary, the duel should not be continued. D. Francisco declared himself perfectly satisfied if Saldanha would allow that the affair should be made public in the newspapers; to which he replied with a smile that he could have no possible objection since it was the truth.

Whilst Saldanha was thus inactive at Paris, the author recollects with what pleasure, as a youth, he paid him a short visit at the Rue des Vignes, where every night were assembled those emigrants who had refused to join the expedition except under his guidance. At this period, he had the honour of being presented by Saldanha to the venerable Lafayette, whose popularity was only equalled by the respect paid to him.

Before concluding our present chapter, we return for a while to the commencement of this year (1832), when the intrigues of his countrymen and the opposition of King Ferdinand had succeeded in preventing Saldanha from forming part of the expedition which sailed for the Azore Islands. This strange exclusion required explanation and demanded vindication, both of which were offered to the public by slandering the character and political merit of Saldanha in anonymous communications to English and other journals. Saldanha himself paid no attention to these attacks; but some erroneous statements having found their way into a paper so respectable as the *Times*, the two brothers, Manoel and José Passos, immediately replied to them in a pamphlet, written first in Portuguese, and dated January 31st, which was followed, a few days afterwards by a French translation.

Had space permitted, we would gladly have quoted at some length the words of these two generous defenders of Saldanha against the attacks of his anonymous detractor; because they were men, whose names, in Portugal, were synonymous with purity, honour, and patriotism. To the brothers Passos, their fellow-citizens at Oporto have raised a monument to commemorate their virtues; hence, may we not say, "Laudari a laudatis viris non ultima laus est."

The Passos thus conclude their pamphlet:

"Après ce que nous venons de dire pour la défense du général Comte de Saldanha, on peut se convaincre que, non seulement les accusations portées contre lui par le correspondant du *Times* sont contraires à la vérité, mais que le général Saldanha est un de ces beaux caractères qui brillent rarement dans l'histoire des peuples, pour faire leur bonheur et leur gloire. Nous croyons que le Comte de Saldanha, noble soutien de la liberté Portugaise, continuera à mériter les applaudissemens de ses compatriotes, et l'estime de l'Europe civilisée.

"JOSÉ ET MANOEL DA SILVA PASSOS.

"Avocats à la Cour royale de Porto.

"EAUBONNE, *le* 6 *Février*, 1832."

CHAPTER IX.

1832.

D. Pedro enters Oporto—Villa Flor takes the command—Hostilities commence—Necessity for a Saldanha—Panic—Fresh disasters—Desperate state of affairs—Proposals for ending the war—Attempt to find a general—Continued ill-success—Villa Flor resigns—D. Pedro assumes the command—Difficulties—Colonel Evans declines—Saldanha is called for—His abnegation—Intrigues against him—Stubbs and Leão Cabreira—Dupin's opinions of D. Pedro—General Solignac is engaged—D. Pedro is compelled to send for Saldanha—Lafayette's advice—Saldanha's generous patriotism.

THE reader is now invited to follow the events of D. Pedro's expedition to Oporto, so far as may be necessary to explain the course taken by Saldanha. The squadron, under the command of Admiral Sartorius, reached the Mindello beach on the 7th of July, 1832. Here D. Pedro landed with a force of 7500 men. He entered Oporto on the 9th. No resistance was offered by the Miguelite general, who at once evacuated the city, although he had at that time under his command a force of 14,000 men, quartered either in, or in the immediate neighbourhood, of the city. It is difficult to understand the conduct of this general in thus retiring from Oporto, unless, indeed, he was afraid that its inhabitants would rise against him, or that a large portion of his own troops would join the queen's forces. We are told by Soriano, who wrote the history of this war, that, when the Constitutionalists landed, D. Miguel had 80,000 men in arms, although not more than 13,600 were at Oporto under General Santa Martha, the remainder being distributed in three or four principal Divisions elsewhere.

Great was the joy of the inhabitants, when the queen's forces entered Oporto. The gallows were pulled down and burnt. The prisons were opened; and, we regret to say, the hangman was put to death by the mob. His conduct, however, towards

prisoners, and towards those who suffered at his hands, had been unnecessarily harsh, and even brutal; so that this solitary victim of the people's fury met with no pity. The day after the expedition reached Oporto, a decree was promulgated, signed by D. Pedro, and by his ministers Palmella, José Xavier, Mousinho da Silveira and Agostinho José Freire, to suspend "as guarantias,"* so long as military operations should continue.

D. Pedro, it is said, entered Oporto on a pony, and with three small field-pieces drawn from the landing place by men. He, however, found fifty pieces of artillery in the arsenal, with a considerable quantity of powder, shot, and shell which the enemy had no time to remove. Had they offered resistance, and such resistance had been effectual, the invading force would have had no alternative but to re-embark in their ships and transports, and return to the Azores. But it was otherwise; and the command of this brave small army, and of this, so far successful, enterprise, was given to the Count de Villa Flor. Of this valiant officer it is painful to narrate that he was far from being equal to the occasion. The Count de Villa Flor was an unconscious instrument in the hands of those who feared the supremacy of Saldanha. He was of far too noble a character to lend himself to intrigues of any description. Throughout the whole of his military career, he evinced a generous nature: for, in the most honourable manner, he never hesitated to divide the credit of success with those who were his counsellors; and, if the credit were wholly theirs, he was ever ready to acknowledge it. Oporto, indeed, during his short command, was defended with courage; and the heroic conduct of the civilians, as well as of the military, is worthy of the highest praise. But the army had no faith in its leaders.

The first engagement between the two contending forces was on the 23rd of July, and was continued on the following day. But, as Soriano remarks, D. Pedro, as a military commander, was wanting both in talent and experience; and the Count de Villa Flor was a soldier, who owed, whatever he had of success, to good fortune. The troops behaved with great gallantry;

* A procedure analogous to the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in England.

but they felt their want of a general to their own heart,—may we say, of a Saldanha? Towards evening of the second day, there arose a complete panic within the city. At one time it was reported that the Constitutionalists had been routed, and that General Povoas was about to enter Oporto with 15,000 men. Many persons sought safety on board the ships anchored in the Douro. The archives of the government offices and of the police were embarked. The alarm was, however, false, and the merchants and others returned on shore.

On the 7th of August, Villa Flor made another gallant, but unsuccessful attempt against the enemy. Soriano writes: "So disastrous was this attempt on the part of the Count de Villa Flor, and so little to his credit was the disposition of his forces, that no official account has ever appeared of the operations of this unlucky and calamitous day."

The Minister of War, J. A. Freire, writes on this occasion to Palmella, who had returned to London: "Captain Rebocho by his shouts of alarm, either imprudently or maliciously, created a panic amongst the battalion of 5th Caçadores; and, in a few minutes, all this battalion, as well as the 3rd and 12th, and some of the 6th Infantry, were in complete confusion. The enemy retained their positions. In officers our loss is considerable. Of soldiers, not more than 200 in killed, wounded, and missing."

Villa Flor himself writes to Palmella, on the 14th, in a despairing tone: "I hope to God that you will soon return here. . . . . We are much worse off than when you left. . . . Our troops still cut a respectable appearance, but the desertions have been numerous." Then, referring to the affair of the 7th, he adds: "The other day we had an engagement at Souto Redondo with Povoas, and it was tolerably obstinate; but, unfortunately, after we had, with much cost, gained the positions, a cry of alarm uttered by Captain Rebocho of the 5th Caçadores caused our troops to retire, and with considerable loss. I was obliged to stand with my sword in hand in order to stop the soldiers, which it took some time to do. . . . My dear Marquis, it would be a good thing if you were here. Let me tell you that you are much wanted. I do what I can, and shall do so to the end; but I tell you *that affairs are not*

going well: this is only for you, on whom the result of the cause will principally depend."*

On the same day, Mousinho writes to Palmella: "From the day you left, up to the present, our affairs have gone backward, and, truly, our position is most critical." Relating the unfortunate affair of Souto Redondo, that minister expresses his fears of "the loss of confidence which the soldiers will feel in the Cause.† If the squadron does not succeed, I consider our position as almost lost, and in three or four days all will be over. But, if it does, we may still hope. At all events, I hope to save our honour; and I, at least, am resolved to perish in preserving my own. If you do not find me here, I already recommend my wife and children to you. . . . It would be a good thing if you were here, or that the permission should shortly be given, respecting which we have so often spoken as a last resource." This "last resource" was the sending for Saldanha.

Soriano bears testimony to the influence which even one effective officer may exercise in restoring the *morale* of discomfited troops. He writes, that the disaster would have been much greater at Souto Redondo, had it not been for the bravery and presence of mind of Major José Joaquim Pacheco of the 10th Infantry, an officer whose name is venerated by his countrymen. When the Marquis de Loulé brought the disastrous news to D. Pedro, everything, says Soriano, was thought lost. Bernardo de Sá offered, with 300 men, to protect the immediate embarkation of D. Pedro, and the return of the troops to the Azores. The supposed author of these misfortunes, Captain Rebocho, was tried by court-martial and condemned to death. The sentence was not carried out; and, at the close of the war, he was set at liberty; when, soon afterwards, he destroyed himself by drowning in the Tagus, at the Caes de Sodré.

Alarmed at the state of affairs, D. Pedro at once summoned a council of his officers; and Soriano relates: "At a military council, which was convened that same night, after the fatal events of Souto Redondo, and which sat until 1 o'clock of the

* Correspondencias, p. 763. Palmella had left Oporto to endeavour to obtain men and money in England.

† Their confidence in their commander had ceased. They nicknamed Villa Flor "General Souto Redondo."

following morning (August 8th), the question was raised whether the occupation of Oporto should cease, or whether attempts should be made to defend it; considering always the nature of its position, the extent of its circumference, and the works that would be necessary for that purpose." The decision arrived at was to remain at Oporto; although, says Soriano, after this affair of Souto Redondo, D. Pedro had at first contemplated taking refuge on board the British frigate *Stag*. As a last resource, he immediately sought the intervention of the Sovereign of England; and his letter addressed to Palmella, on the 15th of August, shows, how sorely he needed the presence of some experienced officer to sustain his hopes and to command his army. But the letter not only shows the despair of D. Pedro himself, it communicates details of the position with which the reader should become acquainted.

"OPORTO, *August 15th*, 1832.

"*To the* MARQUIS DE PALMELLA.

"MARQUIS AND FRIEND,

"As a steam packet is to leave three hours hence, I cannot but inform you that our position is each day more precarious; as I will demonstrate in two words: we are reduced to 5000 bayonets of the line; besieged by two armies; one of 12,000 men, which is at Basto, and the other of 8000, which is at Souto Redondo, Feira, Oliveira, etc.; and, in addition, we are almost blockaded by the fleet, which is in sight, and has not yet been beaten; whilst we have the frigate *Rainha* with its mainmast in a bad condition, and the *D. Maria* with its foremast sprung by a ball passing through it, so that the admiral is afraid to encounter a gale. For these reasons, part of the troops are sanguine and part are not. In consequence, there have been many discussions at the Council as to the means of getting out of this position, and the saving of a large number of victims, whose blood would be shed without advantage to the Cause; and it has been proposed, as was, in fact, obviously necessary, to fortify the city, which has been done, though not well; and to abandon Villa Nova; as we had, by holding it, to guard a line of a league and a half in length,

without reckoning the river frontage. Before the fleet appeared, we had thought of retiring to the Azores; but, since it came in sight, we have seen that that project was impossible; and we then decided to fight without a thought of retreating, which would have disheartened the troops. With a view to prevent bloodshed on both sides, I mentioned to the Council, (when the Count de Villa Flor and Candido were present,) that I could see that in the end, either by force or by hunger (for a scarcity of flour is already being felt), we should have to treat for a convention. This I am desirous of avoiding, that I may not have to negotiate with my brother (a thing I will not do), nor see the affair end in a scene of horrors. But, staunch to my principles of not wishing to promote civil war, and to avoid further bloodshed, a proposition should be made to the chiefs of my brother's army and navy (I will not say in what form) for a suspension of hostilities, until the Government approves or rejects the following proposition:—'A suspension of hostilities, and the continuance of everything *in statu quo*, until the five Great Powers decide definitively, whether the crown of Portugal belongs to D. Maria or to D. Miguel.'

"This proposal did not appear objectionable to the Council; and it will be further discussed to-day: as I begged them, in consideration of the importance of the subject, to meditate twenty-four hours upon it. Although no decision has yet been come to, for the Council only meets at 12 o'clock, yet, foreseeing that the minister of your department will not inform you of it, I have taken the trouble to write to you; it being always a source of great pleasure to me to correspond with persons like yourself. In view of all this, you will act as you please; but my opinion is that it would be advisable that a proposal should be made by England to both the belligerent parties, for 'A cessation of hostilities; and everything to remain *in statu quo* until the five Great Powers decide definitively whether the Portuguese crown belongs to D. Maria or to D. Miguel.' I fear it will not arrive in time; but there will be no harm in such a proposal being made to us, (whether it comes after a victory or after a battle,) even after we ourselves have been obliged to make one:—only, if we had been routed, it could be of little use; for,

in that case, the question would be ended; for reasons which, for want of time, I will not enumerate, as it is absolutely indispensable that I should visit the fortifications which are unfinished. For, as you know, if we make the proposal, and it is accepted, we can do nothing more towards their completion. I hope this will find you in such health as a sincere friend can desire.

"D. PEDRO.

"P.S. Make my compliments to all our friends: Sussex, Palmerston, Holland, Webster, etc., etc."

Besides his ill-success at Oporto, D. Pedro found other reasons for seeking the intervention of England. Spain had again become restless, and its Government was threatening. Almeida writes from Paris, at this time, that D. Miguel had again solicited the assistance of Spain; and that the Madrid Government was much inclined to march an army into Portugal. Palmella, having received his instructions from D. Pedro, writes to Lord Palmerston (August 22nd), that he had received positive orders to solicit the immediate intervention of his Britannic Majesty, in order that there should be a suspension of arms between the belligerents; and that there should be no cause to lament the disastrous consequences of the closing strife which now appeared inevitable in Oporto itself.* The result was, that Palmerston promised immediately to send word to Admiral Parker to order a force to Oporto to protect his Majesty in case of a "catastrophe complete;" and to propose measures with respect to a suspension of arms. But mediation, if attempted, might fail. It was, therefore, desirable, at all events, to find a general. Accordingly, Palmella writes at once to Count de Flahault, begging him to recommend some general who would go to Oporto; and suggesting Excelmans, Lallemand, or Romarino; adding, "The first of all conditions is promptitude."

A short summary of the misfortunes at and around Oporto, which befel D. Pedro's army in rapid succession, from the 23rd of July to the 14th of October, will show that Palmella

* Correspondencias, p. 779.

had not over-estimated the importance of securing a new commander-in-chief. The affair of Ponte Ferreira, of the 23rd of July, was succeeded, on the following night, by the firing of the convent of S. Francisco by incendiaries. It was with great difficulty that the ammunition was saved from the flames; but the troops which occupied the convent escaped, with the exception of two or three who were buried in the ruins. On the 7th of August occurred the catastrophe of Souto Redondo. On September 8th, the Miguelites made an attack on the Serra do Pilar Convent, which, however, was bravely defended by Bernardo de Sá, who, on that occasion, lost his right arm. The attacks were continued on the two following days, and were repulsed with great bravery. Again, on the 16th of September, the attacks were renewed. The Miguelites, however, reserved their greatest efforts for Michaelmas Day, the name-day of their chief. D. Miguel sought to encourage his army by sending a proclamation, in which he called upon his soldiers, not only to conquer, but to swear that their victory should not be deemed complete if they allowed one "rebel" to remain alive! The attack and the defence at three different points were alike obstinate; and great was the loss on either side. That of the Constitutionalists amounted to no less than 77 officers and 569 soldiers,—a heavy loss in a force not numbering more than 8374 combatants of all ranks. The attacks lasted three days; and it is said, that the Miguelites fired during that time no less than 3000 shots.

On the 14th of October, further attacks were made by the enemy, which were again repulsed. During this month, D. Miguel himself joined the army before Oporto. Disappointed at their ill-success, the enemy now hoped for better fortune by changing their general. Santa Martha was reappointed to the command; while on the queen's side, the affair at Souto Redondo having been unfortunate for Villa Flor, the resignation of that general was accepted, and D. Pedro assumed the title of commander-in-chief.

Santa Martha, judging well that the besieged might be reduced by hunger, if not overcome by valour, made many attempts to cut off their supplies. In consequence, during the month of November, continued efforts were made for that

purpose. It is not our purpose to describe minutely the events of a siege in which Saldanha was not engaged. Suffice it to say, that acts of great bravery were performed by the garrison of Oporto, in defence of which the inhabitants assisted, even to the women and children. By day and by night, the town was almost incessantly fired upon, and many were the sorties made by the garrison. We can do no more than allude to the services of the accomplished and gallant Sartorius, who commanded the queen's small fleet.

But D. Pedro had not come to Oporto to be made a prisoner. He had arrived in hopes of expelling the usurper of his daughter's throne from Portugal,—of occupying the country,—and of establishing at Lisbon the Government of the queen. Instead of this, he found himself and his army invested; in danger of being starved; and at his wits' end to discover means of escape:—and this, while the heroism of his troops gave proofs that they wanted only a commander to lead them forth to victory. Situated as he was, the enemy's lines surrounded those of Oporto in a horseshoe shape, and effectually prevented the arrival by land of provisions or reinforcements of any description. By sea, the waves, on a most difficult and intricate bar, so nearly closed the circle, that it was only by landing at the Castle of Foz that any communication could be kept up with the city. It is said that "boatmen sometimes earned as much as seven pounds a night, when employed, under shot, shell, and musketry, crossing a raging surf, amidst the thickly-studded, prominent, and sunken rocks of this very dangerous coast."

Meanwhile, extraordinary attempts were being made, not merely in Portugal, but in England and France, to advance the cause of the queen. Palmella had been making great efforts in London to raise men and money. On the 15th of August, he wrote to Prince Czartoryski with a view of obtaining a Polish legion to go to Portugal: but the attempt failed. On the 23rd, he informs the Minister of War, Freire, that an arrangement was almost completed with Colonel Evans to go to Oporto as chief of the emperor's Staff; but that the news of the affair of Souto Redondo would, he fears, prevent it. "I

have written to Paris," he adds, "most pressingly, in order to see if we can engage some distinguished French officer to go and serve in our cause; but, in truth, it is extremely difficult, under present circumstances, to induce men of note to take such a step."

Other attempts were made to raise an auxiliary force in France. D. Francisco de Almeida wrote from Paris (August 20th) to Palmella, informing him that he has had an interview with General Saldanha and M. Herteaut, respecting the project of the latter to raise a force of 10,000 men to go to Portugal;* and that M. Herteaut has assured him that the Duc d'Orleans and Marshal Soult, Minister of War, were much interested in the project, and desired to further it in every way.† He adds, that Saldanha had said to him; that, although one of the conditions made by the originators of the proposal was that he should command the expedition, he himself was perfectly ready to decline it should his nomination present a difficulty to the realisation of the project: but, at the same time, the general remarked to Almeida, that many of the persons who were to take part in the expedition had insisted that he, Saldanha, should command it. Thus, Almeida appears to have consulted Palmella on the question of command; and it looks very much as if Palmella did not relish the implied charge that he was opposed to Saldanha. For, in reply to Almeida, he writes, "With respect to the command of the said corps, it belongs exclusively to H.I.M. to determine. For my part, I declare at once, that I have not the least objection to General Saldanha being employed in it." ‡

Notwithstanding that his banishment from Portugal was not only enforced by D. Miguel, but was sanctioned by D. Pedro; (for his exclusion from the Oporto expedition amounted to nothing less), Saldanha's courtesy, as well as his loyalty, kept him still an occasional visitor at the Rue de Courcelles, where the empress and the young queen were residing. It is evident, however, that his proposed command found there but scant

* Correspondencias, p. 775.

† Proposals had recently been made for a marriage between the Duke de Nemours and the young Queen.

‡ Correspondencias, p. 792.

encouragement. For Sr. Liberato has published a letter, which he received from Saldanha about this time, from which the following extract is taken: "You know the means by which information reaches me from the Rue de Courcelles. The only person there who has any sympathy with me is the empress. All the others only allow that I was the means of preventing the emigrants from dying of hunger; but they still continue to say, that if I presented myself at Oporto, it would be *necessary to put an end to me* in some way or another. I do not repeat this because I care for such threats, but to show the goodwill with which D. Pedro would look on my arrival there." The English reader may probably be little prepared to appreciate that which is implied in the preceding extract. But we regret, that it cannot be denied, that, in Portugal, assassination was sometimes made the means of getting rid of a political opponent, as well as of a private enemy. We may, as we proceed, have to record instances of such crimes.

The proposal of Herteaut fell to the ground. It had included a loan of 50 millions of francs issued at half the nominal value; and the security was to have been the working of mines in Portugal, of which ten per cent. of the net profits were to be given to the Government.

In a despatch, dated October 17, the Chevalier Lima informs the government at Oporto, of which, in the absence of Palmella, he was the appointed agent, that "General João Carlos de Saldanha, whom I have not yet seen, has arrived in London. D. Francisco, on the 13th, wrote me word, with respect to that general, 'I continue to hear that Saldanha, in combination with Herteaut and Lacroix, meditates *un coup de main* in Portugal; and, I believe, proposes to effect a landing with some men at Figueira or even at Peniche; and this, as I think, not to assist D. Pedro, but to see if he can be the first to enter Lisbon, and to make himself master of the government.' I am satisfied that so extravagant an attempt is not much to be feared, since, for that purpose there would be necessary such ample means, as I do not suppose to be within the reach of those individuals."

If the Chevalier Lima told the truth; if Almeida did indeed write in the terms imputed to him, the conduct of the latter

was an instance of dark ingratitude. It need hardly be stated, that the scheme and the motives attributed to Saldanha had absolutely no existence. Lima contemptuously suggests that the means required were not within the reach of "those individuals." Doubtless he well knew that Saldanha had scarcely means to support his own family; and that, if he should himself leave France, he could not expect the French Government to continue towards his wife and children the generous liberality, which they had graciously bestowed on him when an emigrant in their country. The motive of Almeida's scandal sent to Lima may, perhaps, be found in the unconscious estimate in which the writer held Saldanha's character, courage and influence; which made him fear that, if he once presented himself at the gates of Lisbon, the Miguelite troops might either retire or surrender the Capital; and that, when once Saldanha had, as suggested, "made himself master of the government," the "Almeidas" and the "Limas" might have "to hide their diminished heads." But the reader will not fail to notice, that the Almeida, who thus calumniates Saldanha, was he to whom Saldanha had but recently made a present of his life, while, in giving to him the choice of weapons, he had in an especial manner gallantly risked his own. That which Almeida gave in exchange for his life was intrigue; and, to use the mildest term, scandalous tittle-tattle.

Amongst the officers who had not joined the expedition to Oporto were Generals Stubbs and Diocleciano Leão Cabreira. The former, distinguished during the Peninsular War by medals commemorative of Albuera, Salamanca, Vittoria, and the Pyrenees, was one of Saldanha's warmest friends: the latter, the defender and saviour of the island of Terceira, was kept from Oporto from motives, apparently not of his own choice, if we may thus understand the concluding portion of Lima's despatch to Palmella.

"Cabreira complains, and I think with reason, that he has been overlooked in the promotion made for services in the island (Terceira). It must be confessed, that it was he who preserved for us that bulwark of liberty, and no one can dispute him that glory. I think the forgetfulness ought to be remedied;

for the first duty of every government is to be just; *quand même*, and his Imperial Majesty is too high-minded to do an injustice from motives of resentment."

But although the Herteaut project had fallen through, D. Francisco d'Almeida appears to have been active in his endeavours to enlist the sympathies, and, if possible, to obtain the assistance of the French Government. He writes from Paris, on the 2nd of September, to Palmella, who had returned to London.*

"M. Dupin, who will shortly be appointed Minister of Justice, is highly favourable to our cause, and well knows its importance to France. Speaking to me yesterday, respecting the march of events at Oporto, the conclusion was as follows: 'D. Pedro did not follow my advice, and all the steps he has taken are wrong; consequently, before he asks for assistance in men and money, he ought to beg for good sense.' To this he added many things which cannot be committed to paper." As M. Dupin, Almeida informs us, also strongly condemned the men who surrounded D. Pedro, as well as their measures, it is not unnatural to suppose, that the absence of Saldanha from Oporto was one of the false steps he complained of. Indeed, it is possible that D. Francisco may have expressed as much to Palmella in some eliminated postscript; for, in the answer to his letter, Palmella writes: "For my part, I agree that the emigrants should be sent to Oporto, if we can find the means; declaring positively that I have not the least objection to General Saldanha being amongst them, if his Majesty is agreeable to it."†

Now Palmella's disavowal, twice repeated, of personal hostility to Saldanha's joining the expedition, confirms the idea that he was supposed to be thus hostile; and his words suggest also that D. Pedro himself was opposed to it.

Still the cry was, "Wanted a general,"—the diplomatic faction, indeed, stipulating that it should not be Saldanha! The Chevalier Lima, in a despatch of the 26th of November, informs us, that Lord Palmerston had told him, on the information of the English Consul at Oporto, that affairs were looking very bad there; and that his lordship had recommended that some competent foreign general should be engaged—Excel-

* Correspondencias, p. 812. † Correspondencias, p. 826.

mans, Romarino, or Bem. We wonder if Lord Palmerston suggested the name of Saldanha. If so, the chevalier was silent on that subject. There were some who feared less to risk the loss of the queen's cause, than to see Saldanha's triumph! After many attempts at engaging a foreigner, the French general Solignac was, at length, selected to restore the drooping hopes of the army at Oporto.

But, nevertheless, it was found expedient that the assistance of Saldanha *should* be called for, although the laurels were to be culled by another; and that other a foreigner. The success of a *foreigner*, when the war was over, was not to be feared in Portugal. His light would not eclipse that of others.

Whether circumstances had changed in Spain since Ferdinand VII. had protested against any part being taken by Saldanha in the expedition against D. Miguel; whether Lord Palmerston, on becoming acquainted with that monarch's threat, had at once signified his determined objection to such interference; or, whether the whole affair was, from the beginning, a scheme devised by "*la diplomatie*," by D. Pedro, and his courtiers to keep Saldanha in the background, we leave to the consideration of the reader. Suffice it to say, that, when his presence became absolutely indispensable at Oporto all opposition was made to disappear.

Meanwhile, the army at Oporto had been longing for Saldanha; and his absence was the subject of almost general lament. On the opposite side too, the meaning of that absence was misinterpreted, in a manner which served only to increase the regret of D. Pedro's army for their absent general. From the time of the arrival of D. Pedro at Oporto, it had been industriously circulated, amongst the Miguelite troops, that Saldanha had *refused* to associate himself with the expedition. Indeed, that such was the impression, the author was informed by Captain Bentinck Doyle, who served in D. Maria's cause during the siege of Oporto. He said that when the outposts had nothing better to do, they employed their time in blackguarding each other; and that the Miguelites used to reproach the liberals, that they were such a set of "*canalha*," that "João Carlos would have nothing to do with them."

At all events, the chastening influence of misfortune so far corrected the ingratitude of D. Pedro, and the prejudices of his ministers that they acknowledged the wisdom of sending for Saldanha. But in what manner was this to be done? The memory of his services and gallant exploits in Brazil; his loyalty to the throne and person of the young queen; his stedfast consistency in reconciling the prerogatives of the Crown with the liberties of the people, through that very "Constitution" which D. Pedro asserted he came to establish; his former correspondence with D. Pedro himself; his own private life and family traditions; above all, the esteem in which he was held by the army, the people, and by all but a motley crew of "Intrigantes;"—these motives might well have drawn from D. Pedro himself some gracious letter or message, regretting that the noble general had been, by force of circumstances, banished from his country, and from D. Pedro's side. But no! Saldanha was not to be personally or individually noticed! Some few emigrants still loitered in France and England, in addition to a select few of his own friends and co-victims; and a scheme was contrived to invite them collectively to Portugal, in the hope that Saldanha might be got back without the (fancied) humiliation of requesting his presence.

In September, Palmella had gone to Oporto. It is not likely that *he* advised the unworthy method which was subsequently adopted to obtain the services of Saldanha, although it is highly probable that he counselled his recall; for it was during his stay at Oporto that the "Portaria," dated November 3rd, appeared in the newspapers of London, Paris, and Brussels. It was as follows:—

"Ordered by the Duke de Bragança, regent in the name of the queen, that all subjects of Portugal, military men residing in foreign countries and of whatever rank, should return immediately to Portugal, unless they are otherwise employed in their country's service, or are incapacitated by ill-health or age; and that they may address themselves to the diplomatic agents of H.M.F. Majesty in order that they should be furnished with the means which they may require for their transport.

"AGOSTINHO JOSÉ FREIRE."

"OPORTO, *3rd of November*, 1832."

It is generally recognized that this notice was meant, not so much for the few emigrants coming within the description of its terms, as for Saldanha alone: and it was the only notice, that his country needed his services, which was given to Portugal's most distinguished general and most worthy citizen. At the same time, the Government at Oporto, knowing that Colonel Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro was one of Saldanha's most devoted friends and active counsellors, ordered their agents abroad to refuseto *him* a passport.

As soon as Saldanha learned that the order for all emigrants to go to Oporto did not exclude himself, he consulted his friends, especially General Lafayette and Sir Sydney Smith, both of whom advised him to take no notice of the "Portaria," but to stand on his high position, in quiet reserve, until he received a personal and respectful summons from D. Pedro, or from the Government. But Saldanha's patriotism and loyalty overcame all the inducements to reserve, and he addressed himself, on the 20th of November, to the agent at Paris, D. Francisco de Almeida, requesting that he would furnish him with the means of reaching the seat of war. To this, D. Francisco replied, on the following day, that he had not yet been *officially* informed of the "Portaria;" but that, as soon as he was, and the necessary sums were placed at his disposition, he would furnish them to the general.

Some time before this, Saldanha had been very ill at Paris. His medical attendant in vain sought to discover the cause of his complaint, until one day he inquired if ever, at any previous period, his patient had suffered from the effects of poison. On being told of his serious illness after the attempt upon his life at Beja, the physician at once saw his way clearly; and, with careful attendance and strict diet, Saldanha began gradually to recover his health. In the meanwhile, he wrote to his most intimate friends urging them without delay to make preparations for departure. Colonel Barreto Feio in his answer to Saldanha, dated from Altona, December 3rd, declared that, from ill-health, he himself was unable to leave, but that he rejoiced in the determination of Saldanha to go to Oporto, whether he was furnished by the Government with the necessary means

or not. "Go," he writes, "and may Fortune be so propitious, that, fulfilling the expectations of your friends and admirers, you may, to your own undying glory, give liberty to your country."

Saldanha himself writes, that, by not granting him the means of reaching Oporto, and of enabling him to leave funds in Paris, whereby his family could be supported in his absence, those who did not desire his departure imagined that he would be compelled to remain. But they deceived themselves; for, he adds with satisfaction, that his friend "Angelo Francisco Carneiro at once advanced me 22,000 francs without other security than my word."

Although Palmella still, nominally, retained the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, which Freire held in his absence, he remained in London. On the 25th of December, D. Pedro wrote to him a very sharp letter of complaint, commencing as follows:—

"I presented to the Council your letter of the 6th, to which I have only to say in reply, that I am aware of all the steps you have taken, as well as of the little or nothing which you have obtained for the benefit of our cause."*

But before this letter was written, Palmella had already, on the 21st of December, sent a request to be exonerated from the post he still held at Oporto, on account of the "impossibility of continuing to be a member of the ministry after the changes which have been made."† And he further adds, that, should his services not be required in London, he would wish to return to Oporto, and there render the cause of the queen whatever aid was in his power. To this, D. Pedro replies, January 11th, by accepting his resignation as minister; and, very angrily, adds, with respect to Palmella's services in London, that, "The marquis having, on the 8th of December, addressed a note to Lord Palmerston, (a copy of which has been received at Oporto), in which was written '*This act* (the formal recognition of the queen) *will suffice to quell all further opposition in Portugal; and his Majesty, the Duke de Braganza declares, in*

* Correspondencias, p. 850.

† Correspondencias, p. 853. Joaquim Antonio de Magalhaens and José da Silva Carvalho had, on the 3rd of December, entered the ministry for the departments of Justice and Finance.

requesting the assistance of England, that he is ready to accede at once and without limitations to the conditions which the wisdom of H. B. M. shall think fit to require of him,' " he, D. Pedro, could no longer charge him with the full powers he had hitherto held in London.

The fact was, that D. Pedro considered the proposals to Lord Palmerston, which were underlined, as he remarked, by Palmella himself, very much as a suggestion, that the presence of the two brothers, Pedro and Miguel, might very well be dispensed with, both for the sake of the queen and to the advantage of the country. But D. Pedro had no wish to retire into obscurity. Had he been compelled to do so, a regency must have been appointed during his daughter's minority, and what struggles for power would not have taken place while that continued.

The correspondence on this subject was closed by Palmella defending his own conduct, and by D. Pedro not acknowledging himself satisfied.* However, shortly afterwards, D. Pedro thought proper to confer on Palmella, for his past services, the title of duke; and he offered him the post of ambassador at Paris, a post which Palmella declined; giving, as one reason, that he considered himself pledged to accompany the expedition under Napier, which was preparing to leave England for Oporto —an expedition which he had himself been so instrumental in getting up.

* Correspondencias, pp. 861-3.

THE LINES OF OPORTO
DURING THE SIEGE OF 1833.
OPORTO
Foz
Villa Nova de Gaia
Infesta
Church of S. Mamede
Fort d'Ariosa
Royal Redoubt or Fort of D. Miguel
Arrabida Redoubt
Trou de Loup
Arrabida
Curraes Redoubt
Fort Lamas
Fort Centumil
Fort Begateiro
Fort of Baleiro queimados
Sobral Camp
Cruz de Padrão
Bermingham's Battery of S. Joaõ
Road to Matozinhos
High Road to Braga
Road to Villa do Conde
Road to Guimarães
Road to Villa Nova
Fortified houses of Arrabida
Paranhos
Bulgos
Bulgos Fort
Casa de Bagardas
Medalhas Redoubts
Valbello Redoubt
Monte Feio
Salas Redoubts
Campanhã
Fort Tim
Quinta da Prelada
Pereira
Crucanhos
Carvalhido
Fort S. Paulo
Bat? of Ramada Alta
Gloria Bat?
Lines of Bom Successo
Francos
Casa de Pavilhaõ
Pinheire
Bonfim Bat?
Lomba Bat?
Fort Campolide
Fort Valbom
Camp of Arganil
Wanzeler Redoubt
Quinta de Wanzeler
Fabrica de Louças
Casa de Moreira
Fort Villartinha
Fort Serralves
Bat? of Casa Branca
Quinta da China
Bat? of China
Seminario
Bat? of Pedras Salgadas
Bat? of Bastos
Bat? of Fontainhas
Bat? of Victoria
Bat? of Cortinhas
Bat? of Lordella
Bat? of Convento Terceira
Bat? of Serra da Serra
Bat? of Arrabida
Salabert Bat?
Bat? of Bicalho
Lordella
Nevogilde
Fort Ervilha
Fort Castro
Castelleiro Redoubt
Saldanha Redoubt
Battery
Luz Fort
Light House
Foz
Praia dos Inglezes
Batteries of S. Payo
Fortified Mills
Bat? of Pedra da Cia
Batteries of Cabedello
RIO DOURO
Bat? of Furada
Bat? of Verdinho
Castle of Gaya
Convent of Serra do Pilar
Quebrantões
Bat? of Campo Bello
Oliveira Bat?
Estrie de Areias
Casa da Perveira
Villa Nova Redoubt
Villa Nova de Gaia
Fort Castro
Oliveira
Bat? of Pinhal d'Devesa
Bat? of Fosso Santo
Bat? of Nova
Bat? of Pinhal mindo
Fort Lavoura
Fort Barreira
Camp of Lazeiro Militia
Camp of Aterro Militia
Estrada Grande
Road to Penafiel
Road to Avintes
Ste Ovidio
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Ariosa
Villar
Pinto Ferreira
Penafiel
Rio Tinto
Valbonfo
Avintes
Carvalhos
Olivaes
Senhor Moderado
REFERENCE
Lines of the Constitutionalists
Royalistes
Red.
Yellow.
Scale of One English Mile.
Scale of Portuguese Braças.
London: John Murray.

CHAPTER X.

1833.

Solignac in command—His first exploit—Saldanha arrives—Great demonstrations—Commands 2nd Division—His opinion respecting defences—Council called—Saldanha disobeys Solignac—Observations of various writers—Council of war—Saldanha's opinion—Famine and cholera at Oporto—Solignac loses credit—Saldanha's energy—Battery secretly raised—Enemy attack—Repulsed with great slaughter—Important consequences—Oporto saved—Saldanha warned against assassination—He secretly treats with the enemy—Solignac threatens a court-martial—The generals dine together—D. Pedro acknowledges the truth of Saldanha's former warnings.

GENERAL SOLIGNAC arrived at Oporto on the 1st of January, 1833. On the following day, D. Pedro rode round the lines with the French general; and on the 3rd, Solignac was appointed "General Major" of the army, "under my immediate orders," as D. Pedro was pleased to desire that the decree should be worded. On the same day, there appeared in the Oporto *Chronica* a short complimentary memoir of Solignac, together with an account of his services under Napoleon. It appears that, owing to some misunderstanding with the emperor, Solignac, after attaining the rank of General of Division, had retired into private life, and devoted himself, on his paternal estate, to the special cultivation of potatoes. So useful an employment deserved no censure; but it was alluded to in the *Chronica*, and the allusion was unfortunate. For, whether from the general's want of *dash*, or on account of his foreign birth, or other cause, the soldiers soon began to regard him with little favour; and, ere long, gave him the nickname of "General Batata" (potato), to which were shortly added those of "General Solinhas" and "Donna Anna." He had been received, however, with marked distinction by D. Pedro; and the gallant Duke da Terceira expressed his willingness to be employed in any service that the general might determine.

About this time, there was a partial change in the administration. The Marquis de Loulé entered the Foreign Office; José da Silva Carvalho retained the Finance Portfolio, which he already held *ad interim;* Candido José Xavier took the Home Office; J. A. de Magalhães retained the Department of Justice; and Agostinho José Freire that of War, which he had held since the previous March.

On the 24th of January, Solignac, wishing to show some sign of activity, or, perhaps, desirous of executing some creditable movement before the arrival of Saldanha, determined on making an attempt to occupy the very important position of Monte do Castro. For this purpose, in combination with Admiral Sartorius, whose small fleet was off Oporto, he made his attack.

Although the queen's troops acquired possession of the Fort, they did not maintain their hold of it, but fell back at night to the positions from which they had advanced in the morning. Marshal Solignac on this occasion, excused his ill-success, by adverse winds having rendered the expected co-operation of the fleet impossible. He, at other times, complained of D. Pedro's continual meddling and interference with his plans; and declared, privately, that he had not come to Oporto to hold a divided command.

Having recovered his health, Saldanha left Paris, and arrived in London on the 4th of January. On the 9th, he started for Falmouth, in company with General Stubbs and his aide-de-camp; General D. Cabreira; Lieut.-colonel Margiochi; the Chevalier Domingos de Saldanha; D. Francisco de Menezes e Brito; and José Liberato Freire de Carvalho. In those days, the weekly packets to Lisbon were British Government boats, with but little accommodation for passengers; and it was entirely at the discretion of the officer commanding, as to what number of passengers should be carried. Finding that a vessel was to sail in two days, Saldanha applied for berths for his party, and was at once informed, at the Packet Office, that there were none. He then declared that he would be satisfied with three sailors' hammocks for himself and the other two generals. This request met with a refusal. Greatly disappointed, he proceeded to the residence of his old friend Captain King—at that time holding the appointment of Captain of the Port—and inquired respecting

the packet which would sail the following week. Captain King betrayed a hesitation in his replies, which led Saldanha to believe that there was an intention in some quarters to throw difficulties in the way of his departure for Oporto. Not discouraged by this, he started immediately for Plymouth, and arriving there at night, at once engaged a small vessel, the *Hyperion*, to take himself and companions to Oporto. Placing his faithful servant, José Vicente, on board, he returned, without loss of time, to Falmouth, which he reached at almost the same moment that the *Hyperion* cast anchor in the port. On the 17th, the party embarked; and, setting sail for Oporto, proceeded on their voyage. It was not until the night of the 28th, that they arrived off the entrance to the river Douro. Saldanha and Stubbs immediately went on board the flag-ship, which lay outside the bar, and were received by Admiral Sartorius with great attentions. He frankly described to them the state of affairs in Oporto;—told them of Solignac's unsuccessful sortie of the 24th; that the cholera was raging in the city;* and that, unfortunately, provisions and ammunition were running very short. Saldanha then requested the admiral to furnish him with a pilot to enter the river; and the two generals returned to their anxious companions. As there was, by day and night, a continual firing kept up by the enemy to prevent the landing of supplies to the city, it was deemed prudent at once to disembark, which they did; and, before daybreak, they all landed unhurt on the "Praia dos Inglezes." Thence they directed their steps to the Castle of Foz. After a little delay,—during which a shell fell on the Castle—they again started on foot for Oporto, and were soon met by friends bringing horses for their accommodation.

As they entered the city, the streets were crowded with people, and the windows were occupied by spectators. We are informed by Sr. Liberato, that, in spite of a notice which, on that morning, had been posted in public places prohibiting "gatherings of any kind;" cries of "Viva"; or "the sending up of rockets," Saldanha was received with acclamations by soldiers and officers; by the

* From the 1st of January to August 30th, 1833, it is reported that 4039 cases of cholera were admitted into the civil and military hospitals; and that the total deaths from that disease, at Oporto, during the above period, were 3621.

entire population—"Saldanha, the object of everybody's affections, of everybody's hopes."

The party proceeded at once to the residence of D. Pedro, where they were told that his Majesty was "not at home." This denial does not coincide with the "Court Circular" of that day, which informs the public that his Imperial Majesty did not go out until half-past two and returned at four. Thence they visited Solignac, who invited the whole party to dinner on the following day. At half-past four, they were received by D. Pedro, whose demeanour towards them, as Liberato informs us, was far from being warm and friendly. At night, writes Soriano, a brilliant reception was prepared for Saldanha at the theatre, which was crowded to excess; all expecting to see the long-absent favourite make his appearance. The Government ordered a large body of police to be in attendance. But Saldanha, in order to avoid any chance of his presence at the theatre giving offence, or being misinterpreted, determined on not going.

So great was the joy of the soldiers to see Saldanha amongst them, that, from their batteries, they fired notice to the enemy of his arrival.

Solignac now divided the small army into three Divisions: two of which, the first and third, were placed under the respective commands of the Duke da Terceira, and General Stubbs; whilst the second, and most important Division, extending its lines from Lordello to Foz, was intrusted to Saldanha. It was thus composed:—

1st Brigade.	Commanded by Colonel José Pacheco.	
	10th Infantry.	
	3rd Caçadores.	
2nd Brigade.	Commanded by Colonel Luiz Maldonado d'Eça.	
	3rd Infantry.	
	18th Infantry.	
3rd Brigade.	Commanded by Henrique da Silva da Fonseca.	
	1 Battalion of Volunteers, *movel.*	
	2 ,, ,, ,,	
	3 ,, ,, ,,	
10th Cavalry.		
Artillery.	3 Mountain Pieces.	2 Pieces of calibre 6.
	2 Pieces of calibre 3.	2 Mortars of 5 inches.

On the 2nd of February, Saldanha was promoted to the full rank of Marechal de Campo, of which he had held the brevet rank so far back as February 6th, 1826.

On the day following his arrival at Oporto, he rode round the lines in order to obtain a general idea as to their state of defence. He had not been invited to accompany D. Pedro, who, however, as it appears from the *Chronica* of the day, had, at 2 o'clock, ridden from the extreme right to the extreme left of the lines, attended by an aide-de-camp, and by his "Guarda-roupa."* So simple and natural an act as the inviting Saldanha's presence might have given umbrage in many quarters;—Saldanha must not be too prominently brought forward; his very name must be suppressed whenever it could be! In the course of the day, he was met by D. Pedro, who inquired his opinion as to the state of the lines. "In the worst possible condition," was the reply. "How so?" said D. Pedro astonished. "Without referring to other points," replied Saldanha, "at which, I am convinced, I could gain an entrance with any regiment I ever commanded, I will say no more than that should the enemy at any moment wake up and become aware of our situation, your Majesty, enclosed on all sides, must inevitably surrender." "How so?" again inquired D. Pedro. "The enemy," rejoined Saldanha, "has already a very strong battery at Serralves. Thence their lines are continued to Monte do Castro, and thence to the sea. If, instead of following that direction, the enemy should carry their lines from Serralves direct to the river, it would be impossible, absolutely impossible, for us to receive either ammunition or food." D. Pedro remained for some little time in silent thought: after which, he declared that he would, without delay, call a council. The next night, the generals and chief engineer officers were assembled. "All agreed," relates Saldanha, "with what I had stated; but, they added, that I must know as well as they did, that, with the means at our disposal, it would take many months to fortify ourselves as far as the sea; and 5000 men, at least, would be necessary, even if we had them, to defend such lines." "All

* Keeper of the Wardrobe.

this," I replied, "is true, but not less so is the necessity which I state; and now it becomes still greater, since as the subject has been discussed, it will certainly ere long reach the ears of the enemy. Addressing myself to the emperor, I said, "Your Majesty will lose but little in losing me. Give me 500 men; I will sally out, and see what can be done." On the following day, Saldanha went to Solignac, and declared the absolute necessity for the pine wood in front of Monte do Castro being occupied; as, from it, the enemy could perceive the small beach on which, at night, provisions were landed, in fine weather, for the use of the city. "I know it well," said Solignac, "for it was here I fought on the 24th. But the enemy has a redoubt within pistol shot, mounted with pieces of 24. It would be foolish rashness, to endeavour to establish ourselves there; and I most positively order that no such movement should be made."

"In sadness I left the city," writes Saldanha, in a letter to which we shall again refer in a future chapter, "convinced that all would be lost, if the pine wood was not occupied; and convinced that my conscience would always accuse me, should I, in such circumstances, obey so incompetent a man, who, to our misfortune, had come to occupy so important a post. Accordingly, with that steady resolution which the true love of one's country inspires, on the night of that very day, with four companies of the 10th, I attacked the defences of the pine wood, and, at the point of the bayonet, obtained possession of it. When Major Barreiros, aide-de-camp to Solignac, came on the part of the marshal to enquire the cause of so much firing, I replied, that I was in possession of the pine wood, concerning which I had spoken to him in the morning; and that all the endeavours of the enemy would not make me abandon it."

Long after the queen was securely placed on the throne, and that night's brilliant feat was seen to have been the means of Oporto's safety, and, consequently, of eventual success to the royal cause, did Saldanha, with pride, exclaim, in the letter referred to, "The cause of the queen and of liberty was saved."

"Now," writes an English officer of hussars, "Saldanha came forward. He took the superintendence of the whole left of the line; covering the landing-place, and its communications with

the city. His exertions on this occasion have never been sufficiently appreciated. He deserved every credit for his activity and perseverance in forming those lines, which afterwards became the salvation of the Cause. With very slender means at his command, but with an admirable coup-d'œil, he took advantage of the natural position of the ground, intersected by agricultural stone walls, choosing those whose salient and re-entering angles gave a cross fire. He hastily raised a footing, or banquette, behind them, and dug deep trenches in their front; a covered way communicating across the plain to the lighthouse, and to the out-lying lines and pickets."

Well may this writer remark that Saldanha's exertions were never "sufficiently appreciated." In the *Chronica* of the day, where D. Pedro's ride with his "Guarda-roupa," and his reception of Solignac to breakfast were duly chronicled, not an allusion was ever made to the act of a gallant general, who had himself, by night, led on his four companies to so dangerous an enterprise! Not a word even that there had been any firing, heavy as it was, or that the pine wood had been taken!

Soriano writes (p. 128) that from the very moment of Saldanha's arrival at Oporto, the ministers showed signs of annoyance and hostility; and that even the civility and attention with which he had been received by Solignac was looked upon by them as an affront. He further quotes from the "Revista Historica" (p. 229):—"Neither, in the frightful presence of horrible famine, nor under the terrible showers of shot and shells, did those odious intrigues cease, which were plotted to discredit General Saldanha. Against the general himself there was a hostile plan. What it was I know not."

Saldanha, before he left Paris, was not unaware of the "hostile plans" formed against him, as we may infer from his letter to Liberato already quoted. From henceforth, the author would rejoice if a more skilful pen than his own were employed to interest the reader in the biography of an honest, confiding, and brave man, who, during his long career, will have so many adversaries to overcome, so many intrigues to turn aside, and so many dangers to encounter. But, at any rate, his "plain, unvarnished tale" will bear that impress of truth, which a more

eloquent writer might sacrifice in the alluring language of romance.

In addition to that which the British officer of hussars wrote respecting Saldanha's activity in carrying out his plans, the *Times* correspondent of that day writes, "that the fortifications, as if by enchantment, rose from beneath the feet of General Saldanha."

On the 14th of February, D. Pedro presided at a Council, at which Solignac, the three generals of Division, and the Minister of War, were alone present. It was there declared that there were provisions in the city but for ten days: and, that the enemy, being in possession of Monte do Castro, and of the works they had there constructed, commanded the only landing-place by which Foz could be reached and the city provisioned. Under these circumstances, the necessity for acting on the offensive was declared indispensable. At the same time, it was observed that, while the enemy's force around Oporto was, at the least, 24,000 men, the whole force of the Constitutionalists, which could be spared to march out of the city to attack the enemy, did not exceed 7700. Nevertheless, as their failing provisions rendered such movement indispensable, the opinions of the Council assembled, as to the most desirable steps to be taken, were requested in writing.

General Saldanha presented his opinion written in French, in order that Solignac should not require a translation. The plan was not disapproved of in the Council. Indeed, it seemed a necessity; until, by the subsequent declaration of Solignac, it was shown to be impracticable; for, not only was there a scarcity of provisions, but Solignac now made known that they had not ammunition sufficient enough to undertake Saldanha's proposed attack and march on Lisbon. It is said, that at one time there were but two barrels of powder in the arsenal; and that the government, to keep up appearances, ordered barrels filled with sand to be carried through the streets as if they contained powder.

Saldanha, who had been but a fortnight at Oporto, complained bitterly to his friend Liberato, in a letter dated February 17th, of the shameful neglect of those in command,

by which the city had become reduced to such a condition. He writes, that, fully resolved to do his duty, it is probable he may not survive the misfortunes of his country; and, he sends him, at the same time, a copy of the written opinion which he had placed in the hands of D. Pedro, binding his friend to the strictest secrecy, until such time as it might be made public. Saldanha was resolved to conquer or die: He therefore urges Liberato, in the case of his death, to defend his reputation, and not to let his memory suffer by the calumnies of his enemies. He concludes: "You are well aware of the virtues of my dear wife. But what, perhaps, you do not know is, that I retain the same love for her, and still more friendship, as when we married. How horrible is the reflection that my death may reduce her to misery! But I place my dependence on you and on my countrymen of the liberal party. The cause of my country may, possibly, not be a loser by their charity. For, my beloved Augustus, if his education is continued as it has commenced, will assuredly become an honest man and a real patriot. If we vanquish the enemy, our good cause is safe. If vanquished, the catastrophe is certain. Adieu.

"Your true friend,

"SALDANHA."

"For days we have had neither butter nor oil. We eat our rice with sugar. In addition to the mortality from cholera, there are daily deaths from starvation."

Admiral Sartorius, when Saldanha saw him on board the flag-ship on the 28th of January, had far from exaggerated the state of affairs at Oporto. Sickness was on the increase; provisions were running very short; and the sufferings of the poor were great. Soup kitchens were established by the charitable for the most indigent, who bore their hardships with wonderful patience. The enemy kept up an almost continuous fire; at times, useless, unless to wreak their vengeance on the aged and infirm, as well as on the very women and children. For even these were to be seen within the lines carrying food to their husbands, brothers, or fathers. Often could seven or eight shells be counted in the air at the same moment; and

everyone became familiarised with danger. All that was wanting for continued defence was provisions, ammunition, and a general.* Solignac had lost all credit with the troops. Liberato writes of him: "In his first combat with the rebels on the 24th of January, the only one at which he was *present*, and *personally* directed, he neither vanquished the enemy, nor even profited by the advantage, which might have been derived from his attempt, had he retained possession of the important military position of Monte do Castro, which, during some hours, was in our hands. The enemy, sharper than he, then thoroughly recognizing its value, set immediately about fortifying it; and, by so doing, at once placed in jeopardy our occupation of Foz—the only channel through which we could receive our provisions and military supplies. He quietly watched them fortifying that point without making the slightest opposition; nor did he even recollect to construct some works which might neutralize the harm they could do us. It was necessary that by an extraordinary stroke of luck, General Saldanha should arrive at Oporto, and be charged with the defence of that part of our line, in order that the unpardonable error of Solignac, in resigning the formidable position of Castro, might, as far as possible, be rectified."

A few extracts from the work of the British officer already quoted from will confirm the observation of José Liberato. He writes as follows:

"Saldanha gave another proof of his skill in military defence. The mistake of having allowed the position of Monte Castro to be so strongly fortified, could only be partially remedied; and he did it by erecting a superb redoubt commanding a cross fire. This was called the 'Pinhal,' or Saldanha's battery. The locality was admirably chosen, and prevented the total annihilation of the extreme left; the gaining the 'Senhora da Luz' by the enemy; and the completion of their views of cutting off the supplies.

"Previous to his arrival, every difficulty had been raised and opposed to the forming of works defensively; and every facility

* Shortly after the Council referred to, the weather having brightened, provisions and ammunition were landed from outside the bar with less difficulty, although with great risk.

had been permitted offensively. Although the liberals had no hardworking peasantry for this labour;—their army being composed chiefly of mechanics, to whom it was irksome, and who made little progress;—yet, his popularity, the confidence he had gained in the minds of the lower classes, did wonders. None but the favourite Saldanha could have made such active pioneers of such a people. He lost seven carpenters before he had completed half his works. For they were always under a skirmishing fire; and they were frequently obliged to lay down their working tools, and take up arms to maintain their ground.*

"He likewise built the Pasteleiro battery; and he showed great judgment in the erection of several outworks *en flèche*, which were advanced in the intervals and weaker parts of the lines, and were of the greatest utility in the subsequent attacks."

"Had the enemy, before Saldanha's arrival, cut off the Foz,—a work of three hours with a dashing leader,—they might have completely invested the city, which must have fallen without an assault."

We have, by these quotations, slightly anticipated the events of the 4th of March, which we are now about to narrate. On the 2nd of that month, a corporal of the 24th Infantry deserted from the enemy. He was a remarkably intelligent and fine-looking man, and volunteered much information respecting the army he had quitted. On the following day he was found missing, having returned to the Miguelites. Saldanha at once perceived that the man had come as a spy; and that, from the account he would give of their unprepared position—no guns being as yet mounted,—there would, doubtless, immediately be made a strong attack on the works he had commenced. Anticipating this, Saldanha worked all night; and, before daybreak, a field piece and a mortar were already mounted on the *Pinhal*, or, as the soldiers named it, Saldanha battery.

The enemy, in the early morning, had endeavoured to draw off attention by false attempts on other parts of the line. On the fortified position of Serra do Pilar, the Miguelites, from 3 A.M. until mid-day, discharged no less than one thousand shells.

* The position, at this point, obtained the name of "la flèche des morts."

or shot from the various batteries which sighted it. They made a show of movements from their encampment at Monte Cravele in the direction of Quebrantões, on the left side of the Douro near the Serra do Pilar; and also towards Fervença. But Saldanha was too wary to be thus taken in, or to be misled from the watchful defence of his own position; for which object all his preparations had been made overnight.

To the brave Colonel Pacheco was entrusted the defence of the Pinhal, to the left of the Pasteleiro, with a battalion of the 10th Infantry under Major Carneiro, and the 1st battalion of the Minho commanded by Colonel Ozorio. Major Cabral, with a portion of the 3rd Infantry, was in charge of the Pasteleiro. A strong picket of men from the 3rd and 10th occupied the space between these two redoubts. Colonel Fonseca held the castle of Foz; whilst Major Rangel with the 1st battalion of Volunteers (mobile), was charged with the defence of Luz. Lordello was occupied by a battalion of the 9th Infantry; and the space between that position and the Pasteleiro was held by Major Shaw with a detachment of Scotch, and a few English riflemen.*

Such were the dispositions for defence, when, on the morning of the 4th, the expected assault was made. "I gave orders," says Saldanha in his simple narrative of this affair, "that not a shot should be fired, but at the sound of my voice.† At daybreak, the 24th Infantry and the 8th Caçadores made their appearance, and marched straight towards the Pinhal redoubt. When within a few paces, they were received with grape and shot so unexpectedly, that they fled, with great loss, in the utmost confusion. The action continued the whole day. The enemy, at one time, succeeded in entering the village of Foz, whence they were driven at the point of the bayonet."

Thus, by the well-planned, and bravely executed, efforts of Saldanha, was Oporto relieved from the dangers of starvation, and the consequent necessity to capitulate.

* The above force was officially stated at 1200 men. Ten thousand of the enemy were said to have been opposed to them on the 4th.

† Or, as the hussar officer narrates it, "until the enemy's buttons could be distinguished."

The loss of the enemy was calculated at 1000 men killed, wounded, and missing. It is beyond doubt that 300 dead bodies were left in front of Saldanha's lines. So great indeed was the number, and so much anxiety was felt at head-quarters respecting their interment, that, on the 6th, a letter was addressed to Saldanha by Solignac, with inquiries on the subject. The difficulties attending this humane duty were said to have been greatly increased by the enemy firing on the men employed to perform it.

It was afterwards known that 1000 men had been drawn from the other divisions of the Miguelite army to supply the losses they had suffered on the left.

The corporal of the 24th was shot by the Miguelites as a traitor, for having given them the false information that there was no artillery in the redoubt!

Liberato makes known that greater still might have been the good fortune of this day. He states that twice had Saldanha sent to Solignac to request him to make a movement on the right, feeling confident of preserving his own positions on the left, and, he saw, by so doing, that Solignac might obtain possession of the important position of the Monte Crastro, on the opposite side of the river. "But," adds Liberato, "Solignac remained quiet by the side of D. Pedro at Bom Successo."

On the 7th, an "official notice" of the events of the 4th was given in the *Chronica*.

It would create a smile, if indignation permitted one, to read the pleasant way with which D. Pedro and Solignac are credited with, at least part of, the glory of that day. We read as follows:

"H.I.M. the Duke de Bragança, commander-in-chief of the liberal army, convinced of the necessity for defending, at any price, the fine position of Pasteleiro, in order to secure as much as possible the means of disembarking at S. João da Foz, gave his orders to his Excellency the marshal-general-major; who, after examining the ground, determined the fortified works which should be made in this situation, and charged the General Count Saldanha, with the execution of them."

A very extraordinary assumption of credit to themselves after,

for so many months, D. Pedro and his generals had neglected the only means of securing the safety of their cause. It is equally remarkable that the enemy had taken no advantage of their supineness.

The *execution* is, however, credited to Saldanha; for, the notice is thus continued:

"This general displayed as much zeal and activity in the construction of those works, as he showed skill and courage in defending them. From the Quinta of Salabert to Lordello; from the Casa do Pasteleiro to Nossa Senhora da Luz; in this wide space, which was completely bare ten days previously; was General Saldanha able to repel all the efforts of the enemy's army."

The *Chronica* of April 11th declares with satisfaction; that "The London newspapers, received by the last packet, speak of the action of the 4th of March with vehement enthusiasm. Our victory produced the good effect which could be hoped—the Portuguese funds have risen; and the spirits of our friends, cast down by the latest reports which were circulated in London, are completely reanimated."

It is to be regretted that no detailed account has been published of the attacks made on the different points of Saldanha's lines;—by what particular regiments;—and by whom led. The loss suffered indicates a desperate conflict, at a time when the present arms of precision were not yet invented: and it is probable that acts of heroism were performed, on both sides, worthy of record. That the struggle of the 4th of March led to a change in the whole character of the campaign can no longer be doubted. A letter which shortly afterwards appeared in the *Tribune* newspaper at Paris, written, doubtless, by an officer in D. Pedro's service, is yet worthy of the reader's attention. As a Frenchman, his pride of country would not have allowed him unduly to depreciate the generalship of Marshal Solignac; and his anticipations read now as though they were prophetic; especially where he surmises: "Peut-être le jour n'est pas loin où le Comte" (de Saldanha) "se verra à la tête de l'armée, et *osera faire ce que l'on croît que Solignac aurait du entreprendre depuis quelques semaines.*"

The letter is as follows:

"OPORTO, 27 *Mars.*

"Dans l'affaire du 4 Mars, le salut de la ville et de l'armée constitutionelle a été du au Comte de Saldanha.

"Quand le comte reçut le commandement de la gauche de notre ligne, il n'y avait point de fortifications; nul ouvrage n'était encore commencé pour protéger les troupes et rendre l'approche de l'ennemi difficile. Le comte en fit construire plusieurs, qui parurent faits comme par magie. Les ennemis n'en ont emporté aucun, malgré leurs efforts, dont le seul résultat a été une perte immense de leurs meilleures troupes par le feu de nos retranchemens. On croît généralement ici que Solignac resignera bientôt, et que le commandement de l'armée sera confié à Saldanha. Le maréchal n'inspire plus la confiance que l'armée avait d'abord en ses talents, et en son expérience. Saldanha l'a éclipsé.

"Le maréchal, qui se connait en hommes, a tâché de gagner le comte par des distinctions de hautes espèces; mais Saldanha, aussi bien que ceux dont il s'est entouré, sont tous sur leurs gardes. Ils travaillent sans cesse; et peut-être le jour n'est pas loin où le comte se verra à la tête de l'armée, et osera faire ce que l'on croît que Solignac aurait du entreprendre depuis quelques semaines."

From war, let us for a moment turn to the aged Lafayette (whom Saldanha had so recently left at Paris), and present the reader with the following kind note which he wrote to him at Oporto.

"PARIS, 28 *Février*, 1833.

"Vous ne doutez pas, mon cher général, du plaisir que j'ai éprouvé en apprenant votre heureuse arrivée et votre bonne réception à Oporto. Mon petit-fils, ne se croyant plus utile ici, s'empresse de vous réjoindre. Je m'en rapporte à lui pour vous donner toutes les nouvelles, et vous communiquer toutes les conjectures qui peuvent vous intéresser, me bornant à vous répéter mes vœux pour votre cause et pour vous, ainsi que l'expression de ma bien sincère amitié.

"LAFAYETTE."

Solignac now strove to show himself on the alert. Letters continually arrived from the marshal's head-quarters, signed Duvergier, chief of the staff, addressed to Saldanha. One already on the 5th (March) commences: "L'ennemi ménace notre droite. Si l'attaque se décidait sur ce point, M. le Maréchal ne pouvait laisser au Général Comte de Saldanha le 2me régiment de l'Infanterie légère de la reine." On the following day, the 6th, Duvergier writes: "Plusieurs avis nous annoncent une nouvelle attaque pour ce matin;" and on the 9th, the marshal desired to speak to the general on various subjects. Almost daily letters reached Saldanha, generally imagining an attack; and one letter of the 13th anticipates the possibility of Saldanha having to "vacate his positions, and retreat," by ordering him, in that case, to leave, at the Castle of Foz, only such force as would be necessary for holding it! Saldanha and his brave Staff smiled at the idea of being compelled to relinquish their hard-won positions. Not a man would have yielded, but with his life. However, the counsels generally wound up by desiring Saldanha to do whatever he thought best. The fact was, that Solignac now felt that he had become a cypher; but he did not wish this truth to be apparent.

On the 24th of March, the enemy attacked, on the right, the hill called "Das Antas," and destroyed the works which were there already commenced; but they were, immediately afterwards, driven from the positions they had, for a short time, held. They also made a vigorous attack on the left, marching with three columns on Luz, Pasteleiro, and Lordello; but they were so completely routed by the troops under Saldanha, that the officers were unable to induce their men to renew the fight, as could be seen from our heights. "Thus," as the *Chronica* of the 1st of April writes, "while on our right we obtained many advantages, the enemy was defeated on the left of our lines by General Count de Saldanha, who, on that day, augmented the glory which he had gained by the action of the 4th."

On the 27th, large supplies were safely landed for the use of the besieged, as well as a force of 317 volunteers, who came to assist the cause of the queen.

On the 30th, Saldanha received a communication from the

chief of the emperor's staff, José Lucio Travassos Valdez. We can only judge of its contents by the indignant reply it met with; which was as follows:—

"QUARTERS AT S. JOÃO DA FOZ, *March 30th*, 1833.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SEN^R,

"I have just received your Excellency's letter of to-day, and, in reply, have the honour to remark, for the information of his Excellency the marshal-general-major, that the ailments I am now suffering (some boils and an irritation of the intestines) are the result of forty-one days, and as many nights, of continued labour and anxiety, but that my illness is not of a nature to prevent my continuing on this service. Should, however, his Excellency consider that any other officer can carry out the commission entrusted to me with more intelligence and activity, I shall have great pleasure in making over to him the command. I have for many years used my best endeavours to preserve a quiet conscience; and I have the happiness to assure your Excellency, that it is quite tranquil as to the manner in which I have executed the service entrusted to me. If his Excellency regrets, that the works in front of Luz are not more advanced, still more do I regret that his Excellency has not placed at my disposal the means which, for that purpose, I, for some time back, have so often, and so repeatedly, begged of him. Your Excellency informs me, that the marshal was most tardily informed of the works the enemy so energetically executed in front of Luz; and that if his Excellency had earlier received that information, he would have directed all his attentions to that point, and have reserved for another occasion the works towards Antas. To this I answer: 1st. That his Excellency received notice of those works the very day they were commenced.—2nd. That, for some days past, every one has been aware, that I have requested reinforcements, both for defence and for carrying on the works. (I retain in my possession a letter from Colonel Duvergier, in which he tells me that his Excellency would send me another battalion as soon as the Irish had disembarked.)—3rd. That his Excellency was perfectly aware, that the enemy occupied Monte do Castro with a strong battery; that they had another at Carreiros, and

that they worked assiduously at their fortifications, employing in them two thousand men.—4th, and finally, that as Luz and Pasteleiro were such vital points to us;—for upon them depends our communication with the sea;—and as the city of Oporto has held out for nine months without there being a redoubt at Antas, his not having been informed (supposing that such were the case) of the enemy's operations in the direction of Luz cannot be alleged as an excuse for the employment of our troops in those new works, leaving this position deprived of the force which, in the council of war, had been declared indispensable for its defence. God preserve your Excellency!

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

On the left, simultaneous attacks were made; and, at eleven o'clock on the following day, the enemy left their entrenchments in four columns, advancing upon Lordello, which formed part of the lines defended by Saldanha. The firing continued on this point until 4 P.M., but the enemy were completely repulsed. The *Chronica* reports that, "General Count de Saldanha, with the activity peculiar to himself, preserved the greatest vigilance over the lines under his command, during the days of the 9th and 10th; and, on this last day, when the attack was made on Lordello, displayed that intelligence and skill with which he is endowed." Our loss, during the two days, was 21 killed and 74 wounded; whilst that of the enemy was, it is said, above 600 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides many who deserted the cause of D. Miguel.

Between the 19th and 22nd of April, immense quantities of provisions, including 1436 barrels of flour, were safely landed and brought into Oporto.

Allowing for some prejudice on the part of Soriano, and, perhaps, for some exaggeration, we must yet remark, that his observations, which we are about to quote, were not written on the spur of the moment, but were deliberately made when the war had long ceased. In page 159 of his work, he writes: "The liberal army, at this time, was covered with glory by its recent triumphs; but those which had been obtained by General Saldanha, on the 4th of March, at the redoubts of Pasteleiro and

Pinhal, were so many motives of sorrow and bitterness for the ministers and their partizans, who saw, in the defeats of the enemy, the publication of their own disasters, by the enormous influence of a rival, who, from day to day, became more powerful by his victories."

We must not, however, too easily believe that the language of Soriano was exaggerated. The following fact which he presents (page 175), goes far to support his statement. The *Defeza de Portugal*, a Miguelite paper, had inserted in its columns a very offensive article against Solignac, Saldanha, and Stubbs; which was copied into the ministerial paper, the *Chronica Constitucional do Porto*. There arose such an outcry against the ministers on this account, that the number of the *Chronica* was suppressed, or, rather, was replaced by one not containing the offensive article. "This suppression," says Soriano, "was, nevertheless, made with such ill-will, that, in some of the public offices, the new numbers of the periodical in question were delivered, without the return of the suppressed ones being asked for."

Nothing of particular importance now occurred at Oporto for some time. The enemy kept up a continued firing, which, on the 14th of May, was unusually severe. It was the anniversary of D. Miguel's banishment, when, in 1824, he rebelled against his father; and we learn, from a despatch of the Marquis de Loulé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Chevalier Lima, in London, that during the 14th, 15th, and 16th, no less than 4000 shot and shell were discharged on the bravely defended city.

That the petty intrigues of the Chevalier Lima were still carried on against Saldanha, we have some proofs in a published despatch which he received at London from the Marquis de Loulé, dated May 5th, 1833. After a reprimand for giving to the English newspapers mutilated accounts of the action of the 24th of March, the marquis tells him that the omission of the name of a "certain distinguished person," gave reason to suspect that it was "omitted maliciously."

Shortly before this, as we are told by Sr. Liberato in his "Annaes," considerable intrigues were made for the purpose of

getting rid of Solignac. The Duke da Terceira could not be put forward to supply his place; because he did not enjoy the confidence of the army. "Therefore," writes Liberato, "the ministers, on the 20th of April, made certain proposals to Saldanha, who, in his straightforward way, returned for answer, that he would have nothing to say to their plans or proposals, unless they produced sufficient and valid reasons for the dismissal of Solignac."

Sr. Liberato continues: "I met the count, on the same day, in a house where Major David lodged, and he was speaking to a person who was unknown to me. Seeing this, and supposing that they were engaged on business, I merely spoke a few words and took my leave. But, on my retiring, the count came after me, and, taking my hand in his own, said—in explicit terms—which I truthfully relate; 'If I should be assassinated, my murderers are . . . . . .' The man whom I found in conversation with him, had come purposely to give this warning." The meeting had taken place in the house of Major David, in order that the individual in question should not be seen at Saldanha's head-quarters, where his presence might have excited suspicion amongst those who were plotting against the general's life.

In the character of Saldanha, there was that consciousness of rectitude of intention which led him to do acts that might by some be censured, by others misunderstood, but which none, save the truly honest and the truly brave, would dare venture to imitate. Such an act, we are now about to narrate:—one which gives a direct contradiction to the assertions of those intriguers who pretended that Saldanha was governed by ambitious views, and by the desire to make himself, with his own sword, alone "master of the situation," or "virtual king," as his calumniators expressed themselves. Urged by humane feelings—for a kinder and more tender heart never beat—he conceived, at this time, the idea of bringing to an end by negociation this cruel war. The secret of his plan he kept entirely to himself; or, at most, confided it to his friend, Captain Lord George Paulett, whose ship was then at anchor in the Douro. With his lordship's connivance and assistance, Saldanha contrived to have, on board Lord George's ship, several nightly

meetings with General Lemos and the Viscount da Bahia, chiefs of the Miguelite party; the latter gentleman being the husband of one of Saldanha's sisters. It will ever be uncertain whether any terms could have been come to between the contending parties—even if the negociations had continued. Probably none. The opposite party might, perhaps, have been willing to sacrifice D. Miguel as the means of restoring peace to the country; but the principles of absolutism and liberalism were too widely different to be reconciled, much less united.

The meetings got wind. Some said through Captain Glascock, commanding the British ships in the Douro, who, without being aware of their object, had known of the meetings, and had inadvertently alluded to them. On the 30th of May, an officer of the staff, returning from the city to Saldanha's head-quarters at Foz, surprised his brother officers, by declaring, with a smile on his countenance, that Solignac had discovered, amongst the generals, a traitor in the camp! "Who could it be?" said one. "Is it Doyle?" said another.* "No," was the answer. "It is Saldanha!" The announcement was received with laughter; although the affair assumed a somewhat serious aspect, when the officer declared that Solignac was furious, as was equally so D. Pedro; and that the former had declared that he would bring Saldanha to a court-martial; and, if found guilty, have him shot. The officers present, one and all exclaimed, that, of the two generals, Solignac himself would be the one more likely to meet such a fate.

Saldanha, on learning this, at once proceeded to the head-quarters of D. Pedro, and so convinced both him and Solignac, who was present, of the honesty of his intentions, that the marshal insisted that Saldanha should dine with him on the following day, in order that the army should be satisfied that there was no dissension between them. On this occasion, Saldanha reminded D. Pedro, that if his advice, when Minister of War in 1827, had been followed, when he sent Captain Praça, to give warning to his Majesty, D. Miguel would never

* No one would for a moment imagine that the good-natured and gallant Sir John Milley Doyle, then on D. Pedro's staff, was capable of treachery. It was an involuntary joke, at the expense of a foreigner and of truth.

have usurped the crown. D. Pedro frankly confessed how truly prophetic had been Saldanha's warnings.

Foz was now greatly exposed to a cross fire of the enemy, and nine batteries could be seen from Saldanha's quarters, which rendered his abode a very unsafe one. One morning, calling early for the purpose of inviting the general to dine on board his ship, Lord G. Paulett seated himself by the bed side. Scarcely had he done so, when a shell came rattling about the house. On which Paulett jumped up, saying, "We will finish our talk on board. Good-bye." Saldanha had often been solicited by his Staff to change his quarters; but he never would. On one occasion, he was particularly pressed to do so; and a far less exposed situation was proposed for his residence: but he still refused. Three days after this, the house recommended to him was reduced, by the fire of the enemy, to a heap of ruins.

We have seen Saldanha under various aspects:—as a soldier and a statesman. For a moment, let us glance at his kind feelings as a father. The following letter was preserved amongst the papers of his son Augustus, who died in 1845.

"Foz, *May 17th*, 1833.

"MY BELOVED SON,

"I have had the pleasure to receive three letters from you, one of which was without date. It is a great consolation to me to read what mamma says about you. My beloved Augustus, I trust that you will continue to be diligent, and will understand that you study, not to follow a mere routine, in order to say that you have acquired this and that; but that your object is to obtain the knowledge necessary for advantageously fulfilling your duties towards your country, and to become the stay of your father, of your virtuous mother, and of your brother and sister; for which end I am certain that nature has qualified you, and that you will become the consolation of our old age. Write to me twice a month, and tell me what your studies are; what your last drawing was; and how you are getting on with your music. I should be very glad if you learned to sing. When a man, you would find how

agreeable that talent is. José Vicente is well,* and begs to be remembered. Tell me something about your brother and sister. Embrace them, and give them a kiss from

"Your affectionate papa,

"SALDANHA."

No letters, of this period, addressed by Saldanha to his wife, are now in existence. They were all lost, together with many important letters and documents, when the countess was wrecked in the *City of Waterford*, off the coast of Portugal, in 1834.

* The faithful old servant.

CHAPTER XI.

1833.

Palmella arrives—Satisfactory interview with Saldanha—Opinions respecting Solignac—Council of war—Saldanha differs from Solignac, who resigns—Napier commands naval forces—Saldanha replaces Solignac—Napier to Saldanha—Expedition to Algarves—Loulé reprimands Lima—Persecution of the liberal party—Grand attack on Oporto—Saldanha is made lieutenant-general on the field—Decree of appointment—Gallant action under Napier—D. Pedro desires to treat with Miguelite generals—Saldanha offers to go himself—D. Pedro objects—His motives.

A BRIGHTER era for the queen's cause was now about to commence. On the early morning of the 2nd of June, the Duke de Palmella, accompanied by Captain Napier and the financier Mendizabal, arrived off the Douro, bringing with them five steamers and a supply both of men and money. Palmella landed at Foz before daybreak, and at once proceeded to Saldanha's head-quarters. The petty intrigues of Lima and his associates had caused, as we have seen, a breach between these two distinguished men; and had led each, at times, to colour the actions of the other with dark hues. The frank behaviour of Palmella, in unhesitatingly hastening to meet his former adversary, was responded to by Saldanha with a sincere welcome. They quickly understood each other, and remained some time in deliberation. On leaving, Palmella said, in the hearing of many, "Now that my arrival has commenced so happily, I cannot augur ill for our good Cause."

There had existed at Oporto a strong feeling, that a want of union between Saldanha and Palmella would be unfortunate; and that the former, on his side, had much both to forgive and forget. Much satisfaction, therefore, was expressed when it was known that a good understanding between these illustrious men had taken the place of the previous estrangement.

Palmella had been but five days at Oporto when he wrote, confidentially, to Lima:—"The marshal (Solignac) is an intriguing old fool: his coming was the greatest misfortune to us; positively no one has the least confidence in him."

José Liberato, in his "Annaes," writes: "This general, who had only been brought to Oporto from mean political motives, and by low jealousy of the Count de Saldanha, showed, during his short command of less than six months, neither military talents nor political foresight."

Soldiers are sharp observers of the merits, as well as of the defects, of those who command them; and, certainly, never was a general more beloved and more confided in by his officers and men than Saldanha. A soldier of the 15th Infantry, one day, in allusion to Solignac's custom of riding round the lines in plain clothes, said, "He leaves his fine clothes at home for fear of attracting the balls. See how our Saldanha goes about in full uniform with hat and feathers. *He* is not afraid!"

The opinions thus expressed of Solignac by so many—from Palmella down to the private soldier—foreshadowed the resignation and departure of the French general from Oporto. It occurred on account of what took place shortly after the arrival of Palmella.

D. Pedro, on the 11th, presided at a council which was assembled for the purpose of deciding on their future plan of operations. Solignac, Palmella, Terceira, Saldanha, the ministers, and some sixteen military commanders were present. Solignac, whose *prestige* at Oporto was gone for ever, now proposed to attack the enemy on the south of the Douro, and to march upon Lisbon. This project, which was originally that of Saldanha, had much to recommend it. For it was well known that the inhabitants of the capital were, for the most part, Constitutionalists; and it was but natural to suppose, as events afterwards proved, that, on the approach of the queen's army, they would either rise *en masse* against the usurper, or that the enemy's troops would evacuate the city. Accordingly, the opinions of the chiefs were in favour of Solignac's proposal, until Saldanha addressed them. He represented, that the state of affairs was now much altered since that day when their de-

parture from Oporto, on account of the scarcity of provisions, had become almost a necessity; that there would be rashness in attempting a march of fifty leagues, pursued by an enemy with such numerical superiority, especially in cavalry; and, after giving various other reasons against Solignac's proposal, he ended by declaring his opinion that they could now well spare a force which could be landed at Setubal, or in the Algarves, in order to form a rallying point, on the coast, round which those Constitutionalists might gather who were unable to reach Oporto.

The sixteen officers who followed in turn were unanimously in favour of Saldanha's proposal; and those who had, previously, supported that of Solignac, now begged to withdraw their approval. Upon this, Solignac rose, and, addressing himself to D. Pedro, said, "Your Majesty perceives that all the leading men of the army are opposed to my views; consequently, I can no longer be of service, and I return to France." D. Pedro accepted the resignation, and Solignac retired from the room.

Events now marched rapidly. Admiral Sartorius, on the 8th of June, resigned the command of the naval force; and Napier, who assumed the name of Carlos de Ponza, was, on the same day, appointed in his place. The resignation of Solignac was officially announced on the 13th; and, on the following day, Saldanha was appointed Chief of the Imperial Staff, with the same powers which were possessed by his predecessor—in reality those of commander-in-chief. Thus, he became the leader of the army within a fortnight of the day on which he had been threatened with a court-martial and death!!!

"This nomination," writes General Badcock in his "Civil War in Portugal," "gave them (the inhabitants of Oporto) courage; —he was popular, full of activity, and had given most unequivocal proofs of his intrepidity and skill."

The expedition which Saldanha had proposed, met with immediate approval. Napier, in the naval department, was soon at work; as we learn by the following letter, addressed by him to Saldanha, dated the 14th; which also shows us how anxiously he desired that the latter should command the military force.

"'RAINHA,' *June 14th*, 1833.

"MY DEAR COUNT,

"I have too much to do at present to begin with the guns in the *Edward*. I am now clearing the *Lord Cochrane*. You had better give directions to the officer of the gunboats, who brings off troops to-night, to proceed on board the *Edward* for the guns. You have no idea of the trouble I have to get exertion.

"I congratulate you on the retirement of the marshal; all will now do well. I have written, in the strongest terms, to the emperor and to the minister, to request you may go with the expedition; therefore, push it yourself with the minister. I do not know who is charged with sending off the troops; but I have received one list, and made my dispositions accordingly; and last night I found it all changed. You will see how impossible it is to make arrangements, unless I know beforehand what men are coming. To-night, I have not the most distant idea what men are to embark. Pray explain all this to the person charged with it, and believe me to be,

"My dear Count,

"Yours very faithfully,

"CARLOS DE PONZA."

Palmella, in a letter to Lima, dated June 13th, when the expedition to the Algarves had been decided upon, writes:—"This decision meets with general approbation, except from Solignac, who has resigned. In truth, we lose nothing by that; he was hated by the army, which had no confidence in him. I believe that the emperor will take João Carlos as chief of his Staff; which is the best thing he could do, to give confidence to the troops, and to the inhabitants of Oporto."

Solignac left Oporto on the 18th. Embarking in a small boat at Foz, ere he reached the ship in which he was to sail, he was wounded in the shoulder by a shot from the battery of Cabedello—the only wound he received during his command.

On the same day, Palmella was already on board Napier's frigate, the *Rainha*, at anchor outside the bar, and again writes to Lima:—

"The Duke da Terceira and his Staff are with me. We take with us 2500 men"* . . . . . "Count de Saldanha is appointed general-major; and Stubbs now commands at Foz. Going out, we were greeted with a few grenades, but they did us no harm. For these last seven or eight days very few shells have been thrown on the city. I do not know the reason, but I am inclined to think it is owing to the representations of Captain Glascock (against whom so much has been said), who made use of his influence with the Miguelites, to persuade them not to assassinate women and children."

On this subject Lord Palmerston declared in the House of Commons, on the 2nd of July, that "the manner in which D. Miguel's generals had made war against the city of Oporto was unexampled in the history of civilised nations; slaughtering, unnecessarily, men, women and children, and destroying private property without other object than wanton destruction."

The expedition finally sailed on the 21st. It consisted of the three frigates, the *Rainha*, the *D. Maria II.*, and the *D. Pedro;* the corvette *Portuense*, and the brig *Conde de Villa Flor*. To these were added five steamers, and some transports. Great praise is due to Palmella for having, by the credit he enjoyed in London, succeeded in procuring the means of obtaining these steamers and their equipments. He accompanied the expedition, charged with full powers over all civil authorities; whilst to Terceira was entrusted the command of the military force.

On the 24th, they disembarked upon the coast of the Algarves, at the Alagoa beach, between the fort of Cacella and the battery of Monte Gordo. The official account states that they landed without opposition. On the 25th and 26th, they marched through Tavira, Almargem, and Olhão; and, on the 27th, entered Faro. From the commencement, the enemy, under the Viscount de Mollelos, had, after firing a few shots, retreated; leaving part of their artillery behind, and many officers and soldiers, who joined the Constitutionalists. Terceira had but three or four of his men wounded, including Major Mendonça David, who died shortly afterwards. Mollelos, retreating, entered Alemtejo. Terceira continued his march in pursuit of the enemy.

* The Marquis de Loulé in a despatch to Lima says 3000.

Olhão, Villa Nova, Albufeira, and other towns, submitted. "Unfortunately," writes Palmella, "the people murdered one or two of their magistrates, before our troops reached these places."

In Terceira's first despatch to the Government, on the 28th of June, he was able to announce that, without further bloodshed, the whole of the Algarves had declared for the queen.

Although the despatch from the Marquis de Loulé (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to the Chevalier Lima, which we are about to quote, is of a later date than the occurrences we shall have presently to narrate, yet it is here inserted because it relates to some events we have already treated of. We must premise, that the youth referred to was a son of Solignac; who, having arrived in London, had thought proper to abuse everybody at Oporto. Lima was still pertinaciously intriguing against Saldanha, by endeavouring to substitute another foreign general (Romarino) in the place of Solignac; and, for some reasons, best known to himself, had endeavoured to keep secret, from his own Government, the time when the steamers were to sail from England to Oporto. This drew upon him the following reprimand:—

"PORTO, *July 20th*, 1833.

. . . . . "His Imperial Majesty wonders at the patience with which your Excellency attended to the nonsense of a youth, who, here, was generally considered a fool. As to the insulting expressions he made use of towards the ministers, you may be sure that my colleagues and myself esteem them at their own most insignificant value. We cannot, however, but wonder, that your Excellency, a representative of the queen, in whose service we are, should listen and attach importance to language offensive to the honour and loyalty of the ministers who serve her Majesty." . . . . . "With respect to General Romarino, about whom you interest yourself, his Imperial Majesty has already declared to your Excellency, that he wants to hear nothing more about him; and I am desired to add, that, any contract which you may have made with respect to him—being entirely one of your own unauthorised acts—you may get out of the affair as well as you can, without calling the attention of his Imperial Majesty to a matter concerning which he desires to

hear no more. He, moreover, feels vexed that the Legation of his august daughter should have been the theatre of scenes so little becoming our national dignity, as those which have taken place with the said general, entirely in consequence of the inconsiderate manner in which you have acted." . . . "As to the divulging of the secret of the expedition of which your Excellency seeks to accuse the ministers of her Most Faithful Majesty, such a revelation did not take place when your note No. 85 reached the Government; but it was made known when, by previous packets, the confidants of your Excellency wrote to their correspondents in this city, informing *them* of everything, and desiring *them* to keep the secret from the ministers, for the reason that they, the ministers, knew nothing; and it was not wished that they should. *Thus* was the secret divulged, which was only to be kept from the persons who ought to have been the first to have known it,—such as his Imperial Majesty and his ministers; and, on this subject, his Imperial Majesty wishes it to be distinctly stated to your Excellency, that he highly disapproves of your conduct; and that, notwithstanding all you have to say, he is of opinion that you cannot justify yourself."

We have seen that Palmella, himself, although so recently rewarded with honours and a title, had received the censure—although unmerited—of the regent; and we have also seen how unwilling he was to serve either in London or Paris, under the orders of the actual ministry. The conduct of Palmella with respect to the fitting out of the expedition, had again brought him under the displeasure of D. Pedro. On this subject, Soriano remarks that the ministers, and especially the Minister of War, were much annoyed by the part Palmella had taken in it. He tells us that his coming was the reason of the cool reception which Napier received from D. Pedro; and that Napier was not a little offended, when, at his first interview, D. Pedro met him with his hands placed behind his back; and, by the abrupt manner of his conversation, appeared to be displeased. For that the regent, believing the expedition to have been got up with a view of depriving him of the regency (from the part which Palmella had taken in it), looked on it with most decided

aversion. Soriano adds that it was difficult to restore the duke to the favour (*boas graças*) of D. Pedro, who deemed that Palmella, not only was inclined to deprive him of the regency, but also wished to bring about his departure from the kingdom.

On the 30th of June, it being the anniversary of the day on which D. Miguel had been pleased to accept the crown, the enemy continued from morn till night a fearful fire on the heroic city. The history of this siege might fill many pages with anecdotes of the privations, the patience, and the bravery of the besieged, and of their sufferings from famine, pestilence, fire, and sword. The determined courage of the troops was beyond all praise. Their determination was, doubtless, increased by their knowledge of the frightful persecution which was carried on against those of their countrymen, and even of their relations and friends, who were suspected of constitutionalism. It is reported, that in the fortress of Almeida alone, at the commencement of this year, there were confined, and in a fearful state of misery, no less than 2500 political prisoners.

The enemy, under the command of the Count de S. Lourenço, seeing that the force at Oporto was diminished by the departure of Terceira and his Division, now determined to make a powerful attack on the lines. To this their general was further induced by the hope of obtaining some signal success before the arrival of the French marshal, whose coming was shortly expected in the camp. Accordingly, about midday, on the 5th of July, they advanced with two strong columns of 900 men each, on the advanced posts of the besieged, in the direction of Lordello, with the view of cutting off their communication with Foz. At the Fabrica de Autunes, the first column encountered some resistance from a picket of 24 men of the 15th Infantry, who, yielding to a very superior force, retired; but, nevertheless, in good order. Upon which, Captain Joaquim José Pedroso, with the 6th Company, and part of the 5th of that same regiment, advanced, and, with his comparatively small force, retook the position. For this gallant conduct, he was rewarded on the following day with the cross of the "Tower and Sword." The enemy advancing more force to sustain the position, was met and defeated by Brigadier Duvergier with part of the 2nd Light

Infantry. This brave officer, who had acted as chief of the staff to Solignac, was, when that general left, induced to remain at the special solicitation of Saldanha, who held him in great esteem. During this day's engagement, Duvergier had the misfortune to lose an arm; and he shortly afterwards died, to the great regret of the whole army.

The second column of the enemy attacked the lines on the left of Autunes, which were held by the first four companies of the 15th; but was compelled to retire with considerable loss. In these attempts, the enemy were greatly assisted by a constant fire from the battery at Seralves, and from those of Furada and Verdinho on the opposite side of the river. Thus repulsed on the lines at Autunes, the same column now sought to flank on the right the Quinta do Vanzeller; but Saldanha, who had expected this movement, ordered four companies of light infantry which were posted at Carvalhido, under Major Mellinet, to advance on the Quinta da Prelada, supporting them by the fire of the batteries of Ramada Alta, Gloria, and S. Paulo. The gallant major drove the enemy from the Quinta da Prelada, which they had hitherto held; whilst a Belgian force effected the same object in the village of Francos, situated between Prelada and the Quinta do Vanzeller. By this means, Saldanha was enabled to extend his outer lines to an additional length of nearly a mile. It was now half-past three in the afternoon, and the enemy made no further attempt to regain their lost positions.

Meanwhile, three columns of the enemy advanced towards Monte Pedral: one from the village of Regado; another along the high road leading to Braga; and the third from Paranhos. At every point of attack which was made on the lines, their attempts were unsuccessful. On other localities, attacks were reported, and demonstrations were made by the enemy. They attacked Das Antas on the extreme right; and, at the same time, three corps of the enemy crossed the river from the south to the northern side. But they found that Saldanha, with his brave officers and soldiers, was prepared for them at every point. Great was the success of that day; and great was the depression it produced on the enemy, whose loss, it is said, in

killed and wounded was not less than from 900 to 1000 men, besides 40 prisoners and many deserters. The loss of the queen's troops was reported at but 21 killed and 66 wounded.

Upon the field of battle, immediately opposite the Quinta da China, Saldanha was promoted, by the regent, to the rank of lieutenant-general, for the services so appropriately described in the decree of his nomination.

On the following day, an official article appeared in the *Chronica*, giving an account of the various operations of the 5th of July. It is singular—it would almost appear intentional—that the name of Saldanha was not mentioned in it. True it is, that no one was referred to; but not the less remarkable does it seem, that the name of the general in command, whose conduct was such, that the regent, in a moment of enthusiasm, promoted him, on the field of battle, to the rank of lieutenant-general, should have been thus omitted.

In the wording of the Decree, signed on the 6th, more justice was done to Saldanha. It ran thus:

"Considering the merits and behaviour of the Marechal de Campo, Conde de Saldanha, and the zeal, valour, and intelligence with which, in the presence of the enemy, he has always executed the honourable duties with which he has been charged, especially on the 5th of this present month, when, as chief of the imperial staff, and *under my immediate orders*,* he made the most judicious and wisest provisions both for repelling the enemy in the successive attacks which they made against all the points of our lines of defence, as well as for driving them from some of the positions which they had momentarily become possessed of, directing in person all these operations with the intrepidity, daring, and self-possession which characterize him; I, in the name of the queen, promote the said Marechal de Campo, Conde de Saldanha, to the post of Lieutenant-General.

"D. PEDRO, DUQUE DE BRAGANÇA."

"*July 6th*, 1833."

On the same day, the 5th of July, while Saldanha was successfully defending the besieged city and seat of government

* It is the author who has placed these few words in italics.

with his small army against the large forces of the enemy; the gallant Napier at sea was performing prodigies of valour with his small fleet.

It is not within our province to give any lengthened description of events which assisted in bringing to a termination this intestine war, except where Saldanha himself was immediately concerned; yet, Napier's conduct was so brave and daring in his attack on the enemy's vastly superior force, that a short account of it must have a place in any narrative of this war.

Napier's force consisted of but three frigates; a corvette; a brig; and a small schooner; whilst that of the enemy opposed was no less than two ships of the line; two frigates; three corvettes; and two brigs, mounting in all 254 pieces of various calibre, and manned by 3352 men of all ranks.

Previous to the engagement, Napier, as he himself informs us in his official despatch, had sent Captain Ruxton to Lagos, in the brig *Villa Flor*, to recall the steamers which were there; but both engineers and men, it appears, refused to obey his call, unless with the promise of considerable sums of money.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Napier approached the enemy's ships. Not a shot was fired, by either party, until he came within musket range, when he received the broadsides of the entire line, with the exception of that of the line-of-battle ship, *D. João VI.*, which could not bring its artillery into play. Napier, in his own frigate, the *Rainha*, (Captain Reeves,) closed with the enemy's line-of-battle ship, also called the *Rainha*, which mounted 74 guns, with a complement of 736 men. "Captain Reeves," writes Napier, "and my aide-de-camp, Captain Charley, were, I believe, the first to jump on board—the former receiving three wounds, the latter, five. They were followed, immediately, by myself and my officers, and a few sailors. Captain George, who served as a volunteer, and Lieutenant Woolridge were killed. Lieutenant Edmunds and Mr. Winter, my secretary, were badly wounded. Lieutenants Lyott, Cullus, and I were the only officers who escaped unhurt. Our sailors quickly followed us; and, in five minutes, the ship of the line, *Rainha*, was ours."

Captain Goblet, in the queen's ship, *D. Pedro*, had come up

to the *Rainha* for the purpose of assisting Napier, who gave him orders to pursue the *D. João*, which had decamped in the beginning of the fray. The captain had scarcely received these orders when he was struck dead by a shot from the enemy's line-of-battle ship.

"Leaving the prize," continues Napier, "in charge of Lieutenant Lyott, I, followed by the *D. Pedro*, gave chase to the *D. João*, which surrendered without firing a shot—the officers and crew refusing to fight." In the mean time, the three corvettes and the two brigs of the enemy made off: but, on the following morning, a brig and corvette gave themselves up, and joined the Constitutionalists. At the commencement of the fight, Captain Henry, in the frigate *D. Maria*, attacked and boarded the enemy's frigate, *Princeza Real*. The frigate *Martinho de Freitas*, which was attacked by Napier's corvette and brig, also struck her colours before sunset. The loss on Napier's side was ; officers, 5 killed and 9 wounded ; soldiers and sailors 20 killed and 82 wounded.

A bolder attack could scarcely be imagined, than this of Napier against the very superior force of the enemy. The gallant manner in which he, in his frigate, at once closed with, and boarded the enemy's line-of-battle ship, is, we imagine, scarcely surpassed in the annals of naval warfare. The Miguelites declared, and, apparently, with truth, that there was treachery on their side ; for, of their nine ships, only three entered into action ; the remaining six neither losing a single man, nor offering the slightest resistance. It was, nevertheless, a glorious day for the constitutional cause, and glorious for the brave Napier, who, a few days after the engagement, was promoted to the rank of admiral; and the title of Viscount Cabo de S. Vicente was conferred upon him, the battle having been fought off Cape St. Vincent. Shortly afterwards he was presented by the regent with the Grand Cross of the Order of the Tower and Sword.

After the extraordinary military successes at Oporto on the 5th of July, and the surrender of the enemy's fleet to the valiant Napier—news of which reached the heroic city on the 9th—D. Pedro considered himself in circumstances to offer to the enemy terms for their submission. Accordingly, on that

same day, he wrote to the Count de S. Lourenço, General of the Miguelite army, reminding him that the force which, under the Duke da Terceira, had landed in the Algarves, had been received with enthusiasm wherever it had made its appearance. He informed him that their fleet had surrendered, and that the cause of the usurper might be considered lost. Calling upon him to assist in avoiding the further sacrifice of Portuguese blood, he offered to guarantee that, by their immediate submission, security, both of person and property, should be assured to all those who had hitherto been engaged in supporting the cause of D. Miguel.

The regent forwarded this communication, by one of his aides-de-camp, to the advanced posts of the enemy; where, after a considerable delay, he was informed that the Count de S. Lourenço declined to enter into any correspondence with D. Pedro.

Liberato writes: that, on this occasion, Saldanha had offered to go in person to the enemy's camp, and treat of means for putting an end to the war. Had Saldanha listened to the voice of ambition, its whisper might have told him, that by so doing he would risk the opportunity of being himself the one to strike that final blow, which should place the queen upon her throne. But, although he might lose the future glory of success, he was deaf to such suggestions. Moreover, D. Pedro was averse to this step. He, perhaps, now had that confidence in his general, which led him rather to prefer the risk of defeat than the acceptance of conditions which, while securing the departure from Portugal, of his brother, Miguel, might stipulate a similar fate for himself, in order to ensure the undisputed possession of the crown for his daughter Maria.

D. Pedro may have imagined, that Palmella, during his short stay at Oporto, had succeeded in persuading Saldanha how acceptable such terms would be to the Portuguese people in general; and he may have feared, that Saldanha would seize the opportunity to retaliate on him for the slights which he had received, and the neglect to which he had been subjected. D. Pedro, probably, was not without some suspicion of the ambitious views of Palmella; who, it was pretended, during

the minority of the Queen, aspired himself to the regency, should her father no longer hold it; and there were not wanting some who insinuated that, armed with such power, Palmella would endeavour to bring about a marriage between the young queen and his own son. This project, if it existed, may have arisen from the fact, that, both by the ancient law of the realm, as well as by the modern Constitution, the Queen was prohibited from marrying a foreigner. And it may have gained strength from the general feeling on this subject, which was so great, that when, afterwards, the Chambers sanctioned a marriage with a foreigner, there were some who were heard, indignantly, to exclaim: "Was there no *fidalgo* in Portugal good enough for her?"

CHAPTER XII.

1833 (*continued*).

Marshal Bourmont arrives at D. Miguel's camp—His threat—Loulé's confidence in Saldanha—Bourmont's boast—Grand attack—Saldanha's gallant charge—Remonstrance of Pacheco—Enthusiasm at Oporto—Cadaval evacuates Lisbon—Terceira enters—D. Pedro embarks for Lisbon—Extraordinary powers given to Saldanha—Correspondence with Miguelite general—Saldanha compels the enemy to raise the siege—Deputation of officers—Saldanha's strategy—Bourmont besieges Lisbon—Letter from Lafayette.

WE have seen, in the preceding chapter, how little prospect there appeared to be of the war being brought to an end by any terms of compromise between the belligerents. D. Miguel, who was in the neighbourhood, probably knew that his own retirement from the scene must be one of the terms of such compromise, and flatly refused all negotiation on the subject. Added to this, if present success had raised the hopes of the Constitutionalists, his own hopes had equally become more sanguine by the arrangements which he had recently made for the entrance into his service of the renowned French marshal—Napoleon's Marshal Bourmont—who was daily expected to arrive before Oporto.

Bourmont, as is well known, was one of Napoleon's most distinguished generals. We read that, at the early age of twenty-six, he had been appointed by the Count d'Artois to a high command in the royal armies. Serving afterwards under Napoleon, his gallant conduct was mentioned in several official despatches, especially on the occasion of the battle of Dresden, and after his brave defence of Nogent. He equally distinguished himself in the campaign of 1814; and, in 1829, as Minister of War, he planned the expedition to Algiers, of which he took the command, and obtained, by his skill and courage, a high reputation for his military conquests in Africa.

His departure for Oporto caused an impression very unfavourable to the success of the cause of Queen D. Maria. He was accompanied by several French generals, amongst whom were Clouet and Larochejaquelein, besides many officers of distinction who had seen service.* When the engagement of their services became known, the Portuguese funds immediately fell on the Stock Exchanges both of London and Paris; and the British and French Governments thought proper to augment their naval forces in the Douro. A circumstance which rendered the undertaking of Bourmont to all appearance less difficult, was the unwarrantable conduct of Solignac, who, on his arrival at Paris, in order to excuse his own failure at Oporto, had written a pamphlet, in which he publicly made known many details, the knowledge of which would prove of great advantage to the enemy.

The presence of Marshal Bourmont in Portugal was not looked upon as a matter of merely local interest, by which simply was to be decided, whether D. Maria or D. Miguel should reign in that country. A diplomatic agent of the latter, who, probably, had been greatly instrumental in effecting the marshal's engagement, wrote, at this time, that, "Bourmont ought to consider that his mission, in going to Portugal, was to defend not only the Portuguese Cause,—but the Cause of legitimacy in the Peninsula, in Europe, and in the whole world: such is the immense importance of a successful termination to our efforts." True it is, that, at this period, the eyes of statesmen in all countries were turned to this small, and at times, unimportant corner of Europe, where, as one of them observed: "The great battle for political principles—liberal or despotic—is to be fought."

On the morning of the 10th of July, (1833) Saldanha, according to his daily custom, entered D. Pedro's apartment, and announced that nothing new had occurred. "What," said D. Pedro, "do you not know that Bourmont, yesterday, took

* The Miguelite authorities state, that Bourmont brought with him to Portugal, 12 French generals; 3 colonels; 10 lieutenant-colonels; 10 majors; 24 captains; 25 lieutenants; 19 ensigns; and 2 surgeons. Pinho Leal, vol. vii. page 357.

the command of my brother Miguel's army?"—"How many thousand men," rejoined Saldanha, "has he brought with him?"—"No men," was the answer, "but about 100 officers. You and Pimentel" (the latter was already with D. Pedro when Saldanha entered) "are the only *fanfarons* who are not troubled by the arrival of these French officers."—"Sire," interrupted Pimentel, (then quartermaster-general), "I have already had the honour to tell your Majesty, that I served several years in the great armies of Napoleon; and, your Majesty may depend upon it, that not one of the marshals of France can give lessons to your chief of the Staff."

Surrounded by such officers, and Pimentel was but one amongst many who were conspicuous for their bravery, Saldanha awaited the coming events. Never, perhaps, did a general feel more sure of his officers and men: never had men and officers more confidence in their general.

But foreign merchants, who hitherto had courageously stood the dangers of the siege, were, for the most part, panic-stricken; and many took refuge on board the ships of their respective nations anchored in the Douro.* This proceeding was not to be wondered at, when it became known that Bourmont, "the invincible conqueror of Algiers," had come to carry on a war, not only of conquest, but of extermination; that his orders to General Larochejaquelein were to destroy and burn everything in the Alemtejo, wherever resistance was offered; and that he had threatened to make of Portugal "une nouvelle Vendée."

The Marquis de Loulé, in reference to the arrival of Marshal Bourmont, writes to the chevalier Lima, in London, that, "it has had no effect on the minds of our brave soldiers, nor on our august chief who commands them, nor on the well-deserving

* Captain Doyle informed the author that he was present at a parting dinner given to himself and a few other officers by a young Englishman, engaged in trade, who was about to leave Oporto on the morrow. Their host, after congratulating himself on his speedy deliverance from danger, raised his glass to drink success to their cause, and, especially, safety to those around him. Scarcely had he uttered the words, when a crash was heard from above, and a shell, descending through the ceiling, crushed to death the unfortunate civilian,—leaving the others unhurt—as it passed through the floor, and exploded in a room beneath.

(*benemerito*) General Saldanha. Indeed, still more desirous have they become to try their strength with the rebels commanded by a skilful general, as greater glory to them will be the result of their victory."

A bitter draught to Lima must have been the knowledge of the estimation in which Saldanha was now held by the Government at Oporto. But he had a still more nauseous one to swallow ere long. For, on the 21st, Loulé again writes to him as follows:—

"From what you say of Marshal Solignac, his Imperial Majesty sees that Lord Palmerston knows him better than you do, and is vexed that your Excellency, (as his Majesty is informed), at a dinner given by Prince Talleyrand, where the marshal was present, neither contradicted nor refuted his assertions, which were anything but true. The fact that no one here lamented his departure, or desired to retain him; and that the French themselves were those most satisfied at his leaving, is quite sufficient to characterize the man. Therefore, by no means should you endeavour to induce him to return, or even put such an idea into his head." . . . "With respect to foreign generals, his Majesty wishes you to know that we have no need of them; and that he confides in the activity and talent of General Saldanha. And, it is my duty to inform you, that this well-deserving officer, together with the whole army, far from being dispirited by the coming of Bourmont, are full of the greatest enthusiasm to have the opportunity of fighting a general of such well-known ability, but who is, in other respects, held so low in public estimation."

Another despatch, of the same date, from Loulé, appears to throw some light on the reason why there had been so much difficulty, at a former period, in obtaining from Lima, and others, succour for the emigrants, or means to enable them to reach Oporto. It runs thus:—

"I have received your despatches, Nos. 106 and 107; the latter containing the current accounts of this mission to the time when it ceased to be an embassy, and since it passed to the hands of your Excellency.

"In the former, you declare the impossibility of sending out

the corvette *Constituição*, with the 200 sailors which Admiral Viscount do Cabo de S. Vicente had asked for, from want of the necessary funds for that purpose. To which, his Imperial Majesty, Regent in the name of the queen, desires me to reply; that if the money wasted with General Romarino, with whom the government never authorized you to negotiate, had not been unduly applied, it would have been more than sufficient to fit out the corvette, and despatch her with the sailors which the Admiral required. If the action of the 5th had been unsuccessful,* for want of an additional vessel, a heavy responsibility would have fallen on those persons who, at their discretion, dispose foolishly of the means with which they are intrusted, instead of employing them usefully, or according to the orders they receive from their government. If the immense sums, which, during the last two years, have been placed at the disposal of the agents of her M. F. Majesty had been faithfully applied, according to the instructions of the government, his Majesty and the loyal subjects of the queen would,—from the constancy and valour of the brave army which fights for the rights of the queen D. Maria II.—have witnessed far different results. His Majesty is so convinced of this, that he orders me to make known to your Excellency his firm resolution not to admit the smallest item of expense, however insignificant it may be, unless ordered by the Government; or unless it can be justified by such an urgent necessity as would not allow of time to make application to the ministry."

The news which reached the enemy's lines of the surrender of their fleet to Napier, coupled with the successful landing and progress of Terceira in the Algarves, appeared to determine Bourmont to make, without delay, some great effort at Oporto, which should counterbalance the losses sustained elsewhere. He was confident of success. The force of which he could dispose is estimated by Soriano at not less than 35,000 men. On the evening of the 24th of July, Bourmont wrote to D. Miguel, laconically observing: "To-morrow we shall dine in Oporto." †

It having become known to Saldanha, that, on the 23rd and

* That fought so gallantly by Napier.

† D. Miguel himself was at Monte S. Jaens, a league and a half from Oporto.

24th, Bourmont had massed almost the whole of his forces on the north side of the Douro, he anticipated a very serious attack on his lines. At a quarter past five, on the morning of the 25th, a heavy artillery fire was directed on the position of *Quinta do Vanzeller* from the enemy's battery at *Serralves*; and, at the same time, their batteries of *Verdinho* and *Furada*, from the opposite side of the river, discharged their cannon on the positions of *Lordello* and *Pasteleiro*.

Saldanha, having heard during the night the distant march of cavalry and the rumbling of artillery, had already, at 3 A.M. taken up his position at Fort *Gloria*, on the *Monte Pedral*, in order, at first break of day, to observe the movements of the enemy. At half-past five, it was discovered that between twelve and fourteen hundred men were marching from their lines between *Ariosa* and *Mattozinhos*, on the positions of *Francos* and *Prelada*. A much larger force, estimated at 3500, with six field pieces and two squadrons of cavalry, advanced in three columns towards the left, the right, and the front of the *Quinta do Vanzeller*. Thither Saldanha immediately hastened; this being one of the most important positions on his lines. Approaching *Lordello*, a nearly equal number, 3000, including a squadron of cavalry, made their appearance; whilst on the right and left of *Pasteleiro*, the enemy advanced two columns of infantry; three squadrons of cavalry; and ten pieces of flying artillery—forming a force of about 3800.

Saldanha at once perceived that the primary object of the enemy, as previously so often attempted, would be to cut off his communications with *Foz*. At six o'clock, the attack was general along the lines we have mentioned. At *Francos*, the small force was obliged to retire before the large attacking party of the enemy. On this, Saldanha ordered Captain Solla to march to their relief with 120 men of the "Queen's Volunteers," who were stationed at *Carvalhido;* and he quickly retook the momentarily lost position. Twice did the enemy again become possessed of the redoubt; when Solla (afterwards Baron dos Francos), a rough soldier, but brave as a lion, again came to the rescue; and, uniting his men to those who had previously retired, valiantly charged the enemy with the

bayonet. The bold attack was irresistible. They fled, leaving above eighty men dead on the field.

The enemy, during the time they were in possession of *Francos*, had detached 300 men to attack the *Casa da Prelada;* but they were encountered there by Major Millinet, who successfully defended that point.

The three columns of the enemy, which, as we have said, advanced towards the *Quinta do Vanzeller*, planted, when within musket shot, two field batteries; the one, in front of the Quinta; the other, opposite the redoubt of that name, situated at the extreme end on the right. Thus supported, the enemy advanced at a quick step on the Quinta, and towards the lines between that point and *Lordello.*

The great numerical superiority of the enemy having enabled them to force a part of the line between the Vanzeller redoubt and *Francos*, Colonel Moura Furtado advanced with part of his regiment and compelled them to retreat. At the same time, Lieutenant-colonel Borso, with the force of light infantry under his command, supported by Major Cassano and Captain d'Appice with their respective followers, charged the right of the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and completely routed them with great slaughter.*

The central column of the enemy appeared as yet to have made no advance; but it served as a point for the fugitives on the right and left to re-unite. Saldanha, judging that the enemy, supported by their field pieces, after re-forming their broken columns, meditated an attack, determined on anticipating them. Accordingly, he gave orders to Colonel Furtado to advance from the extreme left of the Quinta, together with the company commanded by Captain Nuski; whilst Major Cassano with Captains D'Appice, Piri, and Larchmann, with their respective companies, advanced from its extreme right. These forces made a simultaneous and vigorous attack both on the

* Poor Borso, at a later period, entered the Spanish service. After an unsuccessful attempt at a counter-revolution in 1841, he was shot at the same time as the brave and talented General Leon. Borso was a native of Piedmont. Several of that country's best Generals, Cialdini, Durando and others, served their apprenticeship in Portugal, under Saldanha. We have reason to know how they all venerated their distinguished chief.

right and left flanks of the enemy. On this, the brave Borso, leaving in the redoubt a company of public *employés* and some volunteers, put himself at the head of the company commanded by Captain Zuppi, and charged the enemy with such impetuosity, that they retired in great disorder. Their flying artillery would probably have been taken, had not two squadrons of their cavalry, which up to this moment had been concealed behind some fir trees, come to their assistance. At twelve o'clock, the enemy having for the fifth time re-formed their columns on these points, prepared for further attacks: but, Saldanha having thrown forward from Carvalhido a force of lancers, some infantry, and two guns as a support, the enemy were compelled to retire from in front of these positions, and with such little order that they left 150 officers and men on the field.

The forces of the enemy which advanced on Lordello approached in four columns; with two of which they endeavoured to break the lines on the right of that position; but were bravely repelled by the force under the command of Colonel Celestino and Major Pedroso. The enemy's cavalry, however, coming down upon them in force, they sheltered themselves behind a wall whence they had previously dislodged the enemy. The other two columns attacked the lines on the left of *Lordello*, and were met by Colonel Shaw and his Scotch Fusiliers. Owing to their great superiority in numbers, the enemy obtained a temporary advantage; but, Colonel Shaw, being reinforced, twice returned to the attack, and, at the point of the bayonet, regained his positions, and drove the enemy to a distance beyond them.

Frustrated in all these attacks, the enemy three times attempted to force the centre of the left lines near the *Casa Branca*, but each time were repelled with considerable loss; not only by a constant fire of musketry, but by a gun which they had not expected to find in position, and by a well-directed fire from the *Salabert* battery. By half-past eleven o'clock, they had retired from further attacks on this position, leaving 137 dead in front of the lines.

The attack on the *Pasteleiro* battery, directed by General Larochejaquelein, was made by two columns of the enemy, of

which, one advanced on the right, the other on the left. Their ten pieces of field artillery were planted in front of the battery itself; the cavalry remaining somewhat in the rear. This battery was defended by the brave Colonel Pacheco, with his usual skill and determination, during a period of five hours; resisting, successfully, all the efforts of the enemy. On the right of the battery, they made continuous attempts to break the line, the ground of which was disputed inch by inch. After resting an hour, a further and very determined attempt to break the lines was made: but Major Miranda, having skilfully sent round the 5th company of the 10th Infantry to attack their flank, whilst he himself charged them in front, the enemy were completely routed with great loss. Round about Pasteleiro, they left no less than 230 dead, besides 53 horses—the cavalry having taken great part in the various movements.

During all this time, Saldanha had been, as we may say, everywhere, directing, encouraging, or leading his men and officers. At ten o'clock, he had ridden in the direction of Antas and the battery of Bomfim, on the right of the lines, convinced that his presence there would be required in the course of the day. Returning to the left, which he did not quit until he was certain of its security, he charged the trustworthy Solla with the defence of the Quinta do Vanzeller, which had been already three times so hotly attacked, and proceeded to the *Gloria* battery, where D. Pedro had stationed himself. He there informed his Majesty that he was about to return to the lines on the right; "For," said he, "Bourmont is a general; and, were I in his place, I would make an attack in that direction, while our attention and forces are so actively engaged on the left."

As Saldanha had anticipated, about one o'clock, the enemy advanced towards the lines a force of 600 men from their columns at Campanhãa, which consisted of between four and five thousand men. The pickets retired: but, being quickly reinforced by Colonel Mesquita with the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 12th Caçadores, the enemy withdrew. Half-an-hour afterwards, the same force of the enemy marched on the pickets,—stationed in front of and between Bomfim and Goelas de Páu,—which were compelled to retire.

Saldanha, at this moment, neared the spot with his Staff, and seeing the great advantage it would be to the enemy if they obtained possession of these positions, he immediately ordered up a portion of his reserves. At the same time, the enemy rapidly advanced. A French battalion retreated before a formidable line of sharpshooters, supported by three battalions of the enemy in column.* Saldanha rode at once to the spot. Then, seeing it impossible to recall to the defence of the position the dispersed Frenchmen, who cried out, as they retreated, "Envoyez vos Portugais;" and perceiving that the enemy—unless checked—must necessarily reach the points in dispute before reinforcements could arrive, he, Saldanha, the general in chief command, and on whom all hopes rested, with a bravery, which would have been deemed madness had it been unsuccessful, gallantly charged the enemy at the head of his Staff, followed by twenty lancers, and threw the astonished battalions into complete and inextricable confusion. This "audaciously daring" charge broke the first advancing battalion; and they, turning, communicated their disorder to the others.

General Badcock, in his work on the siege of Oporto, describes the conduct of Saldanha throughout as "audaciously daring;" and declares, "that there never was so brilliant a cavalry charge, productive of such important results. Without it, the enemy would have been in Oporto."† Indeed, the partisans of D. Miguel within the city—and there were some—had felt so assured of Bourmont's success on that day, that they had prepared, at their various houses, dinners for their expected friends; besides that jubilant reception for Bourmont and his Staff which the renowned French marshal had exultingly anticipated.

At two o'clock, after nine hours' hard fighting, the enemy desisted from further attacks. Bourmont was discomfited, and the hopes and expectations of his employers were disappointed.

* The author thinks it proper to observe that the terms battalions and regiments, when spoken of, do not necessarily imply such a force as is generally understood by these words.

† This bold charge was much commented on at the time by French writers on military tactics, in discussing the relative value of infantry and cavalry forces.

Saldanha was the idol of his brave army; and even the official *Chronica* now did him reluctant justice. We find it written:

"Lieutenant-General, Count de Saldanha, chief of the imperial Staff, as a valiant soldier was to be seen wherever there was most danger. As a skilful general, he executed with the greatest prudence and discretion the *orders of his Imperial Majesty*;* and contributing *in this manner*,* towards the fortunate results of the day, merited the approbation of his Majesty, and acquired fresh rights to the gratitude of his country." . . . . . "Thus the arms of the queen conquered; and the noble deeds of this glorious day will pass to posterity in the most brilliant pages of Portuguese history."

The following is an official list of the officers who made the cavalry charge headed by Saldanha, on the 25th of July, 1833.

Major D. Fernando Xavier de Almeida. Killed.
Captain Y. S. Guillet. Wounded.
Lieutenant D. Miguel Ximenes.
Lieutenant Jorge Vanzeller.

The above were on the general's Staff.

Major J. A. Vellez Barreiros, Engineers.
Lieutenant-Colonel B. de Almeida Pimentel, Quartermaster-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel P. P. Ferreira de Sousa, Deputy-Adjutant-General.
Captain Luiz de Mello Breyner, Cavalry, Assistant-Adjutant-General. Wounded.
Captain J. J. de Amaral, Assistant-Quartermaster-General.
Cornet A. de Mello Breyner, Dep.-Assist.-Quartermaster-Genl. Badly wounded.
Captain João de Vasconcellos e Sousa.
Ensign J. A. Lopes.
Major D. M. Pereira de Barros, Cavalry. Badly wounded.
Brigadier Bento de França Pinto d'Oliveira. Wounded.
Lieutenant-Colonel M. M. da Rocha Colmeiro. Wounded.
Cornet A. Sotero de Faria.
Cornet A. N. de Almeida e Liz.

These officers were supported, as we have stated, by twenty lancers and their captain, who were for the most part wounded. It may literally be said, that a thrill of horror ran through the camp, and through the city, when it became everywhere known to what fresh danger their general, on whom all hopes rested, had, on this day, exposed himself. Truly, it was well known, his "audacious daring" was a matter of every day occurrence.

* The reader is requested to observe the italics, which are the author's.

Of this we may judge by the almost indignant remonstrance which this last act drew from the brave Pacheco, whom we have already mentioned, and to whom we shall again have to refer.

"*July 27th.*

"MY DEAR COUNT,

"I beg to say that not only your friends, but most other people, are not pleased that, without necessity, you risk not only your own life, but, also our good Cause; and this, often, in such trifling matters, as any officer would execute satisfactorily at your command. The appointment you hold has other and more necessary duties attached to it, which you have fulfilled, and do fulfil, so completely, that we consider ourselves most fortunate in possessing you. Moreover, in addition to these reasons, which I trust will meet your consideration, you do injustice to the officers of the liberal army, if you suppose them not capable of retaking any position you may order them to retake, without your own example being necessary to lead them on. If you acknowledge the truth of this, and yet act otherwise, you act contrary to our general welfare, which, it is greatly to be desired, you should not do.

"General, this is an injunction which a friend and a lover of his country may presume to give; and which should be most religiously obeyed.

"J. J. PACHECO."

The loss to the enemy on the 25th of July was very great. Bourmont and his generals had ordered their men to the attack with constant pertinacity. Above 600 dead bodies were left in front of the batteries and positions they attacked. It is difficult to ascertain the precise losses of the enemy; but, even at a moderate estimate, the number put *hors de combat* was not less than 2000. On the queen's side, the official report gave but 57 killed, and 221 wounded. Another account, perhaps more correct, states them at 83 and 280 respectively.

This short account of the operations of this important day, will enable the reader to form but an imperfect idea of the "many and persistent attacks made by Marshal Bourmont;"

which, adds Soriano, "were almost beyond imagination continuous and terrible."

General Badcock, having vividly described the great impression made at Oporto by the arrival of the "Conqueror of Algiers," writes, that Saldanha continued to give "signal proofs of his activity, skill, and bravery." He remarks, "that the great trial of strength, of numbers, and boasted skill against the constancy and courage of the few commenced at daybreak on the 25th." After describing the various attacks which were made with great bravery on all points,—"the Miguelite cavalry, especially, astonishing all who beheld them"—he continues (respecting the charge we have already mentioned) that, "Saldanha hastened to the point assailed; and, finding that the foe had made some impression, he, followed by the whole of his numerous staff, headed about forty* lancers, and cleared the ground by as gallant a charge as ever was made."

Sr. Liberato, who was present during the siege, tells us that, even on this day, such was the faith the whole city had in Saldanha, that, amidst the roaring of cannon and fire of musketry, all business went on as usual, no one thinking of the possibility of a SALDANHA being vanquished. "Within our trenches," writes Liberato, "there was to be seen a spectacle still more admirable, more extraordinary, and more heroic: women were there present firing their muskets from amongst the ranks: others supplied the soldiers with cartridges, which, in order to enable them to load more quickly, they themselves bit: some conveyed powder and shot, as well as drink and food, to the weary troops: whilst others were seen hastening to the hospitals with the wounded on their shoulders."

For his services on this day, by a decree dated August 26th, D. Pedro conferred on Saldanha the Grand Cross of the "Tower and Sword of Valour, Loyalty and Merit." The decree was worded as follows:

"COUNT DE SALDANHA, Lieutenant-General of the Royal Armies, Chief of my Imperial Staff.—Friend,—I, the Duke de Bragança, Regent in the name of the queen, send you greeting

* The official account gives but twenty.

as to one whom I love. Taking into consideration the skill you exhibited on the memorable 25th of July of the present year; repelling considerable forces of the enemy in their successive and desperate attacks upon the principal positions of the lines of Oporto; giving effect, with the greatest courage and dexterity, to my orders; taking measures as intelligently conceived as energetically executed; charging, with a few officers of the staff and twenty lancers, the superior force, which, endeavouring to occupy the outposts between Bomfim and Soelas de Pão, was unable to resist the shock of such great valour,—the result of so many deeds of prowess being a complete victory; the glory of that famous day, being, if possible, still more exalted, by General Count de Bourmont having been forced to lay his laurels at the feet of the brave defenders of the queen and the Charter:—For these just motives, I am pleased, in remuneration of such distinct merit and great services, to elevate you to the dignity of Grand Cross of the Ancient and most Noble Order of the Tower and Sword, for Valour, Loyalty, and Merit. For your information, and to empower you to wear the proper insignia, I send you this, drawn up in the Palace of Necessidades, August 26th, 1833.

"D. PEDRO, DUKE DE BRAGANÇA.
"CANDIDO JOSÉ XAVIER.

"To the COUNT DE SALDANHA, Lieutenant-General of the Royal Armies and Chief of the Imperial Staff."

It could hardly have been agreeable to the Chevalier Lima, when he received, in London, news of this day's victory from C. J. Xavier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,* who wrote to him as follows: "On the 25th of last month, the enemy attacked the whole line of our defences at Oporto; and, notwithstanding they brought up immense masses of troops, repeating on some points their attack three times, and at others even five, and with fresh troops, they were constantly repulsed, and obliged to abandon their attempts after ten hours' fighting; leaving a vast number of prisoners; and the ground strewn with

* The Marquis de Loulé still retained office, but had left Oporto for Paris, in order to accompany the young queen to Portugal.

dead. . . . . General Count de Saldanha behaved with the greatest wisdom and valour, ending by charging the enemy in person at the head of his Staff."

Oporto was now considered invulnerable; and the constitutional cause was gaining ground throughout Portugal. The enemy's fleet had surrendered to Napier. The Duke da Terceira, after landing on the coast of the Algarves, had little more than to march his troops triumphantly to Almada, within sight of Lisbon, on the opposite side of the river. There he met with a considerable force under Telles Jordão, which he completely routed; and that general was himself afterwards found dead on the field of battle. It was night when the fighting ceased; and Terceira sent Lieutenant Jorge to the vanquished enemy, summoning them to surrender. In their rage and despair, this officer was basely murdered by the rebels. The engagement took place on the 23rd of July; and, as soon as the defeat was made known at Lisbon, the Duke de Cadaval, on the following morning, with an immensely superior force, consisting of 8000 men,—whilst that of the Constitutionalists was not a third of the number—either fearing the defection of his own troops, or the rising of the inhabitants, evacuated the city. The Duke da Terceira and his troops crossed the river unopposed, and took peaceable possession of Lisbon on the same day (24th) amidst the enthusiasm of the people.

By a published despatch from Marshal Bourmont to the Duke de Cadaval, dated the 23rd, we learn that he strongly insisted upon the defence of Lisbon as most essential to the success of their cause; and he hoped that D. Miguel himself would shortly go there; "as soon," adds the too sanguine marshal, "as the army shall have obtained some important advantage, which I flatter myself will be within these three days." The advantage referred to was, of course, the possession of Oporto. In the same despatch to Cadaval, Bourmont, little aware of what was to take place at Lisbon on the following day, and calculating on his own success, announces the immediate departure from Oporto to the Capital of a large number of French generals and officers of "talent and experience." Amongst others, he mentions Major-General Baron de Gerdy, serving under the

name of Grival; Count de la Genêtière, an officer of the empire, who changed his name to Almer; Colonel de Buar, who assumed the name of Bourdais; and others who were to be presented by Bourmont's eldest son. The advice of Bourmont reached Lisbon too late. On the 24th, as we have seen, the small constitutional force had entered the city without resistance.

The anniversary of this quiet and undisputed possession of the Capital is yearly celebrated at Lisbon with pompous solemnity. It certainly appears remarkable, if not ludicrous, that with so many days of successful valour to commemorate, the one alone should be selected, of which the most notable circumstance was the pusillanimity of the enemy.

As soon as the news of this important event reached Oporto, D. Pedro determined on proceeding to Lisbon; which he did on the night of the 26th. By a "Carta Regia," dated that same day, he left Saldanha with full powers, as commander-in-chief; and with such additional powers as he expected would be carried out "with the same zeal, fidelity, judgment, and patriotism, of which you have given so many and such conspicuous proofs in the service of the QUEEN and constitutional cause."

On Saldanha were conferred not only all those civil, as well as military powers, which were legal under ordinary circumstances; but also whatever additional powers he might judge it necessary to employ. He was authorized to treat for terms with any individuals of the opposite party: provided always, that the fundamental principles of the constitutional Charter were not infringed. He was also empowered to promise such rewards as he might deem convenient to grant; even to those who had been excepted in any former amnesty, conditionally on their rendering immediate service to the queen's cause. And he might confirm to officers the rank they had acquired during the usurpation; but without active employment, unless Saldanha should determine, that, by some extraordinary acts on their part, they had merited this favour.

This "Carta Regia" was signed by the regent and the following ministers: C. J. Xavier; Agostinho José Freire; Marquis de Loulé; and José da Silva Carvalho.

Authorized by the preceding powers, Saldanha, in the hope

of bringing to an end the civil war, addressed the following letter to his old friend Lemos, general on the opposite side.

"OPORTO, *July 28th*, 1833.

"MY FRIEND,

"The certainty that you are acquainted with all that has taken place since the 24th of last month, renders it unnecessary that I should enter into details. You, as well as all Portuguese who know me, well know that my heart is truly Portuguese; and do not doubt how much I suffer in having to combat against my own countrymen. We have, unfortunately, had to show to admiring Europe, that the Portuguese are ever brave, whatever the opinions for which they fight. Unfortunately, great has been the number of victims. Will you lend your help to avoid the shedding of more Portuguese blood by the hands of Portuguese themselves? I cannot for a moment doubt of your feelings; and, consequently, I have determined on writing to you, through our friend Lord George Paulett, to propose an interview. I shall anxiously await your answer.

"I am, your friend,

"SALDANHA.

"P.S. On the 25th, I had the misfortune to lose our friend D. Fernando."

GENERAL LEMOS' REPLY.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO S^R,

"I know what has passed since the 24th of last month. I understand the politics of the world, and I know the condition of Portugal, and also of Europe. I know that a lawless party wishes to supplant legitimate government; and that this same party wishes to dethrone the king of Portugal, D. Miguel I., who, by all fundamental laws and rights of succession, is sole legitimate king. You are well aware of this: and if you wish to stay the shedding of Portuguese blood, by uniting yourself to the legitimate government, I am ready to go and converse with you, whenever you please. But, if your views and intentions

are other, notwithstanding the pleasure I should have in seeing you, we must avoid this interview.

"You do not feel more than I do the shedding of Portuguese blood. I see, with the greatest grief, the misfortunes of my country; and it is to put an end to them that the royalists in Portugal are now in arms.

"Do not imagine that the royalists are dispirited. You see to what object their efforts are directed; and how they despise death when defending the sacred cause which so honourably animates us.

"I regret the death of D. Fernando. He was an excellent person—at least as long as he was a royalist.

"I am, your obliged friend,

"JOSÉ ANTONIO D'AZD. LEMOS.

"P.S. A nation like the Portuguese, its honour pledged as it is, is invincible."

The reader is requested to contrast the two preceding letters. Saldanha, a soldier, fresh from recent victories, finds himself invested, by his sovereign regent, with vice-regal powers. His first use of them is an endeavour to stay bloodshed. With this object, he addresses General Lemos. He addresses him as a "friend"—for they had been brought up as friends. Saldanha begins by complimenting Lemos upon the bravery of the troops under his command; declaring, that "they had shown admiring Europe that the Portuguese are ever brave, whatever the opinions for which they fight." Lemos answers by a postscript, implying a threat that "a nation like the Portuguese, its honour pledged as it is, is invincible;" a description of the Portuguese in which Lemos hardly meant to include his opponents. Again, Saldanha, far from adopting one word of triumph, laments only that there have been so many victims: Lemos answers, "the royalists despise death." Saldanha avoids every semblance of rebuke: Lemos, in reply, reproaches Saldanha as one of "a lawless party that wishes to supplant legitimate government, and to dethrone the king of Portugal, D. Miguel I.;" and then, by way of embittering his sentence, he tells him that he, Saldanha,

knows it. Saldanha asks his correspondent as a friend; "Will you lend your help to avoid shedding more Portuguese blood by the hands of Portuguese themselves?" That correspondent neither offers, nor admits of, negociation for that object; but says, in effect, that he is determined to shed more blood as a means of putting an end to the misfortunes of his country. Saldanha asks for an interview: Lemos answers, in substance; Only on the terms that you, Saldanha, either admit yourself a traitor, or become one! Lastly, Saldanha reserves for his post-script an announcement, which, in the candour of his own heart, he meant to soften the heart of Lemos—the death of their common friend, D. Fernando d'Almeida. General Lemos did indeed, for a moment, yield to the "compunctious visitings of nature," so far as to write of the dead those sole redeeming words of his letter: "He was an excellent person:" but, after an interval of thought, he repented of his weakness; and added the qualifying words; "at least so long as he was a royalist." It is not easy for us to conjecture, at this distance of time, what General Lemos meant by those words, in which he records the extent of his own knowledge: "I understand the politics of the world, and I know the state of Europe and also of Portugal." But, if he meant, to fling, as it were, those countries and all Europe at the head of his pacific correspondent, the course of events soon proved that those powers, and Lemos' understanding of them, were very different entities. Within three weeks of the date of this letter from General Lemos, the retribution of the 18th of August, fell by the arm of Saldanha himself, upon that very army which Saldanha had invited Lemos to spare.

Notwithstanding that this attempt to put an end to the strife had failed, the Minister of War, Freire, wrote to Saldanha, on the 16th of August, as follows:—

"This is the time to re-open communications with the leaders of the rebels, with the same prudence and dignity with which you have hitherto made the attempt. . . . I will not conclude this despatch without re-affirming to your Excellency; that his Imperial Majesty is thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which you have executed the important command confided to you; and he feels sure that your effective and prudent co-operation will

essentially contribute to a speedy termination of the contest in which we are engaged."

Saldanha, probably, thought it useless, after his correspondence with Lemos, to renew, for the present, his attempts at conciliation or arbitrament. We hope that it has been shown in these pages, that if, as a soldier, his desire, as he himself expressed it, was to be considered the bravest of whatever army he commanded, yet, on no occasion did he suffer his ambition to set aside his constant desire to bring peace and happiness to his country. Willingly would he have seen the war concluded, and, at once, have retired, with his well-earned laurels, to that domestic quiet for which he sighed, and which he so much loved. For, if honour; additional titles; the felicitations of friends; the worship of the army; and the esteem of all good men; together with the now unbounded confidence of the regent, as evinced by the "Carta Regia," could satisfy Saldanha, his satisfaction was complete.

The congratulations of so worthy a man as General Lafayette may well find a place in these pages. On the occasion of the victory of the 25th of July, he writes to his friend as follows:—

* PARIS, *le 4 d'Août.*

"Mes vœux pour la délivrance, et la liberté Portugaise, et mon amitié personnelle pour vous, mon cher général, vous répondent du bonheur que j'ai éprouvé en apprenant votre glorieuse victoire d'Oporto. Le nom des deux généraux, le vainqueur et le vaincu, est une symbole des deux principes qui se partagent le monde, et dont l'incompatibilité se démontre de plus en plus. Je crains que les protocoles ne vous donnent plus d'embarras que les Miguelistes. En attendant, recevez mes félicitations sur le triomphe de votre Cause, dans ces derniers évènements des Algarves, de Lisbonne et d'Oporto. Mon petit fils, Jules Lasteyrie, aura été bien faché de ne pas trouver la récompense de son dévouement dans le bonheur d'être, comme son ami Guillet, à côté de vous à ce beau combat du 25. Je l'attends tous les jours, ainsi que sa mère. Madame de Saldanha veut bien vous faire passer ce petit mot. Mon fils me prie de vous exprimer la part qu'il prend à votre gloire; et moi, mon cher ami, je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur.

"LAFAYETTE."

Bourmont had intended, as soon as he had obtained the expected "important advantage," on the 25th, to withdraw, as superfluous, a part of his force from before Oporto. His late defeat determined that resolution; and induced him, moreover, to hasten in person to Lisbon, where he hoped to recover his tarnished reputation, whilst contending against less skilful generals. Accordingly, he left Oporto on the 6th of August; and was shortly followed by the greater part of the besieging army, leaving, however, 15,000 men, under the command of General Almer, to engage the attention of Saldanha and to maintain the siege. He then marched on Coimbra, where he remained until the 14th, having with him an army which consisted of 17,000 infantry, 1200 cavalry, and 30 pieces of field artillery. Before setting out, it is probable that Bourmont gave orders to Almer to contract his lines of investment. At all events, whether Almer acted under superior orders, or deemed it prudent to strengthen his positions to the north-east and east sides of the city; or, whether he sought to draw Saldanha into the field; where the Miguelites could still greatly outnumber any force that could be spared from the city; the French general, on the 9th of August, withdrew his pickets from the north of the Douro as far as Carvalhos; and, immediately afterwards (on the 12th), completely evacuated the formidable redoubts of Castro, Ervilha, and Serralves; and another, which had been secretly constructed in front of the Quinta do Vanzeller, behind some pines. Saldanha at once took possession of the abandoned positions. The enemy retired on the *Real*, or Forte D. Miguel; and preserved their lines from that point to Carvalhos on the south of the Douro. They still held Villa Nova da Gaia, with a force of between two and three thousand men; as well as their positions on the same side of the river up to its mouth. On the 11th, the head-quarters of General Clouet were at Rio Tinto, with a force of seven or eight thousand men; and the remainder were on the south side of the river.

If it was the design of Almer to draw Saldanha from behind his earth-works and stone walls, Saldanha quickly perceived it, and quickly determined to give to the French general, in the open field, the opportunity he sought. Nay, more. He resolved himself to be the aggressor; and we are able, in his despatch to the

Minister of War, to give an account of the operations he resolved on, and which he so successfully executed.

"HEAD QUARTERS, OPORTO, 19*th August*, 1833.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"The enemy, having abandoned the positions of Castro and Serralves, established their right in the redoubts of Contumil, which, as your Excellency is aware, lie in front of the large Reducto Real.* The rebels had given out that their abandoning the redoubts upon their right was for the purpose of drawing me into the field; where, confiding in their superior numerical strength, they considered victory to be certain. Knowing well the valour and discipline of the troops which compose the liberal army, I immediately resolved to profit by the opportunity offered me, delaying only the time absolutely necessary to place the abandoned redoubts, (which I had at once caused to be occupied) in a condition to repel any sudden attack. On the 17th, after having assured myself that those redoubts were in a fit state for defence, I selected the 18th for the attack, and made the following dispositions.

"The two Immobile battalions garrisoned the interior works of the city; and the battalion of the Queen's Grenadiers the redoubts of Castro, Ervilha, and Serralves. The Minho battalion occupied Lordello for the purpose of watching the bank of the Douro; and the half battalion, under the orders of Major Millinet, garrisoned the village of Francos and the point called Prelada. The Quinta do Vanzeller was occupied by four companies of the 2nd Immobile battalion. The provisional battalions were on duty in the lines; and General Canavarro received orders to have the bell tolled to call to arms at the earliest break of day. I also ordered the 10th Cavalry; the Queen's Lancers; a brigade of artillery, calibre 6; two brigades of infantry; (the 1st commanded by Colonel Pacheco, and composed of the 10th and 15th Regiments, the 1st Mobile battalion, and the recruits of the expeditionary Division who were in the depôt: the second, commanded by brevet-brigadier Maldonado, and composed of the 9th Regiment; the battalion formed of four

* Also named Forte de D. Miguel.

companies of the Marine brigade, and two of Scotchmen; and the battalion commanded by Colonel Dodgins) to be under arms at midnight in the fields lying between Carvalhido and Vanzeller. With this force, I marched at one o'clock A.M. to Padrão da Legoa, where I formed two columns; the first, composed of the 10th Cavalry and the 1st brigade of Infantry; the second, of the 2nd brigade of Infantry; the lancers; and the artillery. Half-an-hour before dawn, I commenced marching by the two roads which lead to S. Mamede, myself accompanying the right column, while the other I placed under the direction of the adjutant-general, Valdez. The enemy's pickets were surprised; and, with the greatest celerity, we marched upon S. Mamede, where both columns arrived at the same moment. The enemy's 11th Regiment of Infantry endeavoured to hold the village church; but our 10th Infantry, commanded by Major Miranda, and some companies of the 1st Mobile, dislodged them in a few minutes. I then ordered the 10th Cavalry to charge them, and they were completely routed. The 4th Cavalry and a battalion of Royalists met with nearly the same fate.

"The lancers charged at the same time; no obstacle being able to withstand them. The slaughter caused by these charges was horrible. Our columns still advancing, we shortly found ourselves in front of the Reducto Real and Contumil, where the enemy had had time to form their line. This operation I had foreseen; and, therefore, had placed, under the command of Colonel Xavier, a column composed of the 5th Caçadores; her Majesty's Volunteers; and the 2nd Queen's Regiment, which I ordered to attack the newly formed position on the left, whilst I charged it in front. Her Majesty's Volunteers, with their accustomed bravery, carried the enemy's trenches, and suffered some loss during the attack on one of the redoubts. Whilst Colonel Xavier was crossing the trenches and forming his column, our artillery had taken position; and, commanded by Colonel Costa, did considerable damage to the enemy.

"As soon as Colonel Xavier was in condition to advance, he marched against the enemy's left; at the same moment that I attacked their position in front. Our columns marched to the attack in the greatest order, and the positions were taken with-

out a shot being fired. The enemy fled in the direction of Vallongo; and our brave cavalry, again seizing their opportunity, made another most brilliant charge, with equally fatal results to the enemy. The rebels, profiting by the nature of the ground, had formed, outside the village of Vendas Novas, two squadrons of their 8th Cavalry and 'Policia do Porto,' supported by infantry. Heedless of their number and position, Colonel João Nepomuceno de Macedo did not hesitate an instant; the enemy's cavalry was charged, sabred, and put to flight; and they, together with the infantry, fled to join the forces which crowned the heights of Vallongo. Brigadier Zagallo, to whom I had confided the command of a column composed of the 12th Caçadores; the 18th Infantry; and a half battalion of the 1st Queen's Light Infantry, had received orders to attack the enemy's extreme left, the instant he saw the fight commence. He was to march first upon the Avintes bridge; and, having obtained possession of it, to continue his movement upon their left until he effected a junction with my forces. These combined movements caused the enemy to abandon their entire line of fortifications; leaving, however, the D. Miguel redoubt garrisoned. I, therefore, ordered Colonel Dodgins to watch that force, until it surrendered, which it eventually did. The enemy had now gathered upon the heights of Vallongo between 5500 and 6000 men. Your Excellency well knows the strength of that position, and that it would be imprudent to attempt to carry it from the front.

"For this reason, as soon as General Zagallo, who had left two companies of the 12th battalion to occupy the Avintes bridge, rejoined me; and, having allowed a short period of rest to the soldiers and horses, I left Colonel Pacheco on the Oporto road with the 10th Infantry; the 15th Infantry; the battalion of her Majesty D. Maria II.; detachments of the Expeditionary Corps; and all the artillery, guarded by two companies of the 18th Regiment, with orders to attack the position in front, the moment they saw me attack the enemy's right flank. The 10th Cavalry was to follow the movements of these forces. I then commenced my march, with the remaining troops, in the direction of the height known by the name of

'Mulher Morta;' and by a route which could not be observed by the rebels.

"I put my troops in position, unperceived by the rebels, and advanced upon their extreme flank in three columns: that on the right, commanded by Colonel Xavier, and composed of the 5th Caçadores and the 18th Infantry: that on the left, under the orders of General Zagallo, consisted of the 12th Caçadores; the battalion commanded by Lieut.-colonel Shaw; and the half battalion of the 1st Queen's Light Infantry: the centre column, which marched by the road, was formed of the 9th Infantry and the 2nd Queen's Light Infantry. The lancers advanced between the second and third columns. At one and the same moment, in the best possible order, did these columns appear advancing upon the flank of the enemy's line, whilst Colonel Pacheco's troops advanced to their front. This spectacle was really beautiful, and must have been most pleasing to the heroic inhabitants of this ever famous city, who, from the trenches they occupied, and have so often defended, were anxiously regarding it.

"The resistance, which we had expected would be obstinate, was rendered unavailing by the movement we had planned; and our columns advanced with such order and rapidity that the enemy were completely routed; and were again pursued by the lancers to the heights of Ponte Ferreira.

"Brigadier Baron Pico do Celleiro had received orders to make, at daybreak, a sortie in force upon Oliveira do Douro for the purpose of drawing off the attention of the rebel troops encamped in that neighbourhood; endeavouring to prevent them passing to the north, so as to give time to General Zagallo to arrive at the bridge. Major Fontoura, commanding the 3rd Mobile, led the sortie, and attained the desired object.

"A bronze cannon, calibre 6; 1 lieutenant-colonel; 1 major; six officers and 238 prisoners; 3 powder-magazines; cannon balls and grenades; large quantities of provisions and camp furniture, were taken. A great number have presented themselves. These, and the complete flight of the enemy to *beyond Penafiel*, are the results of the 18th of August; a day on which the troops outrivalled each other in courage and discipline; and it

is especially my duty to mention the cavalry. The conduct of Colonel João Nepomuceno de Macedo, who, in one of the numerous charges against the infantry, had his horse killed under him; and that of the valiant 10th Cavalry which he commanded, is above all praise. He recommends all his officers, but makes particular mention of Major Simão Pessoa. Colonel Bacon and his lancers fully bore out the high opinion which has been formed of them; neither walls nor hedges were obstacles to the lancers in their pursuit of the enemy.

"In another letter, and with more leisure, I hope to have the honour of conveying to your Excellency for his Imperial Majesty's information the names of the officers who most distinguished themselves; but I should be wanting in justice, did I not at once mention his Imperial Majesty's aide-de-camp, serving as quartermaster-general, Lieutenant-colonel Balthasar d'Almeida Pimentel, not only for the assistance he gave me on that day, but for the bravery with which he took part in every charge made against the enemy. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant D. Miguel Ximenes, also merits immediate mention for the courage with which he repeatedly charged the enemy, sabring and killing the rebels; his horse being wounded by a sabre cut.

"At the commencement of the action, Lieutenant-General Stubbs, though convalescent, regardless of his seniority, came to offer me his assistance; and only withdrew when all was over. At night-fall, having previously ordered Major Barreiros to throw a bridge across the Douro, I marched towards the city for the purpose of passing the river that very night, in order to attack the rebel forces on the south bank. My order, however, could not be carried out; and I was, therefore, forced to delay the attack until to-morrow.

"The spirit of the troops is such that I do not hesitate to affirm to your Excellency that the royal arms will have another glorious day.

"Allow me to present to your Excellency my aide-de-camp, George Vanzeller, who is the bearer of this letter, and who can give your Excellency all the explanations you may desire.

"I beg your Excellency will lay this despatch before his

Imperial Majesty the Duke de Bragança, commander-in-chief of the liberal army, and do me the honour of renewing to him my protestations of most profound respect; and that it will be most flattering to me if my conduct on this day should meet his Imperial Majesty's approbation.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA.

"To Illmo e Exmo Senr AGOSTINHO JOSÉ FREIRE."

The foregoing despatch is characteristic of the writer. It gives the praise to others, while it says not one word of himself more than was absolutely necessary to record the orders for which he was responsible, and to explain why he could, on that day, effect no more. An English reader may, at times, have thought that the letters addressed by Saldanha to D. Pedro and to others, were marked by excessive earnestness and vehement professions. In truth, however, if those letters had concerned less important subjects, their style would not have exceeded that warmth of expression which was then, and to a great extent is now, commonly adopted in correspondence between Portuguese. But the subjects on which Saldanha wrote were of tremendous importance not merely to himself, but to his king and country. In the despatches by which he conveys to the Government the narratives of his own military operations, he seems studiously to conceal the parts which he individually had played in carrying out his own orders. There might have been nothing egotistical in his informing a Secretary of State for War, that he had felt it his duty personally to lead on this attack, or that charge, against the enemy. Seldom a hint of the kind is given in his despatches; and yet the task would be endless, and his biographer would be charged with fulsome adulation, if he were to picture Saldanha, as he constantly might, now galloping from redoubt to redoubt, or, behind earthworks, jumping from his horse and rushing in among his officers and men to cheer on their efforts: or, on other occasions, personally leading an attack to lend it the force of his example, "behaving," as D. Pedro, in a fit of remonstrance, termed it, "like a madman;" but still, all the while, maintaining that perfect self command, which enabled

him, on the instant, to profit by any opportunity which an unexpected movement of the enemy opened for his advantage. The occurrences of the 18th of August exemplify the above remarks; and from the incidents of that day the author selects one which will assist the reader to realize the rest.

The troops were under arms at midnight. At 1 A.M. Saldanha placed himself at the head of part of them, and marched them to *Padrão da Legoa.* At daybreak he attacked the enemy's positions, and continued that attack until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. By this time, the enemy, after being driven from fourteen or fifteen forts, had been obliged practically to raise the siege of the north side of Oporto by retreating to the heights of Vallongo. After this astonishing success, his officers not unnaturally, thought they had done enough for the day. Accordingly, a deputation from them came to Saldanha to congratulate him upon his well conceived plans, and on the boldness with which they had been carried out. But they entreated him, at the same time, not to risk tarnishing the glory of the day by any further attack on the enemy, entrenched as the enemy then was in such a formidable position. This occurred during the time, when, as remarked in the despatch, a short period of rest was allowed to the soldiers and horses. But Saldanha had more enlarged views; and had been led by the course of events to form a new, or, at least, an additional plan of operations. He therefore replied to the deputation, in a tone of kindly and respectful courtesy: "Gentlemen, I did not come out of Oporto to leave the enemy in sight of the city. I am much obliged to you for your advice on this occasion; but I beg that, for the future, you will be pleased to wait until I ask it." Then, raising his voice to his habitual tone of command, he called out: "Right about face. To your columns. March."

Orders were at once given, as explained in the despatch. The moment Saldanha saw that the columns were placed, he himself headed that advance, which, with so much *gusto,* he terms, "a spectacle really beautiful." If it was to be done, it must be done quickly, said he. So having got close up, unperceived by the enemy, he himself galloped forward to the

attack, followed by his cavalry, with such rapidity, that the enemy fired but a single volley, killing one man, and immediately fled. This anecdote, the author has frequently heard recalled to Saldanha's memory by many officers.

Probably, when he left his lines of entrenchment at 1 o'clock in the early morning, nothing was farther from his expectations than that the enemy would, before 2 o'clock in the afternoon, have abandoned all their works (works, by which they had for so many months held Oporto invested); and would themselves have retreated upon the heights of Vallongo. But their retreat opened to Saldanha a new vista of hopes. Vallongo was a strong position. It was held by about 6000 men. While that force remained so placed, they held Oporto still under threat; and, together with the strong forts on the south side of the Douro, they might still hope to keep the city partly invested. If the enemy could be driven from Vallongo, it might be practicable, even on that very night, to cross the Douro; and, thereupon, the southern forts, finding the main Miguelite army around Oporto dispersed, might surrender, or be attacked successfully. At once Saldanha saw, and was resolved to profit by, his opportunity. Vallongo was attacked and taken. "At nightfall," says the despatch, "I marched towards the city for the purpose of passing the Douro that very night, in order to attack the rebel forces on the south side of the river." However, it had not been found practicable to throw a bridge across the river within so short a time. Saldanha was obliged therefore to be content, on that day, with ordering the pursuit of the flying enemy, until night, to a great distance beyond Vallongo, and to wait until the morrow for that "glorious day," which, in his despatch, he promises himself and the royal arms. And, probably, the reader will think, that the officers who formed the deputation, and then, with their men, had captured Vallongo, had truly earned their right to repose.

Great indeed, by the skilful manœuvres of Saldanha, and by the bravery of himself and followers, were the successes of this day. José Liberato states, that they might have been of still greater importance to the constitutional cause, if General

Valdez had been able to arrive, in time, at the place appointed.* This victory, nevertheless, was a completely fatal blow to the enemy. By Saldanha's well conceived plan of occupying the bridge at Avintes,† and by the sortie which he had ordered General Baron Pico de Celleiro to make, for the purpose of assisting that occupation, the Miguelite forces, on the south of the river, saw those on the north driven from all their positions, without being able to come to their assistance. The result was, that they found themselves constrained to quit Villa Nova and all their positions on the south; as well as those on the north. They lost, besides, immense munitions in the depôts of Alfena, Moreira, and other places. Above 1000 pipes of brandy which had been removed by the enemy from Villa Nova, before they set fire to the remainder, were thus saved. On this occasion too, the "Paulo Cordeiro," the "mortier monstre" of Oporto, fell into the hands of the victors.

Bourmont, whom we have left marching on Lisbon, was joined, after his arrival at Coimbra, by the divisions of Mollelos and Cadaval; with these forces, and that which he had brought with him from Oporto, he was enabled to approach the Capital with an army of not less than 30,000 men.

Of other events of this period, we may mention that the Brigadier Taborda, together with his Staff, quitted the camp of the Miguelites and adhered to the queen's cause. Other officers of less note followed his example.

Lord William Russell, having arrived at Lisbon, presented his credentials to the regent, on the 15th of August, as minister plenipotentiary from his Britannic Majesty.

We are informed, on the authority of Sr. Soriano,‡ that when D. Pedro arrived at Lisbon, he went on the following day to the church where the Bragança family are buried, and wrote, as follows, on the tomb of his father, D. João VI.: "One son assassinated you, another will revenge you. July 29th, 1833. D. PEDRO."

It is pretended that, at this time, Admiral Napier made

* Annaes, vol. iv., p. 156.

† It was at this point that General Murray crossed the Douro on the 12th of May, 1809.

‡ Page 243.

some overtures to Marshal Bourmont, authorized by the British Government, for the purpose of putting an end to the war; to which, although supported by the marshal's advice, D. Miguel declined to listen. According to this proposal, he was to have absented himself from Portugal during the young queen's minority; and, on his return, to have married her, and assumed the title of King Consort. To D. Miguel's refusal to accept the advice of his marshal was attributed a coolness between them, which led, it is said, to Bourmont's departure, shortly afterwards, from Portugal. Events may prove, in the following chapter, that he had other, perhaps more personal and more weighty, cause for quitting a service, which he had entered to so little purpose.

We should tire, as well as sicken, the reader, were we to narrate the atrocities which were committed by the partisans of absolutism, in various parts of the kingdom, during these years of usurpation. Such as when, on the 27th of July in this year, thirty-three political prisoners were barbarously assassinated in the prisons of Estremoz by a frantic populace, incited by the authorities, and assisted by that military force which was itself appointed to guard their prisoners' safety. In the list of the sufferers, we find the names of a general, a colonel, and many other officers; besides some few civilians, a priest, and even a boy, six years of age, who had sought his father in his prison!

We will close this chapter with the few kind lines which Saldanha received from his friend Lafayette, as soon as news of the victory of the 18th of August reached the general in France.

"LA GRANGE, *le* 12 *Septembre*, 1833.

"Nos premières lettres se sont croissées, mon cher général, et depuis ce tems vous avez eu de nouveaux succès donc je jouïs doublement lorsque la gloire vous en est due. Ma fille et Jules sont enfin arrivés après une navigation si longue qu'elle nous inquiétait. Vous avez été bien excellent pour elle et pour lui: ils sont penétrés d'une reconnaissance que je partage de tout mon cœur. Votre affaire Portugaise est devenue européenne. C'est un commencement du cinquième acte, qui, j'espère, ter-

minera la tragédie de '89, au profit de la liberté de cette partie du monde. Les Gouvernemens arbitraires la provoquèrent : les justes milieux ne sont pas de force à l'endormir longtems. Donnez-moi de vos nouvelles, mon cher Saldanha. Parlez de moi à votre aide-de-camp, Guillet, qui est bien touché de tout ce que vous êtes pour lui ; et recevez l'expression de la tendre amitié que je vous ai vouée.

" LAFAYETTE."

CHAPTER XIII.

1833 (*continued*).

Saldanha goes to Lisbon—Finds the city defenceless—Bourmont attacks, and is repulsed—Second attack—He resigns the command—Is succeeded by Macdonell—D. Maria arrives at Lisbon—Saldanha is made Marshal—Pacheco—Change of ministry—Sword of honour presented to Saldanha—Proposals to D. Pedro, and secrecy observed—Saldanha attacks the enemy—Extraordinary behaviour of two generals—The enemy retires—Reception of Saldanha at the Palace—Attack resumed.—The enemy retreats to Santarem—General Macdonell's defence—The 12th of October commemorated by an act of justice.

THE ardent desire of D. Pedro that the siege of Oporto should be raised was now accomplished. Shortly before that event, he had sent his aide-de-camp, Calça e Pina, to urge upon Saldanha the importance of his effecting this object, and had begged him (in case it were still necessary to act on the defensive) to spare some assistance to Lisbon, which was now threatened by the strong advancing army of Bourmont. The aide-de-camp reached Oporto on the 19th of August: but, already on the previous day, the enemy had been driven from all their strong positions; the wish of the regent had been anticipated; and the siege was raised.

The presence of Saldanha at Oporto was no longer necessary; but he felt that it had become indispensable at Lisbon. Accordingly, on the 23rd, he issued the following proclamation to the inhabitants and troops:—

PROCLAMATION.

"OPORTO, *August* 23, 1833.

"My duty calls me to the Capital. The pleasing certainty that you do justice to my feelings renders it unnecessary for me to say how much I feel the separation. If anything can lessen my regret, it is the reflection that Lieutenant-General Stubbs, whom I leave in command, and his chief of the Staff,

Colonel Pacheco, take the same interest in your glory and welfare as I do.

"When I have the honour to present myself to his Imperial Majesty, the commander-in-chief, I will take the opportunity of recording what your conduct has been since his Majesty left you.

"Your sense of honour, your love for your country, and your desire for glory, render it needless to suggest the conduct to be observed. An army and a people that may boast of being unsurpassed in valour, in constancy, and in patriotism, receive from themselves those inspirations which lead them to glory, and which afford the safest guarantees of our national independence and liberty.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

Saldanha had already despatched General Valdez and some other officers to Lisbon, with details of the glorious successes of the 18th. They arrived at half-past nine on the night of the 24th, and were immediately received at the palace by D. Pedro, who listened with great satisfaction to their "glad narration."

On the following morning, it was Sunday, D. Pedro, after hearing Mass at ten o'clock, presided at a council of ministers, which had been expressly summoned for the purpose of deciding, if it were now desirable that Saldanha should be called to Lisbon. Whilst actively engaged in discussing the point, telegraphic news reached the council that Saldanha had arrived off the mouth of the Tagus. He had wisely given no choice to his jealous opponents in the Capital; nor had he made known his intentions at Oporto itself, until almost the moment of his embarkation. Having conquered, he came; and, in coming, he brought with him the guarantee of future conquests. He was accompanied by a regiment of lancers, besides four corps of infantry and Caçadores.

By half-past four, he was at the royal palace, where the regent and his ministers received him on the staircase. The emperor, embracing him, said; "At the moment in which I received notice that you were crossing the *Bar*, I and the ministers had resolved upon sending for you. Bourmont is coming with rapid marches upon Lisbon."

It will be observed that Saldanha had thus managed to anticipate, by full eight days, the expected arrival of Bourmont before Lisbon, which did not take place until the 3rd of September.

Had Saldanha delayed a few days longer in Oporto, he would have received a decree, dated August 23rd, and signed by D. Pedro in the name of the queen, by which he would have been called upon to order that all priests and civilians found with arms in their hands, as well as all officers commanding irregular corps of any description, should be brought before a council composed of three members, and, after trial, if found guilty of being rebels, should be summarily shot! How repugnant to the kind heart of Saldanha was such a decree! It is needless to observe that its terms would never have been carried out by those under his command. As some confirmation of our assertion, we may here introduce a circumstance, as related by Sr. Liberato, which occurred at Oporto, on the 5th of July—the date of one of the enemy's hottest attacks. He informs us, that a corporal (at the approach of the enemy), having spiked his gun and fled, D. Pedro, on hearing of it, ordered him to be immediately shot. A like punishment, he adds, was to be inflicted on the artillery sergeant in charge of the gun. Saldanha, passing the spot before the latter order was executed, was shocked at seeing the dead body of the corporal, and at once placed the sergeant in charge of an officer until the affair could be inquired into. "Later in the day," continues Liberato, "the general recounted to me what had taken place; and exclaimed, 'What men we have to govern us!'" *

If this severe decree which emanated from the government at Lisbon had ever been carried out, it would, most assuredly, have been met with instantaneous reprisals, and the civil war would have been henceforward carried on with the same barbarity as were those in Spain. But the character of Saldanha gave a tone of humanity to all who served under him; and rare indeed were the instances of vindictive cruelty practised by the Constitutionalists during the struggle.

At a somewhat later period of our biography (in 1834), a

* Que homens temos nós para nos governar.

young officer was taken prisoner by the queen's troops, and brought to head-quarters at Cartaxo. Saldanha invited him to spend the evening, at his quarters, with his Staff and other officers. The young man came; and conversation having become general, and in no way referring to the events of the day, he expressed his surprise at the manner in which he was received; candidly confessing, that prisoners taken by his own party were often subjected to ill-treatment; and that he had been led to imagine that prisoners taken by the Constitutionalists suffered the greatest indignities.

Palmella, as the reader will remember, had entered Lisbon with Terceira on the 24th of July, where he was invested with full powers to act in the name of the regent. But, as he informs us in a letter to Lima, dated July 31st, "the emperor arrived here on the 28th: consequently, my reign lasted only three days. . . . Mollelos," he continues, "is in Salvaterra, and the Duque de Cadaval in Obidos. Peniche is ours. Let us see what Bourmont will do." On the 20th of August, Palmella writes again, evidently vexed with the governing powers in Lisbon, as he declares that they are "committing the greatest possible follies;" but that "the good cause would prosper in spite of them." With this reflection, his eyes were evidently turned towards Oporto; for, he adds, "João Carlos completely vanquished the Miguelites the day before yesterday, and raised the siege of Oporto." Poor Lima must have been in despair at the continued success of the man against whom he had so persistently intrigued. If Palmella, at one time, had lent his ears to the misrepresentations of those who described Saldanha as a republican, and as one desirous only of serving his own ambitious views, he, now (perhaps since that memorable interview between them at Oporto) saw him with his own eyes, and appeared ever ready to do him justice.

Soriano tells us, (p. 279) that Saldanha, immediately on his arrival at Lisbon, was most actively engaged pressing forward the works on the lines of defence; mounting the necessary artillery on the various batteries and redoubts as soon as they were formed; and organizing and disciplining the recruits and national battalions of volunteers. The same author, referring

to the defenceless state of Lisbon before the arrival of Saldanha, declares that it was the small number of liberal troops there, and the complete absence of defences, which induced Bourmont to march on the Capital, after Cadaval had so unexpectedly resigned it to the Constitutionalists.

Palmella, notwithstanding his many vexations, conceived, at this period, the generous idea of getting up a public subscription to reward the gallant Napier. "But," he writes, despairingly, to Lima: "you know that ours is not the country for this."

In another letter, Palmella makes us acquainted with his opinion of the actual state of affairs; and confirms all that can be said respecting the intrigues and jealousies which at that time existed at Lisbon. His opinion equally prepares us for those future events in the history of this country, when, during a period of some forty years, we shall see Saldanha, at various epochs, called to the defence of his Sovereign, of the Throne, and of the Charter. Palmella writes:

"LISBON, *September 3rd.*

"Our affairs, politically speaking, are all in the worst possible condition. We neither seek to regain the confidence of foreign Powers, and to obtain their good will; nor do we endeavour to reconcile all parties, which would be so desirable. When affairs are looking a little better, our people become so inflated, and their whole endeavours are to triumph, and make a show of victory—not crushing, but pecking at their opponents. The result is, an immense number of enemies, more or less bold, more or less secret. The friars are at work; the guerillas increase; and the civil war is not ended. Bourmont is in front of Lisbon. He is at Campo Grande with the forces he had at Oporto. Our positions here are strong. We have 7000 or 8000 troops of the line, and 10,000 volunteers: but will the latter fight as did those of Oporto? The question will be decided in a few days. Bourmont will raise the siege, or there will be a decisive action."

Two days after the date of this letter, Bourmont made his first grand attack on the Capital. At 5 o'clock A.M. the enemy advanced 12,000 men, in six columns, on our positions at

S. Sebastião da Pedreira and Campolide. The engagement lasted the whole day. It was ten at night when Saldanha himself directed the last bayonet charge, with which he drove the enemy from the upper ground opposite the Quinta da Seabra. General Valdez was wounded, on this day, fighting by the side of Saldanha. The loss on the queen's side is stated at 38 officers and 326 men; whilst Sr. C. J. Xavier, in his despatch to Lima, places that of the enemy at 2400. It is remarkable that the minister, on this occasion, makes no mention of Saldanha, whilst he ascribes the whole conduct of the day's operations to—D. Pedro!

It has been the good fortune of the writer of this biography to have ridden with Saldanha very many times around the lines and positions of Lisbon, shortly after the events which took place at this period. The houses destroyed by the artillery of the enemy were still in ruins: and there was scarcely a spot attacked by the Miguelites of which the marshal had not some interesting account to give respecting the bravery of his officers and soldiers.

Bourmont had been led to expect some reaction in the city in favour of D. Miguel: but the inhabitants, in general, were enthusiastic for their queen and their constitutional liberties. The Cardinal Patriarch himself, in a pastoral, dated July 30th, declared that D. Miguel was an usurper! And so assured was the Government of the constitutionalism of the loyal city of Lisbon, that they, fearlessly but contemptuously, ordered to be printed in the official Gazette of Lisbon, the very proclamation which D. Miguel had addressed to its inhabitants, and which the Miguelites had furtively endeavoured to introduce into the city.

On the 14th, Marshal Bourmont made another attack on the lines, which was commenced at 5 A.M. But the enemy was repulsed at every point, and the firing ceased soon after nine o'clock.

Whether the marshal was disgusted with his ill-success, or had become assured that he would gather no laurels in the presence of Saldanha—of whom an enthusiastic admirer at Oporto, on the 25th of July, had declared "that he was worth ten

Bourmonts,"—or, from the reason which he himself gives, namely, misunderstandings with the king, he tendered his resignation on the 21st of September, and declared his intention to quit the service of D. Miguel, and to return to France.

General Macdonell was Bourmont's successor. This same Macdonell it was, who, as the reader will recollect, had been a fellow prisoner with Saldanha in 1823. Of him we shall have more to say in the course of our narrative.

Lord William Russell had, as we have seen, already, on the part of England, presented his credentials to the regent, acknowledging the queen D. Maria II. *de facto* as well as *de jure* sovereign of Portugal. This example was now followed by France and Sweden, who appointed M. de Lurde and M. de Kantzow, as Chargés d'Affaires to represent their respective Governments.

On the 22nd of the month of September, D. Maria arrived in the Tagus, but did not land until the following day. D. Pedro went on board to receive the young queen; and they disembarked, shortly after twelve o'clock, in the Terreiro do Paço, where a temporary building had been erected for her Majesty's reception. The marshal Duke da Terceira; Lieut.-General Count de Saldanha; with their respective Staffs; together with the municipal and other chief authorities, were in waiting to welcome and do homage to their sovereign.

No sooner was the regent landed, than, calling to himself Saldanha, he exclaimed, with a voice distinctly heard by all around: "MARIA, I DO NOT PRESENT THE LIEUT.-GENERAL COUNT DE SALDANHA, WHOM YOU ALREADY KNOW, BUT THE MARSHAL SALDANHA, TO WHOM YOU OWE YOUR BEING HERE TO-DAY."

With all the faults which have been ascribed to him, there was, at times, a greatness of character about D. Pedro, which displayed itself when following the impulses of his own heart; and this frank avowal of the important services which Saldanha had rendered to his daughter and queen, were alike honourable both to the regent and to his general. If these significant words struck consternation amongst those who were jealous of Saldanha, they gave, at the same time, lively pleasure to his friends; several

of whom, who were present, immediately they reached home, committed to writing the language held by D. Pedro. Some chroniclers of that occurrence, who were probably absent on the occasion, have, to a certain extent, varied the words uttered. They quote them as being "to whom you owe your crown." The difference is unimportant; as, whatever were the words by which it was expressed, the same truth is avowed — that to Saldanha was due the presence of his sovereign in her Capital.

It is remarkable, that, on this occasion, no mention is made of D. Pedro's expressions in the official *Chronica Constitucional de Lisboa* of the day. The *Chronica* simply records that, on landing, the regent presented Saldanha to the queen as a Marshal! And yet, every little incident attending the royal disembarkation is carefully noted down in the official journal. Such no longer remembered ceremonies we may leave untold. It is sufficient to observe, that the Queen of Portugal was received by her subjects with the greatest enthusiasm.

As soon as the illustrious Pacheco heard that Saldanha had attained the rank of field-marshal, he wrote, as follows, to congratulate him:—

"OPORTO, *September 30th.*

"MY DEAR COUNT,

"As a soldier and a Portuguese, I was delighted at the news of your appointment. It was so much wished for by the sound portion of the Portuguese nation; and now all the truly constitutional party is satisfied. So great was their confidence in you, that for a long time past have they been desirous of this nomination. It is my duty, as your sincere friend, to congratulate you; but I regret that there should have been such great delay in granting this military rank, which, for so many reasons, was due to you; and which, for the honour and advantage of the country, should have been given at that time, when they most shamefully sent for a mercenary charlatan, who did his best (with the help of our neighbours*), to lose our cause.

"PACHECO."

* The Spaniards. In allusion to the threats of Ferdinand VII. if Saldanha accompanied the expedition to Oporto.

This was one of the last letters which Saldanha ever received from the virtuous, honourable, brave Pacheco; whose death, at the close of the siege of Oporto, was felt to be an irreparable loss to the country. He fell at the head of his regiment on the 2nd of December, 1833. No death was ever more universally lamented. José Joaquim Pacheco was so warm a friend, and so enthusiastic an admirer of Saldanha, that we may be excused for dwelling on his memory; if only to commemorate what character of men they were, who most loved their chief. He was somewhat taciturn, always grave, with an air of thoughtful sadness, as if deeply lamenting the misfortunes of his country; and it was remarked that he was more than usually melancholy on the morning of his death. Always the soldier, he demeaned himself with a dignity which to the minds of his numerous friends recalled their idea of an ancient Roman. Just, truthful, sincere, and yet, withal, of a kindly nature; while he commanded the respect, he won also the affections of both officers and men. He had served with distinction in the Peninsular war, and obtained a gold medal for those campaigns, with clasps for Albuera and Vittoria. He subsequently served with Saldanha throughout the Montevidean war; and, for his various services, he was made Commander of the three Portuguese Military Orders. He died, colonel of the 10th Infantry, having just declined the post of chief of the Staff to General Stubbs' successor at Oporto. All classes vied with each other in expressing regret for his loss; and the *Chronica*, the only representative at that time of the Oporto press, was crowded with sonnets in memory of Pacheco. The editor inserted twelve, declaring his regret that he had not space for more.

At the time of the queen's arrival at Lisbon, the regent's ministry was composed as follows:—

War . . .	AGOSTINHO JOSÉ FREIRE.
Marine and Colonies	
Home	CANDIDO JOSÉ XAVIER.
Foreign . . .	
Finance . . .	JOSÉ DA SILVA CARVALHO.
Justice . . .	

Shortly after this, on the 15th of October, Xavier died, when Joaquim Antonio d'Aguiar was appointed to the Home Office;

and Freire took the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, resigning to Francisco Simões Margiochi that of Marine and Colonies. The reader will not fail to observe that, by these arrangements, the duties of six offices were performed by four ministers only.

The following is a translation of the decree which conferred on General Saldanha the rank of Field-Marshal:—

"The valuable services rendered by Lieutenant-General Count de Saldanha, both as acting commander of the troops engaged in the defence of the noble and heroic city of Oporto after my departure from thence; and as chief of my Staff since his arrival at this Capital, are worthy of my highest consideration. His well conceived plan of attacking the rebel army within its lines and trenches on the 18th of August deserves especial praise; for having been executed with such skill, as was only equalled by the courage of the said lieutenant-general, and by the rapidity of his manœuvres. On that day, he gained an extraordinary victory over the enemy; who, being surprised in their strong positions, were routed and pursued to the heights beyond Ponte Ferreira, leaving in his hands many prisoners. By these means, he delivered the city of Oporto from the siege it had suffered during almost an entire year; and brought into it abundance of provisions of all kinds; in addition to the capture of large quantities of artillery, arms and munitions of war. Considering also the manner in which he has performed the duties of chief of my Staff; the promptitude, zeal, and military skill with which he has carried out my orders with respect to the system of defence, suggested by me, for the protection of this noble and ever loyal city of Lisbon; considering also the courage, tact, and activity with which he bore himself on the 5th of this present month; ready, whenever necessary, to carry my orders into execution, and, by his most skilful manœuvres, driving away the enemy at all points; thus in every way answering to the confidence I placed in him. Considering also the still further proofs of those qualities which he again displayed on the 14th of the said month; when the rebels were again routed with great loss, and punished for their insane rashness. For these reasons I am pleased, in the name

of the queen, to promote Lieutenant-General Count de Saldanha to the rank of field-marshal.

"The minister and secretary of state for the War Department will thus understand and order it to be executed.

"D. PEDRO, DUKE DE BRAGANÇA.
"AGOSTINHO JOSÉ FREIRE.

"PALACE OF THE NECESSIDADES, *on the 22nd of September*, 1833."

It was about this time that Colonel Bernardin arrived from France; and, in the name of the "Société de Civilisation Européenne," presented a sword of honour to General Saldanha, "in consideration of his great military deeds, energy, constancy, disinterestedness, and unlimited devotion, which contributed so powerfully to the triumph in Portugal of liberty and national independence, without which civilisation cannot make real and lasting progress."

Soon after the arrival of the queen at Lisbon, the Countess de Saldanha, with her three children, left Paris to join her husband. Through the gross ignorance and neglect of the captain of the *City of Waterford* steamer, in which they came, they were wrecked on the coast of Portugal, near S. Martinho; where, after landing with considerable difficulty, they nearly fell into the hands of some Miguelite guerillas who infested the neighbourhood. In the same vessel, several Portuguese families, returning to their homes, were passengers; and their state of fearful anxiety, during several days, may be well imagined. The countess, being of Irish parentage, to which her remarkably fair complexion, in some measure, bore witness, hoped that respect would be paid to her nationality, whilst the captain volunteered to assert roundly that she was his wife.

As soon as Saldanha heard of their misfortune, he sent his brother Domingos with the following letter to his wife. It was written partly in Portuguese and partly in English.

"MY DEAR AND GOOD WIFE,

"Thanks to the Almighty God, you and my beloved children are safe. My good friend, the admiral,* is going

* Admiral Napier.

himself for you. I know you appreciate my feelings. I think I could kill the captain. I would hang him myself. What you must have suffered in the presence of the guerillas! Good God! I hope in Him that your troubles will be at an end, and that you will enjoy happiness and wealth. You have the house of the Marquis de Borba to reside in. The house and Quinta are excellent and very convenient. The emperor has made me a marshal and a councillor of state, so that we shall have about £300 every month. I hope in God that the fright has not hurt you. What a sacrifice I am obliged to make in not going myself with the admiral! My beloved wife has a great deal of courage; but the struggle must have been terrible. First, the dangers of a shipwreck, and then the neighbourhood of such ruffians. I shall not be happy until I embrace you. I have always protected those who have required my help—the Almighty therefore, I hope, will never abandon my wife and children. Your life now is certainly more necessary to them than my own. Kiss them a thousand times, and believe me more than ever your true, fond, and faithful husband,

"SALDANHA.

"My brother is the bearer."

We now have the queen in possession of her throne: whether securely so remains yet to be seen. The Capital is still invested by the powerful forces of the enemy. It were to be wished that from henceforth all the constitutional parties should unite to support the queen and that Charter which, in 1826, had been bestowed by D. Pedro on the Portuguese people. But, on the contrary, we find Palmella, in a letter to Lima, dated October 4th, already lamenting, "that the party of 1820 is again starting up with all its fury."

We will not attempt to describe the variety of those party divisions which now commenced to make their appearance amongst the liberals. Perhaps they approached the number of those humorously summed up by the "officer of hussars," when Saldanha arrived at Oporto. He writes that there were "three parties of Constitutionalists of various opinions. Then there were Pedroites, Miguelites, Ministerialists, ultra-Liberals,

Solignacs, Saldanhists, Terceiras, Amalgamists, Terrorists, and Capitulationists; but all thirteen united against the Miguelites in the hour of danger."

We pass over the minor attacks which were made on the city now defended by Saldanha; neither, as we are not writing a history of the civil war in Portugal, do we think it necessary to give an account of the various successes which the queen's troops met with in various parts of the kingdom. The chief force of the enemy was collected around Lisbon, under the command of General Reinaldo Macdonell; and he, we may presume, meditated some great attempt which would do credit to himself, and serve the cause of his master.

It was on the evening of the 8th of October, that Saldanha, presenting himself at the royal residence, found the queen and empress playing on the piano, whilst D. Pedro was accompanying them with the French horn. Notwithstanding Saldanha's assurance that there was nothing new, D. Pedro, probably, perceived in his visitor's countenance, that which told him the marshal was thinking of something more spirit stirring than even the royal ladies and the instrumental trio. So, taking him into another room, he asked: "What is it?" To this Saldanha replied: "The 12th is your Majesty's birthday."—"Much obliged to you for the information," said D. Pedro, "and what of that?" Saldanha continued: "I do not like that your Majesty should spend your birthday in a city surrounded by the enemy."—"Nor do I," interrupted D. Pedro; "but what can we do?"—"Let us attack them," was the immediate reply. "Are you mad?" rejoined D. Pedro; "did you not see the force which my brother Miguel paraded before us yesterday?"—"Yes, sire; I saw," said the marshal, "that he had 22,000 bayonets and 3,100 cavalry."—"And with what force can you attack them?"—"I have," answered Saldanha, "8400 infantry and 600 cavalry."—"Then would it not be complete madness?"—"Sire," replied Saldanha, "you must observe that the enemy, by delay, can go on augmenting their forces, which it is much less in our power to do. The plan I have conceived, if successful, would be the most brilliant action of modern military history. If not, it would simply appear as an ordinary sortie from a besieged city."

D. Pedro, reflecting for a moment, replied: "I will not oppose you. I have seen you perform such miracles. Do whatever you like."

That same night, Saldanha sent off his aide-de-camp, Solla, in a steamer, to Peniche; furnishing him with orders to the commandants, Sá da Bandeira and João Nepomuceno, that they should immediately advance towards Lisbon, by Cabeça de Montachique, with their entire force of infantry and cavalry, and attack the rear of the enemy on the morning of the 10th. He also gave orders that some gunboats should be moored off the mouth of the Sacavem river, for the purpose of harassing the anticipated retreat of the enemy; and he put, in a condition to enable six horses to pass abreast, that part of the road leading to where the pickets of the enemy were stationed near the Convento do Rego. Such, in a few words, were the well combined plans for the marshal's projected attack on the 10th of October.

The enemy, on their part, had shown, some days previously, an intention of mounting heavy artillery on their strong positions in front of Lisbon. Saldanha observed the strictest secrecy respecting his plans. On the night of the 9th, he requested the Duke da Terceira to take the command of the right, while he reserved for himself the left. At 10 o'clock on the following morning, he marched out his troops in four columns. The enemy were completely taken by surprise. They were unprepared for the boldness of such an attack, which, nevertheless, they resisted with the greatest bravery and obstinacy. It is related that at one spot, near Seabra, 145 Miguelites were put to the sword; and that, at a house near Bemfica, 123 of the enemy were killed by the 5th Caçadores, who would give no quarter. On one occasion, after four attacks had been made on the enemy's position at Pinheiro, Saldanha got off his horse, led on a Belgian corps, and was the first to jump into the enemy's trenches. Five times during this day did the marshal dismount, and himself lead the men to the attack of disputed positions. The combat ceased only at night. It was a triumphant day for the queen's troops, who were outnumbered by their opponents as three to one in

infantry, and five times in cavalry. Still more complete would have been the success of the victors, if the plans of Saldanha had been executed, in other quarters, as he had previously combined. But, unfortunately, with a disobedience to orders which it is impossible satisfactorily to explain, Sá da Bandeira and João Nepomuceno having arrived at Cabeça de Montachique, and having been told that the attack on the enemy was unsuccessful, made no further advance!

An apologist of João Nepomuceno (many years after that officer's death) pretended that, on arriving at Cabeça de Montachique, he expected further orders; and that, not receiving any, he retired. To this it was immediately replied, that, as it had been necessary to despatch Colonel Solla from a besieged city by sea, in order safely to convey Saldanha's positive instructions, Nepomuceno could little expect to receive further orders, unless it were by a bird sent through the air. Sá da Bandeira, who survived this attempted defence of his brother officer, prudently avoided, as far as we are aware, any attempt to vindicate himself.

Thus thwarted in his original plan, Saldanha, when night put an end to the engagement, perceived that he was likely to have another hard day's work on the morrow. The two armies bivouacked in presence of each other; but, during the night, the enemy retired to the heights around Loures. The marshal, having established his head-quarters at Carnide, ran into Lisbon to assure his beloved wife and children of his safety, and to wait upon her Majesty and the regent.

He was received by the queen, the empress, and D. Pedro at the foot of the staircase. The latter exclaimed: "It seems impossible that you have not been killed a thousand times this day. How often from the Redoubt of the Arco do Cego did I see you, and think that you were lost to me for ever."

On the following morning, D. Pedro, by daybreak, was at Saldanha's quarters at Carnide, bringing with him Colonel Hare, who was at Lisbon on a military mission from the British Government, together with Colonel Bernardin and another officer, who had brought from France the sword of honour already mentioned. We believe that General Badcock

was also in attendance on his Majesty. They all complimented Saldanha on the events of the previous day, but they strongly advised that he should not, for the present, attempt any further operations in advance. The marshal insisted to the contrary, and declared that foreigners were not competent to judge of the urgencies of civil wars. Perceiving, however, that D. Pedro sided against him, Saldanha, to use his own expression, threw himself at the feet of the regent, imploring him to support those plans, of the success of which he felt confident; and added, that he must otherwise inevitably decline any longer to take upon himself the responsibility of command. In answer to this appeal, D. Pedro, who felt that the safety of Lisbon, and of his daughter's throne, rested on Saldanha, immediately exclaimed: "God save me from your resignation; march on, and do what you please." *

The whole day, on the 11th, was a series of successes. The marshal, as usual, was everywhere; and, at midnight, the enemy were in full retreat on the fortified position of Santarem, leaving behind them their heavy artillery, ammunition of all kinds, and baggage, together with their sick and wounded. Amongst the latter was a nephew of Saldanha's, who was carried to his father's house, where he lay in the same room by the side of a wounded brother, who had embraced the constitutional cause. And thus were the hitherto divided brothers restored to each other's affection.

During this day's engagement, an incident occurred of uncommon and even affecting interest—an incident which the reader will admit exalts the characters both of the regent and of the marshal. It was about 12 o'clock, and D. Pedro had ridden out to the battle-field, where he found Saldanha, on foot, standing on a rising ground from whence he could observe the movements of the enemy. D. Pedro dismounted and joined him. He was scarcely at the marshal's side, when a ball killed a servant of Captain Walsh (one of Saldanha's aides-de-camp); also a horse; and wounded a mounted orderly. On which, the officer who accompanied D. Pedro (afterwards Viscount de Almeida) said: "For the love of God let your

* Deos me livre de tal; continue a marcha, e faça o que quizer.

Majesty retire. It is the marshal who is in command, and you are exposing yourself without any necessity." D. Pedro, who was by nature brave, playfully ran behind Saldanha, and seizing him by the shoulders, exclaimed (in allusion to the notoriously charmed life of the marshal), "Now I am securely covered by João Carlos." But, in a moment, seriously recollecting himself, and thrusting Saldanha aside, the regent cried out, as if horror-struck at the idea, "Poor Maria! if one ball should kill us both!"

What a candid, because instinctive, avowal of the value of Saldanha's services!

The enemy were retreating on Santarem. Those gunboats which the marshal had ordered to be at the mouth of the Sacavem river, for the purpose of harassing that retreat, did not make their appearance. But where was Colonel Sá? Let Palmella speak, who wrote to Lima, on the 12th, as follows:—

"The siege of Lisbon is raised. At 11 o'clock on the 10th, the Miguelites were completely taken by surprise, and were attacked by four columns in all their positions, which they abandoned at night after an obstinate resistance. The loss on our side is about 600 men in killed and wounded: on theirs it must be much greater. At night they deserted the field and marched to the heights of Mealhada, where yesterday we again took them unawares; as they little expected we should follow them up so closely." . . . "It is evident they are marching on Santarem." . . . "The affair would have been still more complete if Bernardo de Sá had appeared yesterday on their flank; as we expected he would; for already, on the 9th, he had written from Torres Vedras. But, unfortunately, he was not forthcoming: and this, probably, saved the enemy from a much greater defeat."

Palmella, a general officer, and witness to what was going forward, was well aware of the orders which had been sent to these officers; whilst Soriano pretends that they had received but "a simple notice," and awaited further instructions to advance. But we have already seen that the marshal had sent an aide-de-camp with positive orders for their guidance; and, for greater certainty and security, had sent him by sea.

An officer on Saldanha's staff, now a general, alluding to this unfortunate occurrence, lately declared to the author that any general, but one of Saldanha's kind and forgiving nature, would have had these officers brought to a court-martial for such extraordinary disobedience of positive orders. For, on what plea did they hesitate to advance after reaching Montachique, which is five leagues from Lisbon? They knew there was fighting going forward, and that their aid, in any case, must be desirable. When they resolved to advance, which they did on the 12th, the enemy was in full retreat.

General Macdonell was in command of the Miguelite forces on the 10th of October and following days. The reader will remember the first meeting of that general with Saldanha, at the Castle of St. George, and the services the latter was enabled to render his fellow prisoner. Their acquaintance had been renewed at Paris in the year 1832, when Macdonell again found himself in distressed circumstances. He had lost so much money at play, that he was unable to return to Scotland. Whereupon, he addressed himself to Saldanha, who brought the general's case to the notice of his friend Mr. Hamilton, at that time secretary to the British Embassy at Paris. But the application was unsuccessful; and Saldanha himself generously furnished his present adversary with the means of reaching Scotland.

In a despatch, dated October 26th, General Macdonell, in giving an account of what had recently occurred before Lisbon, draws attention to the fact that he only assumed command on the 18th of the previous month. He then asserts, that the positions occupied by his predecessor (Bourmont) were the worst that could have been selected. He states, that he had carefully studied the weak points of the Lisbon lines, and had intended to attack them on the 11th; but that, unfortunately, Saldanha had anticipated him on the 10th. On that day, he adds, various communications had misled him; especially the one that the queen's troops were marching from Torres Vedras on Montachique. His troops, he affirms, behaved with the greatest bravery; and, in fact, accomplished everything he had ordered; but, "I thought it desirable to retreat to Santarem. It is not

to be supposed that this retreat was motived by any respect which I have for the talent or courage of the enemy. No. It was to establish a base of operations, and to work on a system. Nevertheless, I am too old a soldier not to know the unfavourable ideas consequent upon a retreat. However powerful the motive; however skilful the execution; vanity, on one side, will make parade of it; and, on the other, malevolence will murmur. But these miserable feelings of enmity I totally despise. I have weighed my position and circumstances; and I am thoroughly satisfied that I did right. It was time to give a new character to the war!—from a blockade, to action in the field. In this way, making the game more equal, the field would be open for the display of skill and valour; and time will show who best knows how to take advantage of them.

"As for myself, I have only to say that I did my utmost to fulfil my obligations, and I only regret that I could not do more. Nevertheless, his Majesty must remember that when, in Lumiares, I took the command, I told him that I could not promise that Lisbon should be taken, but that I would answer for the safety of the army. And, I hope I may be allowed to say that I have kept my word."

Certainly, we may remark, he had; if the safety of the army was the main object of the campaign, he had done his best to secure it, by a hasty retreat to a very strongly fortified town! It is generally ungracious, to criticise the despatch of an honest soldier, accounting for some failure or misfortune in war. But when the despatch is conceived in a spirit of undue self-assertion, and disparages the opponent of the writer, it provokes comment. General Macdonell might have restrained his contempt for the talent and courage of Saldanha, his officers, and soldiers: but he would not have it supposed that his retreat was motived by respect for that very talent and courage by which he and his army had been driven to seek refuge in Santarem. He was actuated, he declares, by a powerful motive: which was, to change the character of the war from a blockade to action in the field. A wise general does not assume to play the prophet. Bourmont foretold that he should dine that next day in Oporto: but the marshal soon found occasion to dine more luxuriously at Paris.

Macdonell now foresees the triumph of the Miguelite army in the tented field—for the field would be open for the display of skill and valour—and time would show whether he or Saldanha best knew how to take advantage of them.

The 10th, 11th, and 12th of October, 1833, will always be remarkable anniversaries in the history of Portugal. Those, and the 18th of August, are glorious days in the military career of the Marshal Saldanha. On the latter, he compelled the enemy, whose force was more than double his own, to raise the siege of Oporto. On the former, by his courage and well contrived plans, he was enabled to drive the enemy from the very gates of Lisbon, with a still greater disparity of numbers, and to compel them to seek refuge in Santarem.

D. Pedro, being desirous of commemorating these occurrences by an act of tardy justice to the memory of Saldanha's grandfather, the Marquis of Pombal, ordered the bronze medallion of that great statesman, which had once ornamented the pedestal of the fine equestrian statue in the Terreiro do Paço, to be replaced in its original position, with this simple inscription in bronze beneath it.*

"OCTOBER XII. 1833."

On the following day, D. Pedro presented Saldanha with the Star of the Order which he had recently conferred on him; and, at the same time, a copy of the *Chronica*, in which was published the decree respecting the replacement of the medallion bust of Pombal.

* See "Marquis of Pombal," by the Conde da Carnota. Second Edition. Longmans, 1873.

CHAPTER XIV.

1833 (*continued*).

Saldanha at Cartaxo—Intrigues in Lisbon—Conde da Taipa—Protest by Peers—Ministerial reply—Message from the regent—D. Pedro does justice to Saldanha—Divisions amongst the liberals—Saldanha's opinion of affairs—His pecuniary difficulties—Courteous behaviour of Freire—Saldanha's reply to Palmella on Taipa's arrest—Napier complains of the ministry—Freire urges Saldanha to enter the cabinet—The enemy continues at Santarem—Macdonell resigns—Is succeeded by Povoas—Letter from Saldanha to his son.

On the 15th of October, Saldanha's forces already occupied Castanheira, Carregado, Alemquer, and Villa Nova da Rainha; and, on the following day, they advanced as far as Cartaxo. There the marshal established his head-quarters in front of Santarem, to which fortified town the Miguelites had fled. The tables were turned, and now the besiegers had become the besieged. It was here that Massena, in 1810–11, remained several months, and defied any attack on the part of Wellington.

Whilst Saldanha was absent in the field, a war of another kind was carried on in Lisbon, where the strife became one of intrigues, either to gain power or to overturn all existing principles of government. We have already seen Palmella, in a letter to Lima, complaining that the ultra-democratic party of 1820 were beginning "furiously to declare themselves." Unfortunately, not alone they, but the most respectable and influential of the conservative party, were shortly in declared opposition to the ministry; and the first open challenge to the power of the regent was thrown down by one who was himself of a privileged class—a peer and a nobleman of ancient and distinguished family—Count da Taipa.

As our object in referring to this is chiefly to make known how rapidly discord arose among the liberals, even before the queen was in full possession of her kingdom, we need not enter on the subject of the count's complaint, beyond stating that the regent and his ministers had taken upon themselves, without the sanction of parliament (which had not yet assembled), to authorize a "Law of Indemnification," by which the property of those who had served the cause of D. Miguel was rendered liable to confiscation, in order to reimburse those Constitutionalists whose property had been seized and sold during the usurpation. It was in consequence of this, that the Count da Taipa, on the 25th of October, addressed to the regent a very strong remonstrance against the measures of the ministry; and, claiming his privilege as a peer, with his usual vehemence, concluded his letter in the following terms:—

"For the love of my country; for the glory of your Majesty; for the triumph of justice; and, above all, that it should not be proclaimed to the world that the government of your Majesty little differs from that type of infamy, the government of D. Miguel; I beseech your Majesty that, calling together your council of state, and becoming better informed, you will act with the justice which your heart dictates."

This freespoken letter, which the count made public, followed by another on the 18th of November, gave, as may well be imagined, great offence in high quarters; dealing, as it did, in furious invectives against the ministers, and calling them plebeian, disloyal, ungrateful and ignorant. It led to an order for the imprisonment of the irascible nobleman. Upon this, a protest was immediately made, on the same day (December 7th), by the undernamed peers, who did not approve of D. Pedro's views of constitutional government.

DUQUE DA TERCEIRA.
DUQUE DE PALMELLA.
MARQUEZ DE FRONTEIRA.
MARQUEZ DE PONTE DE LIMA.
MARQUEZ DE LOULÉ.
MARQUEZ DE SANCTA IRIA.
CONDE DE LUMIARES.
CONDE DE FICALHO.
CONDE DE PARATY.

On the day which followed the publication of the count's

second letter, a decree was signed by D. Pedro and the minister Aguiar, appointing a commission to restrict the liberty of the press, until the time when, the Charter being in full force, a jury would be competent to decide in these matters.*

The protest was replied to by the Minister of Justice, José da Silva Carvalho, who asserted that the imprisonment of the count was strictly legal; the order for it having been signed, after due inquiry, by the competent magistrate; and, that, if any of the honourable peers considered their privileges attacked, they were free to take such steps in their support as the law permits. The same peers answered, lamenting the "fatal absence" of the Chamber of Deputies, and vindicating their constitutional opinions. Upon this, the regent, on the 16th of December, orders the Home Minister to inform them that their protest would be presented to the Chambers at their first meeting; when it would become the duty of Parliament to decide whether the regent had, or had not, exceeded his powers.

The view taken by Saldanha of the conduct of the peers on this occasion, is shown by the following letters that passed between him and the Duke of Palmella on the subject.

"LISBON, *12th of December*, 1833.

"By another hand you will receive a copy of the 'Protest' which some of the peers found themselves obliged to make; and I am sure you will do us the justice to believe that we were instigated only by the reasons laid out in the said Protest. I am certain that in a question of sustaining the Charter, and the independence of the powers it constituted, you will agree with us, that we could not but take this step, which, it appears to me, will meet the approval of every good Portuguese, and, consequently, yours. Believe me, most truly your friend,

"PALMELLA."

* It is necessary to observe that the regent was still in possession of those extraordinary powers which were assumed by him during the continuance of the war.

To this, Saldanha returned the following answer:—

"QUINTA DA RIBEIRA, 14*th of December*, 1833.

"MY FRIEND,

"'Queen and Charter' has been for a long time my sole motto; and *Gare à qui y touche.* I read, therefore, with much pleasure the Protest which the peers 'who will not perjure themselves' addressed to his Imperial Majesty, in which they demand the entire and religious observance of the Charter. They may lay claim to the noble confidence that they are expressing the opinions of the nation; of that nation which has fought and made sacrifices for the Charter, and which will not lay down its arms until it sees it established in all its vigour. Thanks for your letter. I have only time to assure you that I am

"Your sincere friend,

"SALDANHA."

We have somewhat anticipated events in pursuing the subject of the "Protest;" we therefore return to the period which more immediately followed Saldanha's arrival at Cartaxo.

On the 17th of October, the Minister of War wrote, as follows, to the marshal:

"This morning, I received, with great pleasure, yours of the 16th, and his Imperial Majesty was very highly gratified. I am delighted with the manner in which your Excellency has directed the operations. I am certain that, if a battle takes place, it will not be lost through badly combined plans. The enemy can do little with their infantry; but their cavalry is really respectable, and necessarily impedes our movements. So much the more necessary is it to expel them from their element, which is the flat grounds of the Tagus and Alemtejo. I consider the possession of Santarem of so great importance to the enemy, and of so much advantage to us, that I make bold to beg you not to desist; but, at the same time, not to put in risk the much we have already gained. If we occupy the ground as far as the river Zezere, the battle is more than half-gained, and the rest would quickly follow."

In order that the reader may understand many of the occur-

rences which will follow, as well as many letters which will serve to elucidate those occurrences, it is necessary to remind him that, when, in 1826, Saldanha insisted upon making public, and caused to be observed, that constitutional Charter, which D. Pedro had granted to Portugal, the whole of the absolutist party, besides many who were wavering in their policy, declared that the principles of João Carlos were decidedly republican. As no act of his, at any period of his life, ever afforded the slightest pretence for so absurd a charge, we may pass it over in silence. But when, during the emigration at Paris, a certain *coterie* of the Constitutionalists endeavoured, by every means in their power, to prejudice the public, as well as D. Pedro himself, against Saldanha; it naturally followed that those who viewed with dislike the small diplomatists thus at war with their countryman; together with all those of various stages of liberal opinions; should unite and gather round the well-born and influential general, and proclaim him as the chief of *their* party. Saldanha, during the emigration, thus became supported and surrounded by the most talented, the bravest, the most honest, and, we may confess, the most vehement and noisy of the Constitutional party. Amongst these friends and supporters were the Passos, the Pizarros, the Liberatos, the Margiochis, together with a host of others whose names have appeared, or may yet appear, in these volumes. Thus, united with those who, sincerely, aimed only at the establishment of real monarchical constitutional liberty in Portugal, were many who held the most extreme or ultra-liberal principles; and as these, for their own purposes, evoked the name of Saldanha and proclaimed themselves his followers, he, in a measure, was made responsible for principles which he both disavowed and detested.** But this erroneous opinion respecting Saldanha's ultimate views had obtained such hold on D. Pedro and others, that, as we have seen, Ferdinand VII. insisted that Saldanha should not form part of the liberating expedition to Oporto. It was, however, only necessary that D. Pedro should be better acquainted with his general, in order to be convinced that the queen had not a more faithful subject, nor the Charter a more devoted supporter, than Saldanha himself: and the memorable interview at Oporto

between him and Palmella proved to the astute diplomatist how greatly he had been deceived in his conception of the character of the frank and loyal soldier. With these observations, the author leaves it to the intelligent reader to appreciate the steps which led such of the ultra-liberal party, as had hitherto supported Saldanha, to withdraw that support; complaining, while they did so, of being deserted by their chief; when, in reality, that chief was but consistently holding firm to those principles which he had always avowed—allegiance to the queen, and undeviating support of the Charter of 1826.

The powerful position which Saldanha had now acquired made the ministers very anxious to obtain his support; and, if possible, to induce him to accept a portfolio as minister. With this view, much correspondence took place between Saldanha and various members and supporters of the ministry. But all efforts to withdraw the marshal from his military duties during this critical period of the civil war—for the purpose of entering actively on the field of political life—were without avail.

Meanwhile, Saldanha had his attention distracted from the important duties of his command, by cares which came personally home to him. His household goods had been disturbed, and his very furniture, plate, carriages, etc. had been sold by the Miguelite authorities. During all his country's troubles, he thought of himself last. When commanding at Oporto, he had appealed to the Finance Minister on behalf of his troops; and the reader will perceive, by the following letter from Freire, that he remained himself unpaid. The consequence was that, at this time, the commander of the army was writing to his wife as to the means of raising 2000 francs, to transmit to Paris in payment of a former debt. The minister, having heard of the difficulty, writes to the marshal, on the 5th of December, a letter which evinces at once a delicate sympathy and a proud sense of honour. He says :—

"I am so angry with you to-day, that I have only time to scold. How could it enter into the head of any one to trouble a poor woman with commercial transactions! Is it not bitterness enough to be deprived of her husband's company? Rest assured that Machado will receive the 2000 francs in good time;

for an order shall be sent by the packet, and, if possible, overland too. Your name should not be compromised, however large might be the sum required. Too much is owing to you by the Treasury, that you should thus draw on your private means. I have great hope, that from the first of January onwards, the army will be paid in cash."

Affairs were evidently looking serious for the ministers; for Freire, on the 10th of December, urges Saldanha to take some step that would redound to their credit, and strengthen their hands. Freire writes:—

"It is an absolute necessity, that we should do something to draw off the attention of the enemy; and of our own people too; for they are beginning to murmur about everything; not even limiting their attacks to the ministry, whom they attack as a matter of course. They complain that such large means and resources are paralysed before a small force at Santarem; whilst the enemy overrun the country at their ease, and threaten even the outskirts of Oporto. Should they make an attack in force, upon Setubal and along the Tagus, it would certainly produce a bad effect. I do not know if such a thing is possible; for, without regular troops, little can be done against earthworks; nor even with them; but the sad affair of Alcacer has inspired the enemy with a certain amount of audacity. Really, conscientiously and candidly, I must beg you to consider what you can do; but do something. I trust you will do me the justice to believe that these observations are made in a military sense; and are not the result of consideration for the welfare of the ministry in general, or my own in particular."

We cannot refrain from presenting to the reader, the following letter addressed, at this period, by Admiral Napier to the marshal. It proves that the desire for meddling and the incapacity which had done so much harm was still as prevailing as ever. Just as Freire and the regent were continually interfering with the plans and operations of the general in command, so Margiochi, called from his geometrical studies to preside over the marine department, wished to interfere in the discipline of the navy. Neither Saldanha nor Napier were men to tolerate such folly. They felt their own responsibility;

their own competence; and, the incapacity of their would-be Mentors. Napier felt that Saldanha was the only man in the country who could sympathise with him; and to him he appealed, as he had done once before upon the occasion of the expedition to the Algarves. The letter, moreover, is interesting as affording us an insight to the state of public opinion.

"*December 10th*, 1833.

"MY DEAR MARSHAL,

"I have received more than one indignity from the Minister of Marine: the last, to order my son to be reprimanded for giving a man a dozen lashes for desertion, and to order punishment to be discontinued in the squadron. I replied, that I could neither do one nor the other, without causing a mutiny; and I this day laid both letters before the emperor. I told him his Minister of Marine was unfit for his place; and I also told him frankly and plainly, that there was a general discontent in Lisbon—that he was losing fast his popularity, and that unless things were changed, there would be a reaction. He listened with sufficient attention, but he either did not believe it, or would not. I told him that the affair of Count de Taipa had alarmed everybody. He said that had nothing to do with the Government—it was judicial. I replied that I was no judge of these things; but it was my duty to tell him what was the public opinion. We parted well, but I fear I made no impression. Now, my good friend, I must tell you plainly, things have got to such a pass here, that there will be a row, and everything will go to the dogs, unless he changes his ministers; and I think you are the man to tell him so. I will join with you and do what I can to heal the wounds of this unfortunate country, but these men are not capable of doing it. Your money will get short; your credit is almost gone; your foreign troops will desert you. They have disgusted Shaw; and everything appears to be going to the devil. The emperor, I hear, goes up to-morrow to the army. Were I you, I would run down; talk to him seriously and decidedly, or your country will be lost. They will disgust me; and if I go, all my officers go also; the men will follow, and the squadron will be upset. This I won't do till the last extremity, because it would assist D. Miguel—but so far a man

can go and no farther. It is hard, my dear friend, that all that we have gained by *honest shot* should be lost by incapacity.

"Your very sincere friend,

"CAPE ST. VINCENT."

Saldanha might well congratulate himself that he was not in the ministry; although it was not long before each party strove to attach him to their side: and, at length, all parties seemed to consider that the weight of his authority could alone impart steadiness to the Government. Not only did his own countrymen express this opinion and feel the truth of it, but the concluding sentence of a letter from the British minister, Lord William Russell, to Colonel Hare, whilst it lays open to our view the difficulties of the situation, points unhesitatingly to the most sure means of meeting them. Lord William writes:—

"All eyes are turned towards Saldanha, as the person who holds the power of directing the march of affairs, and it could not be in better hands."

Fortified in their strong position at Santarem, the enemy showed no disposition to come out, and, with their superior forces, risk a battle. Macdonell, if naught else, had learned discretion; for, on his arrival, he had thrust out from the town a large number of the inhabitants. In November, Saldanha sent a force to Pernes, and destroyed the mills which, in part, supplied Santarem with flour. In the following month, on the 21st, he did the same at Torres Novas, the mills of which place furnished the enemy daily with 3,000 rations. Unimportant successes or reverses were taking place in various parts of the kingdom, but Saldanha remained before Santarem, waiting his opportunity for decided action.

The Minister of War, during this time, had been continually pressing upon Saldanha the urgent necessity for making some great effort to bring the contest to a close; or obtaining such a success as might enable the Government to make proposals to the enemy under the advantages which that success would afford them for negotiation. Another motive which, not unnaturally, influenced the ministers, was their desire to brighten up the expiring credit of the Cabinet by the lustre which some brilliant exploit of Saldanha in the field might reflect on themselves.

This habit of meddling with his plans, and urging him to attempt that which he knew to be impracticable, was a constant source of vexation to the marshal. For, although Freire's letters were always concluded by telling him to use his own discretion, yet, prompted by the emperor, the minister was ever suggesting operations which were either needless or impossible. It was the reply of Saldanha to some such suggestions which led Freire to observe, in one of his letters, that:

"The clubbists probably cry out against everything; nevertheless, in truth, I never heard that their impudence had led them to desire the assault of Santarem. . . . Reasonable people really desire that something should be done, but they well know the risks and difficulties; and neither venture to point out time nor place; requiring only that the most appropriate should be selected, so as not to suffer a failure."

Macdonell, who had boasted of his desire to meet Saldanha in the field, continued to shelter himself during this time, perhaps wisely, behind the walls of Santarem. At length, despairing of gathering the laurels he had promised himself, he disappeared from the scene on the 20th of December, and was succeeded by General Povoas in the command of D. Miguel's army.

To add to the vexations of Saldanha at this period, he was afflicted by reports which reached him concerning the health of his wife; and, as his duties in front of Santarem would not allow him to quit his post, he wrote the following letter to his son.

"QUINTA DA RIBEIRA, 31*st of December*, 1833.

"MY BELOVED AUGUSTUS,

"I am greatly afflicted on account of your beloved mamma. Since the 26th I have received no letter; and as I know that mamma would not fail to write if she were not very ill, I have been in great trouble these last two days. Write to me, my dear son. Never mind the writing, but just say how mamma is. My Augustus is incapable of an untruth; and for this I am anxious, as soon as possible, for your answer.

"A kiss to mamma and the children.

"Your father and friend,

"J. CARLOS."

CHAPTER XV.

1834.

Military plans—Secrecy observed—Saldanha takes Leiria—Laconic message—Surprises the enemy—Great slaughter—Soriano's observations—Saldanha's stratagem—Account by a Miguelite—Battle of Pernes—Eulogistic decree—Saldanha threatens to resign—Threat of officers—Further plans—Strange conduct of a confessor—Character of Liberato—Slander—Position of Santarem—Jealous feelings in Lisbon—Grand attack by the enemy—They retreat to Santarem—Saldanha's despatches—Lord Howard de Walden goes to Cartaxo and Santarem—Writes to Saldanha—Quadruple treaty signed in London—The enemy evacuate Santarem—Saldanha enters the town—He follows the enemy—Their retreat to Evora—Saldanha's correspondence with Lemos—Convention of Evora Monte—D. Miguel embarks for Italy—Protest at Genoa—D. Pedro insulted at Lisbon—Honours conferred on Saldanha.

THE queen's forces, at the commencement of the year 1834, were estimated at 38,691 men, of which only 20,382 were infantry of the line, and 1523 were cavalry. That of the enemy being still greater, there appeared but little prospect of bringing the civil war to an end. To add to the difficulties of the situation, some disturbances had taken place, on the 16th of December, at Oporto, to which Freire, in a letter to Saldanha, dated the 6th of January, thus alludes:—

"I hear that the peers are frightened at the disturbances at Oporto, which were serious. Ask the Duke de Palmella if he would be capable of doing what Miranda did, and of quieting the people with such coolness and skill." The anti-ministerialists, on their part, declared that this was little to be wondered at, when Miranda yielded to the people every thing they demanded!

Plans which had been devised with great secrecy, and by one of which the Duke da Terceira was to accept a command out of Lisbon, were now about to be carried into execution. Secrecy



London; John Murray, Albemarle Street.

is an important condition for the success of military operations against an enemy of a different race and language, but still more so in a civil war like that raging in Portugal. In the Capital, almost close at hand, and in the very towns and villages of the district within which Saldanha purposed carrying his plan into execution, might be found partizans of D. Miguel, and even relatives of officers and men who, at that moment, were serving in the army at Santarem: and we have seen, in a previous chapter, the instance of two brothers, nephews of Saldanha, fighting on opposite sides. Add to such considerations, the busy intrigues of rival factions and the bitterness of political enmity, and it becomes evident that there was great danger of the plans of the general coming to the knowledge of his opponent. His secrecy did not proceed from overweening self-conceit; much less from distrust of those honourable comrades, who might well, under different circumstances, have claimed to share his confidence. It was an imperative duty, which the Minister of War duly appreciated, as the two following letters will show.

"*January* 11*th*, 1834.

"Do not believe what Hare sent word to you. Neither he, nor anyone else, knows your plans: be sure of this. Hare, the admiral, and others, seeing the Duke da Terceira depart, which it was impossible to conceal, want to know what is going to be done, that they may communicate it to Parker.* They all want something done; but they are in such confusion, that they change their opinions every day and hour." . . . "As to the subject of intervention, it is idle to imagine that the affair at Oporto has been an obstacle. For it was not known in London at the time of the latest news thence; and, therefore, the English Government could have formed no opinion on it. The case is different. England declines mixing herself up in a question, which might lead her much further than she wishes, in the present state of excitement in which the Peninsula is. *Paciencia!* Alone, up to the present, have we been: alone, we will go on: although, truly, with greater misfortunes to the country. And yet, if they are prolonged, the fault is not ours."

* Admiral in command of the British squadron in the Tagus.

"*January* 13*th*.

"There is no doubt that, at the departure of the duke, it was reported everywhere that you were going to Leiria—to Oporto, etc. Each one made his comments in his own way. But your real plan, never having been divulged or known, could only be guessed at. I spoke of this to the emperor to-day; he assured me that so little idea had any one of the real state of the plans, that the admiral* had complained of many boats in the Tagus having been moved to Villa Nova, and of other directions having been given without his knowledge; and that Valdez had told him last night that the admiral was quite put out about it." . . . . "The duke writes to-day, saying that he had assumed the command of the 'right wing of the army of operations.' Do you approve of this denomination, and that your Division should be called the left wing?"

"*January* 15*th*.

"The combinations and movements which you describe to me are most skilful; and I, in perfect security, expect the best results from them. I do not believe that the city can resist either the force under your command, or, still less, the moral influence of your name. Send us good news of Leiria."

The good news was not long delayed. On the 11th, Saldanha despatched a force to occupy Rio Maior. On the following day, Terceira assumed the command at Cartaxo, and Saldanha commenced to carry out those plans, which he had been so desirous should be kept secret. He marched on Rio Maior, at the head of between 4000 and 5000 men. On the 13th, his cavalry occupied Carvalhos, whilst the infantry halted at Molianos and the neighbouring villages. Lieut.-colonel Gouveia Vasconcellos, with the 1st Light Infantry, marched on Cós; and Saldanha himself entered Batalha. On the 15th, the Constitutional forces advanced on Leiria in three columns. Saldanha, at the head of the 1st, with Bacon's cavalry, crossed the Liz at the bridge of Cavalleiro in order to occupy the high northern road which leads to Oporto. The 2nd column, under Colonel Xavier, advanced from Batalha on Leiria; and the 3rd marched in the

* Napier.

same direction, but on the road which connects Leiria with Santarem. The instructions given to Xavier were that his column should advance to the attack of the city as soon as the firing of the 1st under Schwalbach should be heard: and the 3rd column was ordered to do the same on hearing the firing of the 2nd. As Xavier neared the city he descried the Miguelite forces drawn up outside their entrenchments and prepared for the attack. We shall learn from Saldanha's short account, of which the author possesses the original, what was going forward on his side. The enemy did not surrender, but attempted to quit the city. On this, the two columns under Xavier and Vasconcellos entered Leiria and found it deserted by the rebel troops, who were pursued by the cavalry which Saldanha had so adroitly moved in the direction which he was persuaded they would take. All who offered resistance were put to the sword: and the resistance must have been considerable, as the loss of the enemy on that day is stated at 1500, killed, wounded, and prisoners. The following is Saldanha's letter to which we have referred:—

"Having, on the 12th, given over the command to the Duke da Terceira, I left Cartaxo, on the same day, with 4000 men and a regiment of lancers, and marched towards Leiria. Arrived there, I placed Xavier* on the Lisbon road with his column; and Vasconcellos† on the road between Santarem and Leiria. I then marched, with the cavalry and Schwalbach's column, to occupy the road which leads from Leiria to Oporto. There I saw two men on horseback who were leaving the city, and I ordered my Staff to capture them. One was Sr. Faria, who said he was going to a quinta which he possessed in the neighbourhood. I told him that he was free to depart, but it must be to Leiria, in order to deliver to the governor a note from me. I asked for my writing materials and wrote as follows: 'It is I who am in command. I will assault the city in half-an-hour, and give no quarter, if you do not immediately yield. Saldanha.' Sr. Faria was very unwilling to be the bearer of my note; but I told him that he would run no risk, if, as soon as

* Afterwards Count das Antas. † Afterwards Baron de Leiria.

he delivered it, he went at once to his own house. The governor having inquired if it really was Saldanha, who was in command; and being answered in the affirmative, at once gave orders to abandon the city, taking the road to Figueira. Xavier, on his side, seeing the enemy's picket retiring, advanced towards the parapet. The picket fired before its retreat, wounding only one man in the hand; the only casualty we had that day. Our cavalry followed the retreating garrison, putting to death all who did not surrender as prisoners. Amongst the prisoners was the governor himself, besides 14 officers."

Thus, on this occasion, was exemplified in a remarkable manner that which Freire had so recently described as the "moral influence" of Saldanha's name.

The safety of the governor of Leiria was especially cared for by the marshal, who ordered his aide-de-camp, Major Solla, to protect him from any insult, or from the violence of the exasperated soldiers. During his confinement, he was visited by Solla and by many of his former companions in arms, to whom he expressed his surprise at their friendliness towards him. "For," said he, "I confess that the most undoubted supporter of D. Miguel would not dare to visit one of you who should fall in our power. He would risk his life by merely doing so—still less would he venture to show such consideration and kindness as that with which you treat me."

Saldanha's despatches were received at Lisbon with great satisfaction. The success of his plans, as far as already carried out, appeared marvellous to those who knew the strength and resources of the enemy. They did not remember that Saldanha never undertook but that which he was resolved to accomplish. Two standards were taken from the enemy; one of which the marshal sent, on the following day, to Lisbon, by his aide-de-camp, Ximenes, who presented it to the regent. In his official reports to the Minister of War, dated 16th and 18th of January, Saldanha relates, with feelings of great pleasure, the conduct of three lancers, Antonio da Silva, John Sutherland, and Francisco Nunes, who alighted from their horses, not to seek objects of value which might be met with after the retreat, but to pick up two innocent children, two and three years old, who were lying

deserted on the ground. These kind soldiers, one of whom was an Englishman, did not rest until they had restored the poor children to their mother.

The minister Margiochi wrote immediately to Saldánha, congratulating him upon his well-deserved success, and hoping that he would continue to enjoy health and to take more Leirias. Meanwhile the ministers had never ceased endeavouring to strengthen themselves by persuading the marshal to join them in the Cabinet, and to appoint a substitute to hold his portfolio whilst he continued in command of the army. But, on this point, Saldanha was inexorable, as we learn from the following letter which was addressed to him by Sr. Marcellino Maximo de Azevedo, whom he had requested to call on the ministry and to declare to them his positive determination. Sr. de Azevedo, on the 14th of January, wrote as follows :—

"You were so good as to communicate to me your correspondence with the Minister of War respecting the formation of the ministry, and your opinion on that subject. You also did me the honour, at my departure, to charge me with a verbal reply to the letter of the minister who consulted you as to the person you would wish temporarily to act for you at the War Office, while you held the command of the army. I frankly made known to the minister all you had said, telling him that you declined to become Minister of War; not only that it might not appear that the services you were rendering had such an appointment for their object, but that really you were disinclined to accept office: and that there being no other motive for your entrance into the ministry than to afford a proof of the harmony which would exist between you and the members of any fresh ministerial arrangement, you thought that that harmony would be fully proved by those persons being selected whom you had named. This reply, which the minister considered as official, he desired I should communicate personally to the emperor: which I accordingly did, as, I believe, you are already informed."

The marshal continued for a while at Leiria, as we learn from a few affectionate lines which he addressed, in English, to his wife.

"LEIRIA, 18*th of January.*

"MY DEAR AND VERY TENDER FRIEND,

"I received last night your precious letter of the 16th. It filled my heart with very sweet emotions. Ah, my real good friend, how sincerely I love you, and how I regret your company. I am well and pleased, because I hope this terrible unnatural war cannot last long. Kiss our dear children; and never doubt of the sincere love and real attachment of your true and very fond husband. God bless you all.

"SALDANHA."

The marshal having so successfully carried out the first part of his plans,—the capture of Leiria—left at that city a sufficient force, and prepared to follow out the remainder of his plans. Much advice and many suggestions came from Lisbon; but, as José Liberato in his "Annaes," writes: "The prudent general, whose sole mission was to save the country and to establish its liberty, without troubling himself either with the talk of the idle, or with the desires or intrigues of his enemies, followed the plan of his own combinations, and took another course, which, truly, as it proved, was the right one."

It appears, from what we learn by private letters, that the Government had expressed their opinion, that, now Leiria was taken, Saldanha should march on Coimbra. But this formed no part of the marshal's combination.

On the 24th, Saldanha was at Aldêa da Cruz * and Ourem. The next morning, at break of day, he marched on Torres Novas. He then artfully sent a squadron of cavalry some way in advance, in order that the enemy's pickets should retire before they became aware that he himself was approaching with any force. Arriving before the town, he disposed his troops for an immediate attack. The order to advance being given, an entrance into the town was effected without any opposition. In the square, called the Rocio, the Miguelite cavalry was drawn up, in order to cover the retreat of their infantry. Saldanha's cavalry, commanded by Lieut.-colonel Pessoa on the right, and by Brigadier Bacon on the left, gallantly charged the foe, who,

* Now named Villa Nova de Ourem.

after some resistance, turned. Twice in their retreat did they bravely endeavour to re-form and make head against the advancing cavalry. But in vain. They were pursued for two leagues. A considerable number of them were killed, and seventy-eight were taken prisoners.

In his despatch to the Minister of War, written on the same day (the 25th), Saldanha announces, with satisfaction, that the *prestigio* of the "Chaves Cavalry," on this day, has disappeared for ever. This regiment was the crack corps of the Miguelites; and it boasted that, during the whole war, there had never been a desertion from its ranks to the Liberal army. "Our excellent soldiers," says Saldanha, "desired nothing better than to come across them. It was my good fortune to afford them the opportunity which they so ardently desired." . . . "The determined behaviour of the enemy had enraged our soldiers to such a point, that it was very difficult to make them give any quarter. Consequently, the number of dead was very considerable; and we took seventy-eight prisoners, amongst whom was the captain of the Chaves Cavalry. I cannot yet say the exact number of horses we have taken, but we already have seventy-two equipped and ready for service." . . . . "It is difficult to believe, but I assure you on my honour, that we had not a single man wounded. Not even a horse. Only Captain Vasconcellos, who for a few instants was in the power of the enemy, was slightly bruised."

After mentioning the bravery of various officers, amongst whom he distinguished Brigadier Bacon, Saldanha concludes his despatch by saying, "Many of the officers of my Staff took an active part in the fight, and behaved themselves with their usual bravery; but, as they joined the charge without my permission, I do not mention their names."

Even the official *Chronicle* was compelled to acknowledge the importance of these services; declaring that the news had caused a "frightful impression" in Santarem, where the usurping Government was alarmed at what might be the future conduct of their troops in consequence of these defeats. Already, reports were circulated that it was the intention of the enemy to abandon Santarem. It is, however, remarkable that the

name of Saldanha is carefully suppressed in these comments of the ministerial journal. And yet, on this occasion, the Government sent sixteen military decorations to the marshal to be conferred, at his discretion, on those officers and men who had most distinguished themselves at the important captures of Leiria and Torres Novas.

Soriano, never partial to Saldanha, on account of their widely different politics, describing these events, confesses that the "bold and hazardous march on Leiria was crowned with the most fortunate results;" and he celebrates the conduct of the marshal, who, himself, led on his cavalry. He adds, that now, after the affair at Torres Novas, it became apparent what were the plans of Saldanha.

Shortly after this, the marshal was informed that the Miguelites were advancing on Pernes, with the intention of gaining possession of it. On which, he immediately sent off a force to assist Romão * in the defence of that town. Being, on the 29th, with 100 cavalry at the Ponte de Alviela, Saldanha learned that General Canavarro was marching on Pernes with 4500 men. He at once despatched two aides-de-camp to Romão, with orders to defend the town to the last; and, if necessary, to retire into the church; for, most assuredly, he should receive timely succour. Learning, however, that the enemy had halted at Val de Figueiras; and that it was impossible they could attack Pernes that day, Saldanha practised a successful deception on the enemy's general, by returning to Torres Novas.

It was customary for the officers of the Staff to play at penny Voltarete, after dinner, until 11 o'clock. As soon as they had all retired, Saldanha sent for the quarter-master-general, and desired him to place sentinels around the town, and to allow no one to leave it on any pretence whatever. He was then to form all the different corps under arms without any call. Soon after midnight, the whole force marched from the town; with orders, when they approached Pernes, neither to smoke nor talk. When within a short distance of that place, Saldanha was informed that, at night, the pickets of the enemy had arrived in front of the town, and that it was the intention of

* Afterwards Baron de Cacilhas.

Canavarro to advance with his whole force from Torre do Bispo, and to commence the attack in the morning. Saldanha waited until 8 o'clock; after which, seeing no advance on the part of the enemy, he withdrew his force from the road by which he had come, and placed himself on that which led from Santarem to Pernes.

General Canavarro had planned his attack for 10 o'clock; and was much surprised on finding himself anticipated by Saldanha, who, with his cavalry, had advanced by a détour, and occupied the road between the adversary's pickets and their main body. Sr. Pinho Leal, in his topographical-historical Dictionary, informs us that he took part, on the side of the Miguelites, in the events of this day. He states that Saldanha quickly perceived how ill-chosen were the positions which Canavarro had taken; and that, by an unexpected attack on the 17th Infantry, not only was that regiment completely routed, but that equally so was the remainder of the brigade to which it belonged. He expresses his surprise at the behaviour of those troops, especially of the Elvas regiment, which, he declares, had been throughout the war so conspicuous for its bravery; but he allows that the rout was complete. The enemy fled to the river, which was flooded, and lost, as Pinho Leal states, 900 men in killed, drowned, and prisoners. Those who escaped, united themselves to the 2nd Brigade under Soares de Moura. The Constitutionalists do not allow that this success was so easily won; and, probably, Sr. Leal was inclined to attribute the defeat, rather to the panic of his friends than to the bravery of his adversaries. All parties allow that the conduct of the Miguelite regiment, the 24th Infantry, 1300 strong, under Colonel Velasco, was admirable. Formed in squares, it valiantly, for a while, resisted the repeated attacks of the liberal troops; and was enabled, successfully, to effect a retreat on Santarem. The conduct of Colonel Velasco, writes Sr. Leal, was equal in skill and courage to that of "Colonel Pacheco and his heroic regiment the 10th (liberal) Infantry at Souto Redondo, to whom was due the salvation of the remainder of the Division in that battle so disastrous to the liberal arms;" and he asserts that there was nothing,

throughout the whole Peninsular war, more worthy of admiration than the behaviour of these two officers. The valour and virtues of Saldanha's devoted friend, Pacheco, have already been recorded; and it is pleasant to add this testimony of an adversary to his worth. General Povoas, who commanded the enemy's forces at Souto Redondo, likewise bore witness to the bravery and skilful devotedness of Pacheco, whilst Sr. Leal cites with satisfaction the praise which Saldanha bestowed on Velasco for the ability with which he protected the retreat on Santarem. The enemy lost three flags; 709 prisoners, including 21 officers, all of the line; a quantity of arms and ammunition; a drove of oxen; 15 horses of the Chaves Cavalry; besides a vast number of men left dead on the field, in addition to the multitude drowned.

To add to the extraordinary circumstances of this day's battle, the loss to the Constitutionalists was but 3 soldiers and 8 horses killed; and 4 officers, 13 soldiers, and 2 horses wounded! It would appear from the insignificant losses on the side of the victors on these three occasions—Leiria, Torres Novas, and Pernes—that safety is the reward of courage; and is most assured by a fixed resolution, on the onset, never to yield. This was the secret of Saldanha's constant success; and it may be truly affirmed that, by his example, neither officer nor man ever thought of yielding when they knew that the eyes of their brave leader were on them.

Saldanha remained at Pernes; and, on the 31st, when D. Pedro and Freire visited Cartaxo, he received from the latter the following notice:

"His Imperial Majesty arrived this morning at Cartaxo, and wishes to see you here to-morrow; that is, should your absence not be detrimental to the operations which you are carrying on with so much glory, and so greatly to the public advantage. It appears that we are approaching the end of this strife, so fatal to the rebels, and already of prolonged suffering to ourselves."

Shortly afterwards, on his return to Cartaxo, an aide-de-camp of the Duke da Terceira was charged by the regent to present Saldanha with the Grand Cross of the Order of Christ, in

acknowledgment of the great and continued services he had rendered to the country. It is declared in the decree, signed by the regent on the 8th of February, that the loyalty of Marshal Saldanha; the honourable sacrifices which he has made in the cause of the queen and country; and his important services, render him worthy of the gratitude of the nation. Further allusion is especially made to the "well-concerted plans, intrepidity, skill, activity, and zeal," displayed by Saldanha in the three engagements of Leiria, Torres Novas, and Pernes, when he so worthily commanded the brave troops which annihilated so large a portion of the enemy's forces, etc., etc.

Complimentary as were these expressions, which Saldanha's success had thus publicly elicited from his critics at Lisbon, yet intrigues and misunderstandings had been rife during this time; and the intermeddling with the marshal's plans of operations had become so embarrassing, that he thought seriously of resigning his command. Two days before the battle near Pernes, he had even written to Terceira, saying that it was impossible, in consequence of orders from Lisbon, that he could remain any longer in command of the army. So great, says Soriano, was the discontent at the idea of Saldanha being called away from the army, that Terceira immediately communicated this letter to the Minister of War, and sent Sr. Mousinho to the regent to point out the danger of such a step. Upon this, the minister addressed a letter to Saldanha stating the unwillingness of the king to allow him to relinquish the command of the army, and disavowing any intention of interfering in his plans or arrangements.

The brilliant successes at Leiria, Torres Novas, and Pernes, accomplished in a fortnight, were curiously commented on by Soriano, a civilian, an historian of these events, and the author of a history of the Peninsular War, in which latter work, neither Wellington nor Beresford, neither French nor English generals, escape the fangs of his criticism. He writes:

"There is no doubt that General Saldanha owed his brilliant victory at Pernes to the carelessness of General Canavarro, who might, had he displayed more courage and skill, have seized

this excellent opportunity of chastising Saldanha for his bold and rash operations at Leiria and Torres Novas. He was rewarded," adds Soriano, "for his victory at Pernes, with the Grand Cross of the Order of Christ, which was sent him, by the regent, with the most honourable diploma that could be imagined, and couched in the most flattering terms. And yet, Saldanha, at the summit of his glory, has, not without reason, been accused of grave errors in his military conduct: for, the results due to a fortunate chance are not to be honoured as the conceptions of a superior intelligence."

In the eyes of such critics, success is an error. But the same author continues in terms quite at variance with his preceding observations. He writes: "Brilliant, and full of unfading glory, was, nevertheless, this short expedition of some eighteen days; routing in Leiria 1400 men, almost by a surprise, of whom but few of the enemy escaped: equally successful at Torres, where the renowned cavalry of Chaves was annihilated: and, finally, gaining at Pernes his famous victory." Soriano then attempts to censure Saldanha for undertaking these actions, by observing, that if so and so had happened, they might have been unsuccessful; and he continues, somewhat in contradiction to himself; "It is in these critical occasions that the military reputation of a great commander is formed; because, taking advantage of circumstances, by a luminous idea, he sees a high probability of obtaining from them the happiest results. . . . . For, indeed, in great military operations, it is often advisable to take a venturesome resolution."

Freire writes to Saldanha, on the 3rd of February, that the Duke da Terceira, on his return to Lisbon from Cartaxo, had thought it inconsistent with his dignity to take the command of so small a force as that which the regent now offered to him; and that General Stubbs had been appointed to that command which the duke had declined. It is to be hoped that Terceira had better and more valid reasons for thus withdrawing himself from serving his country.

Intrigues never ceased at Lisbon. On the 9th, Freire writes: "The arrival of the Duke da Terceira had been much talked of here. Perhaps it was on this account that his Imperial Majesty

was induced to offer him the command of this Division,* in order to convince the wicked and the timorous that his Imperial Majesty does not despise the services of one who has already rendered so many; and to satisfy them that no misunderstanding exists, as there are many who wish there was, between the two marshals."

José Liberato states in his "Annaes," that so greatly was the army disgusted, even by the reports of Saldanha leaving the command owing to the intrigues against him at Lisbon, that the officers, at Cartaxo, talked amongst themselves of the desirability of leading a few companies of grenadiers to Lisbon, "to give the ministers a lesson."

Meanwhile Saldanha steadily pursued the course which duty dictated. At this very time, (February 10th) he submitted two plans of operation for the consideration of the Government. Either that the Alemtejo, in the vicinity of Lisbon, should be made secure against the enemy's occupation; or that communications should be opened with Oporto, freeing the north from the enemy, and disregarding the Alemtejo. In the former case, said the marshal, it would be necessary to reinforce Leiria, and leave it to itself with provisions for two months. A force would proceed to the south and expel the enemy, leaving the remainder to observe Santarem. Both projects, he declared to the ministers, had their advantages and disadvantages, which he left to their consideration.

That rival politicians and warm partisans of the opposing claimants to the throne of Portugal should resort to factious intrigues and indirect influences, in order to advance the cause which they respectively espoused, was inevitable, although it might be regretted. But it is lamentable that some few of the clergy (the greater part of whom were supporters of the usurpation of D. Miguel), forgot the duties of their sacred calling, and sought every means of injuring the cause of the queen. The confessor of Saldanha's faithful and devoted wife—a woman of the truest and most unaffected piety—sought to compass his designs, by painting, in the confessional itself, the conduct of

* A Division which it was proposed should march on Salvaterra.

Saldanha in the most odious of colours: declaring it impossible that a liberal, and an opponent of D. Miguel, should ever go to Heaven! "I told him," said the virtuous countess, "that he was a very wicked priest to endeavour to create disagreements and quarrels between man and wife; and that I should report his conduct to the Cardinal Patriarch."

Although, in these less troublous times, such conduct is unknown, nor even suspected to exist; yet, that it was not then a solitary case of the abuse of a confessor's duties, we may infer from the letter, dated February 2nd, 1834, addressed by the Cardinal Patriarch to the clergy of his Patriarchate. His Eminence declares that, having reasons for supposing that there were priests so corrupt, who, instead of confining themselves to their sacred duties, introduced political questions into the confessional, and gave counsels adverse to the rights of the queen and the fidelity due to her; he, in order to oppose so pernicious and scandalous a practice, declared that he would permanently suspend such priests from the office both of confessor and preacher, whenever such conduct was brought to his notice, and satisfactorily proved against them.

Numerous were the congratulations from enthusiastic friends which Saldanha received upon his recent successes. Not to weary the reader, we select but two of them. The Minister of Marine, for instance, Margiochi, writes to him on the 9th of February:—

"Go on from victory to victory, and from triumph to triumph. For this creates infinite pleasure to an immense number of persons; and there is one, who, contrary to all the axioms of geometry, being part only of the grand total, rejoices in your glory as much as all others put together. But do not go on routing the enemy faster than I can write; and do not make the vanquishing those opposed to us too common an affair! What will the Pope say when he sees the militia of the church so relentlessly persecuted? What will the northern Tartars say when they see those of the south so prostrate?

"Yesterday his Imperial Majesty signed the nomination of Jervis * as Professor of Mathematics. It will not however

* Sr. Jervis de Athouguia was acting as aide-de-camp to Saldanha. He became afterwards Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Viscount de Athouguia.

oblige him to leave the military school of which *you* are the professor."

On the same day, Saldanha's old friend, and companion in his emigration, José Liberato, writes :—

"*February 9th*, 1834.

"MY DEAR FRIEND,

"For some time I have been wishing to send you my congratulations on the brilliant wreaths of laurel with which you have crowned yourself, on the occasion of the three magnificent actions, by which you have not only exalted your own military glory, but have added fresh renown to our brave people, who have the good fortune to be commanded by so skilful a captain as yourself. My congratulations are so much the more intense by the reflection, that all the operations were entirely your own ; and, indeed, were opposed to plans, which, if they were not made with a view of compromising your honour and fame, would, by attempting to carry them out, have risked, or at least, weakened, the high military position which, by your skill and prudence, you have obtained. Reply always to your enemies in such manner, and pay no attention to the cowardly blows of envy which never cease, although in vain, secretly to be aimed at you. I do not to-day say all I could wish ; because I am not acquainted with the bearer, although I am told he is safe. Remember that your actual political and military position is similar to the one which General Llander holds at this time in Catalonia ; and, consequently, you may well employ the same language as he did, should it be necessary.

"We are expecting your brother, and it would be a great advantage to him if you could procure him a permanent situation ; and, when he arrives, I hope to write to you more fully.

"I am,

"Your truly obliged friend,

"JOSÉ LIBERATO."

The reader will have observed, on more than one occasion, the devoted language of Sr. Liberato towards Saldanha, and the intimate friendship which united them. And yet they were

men of vastly different characters. Liberato, as we may judge by his correspondence, was, by nature, as extreme in his suspicions respecting the conduct of men, as Saldanha was unsuspicious and confiding. The latter was moderate in his politics, and believed, for the most part, in the sincerity of those with whom he became associated: the tendencies of the former were ultra-liberal; and, like most reformers of that class, (with the words "people" and "liberty" in their mouths) he estimated his opponents either as selfish idiots or corrupt knaves; and was far less scrupulous, than the hottest conservative, in the means he would employ to gain his ends. Thus, as may be perceived in the previous letter, dissatisfied with the actual ministers at Lisbon, he urges Saldanha to the adoption of the most unconstitutional means to supplant them. The position of General Llander, to which Liberato refers, is thus described by an historian:—

"General Llander, captain-general of Catalonia, had repeatedly written to the queen regent of Spain, beseeching her to confide in those who alone were able to support her—the Constitutionalists*—and, at the same time, to reckon on the entire force of the seven Provinces, in which he had already organized forty battalions of National Guards. He urgently begged her Majesty to dismiss Sr. Zea Bermudez from the ministry; and to give certain other pledges † of her intentions, in order to ensure to the nation, in the name of her daughter, a truly constitutional government. The general spoke in very unequivocal terms of the danger in which a refusal might place the interests of the queen her daughter. To this advice and, in truth, conditional threat, the queen replied; 'that she was completely at the mercy of Sr. Zea and the foreign diplomatists resident at her Court;' and added, 'that General Llander might act, in the present circumstances, as his honour and patriotism should dictate.'"

This then was the parallel which existed in Liberato's mind; and such were the dictatorial measures to which he would urge his friend. But Saldanha was far from convinced that Portugal

* That is, the ultra-liberal portion of them.

† Pledges to support ultra-liberal institutions.

was in danger, either from the intrigues of foreign diplomatists, or from the incapacity or corruption of the actual ministers: and he saw suggested to him by Liberato a conduct, which neither his judgment nor his patriotism could approve, while the constitutional Charter, for which he had so ardently fought, was yet untried. Time will shortly prove how just was his appreciation of the ultimate aims of Liberato; who, with his followers and co-ultras, fell off from the one consistent supporter of the Charter, when they themselves came forward to advocate a return to the revolutionary Constitutions of 1820 and 1822, which Saldanha had never accepted, and had resolved never to support.

If the writer of these pages were to make public all the letters and documents, in his possession, which tend to prove the intrigues which were carried on at this time in every direction and by all parties, it would add another volume to his undertaking. With respect to the few that are presented to the reader, he leaves it to others to decide as to the truth of the assertions contained in them. At one time, the ministers complain bitterly to Saldanha of the persecutions *they* suffer, and implore him to unite with them in making head against their opponents; at another, those friends of the marshal, who were averse to the ministers, continually warn him against their proposals, declaring that the ministers are, in secret, his enemies. One correspondent writes, on the 15th of February; "I see in the Cabinet, since your last operations, a course of intrigues against you, got up by ignorance and presumption. They arrogate to themselves the right of interfering in purely military measures; the consequences of which, if unfavourable, would not fall upon them, but upon the true defenders of the country; of which you are the shield."

We have already seen, that both D. Pedro and the ministers were continually urging Saldanha to undertake measures which he deemed unadvisable or impossible to execute. His own reflections respecting an attack on Santarem may opportunely find a place here; and we give them, after first inserting the description of that city, from a military point of view, as written by the historian, already quoted, of the Civil War in Portugal.

"The occupation of Santarem," writes the hussar officer, "could not for a moment leave those, who were acquainted with that position, in doubt that D. Miguel's troops intended there to take up their winter quarters. To the south, the approach is very difficult; having a natural barrier of swampy ground, only to be crossed in winter by a narrow causeway of very considerable length; enfiladed by heights, which were formerly covered with brushwood, flanking likewise the very tortuous road through the low ground to the town. To the north, a very considerable height was crowned by strongly-built houses and convents. To the east, is the Tagus; of which, although it is not of great breadth, the left bank is very flat ground without the least cover; and, on the right banks, are inaccessible heights covered by brushwood. If to the west it was more open, yet the many convents, houses, and walls; (and a few field-works, thrown up in the enemy's usual style of science and perseverance,) would render Santarem a position impregnable to the troops opposed to it. The two armies occupied the same ground which had been held, in 1810, by the troops under the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Massena."

"Many times," wrote Saldanha, "the ministry, as well as D. Pedro, urged me to attack Santarem; and my friends at Lisbon were continually declaring that I should be discredited by my inaction. On the last occasion, when D. Pedro was unusually urgent on the subject, I said, 'Give the command to the Duke da Terceira, and let him accede to the desires which many have shown; and, as a soldier, you will see that I will be the first to enter the city, if to enter, we should be able. As a general, no one shall ever force me to commit so grave an error.'"

"In Europe," continues Saldanha, "there are at least 300 generals, who, with a practical knowledge of war, unite the theory of it. And yet, to so few is it given to be a good general-in-chief. Why is this? Because he must be possessed of two qualities which are antagonistic. He must be so prudent, as to be deemed a coward; and so bravely daring that he might be taken for a madman."

Saldanha, however, quietly pursued his way, heedless of obstacles, and ever ready to resign command if his conduct no longer gave satisfaction; while he refused to lend himself to any

overtures for his own aggrandisement or accession to power; overtures, which he clearly perceived were made with a view to secure to the actual ministers their places. But, at last, vexed beyond measure with all that he knew was going forward at Lisbon, he wrote, on the 15th of February, to the Minister of War, urging him without delay to appoint the Duke da Terceira to the command of the army before Santarem, as he himself was determined to resign, and proceed to Lisbon, at latest, on the 20th. Saldanha also declared that he should decline any further command, unless he had reason to believe, that the Cause would suffer by his so doing. But this he "considered, fortunately, to be safe, notwithstanding all the intrigues, and all the faults which had been committed."

If Saldanha was thus convinced that the career of the enemy was drawing to a close; how unselfish was his desire for retirement, by which another might step in and enjoy the credit of striking the final blow. For, Soriano declares that the late events had sealed the fate of the enemy; and, he writes: "Since the loss of Leiria; the slaughter at Torres Novas; and the extraordinary defeat at Pernes; the Miguelite Cause appeared to march with gigantic strides upon its descending course."

Nevertheless, that Saldanha was known to be in earnest, we may see from the minister's reply on the 18th. Freire wrote:—

"It was known this morning that Major Solla had arrived with a letter from you to the Duke da Terceira, urging him to leave for the army, in order that you might go to Lisbon. The duke is unwell; but, I hear, he expects in three days to be well again, and able to go. As you do not ask my opinion respecting your intention of leaving the army, nor allow any possibility of your determination being altered, I will not venture any advice on the subject, although thoroughly persuaded how fit it would be in this case." But even while the minister was writing, evidently chagrined at the marshal's resolution, news reached him, which, fortunately for Portugal, wrought a change pregnant with important results in the situation. Freire concludes his letter, almost prophetically, as follows: "A telegraphic despatch has just arrived, announcing that the rebels are in position to attack

our left. Heaven permit that their fate should lead them to be annihilated by the arms of our brave soldiers. I wait with anxiety further telegraphic news while daylight continues, or accounts from you early to-morrow morning."

The longed-for day at length promised to arrive. After Saldanha, on the 15th, had tendered his resignation, he learned that it was shortly the intention of the enemy to come out from Santarem, and make a grand attack with their vastly superior forces. There was no longer any question of resignation.

Captain Bentinck Doyle, who served with the liberal army during part of this war, told the author that, on the 16th, he was standing amongst a group of officers, when one of them enquired what were the latest news. "They say," exclaimed another, "that Saldanha retires from the command, and that Terceira will be here to-day to take it."—"Bah!" interrupted the rough, but brave old General Schwalbach; "it is nothing but a report we have spread to induce the enemy to prepare to come out, and attack us when they think Saldanha is gone."

At daybreak on the morning of the 18th of February, the enemy, commanded by General Lemos, commenced an attack on Saldanha's right, which was shortly afterwards extended along the whole line. Saldanha breakfasted at 8, and, on that morning, invited the rich farmer, Sr. Damaso, at whose house at Cartaxo he was quartered, to breakfast with him on the field. He there asked Damaso if he had not a Quinta at Almoster; to which Damaso replied that he had, and inquired the reason of the question. "Because," said Saldanha, "it is there where the battle will finish to-day."—"How so?" demanded Damaso; "my Quinta is two leagues from here."—"Well, we shall see," replied Saldanha; and he rubbed his hands together, as he always did when he was unusually pleased.

"The battle of Almoster," said Saldanha to the author, "was the best and most gallant of all the Miguelite actions. They committed one fault however. They ought to have commenced their movement, to turn our left, at midnight instead of after the break of day. By not doing so, they enabled me to judge of the direction of their movements by the dust they raised."

We give the gallant marshal's despatches to the Minister for War on this occasion almost in full.

"HEAD-QUARTERS AT CARTAXO, *February* 18*th*, 1834.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO S^R,

"The rebels,—having added to the forces they possessed in Santarem the division commanded by General Lemos, lately occupying Alemtejo; and Brigadier Rebocho's division, which had come from the neighbourhood of Oporto,—made an attempt to drive us from our positions; and for this purpose, while threatening our front, they endeavoured, with a strong Division, to involve our left. General Lemos, at the head of four squadrons, ten pieces of cannon, the 1st battalion and the 8th Regiment of Caçadores, the 1st, 7th, 14th, 22nd, and 24th Infantry, the new Lisbon regiment of infantry, and two battalions of volunteers, marched at break of day upon Zambujeira; and then followed the heights facing Almoster to Villa Nova, threatening constantly to cross the Paúl (flat marshy tract) which lies between the heights and the positions we occupy. I followed his movements, but determined not to oppose his passing to—as he eventually did—the bridge of Santa Maria, between Villa Nova and Alforgemel, feeling convinced it was only by so doing that we could engage him. Although I arrived in front of the bridge sooner than the enemy, I did not attempt to dispute the passage; but even allowed them to form upon the heights I occupied, though with forces inferior to the enemy's. I am sure that his Imperial Majesty will not consider my confidence to have been temerity, when I inform him that I had with me the 2nd and 12th battalions of Caçadores, and the 3rd and 6th Regiments of infantry. The 6th Regiment, formed in line, with the 3rd in column upon its right, charged the enemy from the front, whilst the two battalions of Caçadores pressed their flank. The 1st infantry, in line, formed a *corps de reserve*. During a few moments the conflict was terrible: the enemy was driven towards the river, the Caçadores arriving at the bridge before them; and in a short time we were skirting the heights of Villa Nova, with the enemy flying in every direction. Unfortunately the approach of night prevented our pursuing them further. The

rebels also made a feint of passing the Celleiro bridge, and directed a serious attack upon the bridge of Almoster, but were everywhere repulsed. To-morrow I trust I shall have the honour to send your Excellency further details of this glorious day. Major Saavedra, who is the bearer of this despatch, will have the honour of handing to his Imperial Majesty two flags; one taken from the Lisbon regiment of infantry, the other from the 1st battalion of infantry, which lately arrived from the neighbourhood of Oporto. We have taken 162 prisoners; and I can assure your Excellency that the number of dead is very large. Our loss was considerable; among other officers we have to lament the loss of Lieutenant-colonel Miranda, and of my aide-de-camp Major Guillet; both of whom are dangerously wounded. Brigadier Brito, who commanded the infantry brigade composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Regiments; Colonel Queiroz, commanding the brigade of the 2nd and 12th Regiments; Colonel Barroso, commanding the 3rd Regiment; Colonel Mendes; commanding the 6th Regiment; Major Abreu, commanding the 2nd Regiment; and Major Calheiros, commanding the 12th Regiment, merit special mention; with many others with whose names and deeds I shall have the honour of acquainting his Imperial Majesty to-morrow.

"Among the numerous officers the rebels left dead upon the field was found the commanding officer of the 8th Caçadores, whose loss must affect the enemy considerably.

"The Commendador Damaso accompanied me throughout the day, deporting himself most bravely; and his presence was of great utility to me, owing to his knowledge of the ground. This communication I have the honour to make to your Excellency, that you may acquaint his Imperial Majesty with its contents.

"God preserve your Excellency, etc.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

"HEAD-QUARTERS, CARTAXO, *February 20th*, 1834.

"ILLMO E EXMO SENR,

"On the night of the 18th inst. I, in great haste, forwarded to your Excellency an account of the battle of Almoster, in which the royal troops gained fresh laurels, and

the brave soldiers who compose them gave another proof of their worthiness for the glorious mission assigned them of exposing their lives to defend her Majesty's legitimate right to the throne, and the constitutional Charter associated with it, against the attacks of her enemies. I, to-day, propose giving your Excellency a more detailed account, for the information of his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Bragança, commander-in-chief of the liberal army, of the way in which our movements were carried out; the energy displayed in the defence of our positions; the complete rout the rebels once more experienced; and the losses we ourselves suffered.

"About six o'clock on the morning of the 18th inst., the rebels opened fire upon the pickets we had posted there, with four pieces of cannon and a howitzer placed in front of the Celleiro bridge; their artillery being supported by a force in ambuscade, which I calculate, as nearly as possible, to have been composed of from 800 to 1000 infantry, and two small squadrons of cavalry. An hour afterwards, the redoubt they possess above the Asseca bridge, and which they had that very morning armed with three pieces of cannon and a howitzer, also commenced firing; while a force of 2000 to 2500 infantry, and a strong body of cavalry, presented itself to the right of the redoubt, and in close proximity to it. About half-past seven, four strong columns of infantry, and, as I calculated, 350 to 400 cavalry (although the prisoners declare that there were eight squadrons), were observed passing the bridge of Calhariz and taking the direction of Villa Nova de Outeiro and Casaes de Santa Maria—thus encircling our extreme left: this hostile force was accompanied by twelve pieces of cannon and three howitzers. At the first shot fired by the rebels, the pickets and our forces took up their proper positions; and the reserves were placed as appeared most advantageous.

"From the first moment I observed the enemy's movements, and from the information I received, I at once saw that the real object of the attack would be our left. To be prepared for every emergency, I ordered the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Regiments of Infantry to march to Atalaia; and the second and twelfth battalions to take positions to the left of the Casal do Paúl and

right of Almoster;—having already made up my mind to fall upon the rebels with those troops the instant they approached, and had attained positions which would allow of my doing so; and by that means make them pay dearly for the project they wished to carry out. I also ordered two pieces of cannon to be posted upon the height of Almedelim, which, by commanding the Celleiro bridge, strengthened that position; and, as the fortifications in the Valle facing Ponte d'Asseca were sufficiently supplied with artillery for their defence, I desired the officer in command to order to the Casal do Paúl eight pieces of cannon and some Congreve rockets, calibre 12.

"At about eleven o'clock the enemy's cavalry and infantry were marching along the plateau of the heights facing Almoster. Brigadier Schwalbach, who commanded the column entrusted with the defence of that district, ordered some shots and Congreve rockets to be fired at them; the enemy answered with his artillery, which was already in position upon the heights. By this time I had thoroughly discovered the intentions of the rebels: the only doubt in my mind being as to whether the attack would take place that day, and at which point they would endeavour to force our positions.

"Having perceived that the rebel cavalry and seven corps of infantry had passed to the left of Almoster, I caused the 1st, 3rd and 6th Infantry, with the 2nd and 12th Caçadores to advance by the heights upon our side, accompanied by a brigade of artillery; and I ordered General Bacon to cause the 11th Cavalry, the Queen's Lancers, and a detachment of the 10th Cavalry, to accompany the movements of the rebel cavalry; keeping parallel to them until the nature of the ground, at any spot, should render an engagement practicable. "At about 12 o'clock, we observed, at all the points where the enemy was in force, great signs of satisfaction; and heard loud shouts of 'Viva D. Miguel.' These we subsequently found had been caused by an order of the day being read, in which the Miguelite general laid out the itinerary of the rebel army during its victorious march upon the Capital; whereby it was proposed to sleep that night in this town; to be at Villa Franca on the 19th; and reach Lisbon on the 22nd,

"The cries of the enemy were answered by our excellent soldiers with a quiet smile of derision, as they tranquilly awaited the orders of the officers who have so often led them to victory.

"Three o'clock found the enemy's infantry crowning the heights of Ponte de Santa Maria between Villa Nova and Alforgemel, to the left of Almoster; and from that point their sharp-shooters kept up a heavy fire upon our troops; the whole of the ground we occupied being, at the same time, swept by the enemy's artillery, (consisting of eight cannon and two howitzers, most actively served,) which would have carried terror and dismay to any troops less valiant and well disciplined.

"I was aware that the enemy's generals, to animate their troops, had assured them that the moment we were attacked we would retire upon Lisbon. I knew also that General Lemos had brought with him the flower of the troops that were in Santarem; to which were added the forces he himself had commanded in the Alemtejo; and others lately arrived from the neighbourhood of Oporto and Coimbra, commanded by Brigadier Rebocho. Still, fearing that, if I disputed them the passage to our positions, the day would be passed in skirmishing without any decisive result, I resolved to carry out the plan I had formed in the beginning, which was to allow the enemy to advance. For this reason, they were permitted to descend unmolested the hill facing our positions; to ascend that on our side; and to pass between us and the bridge of Santa Maria.

"Accordingly, at about half-past four in the afternoon, the rebels were occupying the extremity of the plateau of the heights we held; and there, about 3500 strong, they formed their columns—one regiment deployed into line, and an immense number of sharp-shooters were thrown to the front. The moment was now arrived to fulfil my orders by annihilating the enemy. Colonel Queiroz, the brave and able commander of the brigade formed of the 2nd and 12th Caçadores, having formed those regiments in line, fell upon the enemy's flank; while two companies were sent down to the bridge to cut off their retreat. Brigadier Brito, at the head of the 6th Regiment in line, and the 3rd in column, charged the rebels at the same time, with great bravery, from the front. The 1st Regiment, as

a *corps de reserve*, had formed in line at less than half a gunshot of the enemy, and there remained with the greatest firmness, exposed to a terrible fire, which the rebels sustained most actively so long as our bayonets did not reach them; but, when at close quarters, they turned and ran, throwing themselves from the heights, and gathering in a mass near the bridge. Such a moment would have been most horrible with any enemy, but it is still more so when we recollect that they were Portuguese. A species of torpor appeared to have come over the rebels; whilst offering hardly any resistance, they did not ask for quarter; and our soldiers, exasperated by such tenacity, made a most fearful carnage. In all my campaigns, I can only recollect the breach of S. Sebastian as anything to be compared with this scene; and I can also say, that I have rarely been under such heavy firing as that of the rebels down to the moment they fled.

"In consequence of my orders to that effect, in a few moments the heights of Villa Nova, where the enemy had posted his artillery, became ours. In the meantime, the rebel general, trusting to the superiority of the forces he had attacked with, had ordered 200 horse to advance at a trot from his right, where the cavalry was placed, for the purpose of passing them to our positions, as soon as he had put our infantry to flight. The moment, therefore, that our Caçadores attained the plateau of the heights of Villa Nova, they found themselves attacked by these horsemen. I had, however, foreseen the circumstance; and, although I did not wish to weaken our cavalry, which upon the left was employed in watching the enemy, I had ordered eighty horse to cover the infantry. This force, led by Brigadier Bacon in person, passed the bridge at the moment that the infantry was ascending the heights to support the Caçadores; and, in spite of the numerical superiority of the enemy's cavalry, compelled them to retire after some fighting, in which they were assisted by the fire of the Caçadores. The enemy's losses in cavalry were great: seven horses fell into our hands. Night had fallen, and we were therefore forced to halt, much to my regret; for, with the dispositions I had taken; the position of our reserves; and the movements which the troops occupying the

Asseca and Celleiro bridges, the Paúl, and Almoster, were to have effected; the rebel army must necessarily have been annihilated, had we had two hours more of daylight.

"Whilst the enemy was thus being routed on the left, they were endeavouring to carry our right at various points; or, at least, to draw off the attention of the troops defending it, and to prevent them rendering assistance to our left. With this view, a strong column of infantry which they had left in front of Almoster, dividing into two, prepared to attack by the bridge of Almoster and the Quinta da Moira: they were however repulsed,—three companies of the 3rd Infantry and the 2nd of the British Grenadiers, at Almoster, forcing them to beyond the heights of the Valla. To the left of the convent of that village, the Queen's Light Infantry was posted; and during the day sustained some sharp firing both of large and small arms. The Quinta da Moira was defended by three companies of the 10th Battalion of Caçadores, who bore themselves with the greatest courage. Other attempts to pass the Valla were made by the rebels, simultaneously with the attack upon the extreme left, both with the force they had in front of the Celleiro bridge, and with that placed at daybreak near the redoubt commanding Ponte d'Asseca. At Ponte do Celleiro, two regiments and two squadrons of cavalry began to move in the direction of Almedelim; which point, the temporary commandant of the 2nd column, José Pedro Celestino Soares, strengthened by the addition of the 4th Regiment of Infantry; and, later, with a company from the 5th Caçadores and another from the 15th Infantry; the result being that the rebels were repulsed with considerable losses. Throughout the day, their numerous sharp-shooters kept up a most active fire upon the positions we held at the bridge and at Fontainhas. This latter point was defended by the 6th National Mobile battalion, and two companies of the 15th Regiment: the bridge being held by over 50 men of the 15th Infantry, and a company of the 4th Infantry. To the right of the bridge, the enemy also kept up a well sustained fire; the sharp-shooters being supported by a force covered by an olive yard at the spot called Lezirão.

"At mid-day, the rebel force which was in the neighbourhood

of Ponte d'Asseca began to move to the right and occupied the heights, sending more than 400 sharp-shooters to the front, who immediately commenced firing most vigorously. Brigadier Bento da França Pinto de Oliveira, commanding the column charged with the defence of that point, placed the force at his disposal in the positions he considered most advantageous; and, as the enemy showed signs of attempting to pass the Valla, it became necessary to extend almost the entire 15th Regiment as sharpshooters (on account of the large number presented by the enemy) together with a company of Scots Fusiliers, also on duty at that point: eventually these were supported by two companies of the 5th Mobile battalion. I can truly say that no movement was neglected by the enemy, which could tend to draw off the attention of our forces; for, in addition to employing nearly all the troops they had in Santarem, together with those lately arrived from the north and south, as I have explained, they even recollected to threaten an attack upon Azambuja; which they did by appearing on the opposite bank of the Tagus with two pieces of cannon of small calibre, 40 or 50 cavalry, and about 100 infantry. These, after firing some gunshots at our pickets, retired to Salvaterra, having received a few shots from the gunboats posted at that part of the river.

"Our artillery, at all the points I had placed it, fired admirably, and the conduct of the gunners, officers, and soldiers both of the artillery and the Rocket brigade, was not to be excelled in coolness, valour, and activity. Our cavalry (half a squadron of the 11th Regiment, half a squadron of lancers, and a few men of the 10th,) which engaged the enemy on the heights of Villa Nova and forced them to retreat, although their opponents were three to one, have covered their respective regiments with glory. I can say with truth, that never, during my long military career, have I seen greater courage and presence of mind than was shown by our brave soldiers and valiant officers in this battle. Every man did his duty; all are worthy of praise. The officers, whilst under fire, gave the words of command as if they were on parade; the soldiers, with that precision which can only accompany valour and true discipline, obeyed them. It was with the greatest satisfaction

that I noted upon the faces of all, even during the heat of the conflict, the smile of contentment which is the sure forerunner of victory,' etc, etc."

The remainder of this interesting and graphic despatch contains the names of the various officers considered worthy of special mention for their conduct on this glorious day. In commenting upon the battle of Almoster, the "English Hussar," already quoted, remarks of Saldanha, as follows; "But the victory he obtained at Almoster cost him 374 men, of whom 30 were officers. He had been latterly audaciously daring, and had exposed himself and his army." Little, probably, did this English officer know, how Saldanha had been pestered by D. Pedro, by minister after minister, and even by anxious friends, to "do something decisive;" at all events, "to do something;" while he, on the contrary, was warily and patiently biding his time, till he could mature his plans and give them effect; resolved, as he showed himself, even to resign his command, rather than expose his army by injudicious attacks; and ruin the cause of his queen and his country by what he knew would be inevitable defeat. On the other hand, when he saw his opportunity to strike, he struck with rapidity, boldness, and decision. After his successful operations about Santarem, especially at Leiria, Torres Novas, and Pernes, the enemy was at last drawn from his unassailable stronghold. Saldanha met and conquered him, in the battle of Almoster, which determined, as the reader will presently see, the fate of D. Miguel, and established the queen D. Maria II. on her throne.

The plan of the enemy, on this day, had been, after vanquishing Saldanha at Almoster, to sleep that night at Cartaxo—the next at Villa Franca—and then march on Lisbon. We learn from the letters of Valdez that this had often been a subject of anxiety to the regent. But after this decisive success, which had frustrated all the sanguine plans of the enemy, they shut themselves up in Santarem; where they remained, never again venturing to try their strength against the Constitutional army.

Saldanha was congratulated by letters from every part of the kingdom. The minister Margiochi wished him to come to Lisbon, even but for a few days, that he might see with his

own eyes how affairs were going on. But, he writes, D. Pedro had opposed it, as it would "be putting in danger the cause of the queen and of liberty." For, the regent did not feel sure but that if the absence of the marshal from the army became known, "the rebels would again resume the attack with the same fury as before." The minister continues: "For some days an intriguing pestilence has raged here, which gives more vexation to your true friends than even anything which your enemies in Santarem can do. It has been reported far and wide that the ministry wishes to dismiss you—an atrocious and absurd invention. For, even if the ministers were so base, and so wanting in common sense, they would never obtain the consent of the emperor, whose confidence in you is unlimited. Little do the intriguers know, that it was your own wish, before the 18th, to come to Lisbon. Fortunately, the Duke da Terceira declined."

In strong contrast to Margiochi's letter, from which we have extracted the preceding, is one which the marshal received, about the same time, from his friend Liberato. It is remarkable, that these gentlemen, sworn friends to each other during the emigration, were two of those enthusiastic admirers of Saldanha who accompanied him from France to Oporto, at the commencement of 1833, when he was called thither in so unhandsome and unceremonious a manner by the regent. Each of these gentlemen, though now become so adverse in politics, doubtless considered himself faithful to his principles; but, at least one of them, will inevitably end by declaring himself deserted by his former chief. Such will become the confusion amidst politics and parties in Portugal, that it would require puppets perpetually before us, as the French novelist has, in order to be able to follow up the intricacies of the game which will be played by so many everchanging characters entering on the scene. But, if the reader will attentively peruse these pages, he will be satisfied that Saldanha, during his long political career, stood pre-eminently the one most faithful to "QUEEN AND CHARTER."

Liberato writes, on the 9th of March: "I cannot say all I would wish. Nevertheless, I must declare that it is true, and

more than true, that José da Silva Carvalho has declared himself, in the most unworthy and grossest manner, your enemy: that all his colleagues, although more disguisedly, and more decently, have done the same; and that even their chief,* from past experience, never can be, and never was, your friend. This it is necessary you should never lose sight of; and, once for all, and, as a good general and a good politician, take your precautions against being conquered, or obliged to surrender at discretion. If, at present, they make much of you, it is because they know that they cannot prevail against your success, nor against public opinion. But you may lose this; or, at least, see it diminished, if you do not take a decided position against your enemies, who are also those of the Charter, and of true liberty" . . . "and their nature is such that they never can be true to you." . . . "You doubtless know what took place at Oporto, on the anniversary of the glorious 4th of March."

On that day there was a grand banquet given at Oporto by the officers quartered there. In the evening, at the theatre, Saldanha's portrait was exposed to view—a hymn in praise of him was played and sung amidst the greatest demonstrations of applause and rejoicing.

Less agreeable news did Saldanha, on the same day, receive from the Baron do Pico do Celiero (General Torres), who was in command at Oporto. He wrote that there was a secret society of anarchists established in that city, the principal members of which, the Baron declared, were "General Canavarro,† and one Dr. Leonel, a writer in Paris."

Saldanha saw before him but a gloomy prospect, should he, at the termination of the war, be called upon to hold the reins of power, and have to reconcile the disagreeing and turbulent politicians who were springing up, with every shade of opinion, now that they thought danger to themselves was over. He turned with longing eyes to his peaceful and beloved home; and Margiochi, who had been to visit the countess, knew well what were Saldanha's fondest aspirations.

* The regent.

† Not the Canavarro, now with D. Miguel, who had been Saldanha's friend and companion during the war in Montevideo.

"I saw," writes Margiochi, "the mamma with her three children, amongst them the lively and amusing Nini *—a little divinity. But I do not know if it is advisable to excite such recollections in your mind, whilst, for the sake of our liberty, you are so honourably a prisoner with our army; unless it is by informing you, that the countess proposes paying you a visit at Cartaxo. I hope she will not arrive there when there is firing going on." . . . "Following your letter, I told the emperor, that you were very disgusted with the troublesome intriguers. To which he replied, that he knew very well how much they vexed you, but that all would go well, if you had the same confidence in him as he had in you. I also spoke to Freire, as you desired, respecting the widows of those who fell in battle."

Although we have not this letter from Saldanha before us, we may judge by Margiochi's reply, of the vexations he suffered; and form an idea how he longed to be free from them, and obtain, with his beloved family, the repose he desired. Margiochi remonstrates against the idea of Saldanha giving up the command of the army; and exclaims against those who render him melancholy, which, he adds, "is not your natural disposition." . . . "And, when the war is over, then I would no longer oppose your desire to live in the country, employed in agriculture, keeping, however, at your side, the sword which has rendered us victorious."

No sooner had Saldanha received these assurances from the minister Margiochi, than José Liberato again comes forward to combat them in his letter of March 17th.

"In truth, it is not to be disputed, and you must feel convinced, that neither the chief nor his ministers are your true friends; and not only are they not so, but they are continually at work to ruin you. Public opinion, and the wishes of the army, brought you from Oporto; but here, as you have seen, you meet with nothing but jealousy, and a continual desire to make a sacrifice of you. And, were it not for your victories, and the power of public opinion in your favour, you would long since have been the victim of ministerial hatred. But even

* Afterwards Countess de Farrobo.

these victories and popularity can only retard the blow they are preparing; for, when you are no longer necessary to them, they will thrust you aside. And not only your enemies may do so, but even a large party of the liberals, if they see that you do not make a right use of your power.* As the ministers see that they cannot attack you in front, it is their policy to lengthen the strife, in order to see if they can bring it to an end without the power of your sword. Some time ago, José da Silva said, 'At all events we can console ourselves that it will not be the Conde de Saldanha who will finish the affair;' this he said, when he was hoping for the English intervention. Now that there is hope of a Spanish intervention, you may be sure that they will endeavour to retard or render fruitless all military operations, in order that they may rob you of all political influence, by diminishing your military glory." . . . "By letters from Oporto I know that it was reported that you were dismissed for disobedience of orders, and had been called to Lisbon. By these and other inventions, which are every day varied, they endeavour to discredit your services. Truly these reports are absurd; but they are spread amongst the people, who live on absurdities; and, by such reports, they get accustomed to see you in a light different to that to which they have been accustomed. For, lies themselves, by dint of constant repetition, become truths, with most people." José Liberato concludes his letter, by calling upon Saldanha to be the saviour of his country; for that the present ministry "not only paralyzes the military operations," but "every day is sacrificing the country by a monstrous system of robbery and neglect."

Attempts were now again made to bring the civil war to an end by foreign intervention. The Spanish Government had secretly offered to send 8000 men into Portugal to expel Don Carlos from that country, and to assist the Cause of the queen. Lord Howard de Walden, who had, on the 8th of March, succeeded Lord Wm. Russell as British minister at Lisbon, being informed of this, privately made proposals to the regent that he should give a general amnesty to the rebels, and grant a

* That is, if Saldanha had too much good sense to go the lengths the ultra-liberals desired.

pension to D. Miguel, on condition of his immediate departure from the country, and of his undertaking never to dispute the rights of the queen D. Maria. To further this plan, Lord Howard went up to Cartaxo, and thence to Santarem, where he had an interview with General Lemos on the subject. He met, however, with no success in that quarter.

No one, from the day he landed at Oporto, to the present time, more ardently and constantly wished for a termination to the strife, without further bloodshed, than did Saldanha. If he loved military glory, he loved his country still more. Lord Howard sought the first opportunity for a personal interview with him at Cartaxo; and the impression which the Marshal left on the mind of the British minister, after their acquaintance had been thus formed, may be gathered from the following letter, which we here present to the reader.

[*Private.*] "LISBON, *April 18th*, 1834.

"MY DEAR MARSHAL,

"The news you sent me down yesterday of the entrance of the Spanish troops gave me the liveliest satisfaction. I trust, by co-operating, although indirectly, with yourself and the Duke da Terceira, Rodil may enable you to dictate terms to the fanatics of Santarem. If General Rodil comes up with his force to the east of Santarem, and cuts off the retreat of D. Miguel to Elvas, they must capitulate. It will then depend mainly on yourself, Marshal, what terms shall be accepted—and it is of the greatest satisfaction to me to think how much may now be in your hands.

"I look back with the sincerest pleasure to the two days I had the honour of spending in your company—and everything which passed between us has inspired me with the utmost confidence as to the spirit which animates you in your public acts; and I trust that my visit to Cartaxo may be the foundation of a lasting and genuine private friendship between us.

"I have the honour to remain,

"My dear Marshal, with the sincerest esteem and regard,

"Your very true and sincere friend,

"HOWARD DE WALDEN.

"Napier returned yesterday. He looked *at* Figueira—but as the sea was heavy, and he saw no soldiers, he was afraid of an ambush, and would not risk a landing!"

Saldanha had written to the Minister of War, hoping that Lord Howard would, by negotiations with the Miguelites, succeed in bringing the war to a conclusion. To which, Freire replies on the 1st of April: "May Heaven permit that the attempts of Lord Howard may be as successful as you suppose. We all require repose—but, that we can already dispense with your services, is what I cannot agree to."

On the 4th, Freire again writes:

"Lord Howard has arrived" [from Cartaxo]. "I have not yet spoken to him; but from a note which he sent me yesterday, and from what M. Mortier * said, I am convinced that the proposal has been without results. You know that I always feared it."

The following extract from a letter from Valdez, proves the estimate which D. Pedro had formed of the services of Saldanha:

"LISBON, *April 4th*, 1834.

"MY DEAR MARSHAL,

"As soon as Colonel Pedro Paulo had handed me your note of the 3rd, in which you ask for instructions, I went immediately to his Imperial Majesty, who, seeing with the greatest satisfaction that you did not insist on resigning the command of the army, told me, with the greatest courtesy, that so far from pretending to give instructions to you, he was, on the contrary, always inclined to accede to any plans you might propose; and that I was to say to you, in his own words, that his Imperial Majesty 'is satisfied that it is of the highest importance for the success of the Cause that you should continue to hold the post you occupy, in the certainty that his Imperial Majesty does justice to your talent, important services, and the distinguished manner in which you have conducted the war.' Thus, in no way, should you fear being called to account,

* French minister at Lisbon.

when you do what you think right; which his Imperial Majesty is sure will always be the best."

We have seen Saldanha vexed by the continual interference of D. Pedro, until he declared his intention to hold the command no longer. But we have not detailed the infinite number of petty annoyances to which such meddling from a civilian emperor, at a distance, subjected him. The above letter seems to imply future confidence. But it was not for long. A letter from Valdez, which we insert here, although written at a later period, still shows how D. Pedro loved to overrule, or, at least, vary the plans which Saldanha proposed.

"HALF-PAST EIGHT AT NIGHT, *May 11th*, 1834.

"MY DEAR MARSHAL,

"His Imperial Majesty, as soon as he received your communication of the 10th, in which you propose to go to Torres Novas with half the force you have, for the purpose of doing considerable damage to the enemy, desired me to send off a courier immediately, with the following instructions: That his Imperial Majesty does not doubt but that your going would be very useful:—but it is more desirable that the whole force should remain at Cartaxo, until he determines the contrary. And that, as affairs are taking so good an aspect both politically, and militarily, to wait is to advance.

"Yours, etc.,

"VALDEZ."

Negotiations had been carried on, for some time past, at London, with a view of putting an end to the civil war in the Peninsula; for it had now extended itself to Spain. The proposals which Lord Howard had personally made to the Miguelite general had, as we have already seen, completely failed. For, writes Freire on the 5th of April, "The Count de S. Lourenço is very explicit in his refusal, excluding any terms which do not imply the continuance of D. Miguel on the throne."

The party of D. Carlos now threatened the throne of Queen Isabella. That prince was already in Portugal, where, associated with D. Miguel, he was waiting the opportune moment to

transport himself and followers into the neighbouring kingdom. England and France were extremely adverse to the restoration of absolutism in Spain; and, seeing the imminent danger of the situation, they entered into combinations with the Governments of Spain and Portugal, both to guarantee the possession of the crowns of those countries to the queens Isabella and Maria, and, when necessary, to assist, with armed force, to expel the pretenders from the Peninsula.

It was, doubtless, the uncertainty as to how the strife might otherwise terminate which influenced the Governments of England and France to this step. With respect to Portugal, it was generally acknowledged that the fate of D. Miguel, however for a while protracted by the possession of a large force and several strongly fortified cities, was already decided. Of this, Marshal Bourmont must have been conscious, when he renounced the service of the pretender after his defeats before Oporto and Lisbon. Also General Macdonell, after his defeat and flight to Santarem, had become convinced of the hopelessness of the cause he had come to support. Under these circumstances, a quadruple treaty was signed in London, on the 22nd of April, by Lord Palmerston and the plenipotentiaries of France, Portugal, and Spain, by which they severally engaged their countries to aid in the expulsion of Don Carlos and D. Miguel from the Peninsula. This treaty was ratified and made known at Lisbon on the 10th of May.*

But, as far as Portugal was concerned, the war now approached to a termination without the aid of foreign intervention. The Miguelite generals were convinced at Almoster that their sole security was behind the walls of their strongholds; and that all attempts to act on the offensive against a Saldanha were in vain. General Torres came out of Oporto, which had never ceased to be watched by the enemy with a considerable force, and occupied Souto Redondo, Oliveira d'Azemeis, and other places. The Duke da Terceira, early in May, entered Coimbra;

* Palmerston was much pleased with the part he took in framing this treaty, which, he declared, would give great strength to the liberal party in Europe. He wrote to his brother: "I should like to see Metternich's face when he reads our treaty."

and, on the 16th, gave battle to and routed the Miguelites at Asseiceira, whence they fled to Santarem. Vasconcellos entered Figueira: Abrantes yielded to the Constitutionalists: the stronghold of Almeida was abandoned, and 800 political prisoners confined there were set at liberty: Other successes in various parts of the kingdom took place at the same time; and, finally, on the 18th of May, the enemy decided to evacuate Santarem, which Saldanha immediately occupied. On this being known at Lisbon, D. Pedro at once hastened to Santarem; and, becoming aware with his own eyes of the strength of the position, said to the marshal, in the presence of Palmella and others: "Now I do not wonder that you would not attack this town." Was D. Pedro not aware that the renowned Wellington occupied, in November, 1810, exactly the same positions before Santarem, as Saldanha did in October, 1833; and that there had been both English and Portuguese writers who had censured and abused the duke for not attacking that strong place? Their positions were the same, but, with this difference; that Wellington's force was greatly superior to that of his adversary, whilst Saldanha's was much inferior. There is also this further difference to be remarked, that when Massena quitted Santarem on the 5th of March, he was able to effect his retreat: whilst Saldanha pursued *his* enemy and captured them.

The author has no wish to make a hero of a husband, or to impute the common-place incidents of Saldanha's social life to extraordinary virtues; yet it is a feature in the biography of a man, who albeit harassed by the cares of state, or borne along upon the career of active warfare, never fails to find occasion to pour out his heart's emotions before her, to whom his life's troth is plighted. And the author, who, during so many years of friendship, witnessed the unfailing and devoted attentions of Saldanha to his wife, felt an especial interest in finding among the marshal's papers an original letter which remained among those of the deceased countess, and which bears on its face proof of the earnestness of her noble husband, that she should not be kept in suspense. No sooner had Saldanha found a moment's leisure in Santarem, than his first thought was to write to the countess. The haste with which he wrote is

evident by the use of the only piece of paper which he, apparently, could get hold of; and that was a half-sheet of rough official paper with the royal stamp on it. Some one had already commenced a despatch thereon, intending apparently to convey some order from D. Miguel himself. The reader will not fail to observe the promise to write again on the morrow, and to provide for the possible wants of the countess and her household. The author possesses hundreds of such short letters, all breathing the same tender affection; some of them written immediately before a battle; others immediately after; but all showing Saldanha's anxiety that his wife should always know that his first and latest thoughts were bestowed on her.

The following is the simple note referred to; and with the official words as commenced by an earlier writer:—

ILLMO E EXMO SR,

El Rey Nosso Senhor

"SANTAREM, *May the 18th.*

"MY DEAR ANGEL,

"I am writing to you in D. Miguel's cabinet. They retired across the river, and I came in in time to prevent them taking away 11 pieces of artillery: and even D. Miguel's *oxaria** remained on this side. We are going to cross the Tagus to-morrow. I will write before, and will send you some money.

"Truly yours,

"SALDANHA."

The Duke da Terceira, with his Division, having joined Saldanha at Santarem, the two marshals crossed the Tagus in pursuit of the enemy, who, with a force of 16,000 men, took refuge in Evora. D. Miguel reached that city on the 22nd, where Don Carlos and his family had already arrived.

On the 24th, General Lemos wrote a short note to Saldanha, saying that he was authorized to propose a cessation of hostilities, in order to avoid the shedding of more Portuguese blood. To this, Saldanha replied, from Montemôr-o-Novo, on the same day, declaring, that, in proof of his repugnance to the shedding

* Oxaria: the royal kitchen service.

of Portuguese blood, he would delay for a day his forward march, in order to receive any proposals which the general might make; and that he would, in the meantime, request the Duke da Terceira to join him in order to consult with respect to such proposals. The marshal then made known to Lemos, in a few words, the nature of the Quadruple Treaty which had lately been ratified at Lisbon.

On the following day, Lemos wrote to say that his Government accepted the armistice (!); and that already yesterday a communication had been despatched to the British minister at Lisbon, respecting the projected negotiations for the pacification of the country, in consequence of that diplomatist having, on a former occasion, offered his mediation between the contending parties. Lemos expresses his certainty that there will be no obstacle to the pacification of the country; and added that Colonel Wylde had that day reached Evora, and made him acquainted with the terms of the Quadruple Treaty, of which Saldanha had already given him notice.

This was not the straightforward answer which Saldanha, under such circumstances, expected. He therefore immediately returned the following answer to General Lemos:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS AT MONTEMÔR-O-NOVO, *May 25th*, 1834.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO S^R,

"I yesterday informed your Excellency that to prove how ardent is my wish to avoid the shedding of Portuguese blood, I would halt to-day at this town, and request the Duke da Terceira to come here that we might receive your Excellency's proposals. I have now received your despatch, in which you tell me that you accept the suspension of operations by the army under my command. I must, however, remind your Excellency that the suspension I promised was only for to-day; and I formally declare that I cannot agree to the armistice you speak of. Naturally frank, it is not at such a moment as this that I shall be other than candid with your Excellency; and I, therefore, forward you the enclosed copies of the orders I have received, and from which I cannot depart.* In fulfilment of

* The orders of the Government were to insist on an unconditional surrender.

those orders I shall again commence marching, and make my head-quarters to-morrow at Arrayolos, where I shall await, during the day, your resolution. Should this not be as we desire, I shall, with the Duke da Terceira, march upon Evora. The result of an attack admits of no doubt; and its consequences cannot but be disastrous. Your Excellency will be responsible for them to Portugal, and to Europe; and this, not only for the blood which will be shed during the action, but for that which, in spite of all we may do to prevent it, will be spilt after it. I repeat, your Excellency will be responsible for the lives of the members of the royal family now at Evora, if you expose that city to the horrors of an assault.

"God preserve your Excellency, etc.

"CONDE DE SALDANHA."

General Lemos replied as follows:—

"EVORA, *May 26th*, 1834.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO S^R,

"I have the honour to acknowledge the reception of your Excellency's despatch of this day, with two copies of the orders your Excellency received from the Government at Lisbon, and a quantity of proclamations signed by Sr. D. Pedro, Duke de Bragança. In answer, I have to inform you, that, to avoid the further shedding of Portuguese blood, the conditions of which your Excellency forwarded me a copy are accepted.

"As Sr. D. Miguel is allowed to embark at any port, and on board a vessel belonging to either of the four contracting nations, he selects the port of Sines, or any other in the Algarves; and an English ship: and he waits to know if the Infanta D. Isabel Maria, who is in the fortress at Elvas, wishes to accompany him. We had better at once treat of the several arangements; on which subject I await your orders, and am ready to meet your Excellency, if you think it convenient, at any spot you may point out.

"God preserve your Excellency, etc.

"JOSÉ ANTONIO D'AZEREDO LEMOS,

"*Lieutenant-general (brevêt.)*"

When General Lemos placed his signature at the foot of this last letter, he must indeed have regretted the severe and imperious tone in which he had replied to the proffered negociations of Saldanha in July last past. Then, the only terms on which Lemos would even meet his brother officer, to whose superior generalship he now has to make an unconditional surrender, were Saldanha's confession of guilt, accompanied by absolute submission to General Lemos's dictates. Saldanha still avoids any semblance of a threat. In his letter of the 25th of May, he encloses copies of his instructions; to prove, that, in whatever measures he might adopt, he had no discretion, but would only obey orders. Still protesting his desire to avert further bloodshed, he, with true solemnity, warns Lemos of the personal responsibility which he would assume, if he should bring upon Evora the horrors of an assault, which would almost inevitably involve the deaths of the members of the royal family. Lemos found the veil lifted up from before his eyes. He was able to picture the probable vengeance of those men among the troops of Terceira and Saldanha, who had seen relatives and friends put to death, at Lisbon and elsewhere, while D. Miguel reigned. He must have felt that the admonition twice repeated by Saldanha was not offered unduly.

On the night of the 26th of May, a convention, known as the "Convention of Evora Monte," was signed by the Duke da Terceira and the Count de Saldanha on the part of the Government, and by General Lemos and Sr. Torrezão on the part of D. Miguel.

Sixteen thousand men laid down their arms at Evora; amongst whom, says Soriano, there were 138 Spanish officers.

Three days after the signature of the Convention, D. Miguel was called upon, by the foreseeing prudence of the marshals, to sign the following:

"PALACE AT EVORA, *May 29th*, 1834.

"To satisfy the further requirements of the Marshals, Duke da Terceira and Count de Saldanha, in the name of their Government, I declare that I will never directly or indirectly interfere in the political affairs of this kingdom and its dominions.

"D. MIGUEL."

The terms of the amnesty were liberal—even generous. Probably the ministers themselves, who framed that document, could not ignore the fact that the Pretender, about to seek the mercy of the Crown, was the brother of D. Pedro, and the betrothed uncle of the queen. But, if personal considerations like these tended to mitigate the conditions which the ministers might otherwise have imposed on D. Miguel, important reasons of state might also have been alleged in favour of the amnesty; especially of the grant of a pension of £15,000 a-year to D. Miguel. A homeless, penniless, adventurer is never the quietest or most pleasant of neighbours; and the Lisbon Government may well have deemed it prudent to bind D. Miguel over by bonds of interest, as well as of gratitude, to keep the peace towards Portugal, in case he should remain insensible to the higher influences of honour, of duty, and of loyalty to his Sovereign. An open grievance of the destitute prince might have the more embittered his partisans in Portugal against the reigning dynasty; and his claims to the throne, such as they were, would have descended to his children in all their force. The terms of the amnesty, and the special undertaking signed by the defeated Pretender, do not indeed embody any express abdication by him, nor any acknowledgment that his claim was false: but he could not abdicate a throne that never had been his; and he could not more effectually renounce his claim or that of his children, than by his written promise "never directly or indirectly to interfere with the political affairs of the kingdom and its dominions." Moreover, the ministers may have deemed it politic to conciliate, by their liberality, those foreign Powers who, having, for a while, rather favoured the pretensions of D. Miguel, had recently formed a quadruple alliance to expel him from that country. England, especially, on whose aid and protection the queen D. Maria confidently relied, had resented even the moderate acts of confiscation by which the Portuguese Government had retaliated upon the wider confiscations levied by the ministers of D. Miguel; but the generous terms conceded by the amnesty to the Pretender himself were likely to place him, in the estimate of Englishmen, irredeemably in the wrong, if, in return for that generosity, he

should again disturb the peace of Portugal. Subsequent events rendered the question of the terms of amnesty immaterial; and, perhaps, vindicated the policy of the ministers in conciliating the foreign Powers.

On the 1st of June, D. Miguel embarked at Sines, with a numerous suite, on board H. B. M. ship *Stag*, commanded by Captain Lockyer. On landing at Genoa, he, shortly afterwards, on the 20th, made a public protest against every thing which he or his agents had signed before his departure, as being obtained from him by force.

In consequence of this proceeding, we may here observe, that the Government, shortly after the meeting of the Chambers, passed a law by which D. Miguel and his descendants were for ever to be excluded from all rights of succession to the Crown; the pension granted to him was revoked; and it was declared that if he landed on Portuguese soil, a military commission consisting of seven officers should be immediately assembled, which, on proof of identity, would within three hours order him to be shot. It was further ordered that the duration of the whole process should not be allowed to exceed twenty-four hours.*

Soriano asserts that D. Miguel was insulted on the road to Sines by an exasperated populace; and that there had even been a plan for his assassination. It might possibly have been so, or was suspected. For Saldanha gave the strictest orders to a most trustworthy escort to secure the safety of the unfortunate prince, even to the hazard of their lives. And, indeed, on more than one occasion, the temper of the escort was sorely tried by the threats and abusive language to which they were subjected.

When, on the night of the 27th, news reached Lisbon of the terms which had been granted to D. Miguel and his followers, D. Pedro, together with the empress and the young queen, was at the Opera. There were loud outcries from the rabble both within the house and in the streets, on account of the leniency of the terms which had been granted. The clemency of the

* Now that D. Miguel is long since dead, it is to be hoped that some deputy will one day rise in his place and propose, that the innocent children of an unhappy misguided father be allowed to return to their country.

Government was much complained of. At this time, one scoundrel was pleased to indulge himself by writing as follows:

"The most execrable of tyrants still exists! But the world must know that our valour is not extinguished, but betrayed! The nation, so atrociously tyrannized over, has the sacred right to revenge itself on the monster who has so scourged it! Eternal hatred to the degenerate Portuguese who was the adviser of such a convention! Eternal hatred to the chief who delayed the triumphant march of our brave troops, and, by this means, prevented the punishment of the tyrant!"

Such was the language of those days over a fallen foe. The race of such writers is, unfortunately, not extinct in Portugal.

Before the arrival of the marshals at Lisbon, a decree, dated May 27th, 1834, conferred on the Duke da Terceira the honours of *parente*, or relationship with the royal family; and on the Count de Saldanha the title of marquis, "for services of so much importance already rewarded by the esteem and sympathy of all lovers of their country." On the same day, the regent signed a decree giving thanks to the brave army which had so nobly conducted itself.

Of minor honours received about this time, we may mention the "médaille d'honneur" forwarded to Saldanha from Paris by the "Société Française de Statistique Universelle." This was followed, shortly afterwards, by the Grand Cross of the Military Order of S. Fernando, conferred on the marshal by the Queen of Spain, in public testimony of her appreciation of his distinguished and brilliant military services in restoring peace to the Peninsula.

CHAPTER XVI.

1834, concluded.

Saldanha is elected deputy—Chambers assemble—Regent's speech—Saldanha sits on the opposition benches—Defends freedom of speech—Presides over committee on regency question—And on a second ministerial measure—Is gazetted a Peer—Honour shown him by the deputies—Correspondence with the minister—D. Pedro resigns the regency—Saldanha again reports on a ministerial measure—Regency question—Saldanha's proposal—Approved unanimously—Queen takes the oaths—D. Pedro dies—Change of ministers—Saldanha selected to condole with the queen—Proposed marriage with the Duke de Leuchtenberg—Title of Excellency conferred on Peers—Complaints of illegalities—The minister's defence—Reply of Manoel Passos.

THE war was terminated, and Saldanha now returned to Lisbon, where, after so many toils and dangers, he hoped to enjoy that quiet happiness for which he so much longed. No man was, at one time, more sanguine than Saldanha, that, by the magic power of the words "truth, liberty, and justice," all political differences might be reconciled and become merged in the love of country. But he was grievously deceived. He found the people dissatisfied, and excited against the Government; whilst even the regent had been insulted by a mob at the Theatre of S. Carlos. He found, moreover, all parties embittered, and intriguing against each other; although each alike sought to obtain his alliance; and great anxiety was felt respecting his intentions. But Saldanha knew no parties. His sole political object was to benefit his country and his countrymen, in securing their happiness and prosperity. He considered it his duty to vote in favour of the ministers when he approved their measures, and to oppose them when otherwise.

The elections now took place, and Saldanha was chosen

deputy for Douro and Estremadura. The Chambers were assembled on the 15th of August (1834).

On that day, D. Pedro, as regent, in a long speech, reminded the Chambers of all the events which had taken place in Portugal since the 29th of April, 1826, when he had given them a constitutional government. He reminded them of the oaths of allegiance to the queen, and of fidelity to the Charter, which D. Miguel had taken at Vienna and Lisbon, and which, on arriving in Portugal, he had disregarded. He dwelt on the cruel conduct of the usurping government towards thousands of Portuguese citizens. He stated the circumstances under which he had assumed the regency, and had afterwards landed on the shores of Mindello, with 7500 men, in order to oppose a well-organized army of 80,000. He referred to the great success of the brave Napier in taking the enemy's fleet; and to the glorious victory over the enemy at the lines of Oporto on the 25th of July; and to the no less brilliant action at Lisbon on the 10th of October,* when 26,000 troops of the enemy were driven away from the Capital, and pursued, as far as Santarem, by a force of 8300, of which but 2500 were men who had ever seen any service. Dwelling on various other military successes, and on measures which had been taken by the Government, both before and since the final overthrow of D. Miguel, he concluded by calling on the Chambers to decide, amongst other weighty matters: 1st, whether he should, or should not, continue to act as regent during the remaining minority of his daughter; 2nd, whether a law should be passed to authorize the queen to marry a foreign prince.

Parliament being now assembled, Saldanha took his seat on the benches of the opposition, and was hailed as its leader. He had frankly told the regent, on the previous day, that he was unable to approve many of the measures which the ministers had recently carried out; and that, under these circumstances, he begged to tender to the regent his resignation as chief of the imperial Staff. The communications which passed on this occasion were honourable on both sides. D. Pedro replied by

* Although the credit for these victories on the 25th of July and 10th of October was due to Saldanha, we still see his name carefully suppressed.

inquiring if it was with him, or with the ministers, that Saldanha was in opposition: because, if only with the latter, it did not concern him personally, and he should insist that the marshal should retain the appointment. "Willingly," answered Saldanha, "if your Majesty will this day or to-morrow make known to the ministers the determination I had come to."

It is not our business to enter at length into the debates or the measures of the new constitutional parliament. They will, indeed, always be interesting to the Portuguese historian; and, perhaps, at times curious to the English reader. A few of the more remarkable incidents, however, and those especially which illustrate the life and character of Saldanha, will be occasionally commended to the reader's notice. At the second sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, members began already to try their wings in the lofty atmosphere of the "law and practice of parliament," and Saldanha at once asserted the undoubted privilege of the house in freedom of speech. The president had called Sr. Manoel Passos to order for using the expression "ministerial majority;" and, after some observations on both sides of the house, Saldanha rose and said:

"The honourable member neither spoke of king nor queen; he spoke of the ministry, and to this no one can have a right to object. I, who both to my evil, as well as to my good fortune (equally alike honourable), have been an emigrant from my country, have seen in all constitutional countries, both in and out of the Chambers, a ministerial party and one of opposition. The honourable member has made no attack on the chief of the executive power; and there is no reason why he should be called to order for thus alluding to the ministers. His language was parliamentary; and the expression 'ministerial' can cast no dishonour on any member who conscientiously approves the general conduct of the ministry."

On the question of the regency which had been raised by the regent's opening speech, a committee of seven, presided over by Saldanha, was appointed to examine the government proposal for the continuance of the powers of D. Pedro.

On the 21st of August, Saldanha declared in the house that the committee were unanimous in approving the Government

proposal; and that they were not actuated by the debt of gratitude which they owed to the emperor, but, solely, by their duties as representatives of the nation. In consequence of some remarks made by the Minister of Marine, Saldanha observed, that it should be remembered that the real friends of the emperor were those who assisted him in giving liberty to the people; and that he had nothing to fear from a handful of miscreants, whose sole object was to bring disorder and anarchy into the country. This plain-speaking gave no little offence to those members in opposition, who had declared perpetual warfare against D. Pedro. But the marshal stood aloof from all personal or party considerations, and never hesitated to call things by their right names, whenever the safety and honour of his country were concerned.

At the next meeting of the deputies, the opinion of the committee having been read, Saldanha rose, and spoke as follows:

"Devoted from my earliest youth to the cause of liberty, my efforts have been unceasing in its favour; and they will never fail, so long as I have life and strength. Gratitude is one of our first duties; but I would stifle even that, if it were necessary for the benefit of the cause to which we are pledged. Great—very great—are the services which the Duke de Bragança has rendered us. He courted every toil; he faced both famine and pestilence not less than did those who accompanied him; and, wherever there was danger, he was sure there to be found. Nevertheless, I must declare my opinion. If there be so many reasons why he should continue to be regent during the minority of the queen, it must still be confessed that his appointment is not sanctioned by the Charter. He is excluded from it by article 92. But the remedy is to be found in the Charter itself. Art. 92 is not a fundamental law of the Constitution; therefore it can be repealed by the existing Chambers without special powers for that purpose being required; without those precautions which the Charter declares necessary previous to any alteration in, or the suppression of, its fundamental laws. And if it were not so: 'Salus populi est suprema lex'—a principle which history confirms by many examples." After citing various instances,

Saldanha, with a noble generosity towards one who, formerly, had borne him but little good-will, declared that he had never met a greater admirer of truth, than the Duke de Bragança; a greater lover of justice; nor one with a greater desire for the establishment of liberal ideas, or with a more sincere wish to put them in practice.

The law in favour of the continuance of the regency of D. Pedro was passed by a majority of 89 against 5 dissentients. It is remarkable that amongst the latter were the two brothers, Manoel and José Passos. In the course of the debate, the former made an eloquent speech in opposition to the bill.

Although sitting on the opposition benches, Saldanha, strange to say, was again solicited by the ministers to lend the power of his authority and influence to support a proposal for the repeal of another article of the constitutional Charter. This measure was brought on, in order to authorize the regent to select some foreign prince as husband for the queen, his daughter, notwithstanding such an alliance with a foreigner was forbidden by the 90th article of that Charter. Saldanha, accordingly, was again placed at the head of a committee to report on the proposed Bill. When announcing the unanimous opinion of the committee in its favour, he urged the House to brevity and to a like unanimity. "For what prince," said he, "in the present state of affairs in Europe would subject himself to be, after acceptance, solemnly and publicly repudiated by the representatives of the nation. I am honoured, and feel flattered by the friendship of many diplomatists; but twice have I been the victim of diplomacy; and I well know to what extent their secret manœuvres can reach. Have we not seen their intrigues amongst ourselves respecting the simple nomination of an inspector of cavalry? What might there not happen in the selection of a husband for the queen? The desires of one Power may be in opposition to those of another; and if there is publicity before the question is decided, far distant, very far distant, may be the marriage of her Majesty."

On the above questions, Saldanha had been able conscientiously to support the Government, and to do all honour to D. Pedro. But when—shortly after—the question of the legality

of the arrest—by order of the Government,—of Colonel R. P. Pizarro came before the Chamber of Deputies, the marshal felt constrained, by his sense of honour and of justice, to adopt a course which implied severe censure both on the regent, and on his ministers. It probably was one out of many matters in which Saldanha had felt it would be impossible for him to approve the conduct of the Government, and which determined him to take his seat, at the opening of Parliament, on the opposition side of the Chamber of Deputies.

By royal letters dated the 1st of September, which appeared in the Gazette on the following day, Saldanha was called to the Upper House. Upon this, the members of the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies respectfully covered with blue velvet the seat which the marshal had been accustomed to occupy, in order that it should remain vacant during the remainder of the session. On the 3rd, there being ninety-two members present, only six being absent from ill-health or other cause, Saldanha entered the House, and advanced towards his usual place. There was a pause, and a dead silence. The president, addressing himself to the apparent intruder, observed: "You see the astonishment of the House." Thereupon, Saldanha made the following explanation.

He commenced by declaring, that having yesterday seen, in the official Gazette, the royal letters which named him a peer of the realm, he felt grateful for the honourable dignity conferred on him by his Imperial Majesty the regent. That now, after mature deliberation, he had come to inform the House of the reason why he entered it to occupy his accustomed seat; and he begged to be allowed to read a copy of the communication which he had addressed to the Home Minister. The marshal then, amidst the most intense silence, read as follows:—

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SEN^R,

"When, at the State Council, yesterday, I heard your Excellency say that his Imperial Majesty, the regent in the name of the queen, had determined upon raising me to the dignity of a peer of the realm, I was in doubt as to what would, in such case, be my determination. In no wise would I

wish to appear ungrateful to his Imperial Majesty, who, in so many ways, has distinguished and honoured me; nor would I betray the confidence which my constituents, the noble citizens of Estremadura and Douro, placed in me when they selected me to be a deputy of the Portuguese nation. By the 12th article of the Charter, both peers and deputies alike represent their country; and I believe that, in either of the Chambers, I can, with equal constancy and patriotism, defend the constitutional Crown of her Majesty the queen, and the liberties of the Portuguese people. I, nevertheless, determined on addressing myself to his Imperial Majesty, thanking him for the honour he had done me; and, at the same time, asking him as a favour, the first I had ever asked, to allow me to decline the high dignity—a request, however, which his Imperial Majesty refused to grant.

"I have again reflected on my situation, and on my duties. As a father I am bound to consult the interest of my son; but paternal affection does not allow me to forget my duty as a citizen. For this reason, I declare to your Excellency that, until the present Chamber is dissolved, I will not abandon my honourable position in it as a Deputy; but, to be worthy of the high consideration which his Imperial Majesty has so generously shown me, I beg him to grant me the special favour of allowing me to retain the Royal Letters until I can present myself with them in the Chamber of Peers, when the important mission is ended with which the honourable confidence of my fellow citizens has charged me.

"Should, however, his Imperial Majesty not grant me this new favour; as soon as I receive a reply from your Excellency, I shall have the honour of returning to you the Royal Letters which I to-day received, renouncing, in this manner, the high dignity.

"I hope that your Excellency will do me the justice to believe, that the step I have taken was dictated by a sense of duty: and, if I am obliged to renounce the favour which his Imperial Majesty has conferred on me, it is not from the fear of loading myself with the weight of new benefits; for, after the many I have received, they cannot increase my gratitude."

At the conclusion of this letter, Saldanha took his usual seat amidst the loud applauses of the House.

On the 18th of September, the president entered the Chamber of Deputies and read the following letter from the regent.

"DEPUTIES OF THE PORTUGUESE NATION,

"Always faithful to my oath, and obeying the voice of my conscience, I announce that having yesterday fulfilled the obligations of a son of the Catholic Church and those of the father of a family, I consider it my duty to inform you, that the same illness which, yesterday, led me to those resolutions prevents me from taking further part in public affairs. Under these circumstances, I beg you will attend to the necessary measures to supply my place. I offer the most fervent prayers to Heaven for the happiness of the nation.

"D. PEDRO, REGENT."

"PALACE AT QUELUZ, *September 18th*, 1834."

At the conclusion of the letter, the reading of which had much affected the president, a feeling of awe ran through the whole House. It was the final leave-taking of a chief—not yet in his thirty-seventh year—who had, for a long time, lived with and shared the dangers of his companions in arms, so many of whom were then present. The president having proposed that a committee should be appointed to report on the subject, and that the House should sit until a decision was arrived at, it was agreed, after a brief discussion, that the same committee should be appointed, with the Marquis de Saldanha as president, which had reported on the proposals respecting the regency and the marriage of the queen.

As the health of the regent had been gradually declining, previous to the public announcement of his resignation, there had been anxious discussions, in the ministry and among the deputies, respecting the steps to be taken in case of his decease. The conditions of the Charter favoured the regency of the Infanta D. Isabel Maria. Some advocated one to be composed of Palmella, Terceira, and Saldanha; whilst not a few were for

the sole regency of Marshal Saldanha: and, had he coveted such a distinction, his popularity would, probably, have rendered any opposition ineffectual.

But Saldanha was unambitious in this case, and had given no ear to the suggestions of those who surrounded him. He at once declared, that the surest means of guaranteeing order, public tranquillity, and the stability of constitutional government, was to proclaim the queen's majority, notwithstanding she was not yet eighteen;* the age at which, by the Charter, she was qualified to assume the government of the country; and he obtained the unanimous concurrence of the committee in this view. Returning to the body of the House, which was crowded to excess—every peer and councillor of state being present—Saldanha read the report of the committee; and this, being at once put to the vote, was accepted unanimously, and was immediately adopted by the ministry.

Thus, three times was the chief of the opposition instrumental in carrying important ministerial measures—all of which were in direct contradiction to the letter of the Charter, although clearly necessary for the purpose of relieving the country from present or future difficulties.

On the following morning, a deputation from both Houses having been appointed to wait on the queen, in order to lay before her Majesty the unanimous Decree of the Cortes, the queen replied as follows:—

"I thank the Cortes for the decision they have arrived at; and, while greatly regretting the cause which led to it, I will not fail to do all in my power to maintain the constitutional Charter of the monarchy; endeavouring to imitate the virtues, and in every way to follow the example and counsels of my august father."

The oath to the Constitution was taken by the queen in the Chamber of Deputies on the following day.

The first decree which the queen signed on assuming power, was to confer upon her father the Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword.

* The queen D. Maria was born on the 4th of April, 1819.

D. Pedro died at Queluz, on the 24th of September, having survived his resignation but a few days.

At the last interview which the marshal had with the dying regent, D. Pedro recommended the queen to Saldanha's care; begging him to consider her in the light of a daughter.

On ascending the throne, the first step which the young queen took was to change her ministers. The new administration was formed on the 24th; and the Duke de Palmella was appointed President without a portfolio. The other members of the ministry were:

Home . THE BISPO-CONDE D. FRANCISCO DE S. LUIZ (Bishop of Coimbra).
Justice . ANTONIO BARRETO FERRAZ DE VASCONCELLOS.
Finance. JOSÉ DA SILVA CARVALHO (who had held the same office in the previous ministry).
War . DUKE DA TERCEIRA.
Marine. AGOSTINHO JOSÉ FREIRE (who had held the War Department in the previous ministry).
Foreign. COUNT DE VILLA REAL.

Of the remaining events of this year, we may mention that, in August, Saldanha was appointed a member of the Supreme Military Court of Justice; and that, on the 4th of October, he was selected by the Chamber of Deputies to condole with the young queen on the death of her father.

Grants of 100 contos of reis each were proposed by the Chambers to be made to the Dukes de Palmella and Terceira, and to the Marquis de Saldanha—and, at the same time, an annuity of 6000 cruzados to Admiral Napier, Count do Cabo de S. Vicente. As the three grants were to be paid in Government securities, which were, at that period, very much depreciated, they each realised scarcely more than one third of their nominal value.

On the 1st of December, a marriage contract was signed at Munich, between the queen, D. Maria II., and Prince Augustus Charles Eugène Napoleon, Duke de Leuchtenberg. On the same day, it was made known by a royal decree, that her Majesty was pleased to commemorate the event, by granting to the members of the House of Peers the right of being addressed by the title of "Excellency."

On the 18th of December, the queen closed the Cortes in person.

After the close of the session, thirty-two deputies of the Opposition, including Saldanha, signed, on the 25th of December, a paper, addressed to the electors, their supporters, giving an account of the proceedings of the late session. In this paper bitter complaints are made of the "scandalous manner" in which the Government interfered in the elections, employing "tricks, calumnies, and outrages" in order to prevent many distinguished citizens from becoming members of the Cortes. Complaints are made that the press had been fettered—that citizens had been illegally imprisoned, in a manner contrary to the articles of the constitutional Charter—that a majority in the Chamber of Deputies had been obtained for the Government by the most illegal means—that the state of the finances was "wrapt in the mysteries of an occult management—that the administration of justice was in a state of confusion unexampled in the history of civilised nations," etc., etc.

In reply to this, the ministers made various denials and declarations; and spoke of "their services," in the cause so lately gained, in a manner which implied that its success was entirely owing to themselves. Upon which, Manoel Passos answered them most eloquently and indignantly. He cited the names of many who had rendered good services to the constitutional cause; and exclaimed that he did not know, if he would exchange the old coat worn by General Pizarro on the field of *Lobios* for all the grand crosses and ribbons which ornament the members of the majority. "And now as to the Marshal Saldanha," continues Senhor Passos—"the hero of the 4th of March—the saviour of Oporto—the conqueror of the conqueror of Algiers—he who with his sword gave freedom to the two Capitals, and drove before him the powerful armies of the tyrant!—this warrior, always conquering, never conquered—he to whom you and ourselves owe the honour of being seated in the chairs of the Senate!—will not even he be an exception? Ask the Portuguese nation to decide between him and the whole of you, and then see what will be the reply." . . . . . "It is true," continues Passos, "that not many of us

had the misfortune to accompany the Argonauts in the *Belfast* in June, 1828; when, on the 2nd of July following, certain ministerial gentlemen imitated the counsels given by Themistocles, and sheltered themselves behind wooden walls." . . . . "It was a misfortune," adds Passos, "that one of them was the unconquered Marshal Saldanha; but this fault of his we have obliterated from the tablets of our memory, in order that we might find sufficient space to engrave on them the series of his great and astounding victories."

This event has been discussed in a previous chapter, and the reader will have judged for himself whether the character of Saldanha has not been there fully vindicated.

CHAPTER XVII.

1835.

Marriage of the queen—Death of the prince consort—Saldanha is offered a diplomatic mission—His letter to the *Nacional*—Parliament closed—Ministers resign—Saldanha forms a cabinet—Enthusiasm—Ministerial programme—Unsettled state of Portugal—Letters from Lord Howard and Marshal Beresford—Saldanha tenders his resignation—Queen's note in reply—Letters from Leonel Tavares and Julio Gomes—Financial difficulties—Queen's generous offer—Saldanha retains office—Impertinent letter—Saldanha's reply—Loulé resigns—He becomes an ultra-liberal—Saldanha is abused by the ultras—He again resigns—Letter to the queen—Queen is unable to form a ministry—Insists that Saldanha shall remain in office—He consents—Dismisses six officers—Petition in their favour—Queen's alarm—Message to Saldanha—Ministers resign—Ultras succeed to office—Their revolutionary principles—The new cabinet—The dismissed officers are reinstated.

We have seen, at the conclusion of the preceding chapter, that thirty-two deputies of the Opposition had signed an address complaining of the "scandalous manner" in which the Government interfered in elections, employing "tricks, calumnies, and outrages" in order to influence the returns. As the complaints thus commenced in 1834 have been continued, yearly, to the present time (1879) against the party in power, we must conclude that they were unfounded, or have been made in vain. On the 23rd of January (1835), thirty-one deputies, including Saldanha, signed a petition to the queen, requesting a dissolution of the House. It was, however, not acceded to.

An event happened at this time, which promised to afford happiness to the young queen, and satisfaction to her constitutional subjects. It was the arrival, on the 25th, at Lisbon, of the Prince of Leuchtenberg, her youthful bridegroom. But, alas! in two short months, D. Maria was a widow. The Prince Consort died on the following 28th of March.

On the 17th of February, a proposal was brought before the deputies to pass a vote of thanks to the two Messrs. Mallot of Dunkerque. On this occasion, Sr. Leonel Tavares observed; that such had been their enthusiasm in the cause of liberty, that, after the revolution of July in France, M. Mallot, the father, wrote to General Saldanha, offering, without any charge to place at his disposal a ship ready equipped for sea, for the purpose of conveying the emigrants to Portugal, whenever General Saldanha was prepared to conduct them: and that, later, he had fitted out two ships of war for the service of Portugal, which were commanded by his two sons, who fought for the cause of the queen, both by sea and land. One of the brothers was so seriously wounded by a ball, which passed through his throat, that, although he survived, he never regained the use of speech. Sr. Leonel added, that the family were now much reduced in circumstances, and proposed that some compensation should be made to them.

The Marquis de Saldanha gladly seconded the proposal of Sr. Leonel: adding, that many members of the House were acquainted with that respectable family, but that no one so well as himself knew the amount and value of their services; and, unfortunately, their present circumstances. "This family," continued he, "were never rich except in their love of liberty. The fortune they possessed, which consisted in their ships, was sacrificed for our cause. The vessels were held in readiness during nine months, waiting for the departure of the expedition; the fortunes of which they followed, without asking for remuneration of any kind."

On the 24th of February, the Duke de Palmella asked the permission of the Chamber of Deputies for one of its members, the Marquis de Saldanha, to be employed on an important mission out of the country; and the appointment was made by the queen on the following day. Shortly afterwards, Sr. Manoel Passos presented a petition from several individuals residing at Torres Novas, who urged the House to request the Government not to employ the marshal out of the kingdom, where his presence might be so unexpectedly required; so that he might continue to hold his place at the head of the Opposition.

In consequence of the attacks made upon Saldanha on his acceptance of the appointment as minister at Paris, he deemed it right to send the following explanatory letter to the editor of the *Nacional*:—

"MR. EDITOR,

"It is natural that my friends and the public in general, to whom I am indebted for so many and continued services, should wonder at my acceptance of a diplomatic mission, after having refused a peerage, and a seat in the ministry. Trusting, however, to the esteem of my fellow-citizens, which I am justly proud of having merited, I hope that they will not hesitate to believe; that fidelity to my principles; the prosperity of my country, for which I have exposed my life during thirty years; my concern for the Cause of liberty and for the service of the queen; are the powerful motives which satisfied and convinced me, that, by the acceptance of that mission, I should render, under present circumstances, the greatest possible service in my power.

"Begging of you, Mr. Editor, the insertion, etc., etc.

"MARQUEZ DE SALDANHA."

The Chambers were closed on the 20th of April. The project of sending Saldanha to Paris was now set aside; for the ministers, feeling that they did not enjoy the confidence of the House nor of the country, sent in their resignations. On this, Palmella strongly advised the queen to call upon Saldanha to form an Administration. This she did; and, on the 27th of May, the marshal was enabled to present the following list for her Majesty's approbation.

President of the Council and War	MARQUIS DE SALDANHA.
Home	SENHOR JOÃO DE SOUZA PINTO DE MAGALHÃES.
Justice	,, MANOEL ANTONIO DE CARVALHO.
Finance	,, FRANCISCO ANTONIO DE CAMPOS.
Marine	,, MARQUIS DE LOULÉ.
Foreign	,, DUKE DE PALMELLA.

All these whom Saldanha had selected were new to office,

except the Duke de Palmella, and the Marquis de Loulé, the latter of whom had served for three months in 1833. Palmella, himself, had, already, on the 4th of the month, resigned the presidency, and the Count de Linhares had occupied his place until the appointment of Saldanha.

The *Nacional* and other papers were greatly rejoiced at the advent of Saldanha to power. No little outcry was, however, made against the selection of Palmella for Minister of Foreign Affairs; but they argued, that his acceptance of office under Saldanha was a proof of regret for his past conduct, and a pledge of his future intentions. The *Nacional* declared that a ministry, headed by Saldanha, in which were found such men as Loulé, Campos, and M. A. de Carvalho, could not disappoint the national hopes. The same journal described the great rejoicings which took place on Saldanha's acceptance of power; and, alluding to the enthusiasm displayed at the Theatre of S. Carlos on that occasion, already betrayed its secret wishes, by asserting that the constitutional hymn of D. Pedro was received somewhat coldly by the audience; but that, when, after repeated requests, the hymn of 1820 was allowed to be sung, the greatest enthusiasm prevailed throughout the house.

The good intentions and plans with which Saldanha began his new ministry are sufficiently proved by the programme which was decided upon at the first meeting of the new ministry. It was as follows:

"At the first meeting of the Council of Ministers, held at the house of the Duke de Palmella, Minister for Foreign Affairs, this 28th day of May, 1835, to decide upon the general and particular principles upon which its administrative system should be based, it was decided that, with regard to the first, the greatest firmness and strength should be displayed in the development and support of the constitutional Charter; and all attacks upon it, either by despotism or anarchy, be vigorously repelled: that justice should be dealt impartially to all Portuguese; protection given to those who require it; and every favour and preference, compatible with strict justice, be shown to those who have rendered services to the cause of liberty: that every means and effort should be employed to

re-establish peace and quietness in all parts, and to allay the bad feelings which have arisen from the civil war: that all existing national contracts should be respected; and the greatest economy observed, consistent with the necessities of the service: and that each of the ministers, with the least possible delay, should forward a circular to the subordinate offices of his department, acquainting them with the principles the ministry has adopted. With regard to the management of affairs in particular, it was decided that each Wednesday and Saturday, at 12 o'clock, there should be a council held in her Majesty's presence for the despatch of business; and, upon the Saturdays, after the meeting at the palace, another council of the cabinet should be held: that an ordinary council of ministers should also be regularly held every Tuesday, at 12 o'clock, at the Home Office; and extraordinary meetings convoked whenever necessary: that all affairs of any importance, although purely relating to one department in particular, be treated of in the Council of Ministers; including all nominations and dismissals, except those of very small importance: and, that the transaction of business with her Majesty be by the ministers in a body."

The Duke da Terceira remained at the head of the army. To him, on the 30th May, Saldanha addressed the following:—

"ILL^MO E EX^MO SENHOR,

"Her Majesty having done me the honour of placing the War Department under my charge, I should, without hesitation, have declared to her that I considered myself unequal to the office, if I were not convinced, by the proofs which the brave Portuguese army have for so many years afforded on so many critical occasions, that it does justice to the wishes which animate me; whilst so many and repeated proofs of its confidence have given me the pleasing certainty of receiving its efficient support, at whatever sacrifices might be necessary for the glory of her Majesty's throne; the security of liberty; and the credit of the army itself. The new ministry, while desirous of seeing the country in the full enjoyment of that freedom which the constitutional Charter ensures, is resolved to support that Charter with the greatest firmness,

and to make it the rock upon which every attack, either from absolutism or from anarchy, may be wrecked. Justice will be dispensed to all alike; protection extended to all who may require it; and favour and preference, consistent with justice, shown to those who have rendered services to the cause of liberty. The ministry is also determined to employ every means, and make every effort, to restore order, and to extinguish those party feelings which sprang from our civil strife. It will observe the strictest economy consistent with the necessities of the State; and will religiously fulfil all existing contracts. By invariably following this path, her Majesty's Government hopes to diminish the evils which have not yet been cured; and it reckons upon the support of your Excellency, who so powerfully and effectually contributed to overthrow despotism, and restore the throne and the Charter. Happily, it is unnecessary to remind the army under your Excellency's command, that obedience is the soldier's first duty; to hesitate is a crime; and mutiny a capital offence.

"MARQUEZ DE SALDANHA."

The new Government soon found itself in a difficult position. The state of Spain rendered complications with that country very possible. Reports were circulated of the intention of D. Miguel to leave Italy, and land in the Peninsula. The provinces were unsettled. The finances were in disorder. The rancour of party-hate still showed itself by the frequent assassinations which occurred. The national guard required re-organizing with a skilful hand. Unqualified and dishonest subordinates had to be dismissed, with the difficulty of finding fitting substitutes. The mission of Saldanha to Paris had not taken place. His acceptance of it, however, caused many of his more violent partisans to fall off from their chief, and their scurrilous papers loaded him with abuse. Still more were they vexed when they found, that Saldanha, forgetting and forgiving former misunderstandings with Palmella, had solicited him to assist in forming a ministry. He saw in Palmella the right man in the right place. The experienced diplomatist was the one most qualified to hold the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. Saldanha disregarded

the scandalous libels which had been, and were, circulated respecting Palmella.

The Chambers were not sitting, and we have little to say respecting Saldanha's government at this period. Lord Howard writes to him in June :—

"I am happy to find, that Lord Palmerston has GREAT *confidence* in *you*. I wish with all my heart, that you and he could have met. It *hereafter* might be very important to this country, though at *present* you do not need in that quarter a better friend than myself—but you know, I have always told you, I was anxious you should make *your friends* YOURSELF. I understood Mendizabal was rather cross—but I do not understand that he expressed the slightest dissatisfaction at your nomination. Of course he could not *like* the sudden and unceremonious dismissal of his idolator and 'Slaves of the Lamp.' I am very much obliged to you for what you have done about Dalton—and I can assure you that your decision has caused much satisfaction, and done honour and credit to you among my countrymen and others, shaken by the disgraceful manner in which he had been treated by Terceira and his successor in office, until your turn came."

The following letter received by Saldanha about this time from Marshal Beresford will be read with interest, as it confirms how continued was that friendship so happily commenced when Saldanha was but a boy-captain.

"LONDON, *June*, 1835.

"MY DEAR FRIEND,

"I trust I may yet call you by that name; for though we have been separated for much time, yet with me, and I consequently believe with you, there is no diminution of that feeling of regard and esteem that I, from the beginning of my knowledge of you, have had for you. Your conduct and character, on which my esteem was based, has been uniform and the same. It has been honourable and straightforward. Your reputation has continued to grow and increase; and I might, perhaps, even take to myself some credit both as regards your conduct and reputation, as of two or three others of my Portu-

guese, friends whom I had formerly under my command, and who know well they then enjoyed my esteem both as men and as officers, and whose merits I was neither averse nor slow to advocate and reward.

"Our positions are not exactly changed. I am, I trust, what I was then in the opinion of my friends. You and others have advanced to, if not surpassed, your old commander; and I hope you will think me sincere, when I heartily congratulate you on it, and on the height of military reputation you have obtained. No one can deprive you of that; and I may say the same of my friend, the Duke of Terceira. But as to your now high political situation, though one in which you can do still greater good to your country than in a purely military one, I can scarcely as yet congratulate you on it. Its uncertainty is too great; and, unfortunately, it is not the best and purest intentions that can preserve you in it. It is a situation from which every one ought to be prepared to fall; and therefore to secure to himself, under such an event, the consolation of his own conscience by acting honourably and patriotically, and which I have no doubt you will do."

The concluding observations of Marshal Beresford were almost prophetic. Great, he said, was the uncertainty of office. Nor was it long before Saldanha was fully convinced that "the best and purest intentions" did not preserve him from intrigues and factious opposition. He, however, enjoyed the "consolation of his own conscience," and, with this feeling, he, shortly afterwards, tendered his resignation to the queen in the following letter:—

"YOUR MAJESTY,

"It is with the most profound regret that I find myself under the hard necessity of declaring to your Majesty, that it is impossible for me to continue to have the honour of presiding over the council of ministers; as it is absolutely impossible for me to satisfy the wishes of your Majesty in a recomposition of the ministry. I have a right to expect that your Majesty will do me the justice to believe me, when I promise your Majesty, that I will neither directly nor indirectly make the slightest opposition to the administration your Majesty may

nominate. Neither ought your Majesty to think that my retirement will cause any hindrance to the financial affairs; on the contrary, it will remove some difficulties, and, to a certain extent, coincide with the wishes of Mendizabal (which are not opposed by the English Government,) who thinks it would be convenient your Majesty should allow me to take the command in Spain. I trust, also, that your Majesty will not do me the injustice to imagine, that I take this step because I wish through it to obtain the admission into the cabinet of some of my friends who are obnoxious to your Majesty. I am incapable of ever taking advantage of my position with any one; and still less of doing so with my queen, whom I love as I love my only daughter. Nothing but the conviction I feel of the impossibility of my retaining it, forces me to renounce the high position in which your Majesty's benignity placed me. The Duke da Terceira is in Lisbon. His position is more fortunate than mine. Among the men whom he can combine with, there are many worthy of your Majesty's confidence. I have rendered some services to your Majesty; and, as their most complete recompense, I beg your Majesty to do me the justice to believe that my resignation is the result of a firm conviction; and that, I should be highly criminal if I did not carry it out.

"With the deepest respect and gratitude I kiss your Majesty's hand.

"MARQUIS DE SALDANHA."

"*July* 12."

To this the queen immediately replied:—

"MARQUEZ DE SALDANHA,—Venha cá falar-me. (Come and speak to me.)

"MARIA."

"12 *Julho*, 1835."

Saldanha had made known his intentions to Lord Howard, who immediately replied in the following note, dated the 12th:

"I have just come home and have received your letter. The only remark I can make is, that you should not talk of resigning. By so doing you may be abandoning the queen to the dictation

of Carvalho and Freire. Your position is a very difficult one—but it becomes the more incumbent on you to show energy and a determination, with the support of the country, to make head against them, and rescue the queen from the dictation of Carvalho and his friends, on the strength of the momentary power derived from a foreigner,* such as the individual in question. You must not abandon the queen; and, depend upon it, if there is a crisis, it will be of a few days' duration. If you should have time to call here *to-night*, there is a view of the subject, which it is important you should take into consideration without loss of time, and on which I should like to speak to you, as of *immense importance* and *power* to you and the present Government. I should recommend *great firmness;* and *if you wish me* to see Carvalho, I will do so with pleasure—and you may rely upon me in any way in which I can render you the slightest *service* or contribute to meet any difficulties."

He had also acquainted Palmella with what was passing; and received from him a reply which does as much credit to his candour and patriotism, as it shows clearly the critical position the queen was placed in, and the important part Saldanha was considered, by so competent an authority, to be playing in the affairs of the country. Its contents were as follows:—

"*July* 13*th*, 1835.

"MY COLLEAGUE AND FRIEND,

"Your letter, which has this instant reached me, when going to retire to rest, after working all night for the packet which is about to leave, caused me the greatest surprise and dismay.

"All your arguments are founded on the idea that the queen has consulted some one, other than yourself, as to a reconstruction of the Cabinet. I know not if she did so; but what I can assure you, upon my word of honour, is, that she did not consult me; and that I neither directly nor indirectly have suggested any one to her, or objected to any one. In a word, if her Majesty had done me the honour to consult me, my only answer would have been to advise her to treat of the affair with you, and with no one else.

* Mendizabal.

"You may be certain that this is the simple truth. You saw with what reluctance I accepted the post you offered me; and I can now assure you that my firm resolution is not to remain in the ministry if you go out, *let the conditions be what they may.* If you remain, I will go out without the slightest reluctance, if the arrangement arrived at requires that I should do so; but if you leave the presidency *I will in no case remain.*

"I earnestly beg of you to think the matter well over before placing the queen in such an unfortunate position.

"Your friend and colleague,

"PALMELLA.

"P.S.—I implore you, on every motive, not to come to a precipitate resolution."

That Saldanha was in great perplexity on this occasion is evident from the next letter which he received from Lord Howard, dated the 14th, after he had made known to his friend, that he had placed his resignation in the hands of the queen.

"LISBON, *July* 14.

"MY DEAR MARQUIS,

"Your note has caused me the greatest distress and anxiety. I know how honourable all your feelings, and your conduct has been throughout this crisis; and I shall be ready to bear testimony to the efforts you have made to avert the impending danger. I do not hesitate to state to you my strongest conviction that *your retirement* at this moment, is likely to be followed by consequences most dangerous to the queen's throne; and either to the *independence* or the tranquillity of the nation. You have already evinced such readiness to make personal sacrifices for the purpose of reconciling conflicting interests for the good of your country, that I am bound to believe, that you felt, you *had no other course* to pursue but to take that fatal step you have done; but which I regret to a degree that I cannot find terms to express. I shall send off the packet immediately.

"Your ever steady and sincere friend,

"HOWARD DE WALDEN.

"I do not understand why the course you considered good yesterday, should be impracticable to-day, *i.e.*, yourself in the Finance, or Silva Carvalho."

On the same day, Palmella again addressed Saldanha:—

"14*th of July*, 1835.

"MY DEAR MARQUIS,

"In answer to your letter I can only repeat that, as you are going out, I cease to be a minister. The queen sent me a message; but I was obliged to beg to be excused from obeying her Majesty, and going to receive her commands at the palace, on account of indisposition. Her Majesty knows my opinion, which simply is, that I will not treat of the organization of the Cabinet but with you, or the Duke da Terceira. If you insist upon retiring, you will expose the country to a crisis, and risk subjecting the queen to an insult. I cannot believe you will take such a responsibility upon yourself; and earnestly beg of you for your own sake, and ours, not to do so.

"Your colleague and friend,

"PALMELLA."

Whilst this, we may say, remonstrance from Lord Howard, and this appeal to his patriotism from Palmella were being communicated to Saldanha, he received the following letters from two of his friends and supporters—influential members of the Chamber of Deputies—which will afford us some insight into the difficulties of his position. They were written in combination on the same sheet of paper. That these gentlemen were both very desirous of becoming ministers is sufficiently clear. But Saldanha must have been startled at the free and easy manner in which Sr. Leonel speaks of national bankruptcy!

"*July* 13*th*, 1835.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO S^R,

"The worst of all is the being as we are. If to-morrow the said 'Contos' are not forthcoming to pay to the Junta, or 'commission for the payment of the interest;' then we have a

bankruptcy. But is that bankruptcy to be the result of a want of action, or is it to be a planned affair? If the former, its consequences will be of the worst description, and unaccompanied by anything which might neutralize or attenuate their effect; whilst if it is the result of a plan, its consequences may not be so bad; and it will allow of a struggle against them. A decision must be come to to-day; and to-day must be done that which ought to have been effected two or three days ago. If nothing is done to-day, to-morrow we shall have disorder with all its horrors. One must bear in mind also, that nothing would be so convenient for José da Silva Carvalho as the present state of irresolution. If I wanted to do him a service, I would promote that state; so that, at the last moment, I could say, or give others a chance of saying: 'Now there is no remedy.'

"My opinion is still, as it was.—In the first place to save our nationality; to fear more for the possible future state of Spain, and our own state six months hence, than for present affairs; to strive against adversity; and to take for a motto, '*Audaces fortuna juvat*,' or '*Una salus nullam sperare salutem*.'

"Your obedient servant,

"LEONEL TAVARES CABRAL."

The above letter may not be very intelligible to the reader, but the enigmatic context will in some measure be interpreted by the letter which follows.

"*July* 13*th*.

"ILL^MO E EX^MO S^R,

"In the hope of avoiding bankruptcy to-morrow, it would be advisable that your Excellency should have another interview with the directors of the bank, and energetically lay before them, that the bankruptcy of the Government must necessarily be followed by the stoppage of the bank; and this would bring with it ruin, or at any rate misfortune, to the shareholders. Their own interest, therefore, requires that they should do all in their power to avert such an evil, by begging of their friends to advance some money upon this occasion. It would also be convenient to invite the principal capitalists to assist for the same purpose, making them most favourable offers, and giving them

all possible guarantee. As a last resource, I do not know if I would not take advantage of her Majesty's great generosity.* These are the means which suggest themselves to me at this moment; but there may be other and better ones. The grand point is, however, to immediately organize an administration, which will do something; or, to consider that which at present exists as in full power and activity, and take some immediate steps. Energy and activity are all that are required. If I am found necessary, I shall not refuse to do anything.

"I have the honour to be,

"With the highest consideration, etc.

"JULIO GOMES DA SILVA SANCHES."

In a note to this letter Leonel adds:—"Neither do I refuse, as is well known; but do not give me anything which is lucrative in any way." Julio Gomes also adds to this note—"It is in this sense that I offer my services."

Saldanha did not accept the offers of either of his correspondents. It is not too much to say that if Sr. Leonel had been admitted into the ministry, he probably would not have been selected for the Finance department. But the reader should be informed that this gentleman was chief editor and proprietor of the *Nacional;* and the fact that Saldanha felt it his duty either politely to decline, or, at all events, not to avail himself of his services, if it did not exasperate, at least did not mitigate the bitterness of the opposition which he afterwards offered to the very man with whom he had thus sought to be politically and confidentially associated.

The principal difficulties of the situation were financial. Sr. Carvalho appeared to enjoy the confidence of the monied interest, and, moreover, had the support of the skilled financier Mendizabal. We have already observed that, from prejudice or other motive, Saldanha had declined to be associated in office with Sr. Carvalho. We shall now learn the circumstances under which they were brought together by the willing sacrifice which the former made of his personal feelings.

* The queen had nobly offered to place her jewels at the disposition of Saldanha's government.

Influenced greatly by the letters from Lord Howard and Palmella, and not a little, perhaps, by the tone of those from Leonel and Julio Gomes, Saldanha consented to a ministerial conference, on the subject of his resignation, at the house of Palmella, who was confined at home by an attack of gout. This took place on the 14th, and is thus related by the marshal:—

"As soon as the Minister of Finance entered, he declared that not having money to meet certain bills which would be due in three days, and others which would become so in eight, he had ordered a notice to be affixed at the Treasury, to the effect that payment must necessarily be suspended. Astonished at such a step being taken without my knowledge and that of my colleagues, I rose, and requested the ministers not to separate until my return. I hastened to the bank, and was enabled there to arrange, on my own responsibility, a loan of 600 contos (about £134,000). From thence I proceeded to the Treasury; and having suppressed the notice, I returned to Palmella's, and at once requested Sr. Campos to send in his resignation. The bank had advanced the money, conditionally on that minister's place being supplied by Sr. Carvalho, who agreed to accept office if allowed to enter with Sr. Rodrigo da Fonseca Magalhães as colleague."

The ministry which was formed on the 15th of July was composed as follows:—

President and War . .	MARQUIS DE SALDANHA.
Home	R. DA F. MAGALHÃES.
Justice	J. DE SOUSA P. DE MAGALHÃES.
Finance	JOSÉ DA SILVA CARVALHO.
Marine	MARQUIS DE LOULÉ.*
Foreign	DUKE DE PALMELLA.

As soon as the ministry was formed, Lord Howard wrote the following to Saldanha:—

"CINTRA, *July 16th*, 1835.

"MY DEAR MARQUIS,

"I will not say that I congratulate you personally on the formation of the Government, including yourself—knowing too well the worry and *désagrémens* of all kinds a minister

* Until the 25th, when Sr. Jervis d'Athouguia succeeded him.

has to undergo in these times in Portugal, without any other compensation than the honour and credit to be obtained from the impartial and high-minded—a mighty small class, as would appear, among public men.

"The Government is on the whole extremely satisfactory—and Palmella is *so important* a feature in the present arrangements, that the compensation for the objectionable nomination is more than enough, even if one did not consider that the responsibility of the *selection* does not fall on you or on him. . . . I shall be in Lisbon early on Friday morning, and I hope to see you in the course of the day, in order that I may be enabled to do justice, if he deserves it, to Carvalho at the twelfth hour. He will not stand well in England on the arrival of my despatches; and his friend* will have bestowed on him many a *hearty curse*."

"Yours ever sincerely,

"HOWARD DE WALDEN."

Very different was the letter received from Sr. Leonel Tavares with the same date.

"LISBON, *July* 16*th*, 1835.

"*To the* MARQUIS DE SALDANHA:

"EXCELLENCY,—The nomination of Rodrigo da Fonseca Magalhães to a post in the cabinet, is the most immoral and least expected event that could be announced to the public.

"Your Excellency, by becoming president of such a cabinet, and putting your name to the decree† referred to, has thrown down the gauntlet to public opinion without any excuse. It now becomes the duty of all honest men to fight against your Excellency's political existence.

"And this it is my duty to make known to you.

"God preserve your Excellency.

"LEONEL TAVARES CABRAL."

The Marshal answered on the same day:—

"SIR,—I have received your letter, and am pleased with

* Mendizabal.

† The decree referred to is that whereby Magalhães was appointed.

your candour. With like frankness, I do not hesitate to assure you, that, for a long time past, I have felt convinced that you are very very far from being possessed of the elevated sentiments, which are necessary to properly appreciate the sacrifices, a man like myself, is capable of making for the good of his country.

"If you can contrive to cut the thread of my political existence, without endangering the existence of my country, I shall look upon you as my greatest benefactor.

"God preserve you.

"MARQUIS DE SALDANHA."

This short correspondence, fully reflects the characters of the two men.

But Saldanha's generous abnegation was not emulated by all his colleagues in office. In the sacrifice he had so readily made of his personal feelings and opinions, to the welfare of his country and the wishes of his sovereign, at least one of the members of the cabinet took but an unwilling part. Scarcely had the crisis been overcome by the entrance of José da Silva Carvalho to the counsels of the throne, when rumours reached Saldanha, that the Marquis de Loulé intended to leave the ministry.

Although a descendant of one of the first families in the kingdom, and allied by marriage to the royal family, he was already tainted with the ultra-liberal opinions of the noisy demagogues; and his political views led him in a wholly different direction to that Saldanha had so consistently followed. Ere long we shall find him in direct antagonism to the throne and the Charter which he had sworn to defend.

The bankruptcy did not take place. The Government was, apparently, safe. There were no Chambers sitting to embarrass or to support the ministers. The paper warfare carried on outside by all parties was of the most violent and scurrilous kind. The ultra-liberal party heaped its abuse on Saldanha, whom they accused of deserting *them*. They were compared by a writer of that period, to those superstitious devotees of the olden times, who, in the most abject manner, were wont to beg

the aid and protection of their patron saint; but who, if their prayers were unheeded, and their wishes ungratified, cast its effigy on the ground, and treated it with abuse and insult.

The Saldanha cabinet, as re-composed in July, had not been four months in office, when it resigned. Not because, as was stated, they had not a majority in the house—for the Chambers had never sat during his ministry—but on far other accounts. It was natural that writers, at a distance, should give so simple and constitutional a motive for what took place.

The following narrative will explain the resignation of Saldanha and his colleagues :—

Towards the end of August of this year, the Viscount de Sá da Bandeira, who, with the rank of colonel, had, during the early part of 1834, held a military command in the Algarves, applied to the Government for no less than 190 decorations of the Order of the Tower and Sword, and 24 of the Order of Christ, with which to reward the officers who had, during that period, served under his orders, and had had some slight encounters with the enemy. With this request, the Minister of War refused to comply; alleging that, in the list presented, he saw but one name, or, at most, two, whose services were of a nature to legally qualify them for such distinction; but that, to solve all doubt, he invited those who considered themselves entitled to it, to send in their claims to the War Office by the 15th of October.

Whether the viscount imagined that this refusal on the part of Saldanha, arose from any recollection of the manner in which his instructions had been disobeyed on the 10th of October, 1833;* or whether he judged that Saldanha resented the opposition which, as an ultra-liberal, the viscount was making to the ministry, he was exceedingly discontented. Some saw in this exorbitant demand for military honours, which had not been merited, a desire on the part of the viscount, to ingratiate himself with so large a body of officers, a large number of whom were of very ultra principles. And, indeed, we shall see that, at a later period, many of them joined in attempts to upset the established Charter; and, even now, they succeeded in creating,

* See Chapter xiii., page 340.

in the army, considerable dissatisfaction with the War Minister's refusal.

In an account of the transactions of this period, we are informed, by the *Boletim do Porto* of July 7th, 1847, that they ultimately got up a petition to the queen, demanding the dismissal of her ministers.

The opposition papers joined in support of the complaints which the viscount made; and a correspondence which passed upon this subject was published.

Rumours of the resignation of the ministers were continually afloat. In accordance with the articles of the Quadruple Treaty, previously referred to, a convention was signed, on the 24th of September, between Portugal and Spain, by which the former country engaged to send 6000 troops into the latter for the purpose of assisting the queen and constitutional cause. This measure of the ministry met with violent opposition in the press; and not only were attempts made, at this time, to procure its dismissal, but, it is said, that conspiracies were planned to effect, not only that, but the restoration of the Constitution of 1820.

As some of the troops which were quartered in Lisbon, received orders to march, to join the expedition to Spain, the Opposition pretended that these orders were given with a view to prevent the said troops from being present at, and taking part in, the coming elections. The opposition had its supporters among the "Camarilla" in the palace, who, as they were in daily communication with the queen, brought an influence to bear on the mind of her Majesty, which placed her wishes in opposition to those of her ministers.

Under these circumstances, it will not be surprising that, on the 11th of November, Saldanha wrote a few lines to D. Thomaz de Mello, who was on weekly duty at the palace, announcing that he had, that day, tendered his resignation to the queen, and that he intended leaving Lisbon.

The following is the letter from Saldanha to the queen, tendering his resignation :—

"My unswerving fidelity to your Majesty has been to me the

cause of many and great sacrifices; but not one of them was so hard to bear as that I made on the night of May 25th, when I took upon myself the formation of the Cabinet. What I have suffered since that moment, is beyond description; and only the idea that my services as minister were agreeable to your Majesty induced me to continue until now. This sole incentive has disappeared since your Majesty, after having stated in the presence of the Council of State,* for its information, that your wishes were positively opposed to the decision of the cabinet, was pleased to inform me by letter that under present circumstances you did not think you ought to dismiss the ministers. Will your Majesty allow me to mention that if your Majesty has the power to dismiss the Cabinet, the ministers have the right of giving in their dismission; and that the declaration made by your Majesty before the Council of State, some of the members of which are in the Opposition, renders it, to my mind, indispensable for me to make use of that right; and, consequently, I most respectfully beg your Majesty to be pleased to name some one to substitute me in the Cabinet. I think it my duty to inform your Majesty that the other individuals who have the honour of being your Majesty's ministers, are, as yet, unaware of my resolution.

"Most respectfully kissing your Majesty's hand.

"MARQUIS DE SALDANHA.

"LISBON, 11*th of November*."

D. Thomaz at once replied to Saldanha's letter:—

"PALACE, *November* 11, 1835.

"MY DEAR FRIEND,

"I had the honour of showing your letter to H.M.F. Majesty, and our august mistress is writing to you on the subject of it. Consequently, I have only to add, as an old and faithful friend, which I truly am, that I hope you will reflect well on this important affair; and that you will act without

* The council of state, in Portugal, is a supreme council, totally unconnected with the ministers, and in which it might happen that every member was in opposition to the ministry.

caprice, and as a true gentleman (*cavalheiro*) who has given so many proofs of his fidelity and love towards the queen.

"Yours faithfully,

"MELLO BREYNER."

As soon as the queen became acquainted with Saldanha's determination, expressed in his letter to her, dated the 11th, she called upon the Marquis de Fronteira, to assist her in forming a ministry. This honest and upright nobleman immediately declared his inability to carry out her Majesty's wishes. Upon which, the queen sent for the Viscount de Sá, who at once undertook the task. He, however, after many fruitless attempts, returned to the palace to make known his failure. Her Majesty then felt herself compelled to address the following letter to the marshal:—

"PAÇO DAS NECESSIDADES, *November 13th*, 1835.

"MARQUIS DE SALDANHA,

"Having, very reluctantly, consented to accept the resignations of yourself and your colleagues in the ministry, as well as that of the marshal commander-in-chief of the army, the Duke da Terceira, I determined to call upon various members of the legislative Chambers, whom I judged were in a position to form an administration. But, after many endeavours to do so, they have frankly confessed their inability to execute my orders.

"I, therefore, again insist on my refusal to accept the resignations so urgently demanded by the ministers, as well as by the commander-in-chief of the army; and I confide in their known characters, that they will continue to serve me with the same devotion which I acknowledge they always have.

"MARIA."

Upon this, Saldanha, sacrificing his feelings to his loyalty, wrote immediately to the Duke da Terceira, enclosing a copy of the queen's letter, and added: "Your Excellency will see that the repeated requests which the ministers have respectfully addressed to her Majesty have been fruitless; and, obeying her Majesty's wishes, they have consented to continue in office. Your Excellency's reasons for resigning the command of the army will thus no longer exist."

The Home Minister wrote in similar terms to the civil governor of Lisbon, who, also, had tendered his resignation.

Saldanha, now, as Minister of War, addressed an official note to the commander-in-chief, drawing his attention to the illegalities that were being practised at the municipal elections by various officers of the army quartered in Lisbon; and, especially, to the conduct of the colonel of the 2nd Infantry. Upon which, the marshal duke immediately issued an order to all officers quartered in Lisbon and Belem, recommending them to guard with the greatest prudence and circumspection against any infractions of the law; declaring that they would be held rigorously responsible for all such.

On the next day, the 14th, the queen signed a decree, removing from active service (passed to the 3rd section) the following officers:

JOÃO PEDRO SOARES LUNA	Col. of Artillery, Regt. No. 2.
BARÃO DE SABROZO	Colonel of 2nd Cavalry.
JOSÉ MARIA DE SOUSA	Colonel of 2nd Infantry.
MANOEL BERNARDO VIDAL	Lieut-colonel of 2nd Infantry.
ANTONIO CESAR DE VASCONCELLOS CORREIA.	Major of 2nd Cavalry.
MANOEL THOMAZ DOS SANTOS . . .	Capt. of Artillery, Regt. No. 2.

The paper war which raged at this time would fill a volume. Some declared that the ministers had resigned, because the queen had opposed the sending to Spain of the troops which, the country had bound itself to send, by the Quadruple Treaty between England, France, Portugal, and Spain. Others that it was a question connected with the elections, and the removing certain regiments from the city. While a third set pretended that it was caused by the intrigues and discontent in the army, consequent upon the refusal of the Minister of War to grant the 214 decorations, which had been demanded by Viscount de Sá, for those officers and men who had served with him in the Algarves.

We have seen that the refusal of Saldanha to consent to this wholesale distribution of decorations had given rise to considerable intrigues in the army; and that some officers even went to the length of soliciting the queen to dismiss her ministers. The decree of the 14th aroused them to new efforts. No sooner

was it made public, than a meeting took place of many turbulent officers who were quartered in the Capital; at which it was agreed, that a petition should be presented by a deputation to her Majesty, requesting the reinstatement of those affected by the said decree; or that the petitioners themselves would resign their commissions.

The queen, influenced, it is said, by the Court clique, or alarmed by the turn which affairs might take, yielded a compliance, the fatal results of which she and her advisers were far from being able to foresee; and, to judge from the following letter, addressed by her orders to Saldanha, had determined to accede to the wishes of the officers previous to the arrival of the deputation at the palace.

"PAÇO DAS NECESSIDADES, *November* 17, *half-past* 9 *a.m.*

"MY DEAR MARQUIS,

"Her Most Faithful Majesty, my august lady, having been informed that, in different places, meetings of officers were being formed who were coming to make representations to her Majesty with respect to the dismissions of those officers who have lately been placed in the 3rd section of the army, her Majesty desires that you will either remain at your house; or be at the War Office, in order to give the necessary directions; until her Majesty sends to inform you of the hour at which you can have the honour of speaking to her.

"Your faithful obliged friend,

D. LOURENÇO DE LIMA,

Chamberlain on duty."

This brought affairs to a climax. What took place at the interview between the queen and her minister it is unnecessary to state. Suffice it to say that Saldanha was thoroughly convinced that he could no longer hold office with honour either to himself or to his colleagues.

On the following day, the 18th, Senhor José Jorge Loureiro was selected to form an administration; and, immediately afterwards, the Duke da Terceira sent in his resignation as commander-in-chief.

And thus fell a ministry which had either received the support, or was composed of those of the liberal party who had most distinguished themselves in arms, in diplomacy, in finance, and, indeed, in every branch of administration. The two marshals—Saldanha and Terceira—in arms; Palmella in diplomacy; José da Silva Carvalho in finance; stood pre-eminent above all others, in their respective walks.

But men who were occupying subordinate places in the State now strove to supplant those whom they had hitherto considered as their chiefs. By a fair parliamentary opposition they would not have been able to accomplish their object; because to every measure proposed for the advantage of the country, they would have met with ready acquiescence from Saldanha and his colleagues. The noisy ultra-liberal party, therefore, came forward, and soon saw at its head men who, under other circumstances, might have remained long in obscurity. Saldanha retained through life his friendship with some of the most honest of this party; but he now, at once and for ever, declared himself opposed to those revolutionary principles which he felt must, if successful, lead to the subversion of monarchical government, and, perhaps, to anarchy and the renewal of civil war.

It is somewhat remarkable that, during Saldanha's administration, three officers were selected for royal favour who became, afterwards, his decided political opponents. The title of Baron do Bomfim was conferred upon the late Adjutant Valdez; that of Das Antas upon Colonel Xavier; and Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro, became Baron da Ribeira de Sabroso. These officers, from this time onward, united themselves with that party which, ere long, revolutionized the country in the name of liberty.

On the 18th of November, the queen signed the appointments of the new ministry, which was composed as follows :—

President and War . .	J. J. LOUREIRO.
Home	VISCOUNT DE SÁ DA BANDEIRA (in the absence of LUIZ DA SILVA MOUSINHO DE ALBUQUERQUE).
Justice	M. A. V. CALDEIRA CASTELLO BRANCO.
Finance . . .	F. A. DE CAMPOS.
Marine and Colonies .	VISCOUNT DE SÁ DA BANDEIRA.
Foreign	MARQUIS DE LOULÉ.

On the following day, the officers who had been dismissed by the decree of the 14th were re-instated.

The principles which the new ministers were likely to sustain were soon apparent in the writings of those organs of the Press which supported them. It was quickly seen that the Charter of D. Pedro, would, ere long, cease to be the law of the land. Hereditary nobility and a hereditary senate were declared absurdities. The law of primogeniture a crime. Who, say they, will, in the face of civilised Europe, in the nineteenth century, dare to defend such monstrosities? With these and similar reasonings we may readily be prepared for the renewed factions and civil wars which were about to follow.

CHAPTER XVIII.

1835—1837.

Saldanha takes his seat as a peer—Marriage of the queen—Change of ministry—Prince Consort is commander-in-chief—Outcries in consequence—Parliament dissolved—Letter from Lord Howard—Severe accident—Saldanha as an agriculturist—Revolution of September—Address to the queen—Saldanha hastens to Lisbon—Returns home—Change of ministry—Oath to the new constitution—Saldanha and Terceira refuse to take it—Letter to Lord Howard—Queen retires to Belem—Failure of plans—Saldanha's narrative of occurrences—Extract from a London paper—Anecdote of D. Miguel's justice—Agriculture unprofitable—Parliament meets—Constitutional questions—Pizarro advocates a dictatorship—Remechido and his guerillas—Letter from Dietz to Saldanha—Change of ministry—Revived hopes in favour of D. Miguel.

WHEN Saldanha took office, in May, 1835, he had vacated his seat in the Chamber of Deputies, which did not again assemble until the following January. During this time, by royal letters addressed to the Marquis de Saldanha, the queen called upon him, to take the oaths and his seat as a peer, on the first opportune occasion, since the motives which had temporarily prevented him from so doing no longer existed. Accordingly, when Parliament met, he took his seat, and, although in opposition, was elected to preside over the committee on military and naval affairs. He was also named, with others, to present the reply to the speech from the throne; but, on the day appointed for that purpose, being unwell, he was unable to attend.

Negociations had been carried on, during 1835, for the marriage of the queen with Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, and they were married by proxy on the 1st of January, 1836. On that day, the queen conferred on her future husband the rank of marshal-general. The youthful prince arrived in the

Tagus on the 8th of April, and was warmly received by the people. His manners and appearance gave universal satisfaction to all who approached him; and the queen was greatly pleased with the choice which her ministers had made.

A change of ministry shortly followed Sr. D. Fernando's arrival. On the 9th of April, the Duke da Terceira became President of the Council and Minister of War. With him were associated Freire; Joaquim Antonio de Aguiar; José da Silva Carvalho; M. G. de Miranda; and the Count de Villa Real.

One of the first steps of the new ministry was to give the command of the army to the prince consort, who immediately named Saldanha to the post of chief of the Staff. The Opposition raised a great outcry against the appointment of the prince to this high command; and, in consequence of the offence which their conduct gave, the Chamber of Deputies was, on the 4th of June, dissolved by the queen, to whom the ministers represented that the "proceedings of the Deputies were something more than a simple dissent in a matter of opinion; for that the prerogatives of the crown; the respect due to the executive power; and the independence of its representatives were equally attacked by their conduct."

The reader will recollect, that, when the Saldanha ministry quitted office in November of the preceding year, it was succeeded by one composed entirely of members of the ultra party. They, in their turn, had given place to the Terceira ministry which now governed the country. But this administration—hastily formed—was one which, from its commencement, was considered unlikely to be of long duration. The British minister, at that time, expressed his opinion on the subject to Saldanha in the following letter, in which he regrets that the marshal himself had not returned to office.

"LISBON, *Tuesday night.*

"MY DEAR MARQUIS,

"I am so disgusted that I shall go off to Cintra. I can take no interest now about the formation of the Government, as I am certain it cannot stand without *you*—formed, as it will have been, on the basis of proceedings which I will not

venture to characterize. I *must*, however, return for a day, to send off the result of the Duke of Terceira's labours—when I shall hope to see you, to talk over *Spain* at least. Why don't you bolt? and pay your sister a visit? You really want change of air, scene, and occupation. Adieu.

"Yours always most sincerely,

"HOWARD DE WALDEN."

During the summer, the marshal accompanied Prince Fernando on a tour in the Provinces; and, at its conclusion, he met with a very serious accident from the fall of his horse. He was compelled to be transported from Leiria, in a litter, to Cintra, where he was laid up for some time.

The Chambers, after the elections, were to have been opened on the 15th of August; but, before the arrival of that day, their meeting was postponed until the 11th of September.

In the neighbouring kingdom, the fall of the minister Isturitz took place in August; and the queen regent was compelled to re-establish the ultra-liberal constitution of 1812. We shall shortly see the influence this had upon the course of events in Portugal. Two Divisions of the Portuguese army were at this time in Spain for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Quadruple Treaty, which excluded D. Carlos from that country. They were commanded by the Barons Das Antas and Sta. Maria.

On the 5th of September, the official Gazette commemorated the anniversary of Marshal Bourmont's attack on Lisbon; and alluded to the same marshal's repulse on the glorious 25th of July at Oporto. But the name of Saldanha was carefully suppressed by the editor.

The marshal was now living quietly, with his family, at the Quinta of Penha Longa near Cintra, a property which he had recently purchased from the Government with part of the grant voted to him by the Chambers. Thither he had retired with the pleasing hope of causing "two ears of corn or two blades of grass to grow where only one grew before;" a work more meritorious, says an old authority, than that performed by the whole race of politicians. In this laudable attempt he was joined by the author of these pages, who, with shame confesses,

that up to that time, he scarcely knew a cabbage from a turnip as it grew in the field. As he has already referred to the circumstances which led to his first acquaintance with Marshal Saldanha, he may be permitted here to add, that, with a longing desire to again meet the friends of his boyhood, and to visit a country which so much interested him, he determined on passing a month or two in Portugal. On his arrival at Lisbon in April, 1835, he presented himself, unexpectedly, at the residence of the marshal, who would not hear of his remaining at the hotel even for a night. To quit Portugal without spending a summer at Cintra with the kind family of Saldanha was not to be thought of: and, when the winter approached, little persuasion was necessary to induce him to remain, during that season, in the delightful climate of Portugal. Time thus passed on, during which the good marshal loved to talk of retirement into the country, and there to devote himself to every kind of agricultural pursuit. The author joined him enthusiastically in these plans; and soon, following the directions of a well selected library—all English, we proceeded to make ourselves acquainted with the culture of lucerne, sainfoin, mangolds, and cow-cabbage: indeed, with almost every known agricultural plant. We had cows from Alderney; sheep from Leicestershire; pigs from Berkshire; and poultry of every description. Ploughs, harrows, and drilling machines for sowing wheat and turnips were sent for from England.

To those readers acquainted with the appearance of a wheat drill, with its dozen iron blunderbuss-looking barrels, it may not create surprise to be told, that the arrival of one of these machines caused some wonder at the Custom House, where such a machine was then unknown. With not more amazement did the Lilliputians survey the pistols and other strange property of Gulliver than did the officials at Lisbon examine this suspicious apparatus. At length, on the suggestion of one more cunning than the others, it was reported to the Minister of State that there was an "infernal machine" lying at the custom house, which the authorities had not thought proper to let pass without bringing the fact to the knowledge of the Government!

The author would be afraid to estimate the cost of this farming; but we were then very sanguine of success, and our evenings were often passed in planning future operations. The good* Marshal rubbed his hands and exclaimed with Cicero: "Nil melius, nil utilius, nil uberius, nil jucundius homini libero quam agricultura." It was his first speculation; if such it should be called when his chief object was to benefit his country by the improvement of its agriculture—still so neglected and so little favoured by the Government. On the contrary; by a monstrous system of taxation, enterprise in rural industry has been rendered impossible; while each successive ministry, encouraging by heavy protective duties a few unthriving manufactures, has robbed agriculture of the capital and the hands which would, otherwise, have been devoted to it. However, the marshal greatly enjoyed his country retirement; and often referred to this period as being one of the happiest of his life.

It was not long before the ultra papers began, with an artful design, to spread reports of plots against the Government—hoping by this means to prepare the minds of men for the revolution they desired to see brought about. Day after day, in July and August, were such reports carefully circulated; until, on the 9th of the latter month, news reached Lisbon of the revolution which had taken place at Cadiz, and of the ultra-liberal Constitution of 1812 having been proclaimed in Spain. At once the *Nacional*, together with other papers of the same political creed, seized the opportunity of furthering their designs. "The causes which the Spanish people," writes the *Nacional*, "have for proclaiming the Constitution of 1812 are just and reasonable. Deceived they have been (and not only they) by those who call themselves liberals." "Liberals," continues the *Nacional*, "who have indeed rendered some former services to the cause of liberty, but who now ungratefully neglect those who assisted them."

Every day the papers continued to uphold, and wish success

* "O bom marechal," by all who knew him; and "o pai do povo"—father of the people—by the poor, were the appellations acquired by Saldanha and universally confirmed.

to the revolution in Spain. As far as the affairs at home were concerned, they expressed their satisfaction that the battalions of the National Guard had elected officers whose political opinions were those of advanced liberalism. They narrated exultingly, that the hymn of 1820 was repeatedly called for and played by the bands in provincial towns; and they expressed the hope, that no meddling authorities would endeavour to repress these demonstrations.

On the 7th of September, the *Nacional* went so far as to assert that "the Chamber of Peers, as given to us by the Charter of 1826, is unfitted for the 19th century. It is a thing of the feudal times. Its existence now is an anachronism. It must be reformed. This cannot be denied."

The preceding extracts from an Opposition paper in some measure prepare us for the suddenness of the events, which almost immediately followed. The Cortes were to assemble for the despatch of business on the 11th of September. On the 9th, at half-past three in the afternoon, the steamer *Napier* anchored off Lisbon, bringing the Oporto deputies, and some of those elected for the Province of Beira Alta.

When these deputies landed in the great square, the Terreiro do Paço, they were greeted by a crowd of people with cries in favour of the Constitution of 1820. Already in the morning, some of the battalions of the National Guard had quitted their quarters, and now united themselves in the square of the Rocio. Here they were joined by other battalions, which had marched from the Rato with Colonel F. Soares Caldeira; and the whole force was placed under the command of that officer. Other corps, of the line, national guard, and municipal forces, having expressed their adherence to the movement, it was determined, that an officer should be selected from each corps to proceed to the barracks of the Carmo, in order to prepare a respectful declaration to the queen.

On the following morning, the 10th, a deputation from the troops proceeded to the Palace of the Necessidades; and being admitted to the presence of her Majesty, addressed her as follows:—

"MADAME,

"The loyal National Guard and the loyal garrison of Lisbon address your Majesty, begging that you will accede to their wishes, and to those of the Portuguese nation in general, by providing a remedy for the evils, which, unfortunately, have brought this magnanimous nation to the brink of a most horrible abyss; from which it can only be preserved by the immediate proclamation of the CONSTITUTION OF 1820, with the modifications which the Constituent Cortes may deem desirable.

"It is not possible, Madame, to avoid asking your Majesty to select a ministry and counsellors who will promote the well-being of the magnanimous Portuguese nation, whose constitutional throne your Majesty occupies.

"The citizens, who have the honour to address this respectful request to your Majesty,—well persuaded that your Majesty desires nothing so much as the happiness of the Portuguese nation—anxiously await, in the place where they are assembled, your Majesty's benign compliance with their wishes.

"LISBON, 10*th of September*, 1836.

"BARRACKS OF THE CARMO."

On the first rumours of these disturbances reaching Saldanha at Penha Longa, near Cintra, he mounted his horse, and proceeded immediately towards Lisbon, to place himself by the side of his sovereign, and offer his counsels and his sword to protect her from these lawless and disloyal revolutionists. Ere he reached the city, he was met by his aide-de-camp, Ximenes, who inquired whither the marshal was going. "To the queen, of course, where you yourself ought to be at this moment," was the reply. "It is in vain," rejoined Ximenes—"the Constitution of 1822 has been proclaimed at Lisbon; and the queen and D. Fernando are to take the oaths to it at 5 o'clock this afternoon (the 10th), at the municipal chamber." Under these circumstances, Saldanha returned in a melancholy frame of mind to his home.

The Viscount de Sá, in his reply to a work by General Goblet concerning the events of this period, boasts of having been one

of those who, during ten years, had defended the constitutional Charter and the reigning dynasty; and that he had disapproved of the revolutionary movement as being unnecessary, and likely to lead to civil war. He tells us, that these reasons had induced him to express his disapprobation of the proposed revolution, to a deputation of officers of the National Guard who had waited upon him on the previous evening; and that he had advised them to persuade the various battalions to return quietly to their homes. It is difficult to reconcile these assertions with the fact that, on the following day, the 10th, the viscount undertook the formation of a ministry, in which he held the portfolio of Finance and Foreign Affairs! He acknowledges that the young queen—then only in her 18th year—signed the illegal decree—insisted upon by a revolutionary mob, "avec une répugnance très-marquée." He boasts that the proclamation of the Constitution of 1820 took place throughout the kingdom without disorder; but he is compelled to confess that the chief authorities, both civil and military, were, for the most part, averse to the revolution. "It took place in Lisbon;" said Saldanha at a later period, "but not another city, town, or village adhered to it; and it was only after receiving the orders of the executive power, that, in the various districts of the kingdom, the constitutional Charter ceased to be the fundamental law of the country."

The new ministry was presided over by the Count de Lumiares, who, for a while, held the portfolio of War, and that of Marine and Colonies: Manoel Passos held the Home: whilst Viscount Sá da Bandeira, was charged with those of Finance and Foreign Affairs.

On the 11th, a decree was published by which all authorities and public employés were compelled to take the following oath:—

"I swear to keep and cause to be kept the political constitution of the monarchy of the 23rd of September, 1822, with the modifications which the Cortes of the Portuguese nation shall hereafter determine." *

* "The Duke da Terceira and the Marquis de Saldanha," writes the Viscount de Sá, "took no notice of the decree. The Government acted with respect to them as if it were unaware of their neglect."

The queen and prince were at this time both young and inexperienced. And if the counsellor,* who had accompanied the prince from Germany, was a faithful servant, he was undoubtedly a very timorous one. The queen, moreover, was, naturally, much influenced by those who had constant access to her; and these unfortunately had their own views.

A letter, in the handwriting of Saldanha, written some few years after these occurrences, informs us that the state of coercion in which the queen now found herself was very great; and that in tears she was forced to sign her approval of the Constitution of 1822. The principal people who surrounded her at the palace were favourable to the Revolution, and to the party which brought it about.

The following letter from Saldanha to Lord Howard, which was written in English, gives a full account of the part he took in these transactions.

"MY DEAR LORD HOWARD,

"You had the goodness to let me know on Saturday (the 10th) what had taken place at Lisbon during the night; viz., that the National Guard had proclaimed the Constitution of 1822; and that all the troops of the line had joined them. Without losing time, I started for Lisbon; and, arriving near Queluz about 10 o'clock, I was met by a friend, who told me, that he had seen the arrival of Thomaz de Mello at the Rocio about 7, announcing, on the part of the queen, that her Majesty acquiesced to the wishes of the people, and was going to order that the Constitution of 1822 should be sworn everywhere. The queen, by swearing to the Constitution of '22, has dissolved the council of state, and dismissed the prince from the command of the army; † and therefore the two situations I held were put an end to. My conscience does not accuse me, in any way whatever, of bringing forth the present crisis. You know that many important measures were not taken, merely because they had been suggested by me. The declaration of the queen, in the

* Dietz.

† The Constitution of 1822 did not acknowledge a council of state composed as that of 1826; nor did it allow that a member of the royal family should command the army.

presence of the council of state, when the troops marched into Spain; and that which took place on the 17th of November, when the Conde de Mafra * wrote to me saying, her Majesty ordered me not to go to the palace, but to wait her commands at my own house, absolutely decided me to put an end to my political career. And, had it not been for what took place in the Chamber of Deputies with regard to the command of the army, I would certainly not have accepted a situation on the prince's Staff. The evils which lacerate my unfortunate country are tremendous; and if we consider the numbers of the followers of D. Miguel, and of the Portuguese who wish the continuation of the Charter of 1826, no one will doubt that the majority of the nation is against the Constitution of 1822; and I go further, and I believe, that many of the instigators of the movement of the 9th ult. were disappointed, when they saw it went so far. But any attempt that now would be made to undo what has taken place would, I am convinced, be a very great misfortune. It would not take place without much bloodshed. A civil war between the two portions of the liberal party would positively be kindled, and an excellent opportunity would be given to the absolutists to show themselves; and no one can foretell what the consequences might be. My dear Lord Howard, I am proud of your friendship, and you are my friend, because you have always found me true to my word. Well, with all the truth and sincerity you know I am capable of, I own, that it cuts my heart not to be near the prince. For, having observed him during our excursions, I admire and love him; and, the only thing that gives me some consolation, is the certainty that there is not the least danger to him, or to the persons near him. For Terceira goes about in his uniform after having taken refuge on board. Since the age of 16, I have always wished for, and worked for, a representative government. I have contributed with all my might to see it established; and I shudder when I see our situation. The queen will now find out, that the Constitution of 1822 is not the Charter of 1826; and I hope that her Majesty will profit by the lesson. If my

* D. Lourenço de Lima.

inactivity should be misrepresented, I will put up patiently with the consequences, because for many years I have accustomed myself to seek refuge in the purity of my intentions.

"Believe me, my dear Lord Howard,

"Truly yours,

"SALDANHA."

Lord Palmerston, in a letter to Mr. Aston, dated 19th August, 1836, imputed the overthrow of the Saldanha ministry in the previous year to French intrigue; and he writes: "A pretty mess Loulé and his colleagues made of it." Shortly after the revolution which took place in September, and which we have just described, he writes to Mr. Temple, on the 1st of November: "I hope there may be a counter revolution in Portugal, but so do not hope the Holy Alliance. They think the Constitution of 1820 may bring back Miguel and despotism again, as it did once before. They hate Pedro's Charter, because it is too reasonable a system of government; an impracticable Constitution is a thing to their heart."

It soon became evident to all parties that the queen already regretted the step she had been forced to take in restoring the Constitution of 1820. It is beside our purpose to enter into the details of the counter-revolution that was now attempted. With a view to carrying it out under the protection of the British ships of war in the Tagus, the royal family retired to the Palace of Belem—but, after some modification of the ministry, the attempt to reverse the order which had revived the Constitution of 1820 failed. Saldanha, who had hurried to Belem at the call of the prince consort, returned to his country seat at Penha Longa.

In his written account of the events which had taken place he says, "After many bitter hours spent in fruitless attempts to come to terms, I, charged with full powers from her Majesty, met the deputies of the people. . . . Before the queen had entered her carriage to return to the Necessidades Palace, many had disappeared, having sought refuge on board the English fleet. After the queen had left, I was informed by the British admiral that he had his boat waiting for me to go on

board; but I replied that I would rather die than fly from my countrymen on board a foreign vessel. I mounted my horse, and, accompanied by my aides-de-camp, Ximenes and Jervis, I returned at a foot's pace to Penha Longa."

This attempt at counter-revolution, and the causes of its failure, are thus referred to by Lord Palmerston in a private letter to Mr. Temple, dated December 1st, 1836.

"Peninsular affairs are so bad, that they cannot become worse, and must therefore become better. The attempt at counter-revolution at Lisbon was an ill-concocted, premature, and ill-executed scheme of the Court party, in which we had no share. Saldanha had a plan, which, if time had been allowed him, would have succeeded. He was working in the Provinces; and, in due time, the change would have been made spontaneously, as it were, by the nation itself, and without violence or convulsion. But the adherents of Terceira and the Court party were jealous of Saldanha; and fearful that if he were allowed to make the counter revolution, he would thereby acquire influence and power, from which it was their *first* object to exclude him. Hence they resolved to be beforehand with him."*

A London paper thus alludes to the part Saldanha took in this attempt:—

"In the recent affair, Saldanha, the most able of the queen's party, and the only man in it who has come out of the affair with credit, does not appear even to have had notice of the party's intentions; and only to have complied with the queen's summons in attending her councils. The jealousy of this chief, entertained by the courtiers, appears to have led them to raise their party in the Capital without waiting for aid from the country, which was known to be the main seat of his influence. He is consequently the only man, whose conduct has not lost him with either party; as he seems to have been the only man, who did not lose his head in the business from sheer terror of the fate of Freire.† It is acknowledged by the popular organs,

* Dalling's "Life of Lord Palmerston," vol. iii., p. 21.

† The ex-minister Freire was barbarously assassinated on his way to join the queen at Belem.

that Saldanha conducted himself throughout as a cavalier—*se houve como cavalheiro.*"

Without doubt, many of the leaders of the Septembrista party were honest men; but they were supported also by violent and unscrupulous persons. Extremes meet, in politics as elsewhere. If cruelty and assassinations were justly charged to the Miguelites—no less did the ultra-liberals advocate such measures, and employ them. At the time when D. Miguel was on the throne, some students at Coimbra had determined on the death of certain professors of that university, who formed a deputation, selected for the purpose of congratulating D. Miguel, on his arrival at Lisbon in February, 1828. Lots were cast, and some twelve or fourteen young men were sworn to execute their infamous project. The crime took place at Cartaxinho on the 18th of March. Four members of the deputation were brutally assassinated by these students. It is said, that they were interrupted in their work by some approaching troops, and that one of the assassins was at once secured. He, with eight others, was hanged at Lisbon, for their crime, on the 20th June. Another of these assassins was discovered, and hanged in 1830. The others escaped. Of those who suffered death, one was the only son of the wealthy *Capitão Môr* of Cintra. We are told, that the father went to D. Miguel, and, on his knees, and in bitter anguish, implored the life of his son; offering, literally, the weight of the youth in gold if his life were spared. Honour to D. Miguel, the prayer was refused; and justice was done to all alike.

It is not the author's purpose to defend D. Miguel; still less to praise him. But he cannot help observing, that, having lived on most friendly and intimate terms, for many years, with the partisans of that unfortunate prince; and having conversed with those of the most humble rank, as well as with those of the highest, he never heard abuse heaped on the head of D. Miguel, either for his conduct or his ill-success, as he has heard it lavished on D. Pedro by his own followers and party. When Saldanha, in 1862, went as ambassador to Rome, one Antonio Maia was strongly recommended to him as house-steward, as well for his intimate acquaintance with that city,

as for his honesty. He was married to a Roman woman, who was desirous of returning to her country. This man had for a long time served D. Miguel in Italy and elsewhere. When the author was at Rome in 1864, he could not help remarking to Sr. Antonio, how strange it was, that he should have served two such different masters! Before replying, he begged the author to step into his apartment, where he showed him the portraits of D. Miguel and Saldanha, hanging side by side on the wall. Pointing to them, he exclaimed: "There you see, senhor, the portraits of the two most saintly men I ever knew, and whom I most esteem."

Poor Antonio remained at Rome, when Saldanha quitted it in 1869; but his kind master rewarded him, for his services and honesty, with a pension, which was the more acceptable, as he soon afterwards became almost totally blind.

To return to the period at which we had arrived, Saldanha continued to reside at Penha Longa, taking no part in the politics of his country; although he soon learned, from experience, that agriculture, in Portugal, was not a profitable speculation. But he was living in quiet and with his family; therefore he was happy.

The first question raised on the meeting, on 18th January, 1837, of the one Chamber, which now constituted the Cortes, was, whether the election of the ministers to serve as Deputies was legal. The Constitution of 1822 expressly declares them disqualified. The Home Minister, Manoel Passos, had himself, on November 11th, signed the decree of their eligibility. In the Senate, the supporters of the ministry could advance no better argument, for acting in contradiction to the Constitution they had proclaimed, than public expediency. "Authorised by this decree," said one deputy, "the ministers were elected; and I will ask if this assembly has the right to put its hand into the electoral urn, and withdraw the names which the citizen elector has placed in it." Singular reasoning!

The Baron da Ribeira de Sabrosa (R. P. Pizarro); that staunch advocate for liberty, when in opposition; *now* advocated a "kind of Dictatorship, which should intimidate the numerous enemies of the throne and of the Constitution—a power," said

he, "without which it is impossible to maintain public order, and preserve the independence of the nation." "How often," continues the baron, "have we had reason to lament the determination of my noble friend, the Marquis de Saldanha, when he resigned the power he possessed in 1827. The terrible effects of this resignation, which then appeared a necessity, are incalculable. My esteem for my noble friend is ever the same, whatever our political differences may be."

The right of the ministers to be elected, and take their seats in the Chambers, was declared valid by 44 votes against 17.

The civil war still continued in Spain. Marshal Soult, on the 10th of January, had declared in the French Chambers, that armed intervention had become desirable in that country. William IV., when he opened Parliament on the 31st, said, that he continued to fulfil the obligations of the quadruple alliance. By an additional article to that treaty, signed in London, August 18th, 1834, France had engaged to prevent all succours to D. Carlos reaching him from that country. England promised to furnish such arms and ammunition as Spain might require; and, if necessary, a naval force; and Portugal, in addition to previous obligations, was bound to send into the neighbouring kingdom a force of not less than 6000 men.

Whilst the liberals were squabbling amongst themselves, and Saldanha still remained at his country residence, the official Gazette, of April 7, announced that above 2000 Miguelites were amongst the hills of Caldeirão; and about 1200 in other parts; that they had communication by sea for supplies of arms and powder; and that the famous guerilla chief, Remechido, was showing great activity.

"My poor country,—what will become of her?" was the frequent exclamation of Saldanha to the author at this time, when we were together at Penha Longa.

But the ministers had now been already more than six months in office! It was time for a change. Saldanha was in Lisbon for a few days, during which period he received the following letter from M. Dietz.

"AU PALAIS, *le* 31 *Mai*, 1837.

"VOTRE EXCELLENCE,

"M. le Baron de Leiria a été au palais pour annoncer à Sa Majesté, qu'il n'a pas réussi à former un ministère. Sa Majesté fera écrire demain matin aux personnes que je vous ai nommés aujourd'hui. Le Prince, me chargeant de mille belles choses pour vous, comprend très-bien la raison, pourquoi vous n'avez pas voulu venir le voir aujourd'hui.

"En vous priant de vouloir bien communiquer cela à Lord Howard, j'ai l'honneur d'être,

"De votre Excellence

"Le plus dévoué serviteur,

"DIETZ."

On the 2nd of June, a ministry was formed under the presidency of Sr. Antonio Dias de Oliveira; of which we need say no more, than that it lasted little more than two months.

During this time, a new Constitution was sworn to in Madrid. The Viscount das Antas was in command of the Portuguese auxiliary Division at Vittoria in Spain. News from Rome reached Lisbon, that D. Miguel was in great hope and expectation of returning soon to Portugal. Nor need we be surprised at this, when we reflect on the dissensions of the liberals amongst themselves in his unhappy country. The men who had sprung into power with the revolution of September had not answered the expectations of those who had supported them. One government succeeded another; and that now in office was weak and falling; when the events commenced, which we shall describe in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIX.

1837—1839.

Plans to restore the Charter—Failure of the attempt—Manifesto—Saldanha and his family land at Plymouth—They proceed to Paris—Lady Howard's condolence—Letter from Lord Howard—Charter of 1826 and Constitution of 1822—Cortes meet—Riots at Lisbon—Queen takes the oath to the new Constitution—General amnesty—Saldanha continues at Paris—He studies agriculture—Offers made to him by the Pacha—Letter from Lord Howard—Saldanha's letter from Paris—Is elected senator—Pizarro prime minister—Saldanha takes the oath to the new Constitution—Declines to take his seat as senator—His reasons—Returns to Lisbon—Retires to Cintra.

THE attempt to restore the constitutional Charter of 1826 had failed through the ill-concerted measures of its advisers. Foreign sovereigns had busied themselves with plans to enable the queen to regain her impaired authority, and to stem the torrent of republican ideas which threatened to undermine the foundations of monarchical government. Their agents at the court of Lisbon were instructed to counsel the young and inexperienced queen; and, with the armed force which was stationed in the Tagus, to defend her, if necessary, from personal danger. It would be difficult to ascertain with certainty to whom should be ascribed the failure of the attempt at Belem: but it was acknowledged, by those in circumstances to form a correct judgment, that Saldanha alone came out of the affair with honour and dignity. The pacific overtures which he had previously made to the Government for the restoration of the Charter had been frustrated by the imprudence and ill-will of others: and, when these failed, the measures which were afterwards planned throughout the country for the same purpose had been thwarted by this premature and clumsy attempt, undertaken without the approval or knowledge of Saldanha. He retired from Belem, disgusted with what he had witnessed.

The nation, in general, saw no advantage to itself in the substitution of the Charter of 1826 by the Constitution of 1822; whilst it observed, with no little astonishment, that the chiefs of the liberal party—Saldanha, Terceira, Palmella, and many others—were absent from the councils of their sovereign, and their presence supplied by a host of inferior men, who had become prominent owing to their disloyalty, and the overthrow of the laws which they had sworn to defend. In these circumstances, many, who, with regret and indignation, had seen the Charter set aside, now resolved to hazard a fresh attempt to rescue the queen from the thraldom of those officers and national battalions who had brought about the revolution in September, 1836. They knew that their conduct, if successful, would receive the royal approbation; and that the marshals, to whom they sent notice of their plans, would, at the opportune moment, countenance and support the attempt.

The plans for this purpose were very carefully prepared, and afforded reasonable hope of success; but, through unfortunate misunderstandings on the part of some of those who held subordinate commands, the orders of the marshals were not effectually carried out. It would be impossible to enter into the details of this struggle without extending this biography to far too great a length to satisfy the English reader. We will, therefore, only say with respect to the battle of Chão da Feira, at which the author was present, that the too much good faith of the Marshals Terceira and Saldanha, at the moment of victory, allowed that victory to slip through their hands in consequence of the urgent request of the losing party for a cessation of hostilities, in order to spare the further effusion of Portuguese blood. In the north, the supporters of the Charter were completely vanquished by Count das Antas ere the marshals could arrive to their assistance: and, therefore, convinced that it would be useless to prolong the attempt, it was decided by the Council of Regency to treat with the Government generals with a view to protect the interests of those soldiers and officers compromised, who desired to submit themselves to, and to recognize the actual Government; but with the condition that those who did not wish to do so should be free to leave the kingdom. Accordingly, a memoran-

dum was drawn up, and signed by the Marshals Saldanha and Terceira; by Mousinho de Albuquerque; by the Colonels Miguel and José Pimentel; by Baron de Leiria; and by Brigadier Antão Garcez. Brigadier Azedo was then deputed to treat with the Government general, Das Antas, and to make the best possible terms with him in favour of those officers and soldiers who had been engaged in this attempt to restore the Charter. The marshals and some officers present at the council, declared that they would ask no concessions for themselves, as they were determined to quit the country. It was ultimately agreed between Das Antas and Azedo that all the officers, with certain exceptions, should retain the rank they held at the commencement of the strife; and should receive their pay as such; but retire from active service.

The Duke da Terceira proceeded to Lisbon, where, however, he remained but a short time. Marshal Saldanha and Sr. Mousinho crossed the Spanish frontier and reached Vigo. There they deliberated anxiously upon the part which Saldanha had himself taken in sanctioning the convention with Das Antas, and then drew up, signed, and caused to be published in Portugal, the following declaration. On examining its terms, the reader will learn from Saldanha's own pen the motives of his conduct. Suffice it to remark, he sought only to guarantee the honour and safety of those officers and men who had risen in support of the "Queen and Charter;" and determined on himself withdrawing for the present from this troublesome scene.

"The undersigned, feeling convinced from the state in which they found the troops commanded by Brigadier Antão Garcez when they, the undersigned, marched from Chaves to ás Alturas on the 18th of the present month of September, that it was impossible to continue, with any probability of success, the struggle in which they had engaged: further convinced that to persist in doing so, without that probability, would be a crime as inhuman as it would be unpatriotic: confirmed in this conviction by the opinions of the general officers and commandants of the forces at Chaves: considering also that to retire into Spain with such of the assembled forces as might wish to accompany them, would

be to withdraw from their country a large number of soldiers who could defend it from external enemies; and also deprive it of a great quantity of war material of considerable value—public property and purchased with the money of the nation:—and, moreover, that so numerous a body of emigrants without the means of subsistence in a foreign land would be liable to die of hunger: therefore, for these various reasons, and in accordance with the opinions of the generals and officers consulted in the before-mentioned council, they, as chiefs chosen by the Portuguese in arms for the re-establishment of the constitutional Charter of the kingdom, resolved to propose, and conclude with the Viscount das Antas, commanding the opposing army, a military convention of pacification. By this, the undersigned desired to secure and see guaranteed the future of all their subordinates; to shield them from all risk of persecution; and to avoid the shedding of more Portuguese blood; and loss and ruin to the country. In order to negociate and draw up the said convention, necessary powers and verbal instructions were given to the Brigadier Martinho José Dias Azedo; who, in consequence, concluded, and, together with the colonel of the Royal Engineers, José Feliciano da Silva Costa, signed the said convention on the 20th of September.

"As, however, in this convention, there are stipulations which concern the interests of the undersigned, they consider themselves bound in duty and in honour to declare that they did not authorize the Brigadier Azedo to stipulate any advantages whatever for themselves. For, from the moment that they considered it their duty to no longer have recourse to arms, they decided to leave the country, and never to live in Portugal under the actual political régime. Their object in concluding the Convention being to guarantee the future of those who, notwithstanding the existence of the said régime, preferred to remain in the country; the undersigned declare that they considered it their duty to remain with, and at the head of, their comrades until the moment when, by the signing and ratification of the Convention, this object had been insured; and that they might then leave them only, at the last moment, without any possibility of their being charged with having abandoned them.

The undersigned, considering a statement of facts desirable, in order that their proceedings and intentions should be clearly made public, drew up and signed this Declaration at Vigo in Galicia on the 29th of September, 1837.

"MARQUIS DE SALDANHA.

"LUIZ DA SILVA MOUSINHO D'ALBUQUERQUE."

This strife was thus brought to an end by the success of a party whose ultimate aims, or at least those of many of its members, were, in fact, nothing short of republicanism. Some of the leaders then acting with the Septembrists became, at a later period, active in the restoration of the Charter of 1826; while many of those who had so lately fought for that Charter, became its most zealous opponents.

Saldanha had now to select a country for his voluntary exile. During his former banishment, the reader will recollect that he resided chiefly in France; and the remembrance of the generous hospitality which the French Government then dispensed to himself and his fellow refugees, prompted him again to resort to that country. But not only had the reasons which then operated on the Portuguese emigrants ceased to exist—other motives now led him to doubt the propriety of his immediately entering France. The following affectionate letter to the marchioness will show how he at once took counsel with her for their common happiness. Hers was indeed absolute, provided only she was with Saldanha. Nevertheless, he consulted her, and placed before her his reasons for shaping their course first to England.

"VIGO, *October 12th.*

"MY DEAR ANGEL,

"I have received yours of the 6th and 9th. Thanks to the Almighty God that you are all well. In my last I wrote to you, saying that I thought it better to take your passage only as far as this; and that here, if you preferred it, we would take a vessel to go to the south of France. There are now some strong motives that alter my wish of going to France. I have received a note from the Duke of Terceira, who is on his way to England, saying that all the diplomatists (at Lisbon) went to

see him, with the exception of the French minister. Besides, as we know that the French Government has given all its protection to our enemies, it would not appear delicate on my part to go and live there; and the prince, now king,* would take it amiss if we sought hospitality in a country that is adverse to him. All this considered, I think we had better go and pass the winter at Plymouth. It is a mild climate for England, and the cheapest part of that country. If you approve of this, you must take your passage for Falmouth, and I will meet you here and go together. . . . . Do not be afflicted or hurried: but if your own things are ready, come by the next steamer. The weather has been most beautiful. The duke was only thirty hours from Lisbon to Vigo. José Maria O'Neill writes me that he was going to see you on a good message.† You must bring English money. Adieu, my good friend. God bless you all, and bring you soon to the arms of your true

"SALDANHA.

"Kiss them all. I have received Augustus' letters."

The author accompanied the marchioness in the packet to England. At Vigo, the marshal joined us on board. After landing at Falmouth, we continued our journey to Plymouth, where we remained a fortnight. Sad were the thoughts which presented themselves to the mind of the noble marshal, when he reflected how he and so many of his countrymen had, a few years previously, lived in this city, banished from Portugal, where despotism then reigned. Now, after years of suffering and dangers, he again found himself at Plymouth. The constitutional Charter for which he had so well and so bravely fought, had been set aside by those ambitious men, who, without him, would probably have lived and died in obscurity abroad or in insignificance at home.

Lady Howard de Walden, who was so well acquainted with all that had taken place, during these last three years, in Portugal, and with the characters of that country's statesmen,

* The prince consort, Sr. D. Fernando, assumed the title of king on the birth of his son, afterwards D. Pedro V.

† Sr. O'Neill was Saldanha's banker, and very worthy and sincere friend.

in writing to the Marchioness of Saldanha a few lines of condolence on this unfortunate occasion, says: "The only comfort is that his life is safe and his honour unassailable. He risked his life and fortune to maintain the cause of good government; and, basely deserted, has fallen the victim of the apathy and treachery of his countrymen."

After leaving Plymouth, we made a stay of two days at Salisbury, where the marshal was greatly pleased in visiting the magnificent cathedral of that city; and Wilton House, in its neighbourhood. Shortly after reaching London, the scruples of the marshal as to visiting France having been removed, the author bade adieu to his kind friends, and they proceeded, by way of Dover, to Paris.

We will insert here an interesting letter from Lord Howard de Walden, which gives us an insight to the feeling of the country at this period, and the way in which the news of the failure of the movement was received in Lisbon.

"*October 4th.*

"MY DEAR FRIEND,

"I write you one line to assure you how deeply from my heart I have sympathised in your afflictions. I have taken what steps I have considered most likely to be of use to you; and I send you a letter, the result of the first. Let me know what your plans are for the moment. Why should you not offer to raise a corps for the queen of Spain? This would give you the opportunity hereafter perhaps of returning to your country with *éclat*. Pray be cautious in what you write, as your letter to Lady Howard was the most imprudent one I ever set eyes upon. If it had fallen into your friend Sá's, or Castro Pereira's, or Sabrosa's hands, it would have been perdition, from the manner in which you alluded to a transaction which took place before Belem. *Since* that affair, as you know, my position has been much altered.

"Madame de P. has had your letter some days. She said she would send you an answer immediately; but she has not done so; which I regret much, as I knew it would have given you pleasure to have heard from her.

"I have seen Terceira, and had from him the whole account of the campaign, which verifies my misgivings which I always entertained of the most violent Chartists after Belem.

"There is *not the slightest excitement* in Lisbon against *your party*—and I trust, in a short time, there will be no obstacle to your return.

"The Cortes seem disposed to frame a more moderate Constitution than they would have done two months ago; and the second Chamber was carried by a very large majority. Should the new Constitution be a tolerably fair one, would you then acquiesce in it? I believe it to be the intention to grant a general amnesty after the Constitution is passed. The French people will oppose this; as I suppose will B. le Cte:* but I hope there will be firmness in the proper quarter.

"The ministers have quarrelled with the queen, on her refusing to sign the law for depriving officers of their rank, etc. without a trial; and they have resigned. Sá is to make a new government; but I suppose he will patch up matters with part of the old set. Castro Pereira has been the most bitter, venomous, and calumnious enemy you and your friends have had; and has become quite an arsenal man †—*faute d'autre appui.* I must now conclude. Adieu, and may we soon see better times is the fervent sincerest wish

"Of your friend

"HOWARD DE WALDEN."

The reader of this biography, if unacquainted with Portuguese legislation, may wonder what were the essential differences between the Constitution of 1822 and the Charter of 1826 which caused the liberal party—so shortly after the overthrow of despotism—to fly to arms in support of one or the other; and which determined such men as Saldanha, Terceira, Palmella, Mousinho, and others, to quit their country, and submit to manifold privations abroad, rather than sanction, by their presence, a Government whose principles they could not approve.

* M. Bois le Comte—the then French minister at Lisbon.

† The arsenal battalions of national guards were the supporters or promoters of all revolutionary measures of an ultra-liberal description.

They had successfully fought for the establishment of those monarchical principles on which they considered that all good and prosperous government must be based. The framers of the Charter of 1826 had prepared it after a study of the British Constitution; and they fondly imagined that such a Constitution would at once take root in Portuguese soil, and afford liberty, happiness, and prosperity to the nation. Their adversaries, on the other hand, formed their principles on shallow theories of the "rights of man"; and (though often well-meaning and sometimes honest) drew their inspirations from the theories of the regicides of the first French revolution. The Chartists insisted upon a sovereign endowed with ample powers; an hereditary House of Peers; and a Chamber of Deputies, the members of which should possess certain property qualifications. The Constitutionalists, on their part, asserted that too much power placed in the hands of the "Chief of the Executive" would lead to despotism: that a House of Peers was inconsistent with the equal rights of the people, from whom, as they constantly declare, all authority emanates.

Without entering at further length into the differences which existed between the Charter and the Constitution, the reader will, we trust, acknowledge that Saldanha and his companions had valid reasons for asserting, both now and afterwards, that the ultimate object of the framers of the Constitution of 1822, and of its present supporters, was to expel the queen from the throne, and to establish a republic in Portugal.

One article of the constitutional code completely nullified the sovereign's right to place his *veto* on any proposed law. According to the Constitution, the king, when a law was presented to him by the Chamber, must either sanction it within one month, or return it to the Chamber (after consulting the Council of State) with the reasons for his refusal, or for wishing it to be amended. If the Chamber did not think them valid, the law was passed without the royal signature. Under the Charter, the right of *veto* was absolute. The Council of State, under the Constitution, held most of the prerogatives of royalty. It consisted of thirteen members selected by the sovereign from

lists furnished him by the Chamber. These counsellors held their places for four years, during which they had the right of recommending to the Crown the persons they considered qualified for various administrative and ecclesiastical appointments.

Under the Charter, the Council of State consists of a certain number of life members named by the Crown; and their position was simply that of advisers whenever the sovereign thought fit to ask their counsel.

Immediately after the restoration of peace, the Cortes met (in October) for the purpose of discussing and forming a new Constitution.

We need not accompany the Chamber of Deputies in their labours to form a Constitution. It was in course of time completed. But whilst engaged in these curious theories of government—"the sure symptom of an ill-conducted State"—even the official Gazette itself indulges in complaints of the condition of the finances; of the administration of justice; of the state of the army, etc., etc. Similar assertions are continued, by opposition journals, to the present day; and, if true, either the country has made no improvement in its government, or bad indeed must have been its condition in 1837.

On the 12th of October, by an order emanating from the War Office, the names of the Duke da Terceira, the Marquis de Saldanha, Baron da Fonte Nova, and many other generals, colonels, and officers were removed from the Army List, in consequence of their refusal to take the oath to the Constitution of 1822.

During the deliberations which took place in the Cortes for the formation of a new Constitution, the turbulent national battalions which had brought the ministers into power were dissatisfied with every appearance of concessions made to the chartist party; and thoughtful men anticipated serious outbreaks. On the 9th of March (1838) disturbances occurred amongst the arsenal battalions; and, they assumed, on the 13th, a more serious appearance, when several lives were sacrificed. Other riots took place at subsequent periods to which we need not particularly refer.

The labours of the Legislature being completed, the queen, on the 4th of April, took the oath to the new Constitution, and dissolved the Cortes. On the same day, the amnesty promised in the speech from the throne appeared in the official Gazette. It ran thus:

"Every political event which has taken place since the 10th of September, 1836, shall remain in perpetual oblivion and absolute silence. All pending proceedings resulting from the same shall be considered as null and void. All such persons, who, in consequence of those events are out of Portugal, may return to their country. Such military men, as took part in the said events, shall be restored to actual service after they have taken the oath to the Constitution of 1838. This amnesty does not include the restoration to civil employments."

On the 18th of July, a decree was issued which determined that the next elections for a new parliament should take place on the 12th of August. The Cortes did not, however, assemble until the 9th of December.

Saldanha, with his family, continued at Paris, where he devoted much of his time to the theory of agriculture. But much as he longed to return to his country and to his quiet home at Penha Longa, and put his studies into practice, he would neither accept the amnesty nor take the oath to the new Constitution. His means were very limited; and, at one time, he had seriously thought of offering his services to the Emperor of Brazil. Offers most advantageous, in a pecuniary sense, were made to him by the Pacha of Egypt, if he would take the command in chief of the Egyptian army. This being known in Lisbon, the king consort, D. Fernando, immediately ordered his secretary, M. Dietz, to write a strong letter to the marshal, remonstrating against his acceptance of such a proposal.

Lord Howard felt assured that the struggle for power would recommence when the Cortes met; and it was from a similar conviction, that the Viscount de Sá and his colleagues desired to defer the meeting as long as possible. The British minister, on his arrival at Lisbon, again wrote to Saldanha (October 12th), and, in the avowal that the "anarchists have now almost *champ libre*," fully confirms the just motives for which so many dis-

tinguished Portuguese had disapproved of, and fought against the September Revolution and its supporters.

"I was in hopes to have experienced the great satisfaction of meeting you again soon in your own country; and I have been very much disappointed at learning your decision on this subject. With the determination you have come to—I think most wisely—of not taking, *as a party man*, an *active* share in politics, I am satisfied your opinions would not fail to produce a most beneficial influence on those who do; and among whom are many who are only jealous of you as a RIVAL for PLACE and POWER—while your presence would operate as a check upon the anarchists, who have now almost *champ libre*. I now speak as a friend with reference to yourself and your *own* interests, as connected with those of your country,—as I take quite the same view as you do as to any portion of gratitude, etc. to *any one*, after having been so ill treated and recklessly abandoned as you have."

The following letter was addressed by Marshal Saldanha to a friend, in November 1838:—

"ILL^MO S^R,

"I to-day had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd ult., and can assure you that, knowing so well the interest you have taken in my private affairs, it was impossible that I could attribute the cessation of our correspondence to any rupture of the friendly sentiments for which I am indebted to you, and which I reciprocate.

"Sad and melancholy is the picture you draw of the state of our unhappy country; but, far from considering it exaggerated, I believe that its internal state is much worse than you represent. The remarks made by the good counsellor, Dietz, to you, about me, are most grateful to my feelings; and I can assure him that if, in his kindness, he has too highly valued my importance, he has only done justice to my sentiments; for I will give place to no one in the desire to be useful to my country, to well and faithfully serve the queen, and to show to the king the sincere affection I have always felt for him since I first knew him; and more especially since the moment when, on

the 4th of November, 1836, I saw him jump on horseback, and, sword in hand, place himself at the head of those who were rushing to recapture a piece of artillery which they were trying to drag off to Campo d'Ourique.

"The situation in which I am placed is extremely delicate. Senator for various districts, it is my duty to be present at the meeting of Parliament; but, owing to the peculiar situation the events of 1837 have placed me in, would it be useful to the service of her Majesty and to the country, that I should return before the ministerial crisis, which must follow the meeting of Parliament, has taken place? The case is very doubtful; but I am inclined to believe that it would be more convenient to put off my return until that moment. The opposition which, from the nature of affairs, must arise in the Chamber of Senators, and in the Chamber of Deputies, and which must infallibly bring about the fall of the ministry, will, (instead of being the result of the elections, the imbecility of the ministers, and their connivance with the Democratic party), if I am in Lisbon, be attributed to my intrigues, my desire to be revenged upon Sá da Bandeira and Bomfim, and to my obstinacy in wishing to restore the Charter. And would not the advantages which ought to result from the crisis be considerably lessened, if it can be looked upon as the result of private intrigue, instead of having arisen from public necessity?

"In the terrible and memorable political crisis through which our country has passed since 1820, I have given so many and such oft repeated proofs of disinterested devotion to the public cause, that I flatter myself that even my enemies will do me the justice to believe, that I never hesitate for a moment, let the sacrifice required of me be what it may, when once I feel convinced, that some utility can arise from it; and it is not, certainly, from any private consideration that I incline to my present mode of looking at the question. The result of my reflections in this respect is at variance with the sincere desire I feel to follow out Dietz's suggestion; but I believe, that I am doing a greater service to their Majesties by continuing here a short time longer. I will, however, turn the matter over in my mind; and, if I can persuade myself,

that my going immediately will be of any utility, you may be certain that no consideration will make me delay my departure.

"SALDANHA."

By the new Constitution of 1838, the country had again accepted two Chambers to compose the Cortes,—a senate and a house of deputies,—both of which, it was decided, should be elective.

When the elections took place for the Cortes, which were to meet in November, Saldanha was chosen senator for several of the 24 districts in which the kingdom was now divided—such as those of Madeira, Coimbra, Santarem, and others.

The ministry of Viscount Sá, which had come into office on the 10th of August, 1837, remained under his presidency, until the 18th of April, 1839, but with some fourteen changes in the various departments, during those twenty months. The Sá ministry then went out; and now, the queen had to undergo the humiliation of seeing the most bitter enemy of her father, Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro, Baron da Ribeira de Sabrosa, at the head of her Government! He was not only president of the ministry, but he held the portfolios of War and Foreign Affairs during the whole period of his administration; and that of Marine and Colonies during the greater part of it. No Portuguese statesman could be more objectionable to Lord Howard, and to the British Government, than was the Baron: and his foreign policy was such, as to create, ere long, very serious differences be tween the two countries. His advent to power was also not likely to impress Saldanha with a favourable idea of the stability of the new institutions; even when he saw that the voice of the country, by two general elections, seemed to approve of them. Still Saldanha had, at last, accepted the new Constitution, and had taken the oath to it at the Portuguese Legation in Paris. But, being called upon to take his seat in the senate, he refused, feeling assured that the position he was in would only allow him to serve the Government in his military capacity.

Saldanha remained in Paris until the middle of the year 1839.

While there, he was elected a member of the "Société Géologique de France." Geology had long been a favourite study with the marshal; and it led him to collect the materials for a work on the concordance of that science with the Book of Genesis, part of which he afterwards published. In July, 1839, the author had the pleasure of seeing the marshal and his family in London on their way to Lisbon. The excellent marshal was as sanguine as ever with respect to his agricultural projects; and, while at Paris, had purchased the necessary machinery (having made himself acquainted with its use) for making artificial champagne on his estate in Portugal. Alas! such plans were never carried into execution. His expenses at Paris had obliged him to heavily mortgage his estate at Penha Longa, to which he never returned. The marshal, with his family, reached Lisbon, in July; and, shortly afterwards, proceeded to spend the remainder of the summer quietly at his house in Cintra.

END OF VOL. I.

BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO., PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.

00023050

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018